all those who were citizens of the original states became, upon the formation of the Union, citizens of the United States, and that upon the admission of Nebraska into the Union "upon an equal footing with the original states, in all respects whatsoever," the citizens of what had been the territory became citizens of the United States and of the state. The court concluded: "We are of opinion. that James E. Boyd is entitled to claim that, if his father did not complete his naturalization before his son had attained majority, the son can not be held to have lost the inchoate status he had acquired by the declaration of intention, and to have elected to become the subject of a foreign power, but, on the contrary, that the oaths he took and his action as a citizen entitled him to insist upon the benefit of his father's act, and placed him in the same category as his father would have occupied if he had emigrated to the territory of Nebraska; that, in short, he was within the intent and meaning, effect and operation of the acts of Congress in relation to citizens of the territory, and was made a citizen of the United States and of the State of Nebraska under the organic and enabling acts and the act of admission." Id.

In the somewhat similar case of Trabing v. United States, 32 Ct. Cl. 440, the court said that the status which a minor acquires by the declaration of intention of his parents is only an inchoate status. "If he attains his majority," said the court, "before his father completes his naturalization, he has an election to repudiate the status and determine whether he will render allegiance to the United States or to the foreign potentate or power of the country where he was born." In that case there was nothing to evidence the election of American citizenship by the claimant upon attaining his majority. He did not vote, but remained in his status until the year 1892 (when he was fifty years of age), when he applied for naturalization and obtained a decree. "If he had

voted and held office [said the court], and performed all the duties of citizenship in the active and unequivocal manner of the respondent in Boyd v. Nebraska, there would be good reason to say, as his counsel says, that obtaining naturalization in 1892 was for the purpose of obtaining some precise evidence of naturalization so that his status as a citizen could not be questioned. But, taken with the negative facts of this case-the facts that he was not born a citizen of the United States, that his father was not a citizen of the United States, that his father is not shown to have become a citizen of the United States, that the claimant owed no natural allegiance to the United States, and that he apparently chose to remain a subject of a foreign power after attaining his majority-it must be held that this application for naturalization was the first manifestation of an intent to become a citizen, and that it negatives the presumption of an earlier election."

In the case of In re Di Simone, 108 Fed. 942, an Italian subject came to the United States, leaving a child in Italy with relatives. After taking out his first citizenship papers, the father sent for his child to join him. Upon arrival in the United States and examination by the immigration authorities it was found that she had trachoma, and an order for her deportation was issued. Application was made on her behalf to the circuit court for the district of Louisiana for a writ of habeas corpus, on the ground that she was illegally detained. In view of the fact that her father had made his declaration of intention, it was contended that the child, under the policy of our naturalization laws, was not an alien immigrant. The view was expressed that if the petitioner on coming here had found her father a naturalized citizen, she could not, under the policy of the law, have been treated as an alien immigrant so as to prohibit her from entering this country, however loathsome, dangerous or contagious a disease

her sore eyes might prove to be. The opinion was advanced that, under the policy of the naturalization laws, "alien residential citizens," though not naturalized, may possess an "inchoate status" of citizenship, which may vest such rights of citizenship in this petitioner on her arrival in the United States, as should forbid her deportation as an alien immigrant, even though she may be afflicted with a dangerous, contagious disease. The court said that the petitioner, although an alien, may not be "an alien immigrant" under the statute. The court stated that the facts involved "grave questions of both domestic and international law, which have not since the organization of the national courts been free therein from plaguing difficulties-that is, as to whether the petitioner, notwithstanding the 'inchoate status' of the father's citizenship, on her coming to this port, is an alien immigrant."

There was no evidence introduced by the immigration authorities in this case in support of their view that the petitioner was an alien immigrant or that she had a "loathsome or dangerous contagious disease." There were certain unverified papers pinned to the answer of the immigration authorities, called "annexes," but it was ⚫ held that these were not competent as evidence in a court authorizing the deportation of the petitioner, and the court expressed the view that she should be set at liberty to join and live with her parents, who were "residential citizens" of New Orleans.

In United States ex rel. Abdoo v. Williams, 132 Fed. 894, the facts were that John Abdoo, a native Syrian, came to the United States and prior to July, 1904, took out his first papers. On July 31, 1904, his two children, aged 8 and 14, arrived at the port of New York. Upon examination it was found that they both had trachoma, and they were excluded from admission. On August 10, 1904, Abdoo took out his final papers and applied to

the immigration authorities for a rehearing, which was granted. The result of the hearing was to confirm the view reached as to the older child, but on the ground that it did not satisfactorily appear from the evidence that she was Abdoo's daughter. As to the younger daughter, although the board who passed upon the matter was satisfied that she had a contagious disease, a majority apparently supposed that her father's naturalization had changed her status, and voted to admit her. The third member of the board appealed to the Department of Commerce and Labor, and that Department held that both children were aliens and should be excluded.

The court held that the naturalization of the father did not change the status of the children. Said the court: "They were born out of the limits and jurisdiction of the United States, their father at the time of their respective births not being a citizen thereof; therefore, under R. S. 1993 they were born aliens. They were aliens when they arrived here on July 31, 1904. The effect of their father's naturalization has been carefully restricted by Congress. The relevant parts of R. S. 2172 are, 'the children of persons who have been duly naturalized under any law of the United States, . . . . being under the age of twenty-one years at the time of naturalization of their parents, shall, if dwelling in the United States, be considered as citizens thereof.' It has been repeatedly held that the mere being at Ellis Island in the custody of the immigration authorities is not a landing within the meaning of any provision of the Revised Statutes, and that no landing has been effected until the immigrant has been passed by the authorities at Ellis Island. In re Palagano, 38 Fed. 580; Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U. S. 651; In re Gayde (C. C.), 113 Fed. 588. Therefore these children were not 'dwelling in the United States' when their father was

naturalized, and his act did not require the authorities to consider them as citizens. Being aliens, and indisputably immigrants, the provisions of the exclusion acts apply, and it being properly determined that they are within one of the excluded classes, the respondent has jurisdiction to hold them for deportation. The relator relies on In re Di Simone, 108 Fed. 942. In that case the court held that a minor child 'coming to join her father and finding him a naturalized citizen, could not, under the policy of the law, have been treated as an alien immigrant, so as to prevent her from entering, however loathsome, contagious and dangerous a disease her sore eyes might have proven to be.' And it applied the same rule when the parent had only taken out first papers. Although the opinion cited is a careful and elaborate one, it is unpersuasive to the conclusion that plain, positive, and unambiguous provisions of statute should be disregarded, as they necessarily must be, to reach the result contended for. The subjects of naturalization and its results and of immigration and its restrictions rest wholly with Congress, and the policy of the law is what that branch of the government chooses to make it. If the law which it enacts works hardship, application should be made to amend it. Judicial legislation under the guise of a construction of unambiguous words is an imperfect remedy, and one which courtscertainly courts of first instance-should be slow to adopt. But in cases like the one at bar, there is no injustice in the legislation. Upon this subject Congress has expressly provided for just such a case as this. As to aliens generally, it is provided (Sec. 19, Act Mar. 3, 1903, 32 Stat. at L. 1218), that 'no alien suffering from a loathsome or with a dangerous contagious disease other than one of a quarantinable nature shall be permitted to land for medical treatment in the hospitals of the United States.' But in the 37th Section of the same act (32