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The group of six neutral members of the Security Council had, in the meantime, initiated studies of the currency problem. Through Mr. Bramuglia, the following questions were directed to the four parties concerning the implementation of the August 30 directive:

1. Which organ is to exercise quadripartite control of the financial arrangements on behalf of the four occupying powers ?

2. What are to be the functions of the organ for quadripartite control?

3. Over what financial operations and in what areas should quadripartite control be exercised?

4. What should be the exact wording of the directive to be released for the implementation of quadripartite control?

5. How will control over trade between Berlin and the Western zones of Germany and third countries, including the issue of exportimport licenses, be exercised?

On November 26 Mr. Bramuglia made public the replies which he had received. The Soviet reply confined itself to generalities which did not go beyond or suggest means for carrying out the terms of the August 30 directive itself. That of the three Western Powers laid the greatest stress on the necessity of effective quadripartite control. They pointed out that they had stated their willingness to meet the Soviet insistence that the Soviet zone currency should be made the sole legal tender in all Berlin, but only on condition that the military governors could work out satisfactory arrangements to assure the provision of adequate currency and credit in all sectors of Berlin with effective quadripartite control over the practical implementation of such arrangements. They would not in any circumstances agree that the Soviet authorities should exercise sole and unrestricted control over the currency and finances of Berlin.

Developments in Berlin

In late November and early December 1948, developments in Berlin itself increased greatly the difficulties in the way of agreement on a uniform currency. Up to that time, the Soviet authorities in Berlin had, in various ways, increasingly isolated the Soviet sector from those occupied by the Western Powers. Their efforts, directed especially at splitting the city administration, were accelerated greatly in November and finally culminated in a complete split of the city government. This, coupled with similar measures in other fields, went far toward making impossible the development of any system of quadripartite currency control on which the Western Powers would be justified in relying.

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Under the temporary constitution for Berlin, approved by the Allied Coordinating Committee, the city officials who were elected in October 1946 were to hold office for two years. New elections were thus necessary in 1948, and duly elected German officials decided to hold these elections. The Soviet authorities, however, forbade the holding of elections in their sector, and the Communist-front parties throughout the city refused to participate. On November 30, 1948, a meeting of selected Communists and Communist-front organizations, held under the sponsorship of the Soviet authorities, purported to elect a new provisional government for all Berlin. This body, for which no legal basis exists, has been treated as the governmental authority of the Soviet sector and was undoubtedly brought into being as an excuse for the failure to permit participation of the Soviet sector in the elections of December 5 and as a rival government to that which would result from those elections.

The elections, which were held on December 5 despite Soviet and Communist-front opposition of every sort, registered so heavy a nonCommunist vote (86.2 percent) as to show a definite trend toward the non-Communist democratic parties.

The Representatives of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States brought these events to Mr. Bramuglia's attention on December 5, pointing out that the de facto political division of the city made the establishment of a unified currency extremely difficult and that the currency experts would need to take it into account. They made clear once more, however, their continued willingness to cooperate in seeking a solution of the currency problem.

Technical Committee on Currency and Trade

On November 30 Mr. Bramuglia made public a further step in his exploration of the currency problem. “In the exercise of his powers” as President of the Security Council he established a Technical Committee on Berlin Currency and Trade, consisting of experts named by the six noninvolved members of the Security Council. The Committee was directed to study and make recommendations to the President of the Council on the most equitable conditions, taking into account the August 30 directive as well as subsequent events, for agreement relating to the introduction, circulation, and continued use of a single currency for Berlin under adequate Four Power supervision, and regulations for the import and export trade of Berlin. The Secretary-General was invited to name an expert to work with the Committee. The Committee was authorized to consult with experts of the four occupying powers and was required to submit its report within 30 days. In promising cooperation with the neutral experts the Western Powers repeated their reservation to take such measures as may be necessary to maintain their position in Berlin, pointing out that they could not agree to be bound to submit to all Soviet measures which aggravate the Berlin situation, while the Soviets remained uncommitted to any restraint.


On September 28, 1948, the Representative of Mexico proposed to the General Assembly, in the course of a speech in the general debate, the adoption of a resolution appealing to the Great Powers to renew their efforts to compose their differences and establish a lasting peace. On October 21, in the Political and Security Committee, the Representative of the United States declared that the United States Delegation was in agreement with the principle which was at the basis of that draft, according to which the Great Powers must employ to constructive ends the power of initiative which their wartime effort had earned them. Theirs was not only a right, but a responsibility which they could not eschew. The United States Delegation hoped, however, that the Mexican draft would not be regarded as a technical resolution, as its intention was clearly to record the justified concern of all United Nations Members for the early conclusion of the peace treaties. Without objection to this interpretation, the Committee established a subcommittee, upon which the United States was represented, to consider the draft resolution together with amendments which had been submitted by the Delegations of France and the U.S.S.R., with a view to reaching an agreed text.

The subcommittee at its first meeting on the same day reached unanimous agreement on a text the operative provisions of which recalled the determination of Messrs. Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin, expressed at Yalta on February 11, 1945, to build in cooperation with other peace-loving nations a world order under law, dedicated to peace, security, and the general well-being of all mankind, which they acknowledged could be realized only with continuing and growing cooperation between their respective countries and among all peaceloving nations; endorsed these declarations and expressed the confidence of the General Assembly that the Great Powers would conform to their spirit; recommended that the Powers signatory to the Moscow agreements of December 24, 1945, and the Powers which subsequently acceded thereto, redouble their efforts to secure as promptly as possible a final settlement to the war; and recommended that these Powers associate with themselves the states which subscribed and adhered to the Washington declaration of January 1, 1942.

This text was unanimously approved by the Political and Security Committee on October 22 and was in like fashion unanimously approved by the General Assembly in plenary session on November 3, 1948. It stands as an expression of the disquiet felt by all Members of the United Nations over the continuing differences of opinion among the Great Powers with regard to the peace settlements and as an evidence of their belief that these settlements must be promptly concluded if the United Nations is to function with the fullest possible effectiveness.

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KASHMIR QUESTION On January 1, 1948, the Government of India brought a complaint before the Security Council charging the Government of Pakistan with having provided assistance to raiders who were attacking the State of Jammu and Kashmir, considered by India as a part of its territory. In a reply dated January 15, 1948, the Government of Pakistan denied the allegations and entered a series of countercharges.

Jammu and Kashmir is one of more than five hundred Princely States whose status was left undetermined at the time of the creation of the Dominions of India and Pakistan in August 1947. Shortly afterwards, fighting broke out in Kashmir for a variety of reasons between State forces on the one hand and raiding tribesmen and elements in rebellion against the Maharaja on the other. The Maharaja appealed to the Government of India for armed assistance, at the same time requesting the accession of the State to India. India accepted the accession of the State and dispatched troops to assist the State Government but stated that “as soon as law and order have been restored in Kashmir, and her soil cleared of the invader, the question of the State's accession should be settled by a reference to the people.”

In its discussion the Security Council sought to facilitate a solution rather than to assess blame. On January 20 it adopted a resolution establishing a three-member commission with instructions to proceed to India and Pakistan to exercise functions of good offices and investigation on the spot. Through informal consultations with representatives of the two Governments, initiated by the President, the Council then endeavored to draft proposals for settlement of the dispute acceptable to the parties. As a result the Security Council on April 21, 1948, adopted a resolution sponsored by the United States, Belgium, Canada, China, Colombia, and the United Kingdom providing for the restoration of peace and order and the holding of a plebiscite to determine the future status of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Also, the membership of the commission established in the resolution of January 20, but not yet constituted, was increased to five. Although both parties objected to parts of the resolution, they did not object to the dispatch of the commission which, as finally composed, consisted of representatives of Argentina, Belgium, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, and the United States. The United States was represented by J. Klahr Huddle, United States Ambassador to Burma.

Upon its arrival on the subcontinent the commission was informed by Pakistan that Pakistan troops had in May been introduced into the State of Jammu and Kashmir. This action, the Prime Minister explained, had been made necessary by an Indian offensive launched the previous month. In New Delhi, the Government of India insisted that the Pakistan troops be withdrawn before any further discussions were undertaken as to the final solution of the problem. On its part, the Government of Pakistan maintained that it could withdraw its troops only if the troops of India were likewise withdrawn and assurances given that a fair plebiscite to determine the future of the State would be held.

After a careful consideration the commission on August 13, 1948, presented, for acceptance by the two Governments, a three-part resolution which provided for a cease-fire, a truce agreement, including the withdrawal from the State of Jammu and Kashmir of Pakistan troops, tribesmen, intruding Pakistan nationals, and the bulk of the Indian army, and a reaffirmation of the wish of the two Governments that the future status of this State be determined in accordance with the will of the people.

Following an exchange of correspondence concerning the interpretation of various provisions of the resolution, the Government of India on August 25 accepted the resolution as a whole. The Government of Pakistan on September 6 accepted the resolution subject to the con

6 dition that interpretations given by the commission to each Government were acceptable to the other Government and also that the Government of India agree to those provisions in the April 21 resolution of the Security Council relating to the holding of a plebiscite. These conditions were believed by the commission to go beyond the compass of its resolution, and, in view of the position of the Government of India that it could not enter upon further discussions until the Gov- · ernment of Pakistan had unconditionally accepted the resolution, the commission returned to Geneva, Switzerland, and prepared an interim report to the Security Council.

On November 8 the commission transferred its activities from Geneva to Paris and began informal discussions with representatives of India and Pakistan on the possibility of elaborating proposals for the holding of a plebiscite in the State of Jammu and Kashmir.

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