acquisition, any further than may be necessary to distinguish the character of certain rights of property which are the peculiar objects of international jurisprudence.

"In American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 1 Pet. 511 [7 L. ed. 242], the general doctrine was thus summarized in the opinion delivered by Mr. Chief Justice Marshall, page 542 [L. ed. 255]: 'If it (conquered territory) be ceded by the treaty, the acquisition is confirmed, and the ceded territory becomes a part of the nation to which it is annexed, either on the terms stipulated in the treaty of cession or on such as its new master shall impose.'

"When our forefathers threw off their allegiance to Great Britain and established a republican government, assuredly they deemed that the nation which they called into being was endowed with those general powers to acquire territory which all independent governments in virtue of their sovereignty enjoyed. This is demonstrated by the concluding paragraph of the Declaration of Independence, which reads as follows: 'As free and independent states, they [the United States of America] have full power to levy war, conclude peace, contract alliances, establish commerce, and to do all other acts and things which independent states may of right do.'

"That under the Confederation it was considered that the government of the United States had authority to acquire territory like any other sovereignty is clearly established by the 11th of the Articles of Confederation.

"The decisions of this court leave no room for question that, under the Constitution, the government of the United States, in virtue of its sovereignty, supreme within the sphere of its delegated power, has the full right to acquire territory enjoyed by every other sovereign nation.

"In American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 1 Pet. 511 [7 L. ed. 242], the court, by Mr. Chief Justice Marshall, said

page 542 [L. ed. 255]: 'The Constitution confers absolutely on the government of the Union the powers of making war and of making treaties; consequently, that government possesses the power of acquiring territory, either by conquest or by treaty.'

.

"In United States v. Huckabee (1872), 16 Wall. 414 [21 L. ed. 457], the court, speaking through Mr. Justice Clifford, said, page 434 [L. ed. 464]: 'Power to acquire territory either by conquest or treaty is vested by the Constitution in the United States. Conquered territory, however, is usually held as a mere military occupation until the fate of the nation from which it is conquered is determined; but if the nation is entirely subdued, or in case it be destroyed and ceases to exist, the right of occupation becomes permanent, and the title vests absolutely in the conqueror. Complete conquest, by whatever mode it may be perfected, carries with it all the rights of the former government; or, in other words, the conqueror, by the completion of his conquest, becomes the absolute owner of the property conquered from the enemy nation or state. His rights are no longer limited to mere occupation of what he has taken into his actual possession, but they extend to all the property and rights of the conquered state, including even debts as well as personal and real property. Halleck, International Law, 839; Elphinstone v. Bedreechund, 1 Knapp P. C. C. 329; Vattel, 365; 3 Phillimore, International Law, 505.'"

For a further quotation from the opinion of the court in this case see pp. 295 et seq, post.

C. Treaties of Cession to which United States has been a Party.

a. In General.

Every treaty of cession to which the United States has been a party, with the exception of the treaty of peace of 1898 (30 Stat. at L. 1754), with Spain, ceding Porto

Rico and the Philippine Islands to the United States, contains a stipulation providing that the inhabitants of the territory ceded may, in whole or in part, become citizens of the United States, either immediately or under certain conditions.

The treaty with Russia for the cession of Alaska (15 Stat. at L. 542) excepted "uncivilized native tribes" from the privilege of admission to citizenship.

The pertinent provisions of these several treaties are set out below, together with concrete cases in which they have been construed by the courts or international claims commissions.

b. Treaty of 1794 with Great Britain.

Under the 2d article of the treaty of 1794 (8 Stat. at L. 116), between the United States and Great Britain, British subjects who resided at Detroit before and at the time of the evacuation of the territory of Michigan, and who continued to reside there afterwards without at any time prior to the expiration of one year from such evacuation declaring their intention of remaining British subjects, became, ipso facto, to all intents and purposes American citizens. Crane v. Reeder, 25 Mich. 303.

c. Treaty of 1803 with France.

By Article 3 of the Treaty of Paris of 1803 (8 Stat. at L. 200), ceding Louisiana to the United States, it was provided that "the inhabitants of the ceded territory shall be incorporated in the Union of the United States, and admitted as soon as possible according to the principles of the Federal Constitution, to the enjoyment of all the rights, advantages, and immunities of citizens of the United States."

1. Case of Egle Aubry.

Egle Aubry, a person of color, presented to the commission under the convention between the United States and France of January 15, 1880 (21 Stat. at L. 673), a

memorial in which, in the character of a citizen of France, she claimed damages from the United States for the occupation of buildings by General Grover in the parish of St. Tammany, Louisiana, in February, 1864. In this memorial it was set forth, as the ground of the claimant's French citizenship, that she was born in the territory of Orleans, January 3, 1803, while that territory was a French colony.

Counsel for the United States demurred on the ground that, as the claimant was an inhabitant of the territory in question when it was ceded by France to the United States by the treaty of April 30, 1803 (8 Stat. at L. 200), she thereby became a citizen of the United States, inasmuch as the treaty of cession transferred to the United . States full and complete jurisdiction over the inhabitants resident upon the territory without any reservation whatever on the part of the French government. In support of this position, counsel cited Wheaton's International Law, 6th ed., 627, where, in treating of "collective naturalization," the author mentions the convention of April 30, 1803.

Counsel for the memorialist relied upon the third article of the treaty, which is in these words: "The inhabitants of the ceded territory shall be incorporated in the Union of the United States, and admitted as soon as possible, according to the principles of the Federal Constitution, to the enjoyment of all the rights, advantages, and immunities of citizens of the United States, and in the meantime they shall be maintained and protected in the free enjoyment of their liberty, property, and the religion which they profess."

As memorialist was a person of color, whose citizenship was not recognized by the United States till the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, her counsel contended that she had not, at the time her claim arose, enjoyed the advantages and immunities of a citizen of

the United States, but that she remained a citizen of France, and as such was entitled to be "maintained and protected" in the "free enjoyment" of her "liberty, property, and religion." In support of this position he cited the case of one Decuir, whose father, a free negro, was an inhabitant of the territory of Louisiana when it was ceded to the United States. The son, having been impressed into the Confederate service, was discharged by the superior court of Alexandria on a writ of habeas corpus upon the ground that he was not a citizen of Louisiana, and, consequently, that he was protected as a French subject under the third article of the treaty of 1803.

Upon the issues thus presented, the demurrer was sustained by the following decision of the Commission: "The claimant, Egle Aubry, a colored woman, was born on the 3d day of January, 1803, in the territory of Louisiana, then a French colony, and therefore was by birth a citizen of France. On the 30th day of April, 1803, the territory of Louisiana was, by treaty, ceded by France to the United States. The treaty 'cedes to the United States forever and in full sovereignty the territory, with all its rights and appurtenances, as fully and in the same manner as they have been acquired by the French Republic in virtue of the treaty with Spain.' Spain had ceded the territory to France in October, 1801, and the cession did not affect slavery, which then existed there. The treaty of cession contains no provision by which the inhabitants could remain, or by their option choose to remain, French citizens. On the contrary, the third article of the treaty obviously contemplates that they were to be American citizens. Article 3 of the treaty is as follows: [Here follows the article as above quoted.] There is nothing in the treaty, therefore, to indicate that it was the intention, either of France, or of the United States, that the inhabitants, or any of them, were