equal proportion of national taxes, even although the consequence would be to entail ruin on the discovered territory, and to inflict grave detriment on the United States, to arise both from the dislocation of its fiscal system and the immediate bestowal of citizenship on those absolutely unfit to receive it?

.

"The practice of the government has been otherwise. As early as 1856 Congress enacted the Guano Islands Act, which by Sec. 1 provided that when any citizen of the United States shall 'discover a deposit of guano on any island, rock, or key not within the lawful jurisdiction of any other government, and not occupied by the citizens of any other government, and shall take peaceable possession thereof, and occupy the same, said island, rock, or key may, at the discretion of the President of the United States, be considered as appertaining to the United States.' 11 Stat. at L. 119, Chap. 164; Rev. Stat., Sec. 5570 [U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, 3739]. Under the Act referred to, it was stated, in argument, that the government now holds and protects American citizens in the occupation of some seventy islands. The statute came under consideration in Jones v. United States, 137 U. S. 202 [34 L. ed. 691, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 80], where the question was whether or not the Act was valid, and it was decided that the Act was a lawful exercise of power, and that islands thus acquired were 'appurtenant' to the United States. The court, in the course of the opinion, speaking through Mr. Justice Gray, said, page 212 [L. ed. 695, Sup. Ct. Rep. 83]: 'By the law of nations, recognized by all civilized states, dominion of new territory may be acquired by discovery and occupation, as well as by cession or conquest; and when citizens or subjects of one nation, in its name and by its authority or with its assent, take and hold actual, continuous, and useful possession (although only for the purpose of carrying on a

particular business, such as catching and curing fish or working mines) of territory unoccupied by any other government or its citizens, the nation to which they belong may exercise such jurisdiction and for such period. as it sees fit over territory so acquired. This principle affords ample warrant for the legislation of Congress concerning guano islands.

.

"And these considerations concerning discovery are equally applicable to ownership resulting from conquest. A just war is declared, and in its prosecution the territory of the enemy is invaded and occupied. Would not the war, even if waged successfully, be fraught with danger if the effect of occupation was to necessarily incorporate an alien and hostile people into the United States? Take another illustration. Suppose at the termination of a war the hostile government had been overthrown, and the entire territory or a portion thereof was occupied by the United States, and there was no government to treat with or none willing to cede by treaty, and thus it became necessary for the United States to hold the conquered country for an indefinite period, or at least until such time as Congress deemed that it should be either released or retained because it was apt for incorporation into the United States. If holding was to have the effect which is now claimed for it, would not the exercise of judgment respecting the retention be so fraught with danger to the American people that it could not be safely exercised?

"Yet again. Suppose the United States, in consequence of outrages perpetrated upon its citizens, was obliged to move its armies or send its fleets to obtain redress, and it came to pass that an expensive war resulted and culminated in the occupation of a portion of the territory of the enemy, and that the retention of such territory-an event illustrated by examples in history-could alone enable the United States to recover the pecuniary loss it had suffered. And suppose, further,

that to do so would require occupation for an indefinite period, dependent upon whether or not payment was made of the required indemnity. It being true that incorporation must necessarily follow the retention of the territory, it would result that the United States must abandon all hope of recouping itself for the loss suffered by the unjust war, and hence the whole burden would be entailed upon the people of the United States. This would be a necessary consequence, because if the United States did not hold the territory as security for the needed indemnity it could not collect such indemnity, and, on the other hand, if incorporation must follow from holding the territory the uniformity provision of the Constitution would prevent the assessment of the cost of the war solely upon the newly acquired country. In this, as in the case of discovery, the traditions and practices of the government demonstrate the unsoundness of the contention."

"In Brown's case, 5 Court of Claims, 571, the facts were that claimant, a former subject of the Kingdom of Hanover, brought suit before the Court of Claims as a Prussian subject to recover the proceeds of the sale of his cotton seized by the authorities of this government during our civil war. Subsequently to the time when the claim arose and before the bringing of the suit, Hanover had been incorporated by conquest in the Kingdom of Prussia. The law gives the Court of Claims jurisdiction of claims against the United States of aliens, 'citizens, or subjects of any government which accords to citizens of the United States the right to prosecute claims against such governments in their courts.' Under the law of Prussia aliens could prosecute claims against that government in its courts. In the opinion of the Court of Claims, which held that Brown was a Prussian subject, and hence capable of prosecuting his claim before the court, the court said:

"Hanover, by conquest, in 1866 became incorporated

and government of a kingdom pass to and become merged in the territory and government of another nation, all of its subjects pass also. The tie which binds and carries them is not bodily presence, but allegiance."

C. American Ante-nati.

All white persons, or persons of European descent, who were born in any of the colonies, or resided or had been adopted there, before 1776, and had adhered to the cause of independence up to July 4, 1776, were, by the Declaration, invested with the privileges of citizenship. Inglis v. Sailor's Snug Harbour, 3 Pet. 164, 7 L. ed. 640.

It is universally admitted, both in English courts and in those of our own country, that all persons born within the colonies of North America while subject to the Crown of Great Britain were natural-born British subjects, and it must necessarily follow that that charcter was changed by the separation of the colonies from the parent state, and the acknowledgment of their independence.

The rule as to the point of time at which the American ante-nati ceased to be British subjects differs in this country and in England, as established by the courts of justice in the respective countries. The English rule is to take the date of the Treaty of Peace, in 1783. Our rule is to take the date of the Declaration of IndependThe settled doctrine of this country is that a person born here, who left the country before the Declaration of Independence and never returned here, became thereby an alien. Inglis v. Sailor's Snug Harbour, 3 Pet. 99, 7 L. ed. 617.

ence.

By withdrawing from this country and adhering to the British government, the ante-nati lost, or, perhaps, more properly speaking, never acquired the character of American citizens. Id.

II. Naturalization by Treaty.

A. In General.

Collective naturalization is also effected by treaty. Treaties of cession of territory, whether made as the result of military conquest or peaceful transfer, ordinarily contain stipulations determining the relations which the inhabitants of the ceded territory shall bear to the acquiring state.

B. Power of United States to Acquire Territory by Treaty and to Prescribe Terms Upon Which It Will Receive Inhabitants.

Justices White, Shiras, and McKenna, in their concurring opinion in the Insular cases (182 U. S., 300), said:

"It may not be doubted that, by the general principles of the law of nations, every government which is sovereign within its sphere of action possesses as an inherent attribute the power to acquire territory by discovery, by agreement or treaty, and by conquest. It can not also be gainsaid that, as a general rule, wherever a government acquires territory as a result of any of the modes above stated, the relation of the territory to the new government is to be determined by the acquiring power in the absence of stipulations upon the subject. These general principles of the law of nations are thus stated by Halleck in his treatise on International Law, page 126: 'A state may acquire property or domain in various ways; its title may be acquired originally by mere occupancy, and confirmed by the presumption arising from the lapse of time; or by discovery and lawful possession; or by conquest, confirmed by treaty or tacit consent; or by grant, cession, purchase or exchange; in fine, by any of the recognized modes by which private property is acquired by individuals. It is not our object to enter into any general discussion of these several modes of

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