a decree of naturalization where it had been fraudulently obtained. United States v. Norsch, 42 Fed. 417.

In Pintsch Compressing Co. v. Bergin, 84 Fed. 140, where a woman had been admitted to citizenship, and there was no irregularity or defect apparent on the face of the record, while the court refused the petition of a private party to cancel the decree at a subsequent term on the ground that for the greater part of the two years immediately preceding her admission she had been under the disability of marriage, and held that this proposition involved mixed questions of law and fact, which were presumably passed on by the court before it admitted her to citizenship, the view was expressed that only the United States, or some person acting by their authorization, can institute proceedings to set aside a judgment of naturalization.

In United States v. Kornmehl, 89 Fed. 10, where it was made to appear to the court that the court issuing a naturalization certificate had been deceived by material false statements of the applicant as to his age and length of residence in this country, the court directed that the letters of naturalization be revoked as having been improvidently issued. The proceedings in this case were instituted by the immigration commissioners, in behalf of the United States.

See, also, 3 Moore's Int. Law Digest, 500.

But, in United States v. Gleason, 78 Fed. 396, the court declined to cancel the certificate upon the ground that it had been obtained by false representations. In referring to the case of U. S. v. Norsch, the court said: "Thayer, J., in U. S. v. Norsch, 42 Fed. 417, . . . seems to treat the liability of a judgment of naturalization to be set aside for fraud, like a patent, as conceded, and to have considered only the power of the courts of the United States to set aside such judgments of state courts and to intimate that the relief would be accomplished

by setting aside the certificate or by injunction against exercising the right. Such would seem to be the only modes of relief, if any could be granted, for, technically, no court not authorized by law to review a judgment could directly set it aside. Barrow v. Hunton, 99 U. S. 80, 25 L. ed. 407. And a court of equity can affect a judgment only by decree to prevent carrying it out or enforcing it. 2 Story Eq. Sec. 885. The surrender of the certificate, which is only evidence of the judgment, would not affect the citizenship established by the judgment; and an injunction which could only run against further exercise of the rights of citizenship would not affect past acts."

The court said that an attempt to carry out such a decree against the defendant would produce great confusion and mischief. "The defendant became," said the court, "a citizen of the State of New York, as well as of the United States. Other citizens became entitled to vote for him for such offices as citizens could hold, as well as he became entitled to vote, hold office, hold lands, or do what else citizens can do. Neither the state, nor any citizen of New York or of the United States, is a party to this suit; nor do they hold their right to vote for him or to have him hold office, under him, and no decree against him here could affect their right."

Upon the question whether a judgment of naturalization is conclusive upon a state, there has not been entire unanimity of opinion. The Act of 1906 contains no provision relating to the matter. In Commonwealth v. Paper, 1 Brewster, 263, while the court ordered the setting aside of certain certificates of naturalization, it was stated that this was done on the condition that the Attorney-General of the state should appear in the case. The court said: "One citizen can not impugn the action of a court in naturalization cases so far as to require the

cancellation of naturalization papers. Some public authority must do this; and I understood when this petition was handed up that the Attorney-General was to be the official party to the proceeding."

In re Shaw, 2 Pa. Dist. C. 250, is to the same effect. See, also, Re McCarran, 8 Misc. 482, and 16 App. Div. 311. On the other hand, it was held in Peterson v. State, 89 S. W. 81, that a state can not impeach naturalization proceedings.

2. International Practice.

a. Executive Department of Government.

(A.) Power to Treat Certificate as Invalid.

The Department of State possesses no power to vacate decrees of naturalization; but it exercises, under the direction of the President, plenary jurisdiction over the conduct of foreign relations. In the exercise of this jurisdiction, the Department, as has often been held, will, so far as any action of its own is concerned, treat as invalid a certificate of naturalization that has been improperly obtained. John Bassett Moore, 3 Moore's Int. Law Digest, 501.

Secretary Hay in an instruction to the American Minister to Ecuador, June 21, 1902, said: "As you are aware, the Department's regulations require every naturalized citizen when he applies for a passport to make a sworn statement concerning his own or his parents' immigration, residence, and naturalization; and whenever the naturalization appears to have been improperly or improvidently granted it is not recognized under the Department's rules. For. Rel. 1902, 389. See also, Moore's Int. Law Digest, 501 et seq.

Recitations in the record of matters of fact are binding only upon parties to the proceedings and their privies. The Government of the United States was no party and stands in privity with no party to these pro

ceedings of naturalization. And it is not in the power of Mr. Stern by erroneous recitations in ex parte proceedings to conclude the government as to matters of fact. Case of Moses Stern, 13 Op. Atty. Gen. 376.

(B.) Right of Foreign Governments to Impeach American Certificate of Naturalization Denied.

While the Department of State declines to recognize the validity of a certificate of naturalization when it appears that it was obtained by fraud or granted by mistake, this government denies the right of a foreign government to impeach a certificate of naturalization issued by an American court. American Passport, 156.

It has been uniformly held by the Department of State that while, on the application of a foreign government, it will cause inquiries to be made as to whether a judgment of naturalization was improvidently granted, and while it will never permit itself to grant protection based upon a naturalization decree which is shown to it to be fraudulent, it will not recognize a foreign government's right to impeach such decrees. When set up by it as a basis of its action towards a foreign state, it can not recognize the right of any foreign executive or court to determine as to their validity. That determination must be made, so far as concerns foreign governments, exclusively by itself. Mr. Bayard to Mr. McLane, February 15, 1888, For. Rel. 1888, pt. 1, 511. See 3 Moore's Int. Law Digest, 513, et seq.

b. International Claims Commissions.

(A.) In General.

It has been repeatedly held by international claims commissions that certificates of naturalization may be impeached in proceedings before such tribunals.

(B.) Spanish Claims Commission of 1871.

In a communication relating to the United States and Spanish Claims Commission of 1871, Secretary Evarts

said that that Commission was "an independent judicial tribunal possessed of all the powers and endowed with all the properties which should distinguish a court of high international jurisdiction, alike competent in the jurisdiction conferred upon it to bring under judgment the decisions of the local courts of both nations and beyond the competence of either government to interfere with, direct, or obstruct its deliberations." 3 Moore's International Arbitrations, 2599.

(C.) Costa Rican Claims Commission of 1860.

The umpire, Bertinatti, in Medina's case, before the United States and Costa Rican Commission of 1860, said: "An act of naturalization, be it made by a judge ex parte in the exercise of his voluntaria jurisdictio, or be it the result of a decree of a king bearing an administrative character; in either case its value, on the point of evidence before an international commission, can only be that of an element of proof, subject to be examined according to the principle locus regit actum, both intrinsically and extrinsically, in order to be admitted or rejected according to the general principles in such a matter.

"The certificates exhibited by them (the claimants) being made in due form, have for themselves the presumption of truth; but when it becomes evident that the statements therein contained are incorrect, the presumption of truth must yield to truth itself." 3 Moore's Arbitrations, 2587.

(D.) Venezuelan Claims Commission of 1903.

In the Flutie cases, which came before the United States and Venezuelan Claims Commission of 1903, Mr. Bainbridge, commissioner for the United States, in delivering the opinion of the Commission-an opinion remarkable for its clearness and comprehensiveness, giving