they were neither to continue Mexican citizens, nor become citizens of the United States, a whole people would become disfranchised. They would have no status as citizens, owe no allegiance, and be left in the anomalous position of a people without a country. Not so with the defendant Forbes. So soon as he had been released from the voluntary allegiance to Mexico, he was remitted to his original status. No power existed in one government to transfer, or in the other to receive, the voluntary or statutory allegiance of a naturalized citizen. Neither had the right to say to such, 'You shall continue your allegiance to Mexico, although she has conveyed it away; or you shall become a citizen of the United States.' The allegiance of the naturalized citizen is the offspring of municipal law. Unlike natural allegiance, its support does not rest upon the law of nature and the code of nations. The only relations that Mexico or the United States could change were those arising from those. sources. Nor does the language of the treaty authorize the conclusion that the contracting parties intended to include within the word 'Mexicans' naturalized citizens of foreign countries. In the 8th article of the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, Mexicans are only mentioned as entitled to the rights of election. The whole of this article refers to Mexicans; and the 9th article speaks of 'Mexicans' only, and provides that those who do not preserve the character of Mexican citizens shall be subsequently incorporated into and become entitled to all the rights of citizens of the United States. Naturalized citizens are nowhere included, eo nomine, within the provisions of the treaty, and, in the opinion. of the court, it was not intended to include them. This construction of the treaty is sought to be defeated by the assumption that the change in the political relations of the inhabitants of the ceded territory was contemplated

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to be made by the treaty with their consent by giving to them the right of election; hence, that it is to be reasonably concluded that naturalized citizens were intended to be included in the term 'Mexicans.' The answer is, first, it is a violence to the language of the treaty so to construe it; secondly, the allegiance of the naturalized citizen was not a subject of transfer between the contracting parties; and thirdly, the argument surrenders the whole question, because if the defendant was included in the treaty, his consent was essential to entitle him to exercise the right of election. But, in the opinion of the court, the election was given only to Mexicans who remained in the ceded territory longer than one year after the date of the treaty, who were during that interval to elect to retain Mexican rights or be considered citizens of the United States. Both governments had the right so to negotiate in regard to Mexicans; but in relation to the defendant, Forbes, a naturalized citizen, his voluntary allegiance might be released by Mexico-not transferred. On his release he was remitted to his original status of a British subject, derived from his birth, and the courts know no principle of law which would authorize the Government of the United States to compel the transfer of the defendant's voluntary allegiance from Mexico to themselves. The contracting parties did not intend to do so. The court considering the defendant without the provisions of the treaty, his claim to be a citizen of the United States under them can not be sustained; and he stood at the execution of the treaty, and now stands, where his acts and declarations and original status have placed himan alien, and subject of Great Britain."

A subject of a foreign state, residing in the State of Texas at the time of its admission to the Union, did not thereby become a citizen of the United States. Coutzen v. United States, 33 Ct. Cl. 475.

A person born in Texas, and removing therefrom before the separation from Mexico, remains a citizen of Mexico, though a minor when the separation took place. Jones v. McMasters, 20 How. 8, 15 L. ed. 805.

In the case of Masson v. Mexico (American and Mexican Claims Commission, Convention of 1868, 15 Stat. at L. 679), claimant stated that he emigrated from France to the Republic of Texas in 1844, and continued to reside there until the annexation of that republic to the United States and its incorporation into the Union. He asserted that he thereby became a citizen of the United States. The umpire held that, to have become a citizen of the United States by virtue of the annexation of Texas, the claimant must have first been a citizen of the Republic of Texas, and, as it was not found that he went through the forms required to acquire that citizenship, his claim to American citizenship was not established. 3 Moore, International Arbitrations, 2542, 2543.

f. Treaty of December 30, 1853, with Mexico (Gadsden Treaty).

Article 5 of the Gadsden treaty, signed December 30, 1853 (10 Stat. at L. 1031), declared that the provisions of article 8 of the treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo (9 Stat. at L. 922) relative to the inhabitants of the ceded territory should apply to the territory ceded by the Gadsden treaty. The Mexican inhabitants of the territory referred to (Arizona) who adhered to and remained in the United States thereby became citizens of the United States.

g. Treaty of 1867 with Russia.

The treaty of 1867 with Russia, ceding Alaska to the United States, gave the inhabitants of the ceded territory the privilege of reserving their Russian allegiance and returning to Russia within three years. It was provided that those remaining there (with the exception of

uncivilized native tribes) should be admitted to the enjoyment of all the rights, advantages, and immunities of citizens of the United States.

The treaty provision (art. 3) reads as follows: "The inhabitants of the ceded territory, according to their choice, reserving their natural allegiance, may return to Russia within three years; but, if they should prefer to remain in the ceded territory, they, with the exception of uncivilized native tribes, shall be admitted to the enjoyment of all the rights, advantages, and immunities. of citizens of the United States, and shall be maintained and protected in the free enjoyment of their liberty, property, and religion. The uncivilized tribes will be subject to such laws and regulations as the United States may from time to time adopt in regard to aboriginal tribes of that country." 15 Stat. at L. 542. See Rasmussen v. U. S., 197 U. S. 516.*

*The following report from Moore's International Arbitrations of an interesting case which came before a claims commission to which the United States was a party, is given:

Henriette Levy, widow of Jacob Levy, and a native of Alsace, filed, in her own right, and as tutrix of her six minor children, a memorial before the commission under the treaty between the United States and France of January 15, 1880 (21 Stat at L. 673), for damages for the seizure of cotton by the United States forces in Louisiana in 1863. The cotton in question belonged to the firm of Isaac Levy & Co., then doing business in Louisiana. This firm was composed of Jacob Levy and Isaac Levy, citizens of France, and Marx Levy and Benjamin Weil, citizens of the United States. In 1866 Jacob Levy purchased the interests of Marx Levy and Benjamin Weil in the property and assets of the firm, and subsequently removed to Strasburg, in Alsace, then in the jurisdiction of France, where he died March 1, 1871. The memorial filed by Henriette Levy embraced both the original and the acquired interest of Jacob Levy in the property and assets of the firm.

On this state of facts counsel for the United States demurred to the memorial, on the following grounds: "1. As to the whole case: That it appears that the claimant and her children, about the year 1871, became citizens or subjects of Germany, and have ever since remained and are now such citizens or subjects, and have not since that year been citizens of the Republic of France, and that this claim is, therefore, not presented by or on behalf of the citizens of that Republic. 2. As to the

h. Treaty of 1898, with Spain.

The treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898 (30 Stat. at L. 1754), which terminated the late war between the United States and Spain and by which Spain ceded Porto Rico and the Philippine Islands to the United States, provided (art. 9) that Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, residing in the territory ceded, might preserve interest alleged to have been assigned by Benjamin Weil: That as it appears that said Weil was at the time of the acts complained of a citizen of the United States, the claim is not one arising out of acts committed against the persons or property of citizens of France."

In support of so much of the demurrer as related to the claim derived from Benjamin Weil, counsel for the United States referred to the case of Archbishop Perché.

In support of the demurrer to the whole case counsel for the United States invoked the treaty of Frankfort of May 10, 1871, by which Alsace was ceded to Germany. By article 2 of this treaty it was provided that French subjects, born in the ceded territory and actually domiciled therein, who desired to preserve their French nationality, should be allowed till October 1, 1872, to declare their intention to do so, before competent authority, and to remove their domicil to France.

As there was no allegation in the memorial that Henriette Levy had availed herself of this privilege, counsel for the United States maintained that it was a reasonable presumption that she had omitted to do so, and had in consequence become a German subject. Counsel cited in this relation the case of Archbishop Perché, and moved that the memorialist be required to amend her memorial and state whether she had availed herself of the privilege secured by article 2 of the treaty of Frankfort. He further moved that in default of such a statement the case be dismissed.

Special counsel for the memorialist contended (1) that the case was not analogous to that of Archbishop Perché, since in that case the claimant had voluntarily renounced his allegiance to France and become a citizen of the United States; while Jacob Levy, the husband of Henriette Levy, was born in France, lived in France, and died a citizen of France; and (2) that as Jacob Levy was a citizen of France when the loss was sustained and continued to be a citizen of France during his life, the claim was by a citizen of France, and that the commission should take and maintain jurisdiction. In support of this position the 1st, 2d, and 4th articles of the treaty were quoted. The attention of the commission was also called to the 7th article of the treaty of February 23, 1853 (10 Stat. at L. 996), between France and the United States, in which it is provided that: "Frenchmen shall enjoy the right of possessing personal and real property by the same title and in the same manner as the citizens of the United States. They shall be free to dispose of it as they may please,