of the Lord. They call their message, the word of GOD, and Christ has set his seal to the plenary inspiration of all the Scriptures of the Old Testament. The apostles and evangelists, in the most explicit manner, declare the same truth.

Besides, Christ promised plenary inspiration to his disciples; and they professed to be under the guidance of the Spirit, in what they wrote.

And, finally, while some of the apostles were living, their writings were classed with the divine Scriptures ; and were universally received as inspired, and as the infallible word of God, by the whole primitive Church.

We cannot but conclude, therefore, that all the books of the Old and New Testament, were written by the inspiration of God; and contain an infallible rule, to guide the faith and practice of the church, to the end of the world.

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NOTES.

NOTE Α.

AN APPENDIX TO CHAPTER VI.

On the Proof of Miracles by Testimony.

In a recent popular, but anonymous publication, entitled, “Essays ON THE PunsuiT OF TRUTH, ON THE PROGRESS OF KNOWLEDGE, AND THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF ALL Evidence AND EXPECTATION, BY THE AUTHOR of Essays on the Formation and Publication of Opinions,” the doctrine of Hume, on the subject of testimony, has been exhibited in a form somewhat new and imposing, And as this writer has acquired considerable celebrity in England, and his Essays have been republished in Philadelphia, and recommended strongly to the public, upon the authority of the WestminSTER Review, it seems necessary to guard the public against the insidious design of these Essays; which we have reason to thinks, was not known to those concerned in the republication of the work in this country. Indeed, the ingenious author, never brings the subject of divine revelation directly into view, in all that he has written; and I believe, the word "miracles" does not occur in either of the volumes which he has published: nevertheless, it is a fact, that in the last of his Essays, he has revived, in substance, the famous argument of Hume, on miracles; and has, with even more concealed sophistry; than that celebrated infidel employed, endeavored to prove that no testimony, however strong, is sufficient to establish any fact which involves a deviation from the regular course of the laws of Nature. But that I may not be suspected of

Inisrepresenting the sentiments of this discriminating and popular writer, I will here insert an extract, from the Essay before-mentioned, which contains the substance of the whole argument.

“ But it is only a small part of our knowledge of past events which we gather from physical evidence. By far the most important source of in ation of such events is the testimony of human beings; and it is a curious, interesting, and momentous inquiry, whether we proceed on the same principle when we avail ourselves of this moral evidence to penetrate into the past, as when we make use of that which is of a purely physical character.

“ Testimony must be either oral or written. As far as the mere physical circumstances are concerned, we evidently commence our use of it by reasoning from effects to causes. We infer, for example, that the writing before us has been the work of some human being, in doing which we of course assume the uniformity of causation. If from the circumstances attending the testimony we infer that is entitled to be received as veracious; if for instance, we find that it has proceeded from a man of tried integrity, and who acted under the influence of motives which render it unlikely that he should deceive, our inference still proceeds on the assumption of the same principle. I may have in other cases found these circumstances to have been the precursors or causes of true testimony; but how can I or any one tell that they have operated in the same way in the instance before me? The reply must evidently be, that it is impossible to avoid assuming that the same causes have invariably the same effects.

“In fact, if we examine any of the rules which have been laid down for the reception of testimony, or any of those marks which have been pointed out as enabling us to judge of its credibility, we shall find them all involving the uniformity of causation. It is allowed on all hands, that the concurrence of a number of witnesses in the same assertion, their reputation for veracity, the fact of the testimony being against their own interest, the probability of detection in any false statements, are all circumstances enhancing the credibility of what they affirm. These are considered as general principles on the subject gathered from experience, and we apply them

instinctively to any new case which may be presented to us, either in the course of our own observation, or as having taken place at some former period. But it is obvious from what has just been said, that unless we assume a uniformity in the succession of causes and effects, we cannot transfer our experience from any one case to another. That certain circumstances have produced true testimony in one or a hundred instances, can be no reason why they should produce it in a different instance, unless we assume that the same causes have necessarily the same effects.

“ It is clearly shown by this reasoning, that in the reception of testimony and the use of physical evidence we proceed on the same principle. But in the case of testimony there is a peculiarity not belonging to physical evidence. In the former we not only have certain effects from which it is our task to infer the causes, or certain causes from which to infer the effects; as when we judge the writing before us to have been the work of some human being, or the testimony to be true on account of the circumstances under which it was given; but the testimony itself consists of the assertion of facts, and the pature of the facts asserted often forms part of the grounds on which the veracity of the testimony is determined; it frequently happens, that while external circumstances tend to confirm the testimony, the nature and circumstances of the facts attested render it highly improbable that any such facts should have taken place, and these two sets of circumstances may be so exactly equivalent as to leave the mind in irremediable doubt. In the consideration of both, however, the same assumption is iovolved. We think the facts improbable, because we have found them rarely occurring under the circumstances stated; we think the testimony likely to be true, because we have generally found true testimony to proceed from witnesses acting under the influence of similar motives, and what we have found to happen in other cases we are irresistibly led to conclude must also happen in the case before

us.

“The opposition of the circumstances of the evidence and the nature of the facts may be carried still further. Assertions are frequently made which in themselves imply a breach of the uniformity of causation. From such cases the conclusions

х

already established remove all difficulty. To weigh probabili. ties, to determine what credit is due to two sets of conflicting circumstances, neither of which as far as our knowledge ex

tends is irreconcilable to the usual course of nature, is often a - nice and arduous task; but if the principles of this essay are

correct, it is easy to see what reception onght to be given to assertions professedly implying a deviation from the uniform succession of causes and effects.

“ Suppose, for instance, any person to affirm that he bad exposed a cubic inch of ice to a temperature of 200 degress of Fahrenheit, and that at the expiration of an hour it had retained its solidity. Here is a sequence of events asserted which is entirely at variance with the admitted course of nature; and the slightest reflection is sufficient to show that to believe the assertion would involve a logical absurdity. The intrinsic discrepancy of the facts could never be overcome by any possible proofs of the truth of the testimony.

“For let us put the strongest case imaginable; let us suppose that the circumstance of the ice remaining uomelted, rests on the concurrent testimony of a great number of people, people too of reputation, science, and perspacity, who had no motive for false bood, who had discernment to perceive and honesty to tell the real truth, and whose interests would essentially suffer from any departure from veracity. Under such circumstances false testimony it may be alleged is impossible.

56 Now mark the principle on which this representation proceeds. Let us concede the positions, that what is attested by a great number of witnesses must inevitably be true,-that people of reputation and intelligence without any apparent motive for falsehood are invariably accurate in their testimony, and that they are above all, incapable of violating truth, when a want of veracity would be ruinous to their interests. Granting all this, I ask the objector, how he knows that these things are so; that men of this character and in these circumstances speak truth? He will reply that he has invariably found them to act in this manner: but why, because you found them to act in this manner in a few or even in many cases, within your own experience or in the experience of ages, do you conclude that they have acted so in all cases and in the case before us? The only answer is, that it is impossible not to