goodness had been as unalterable as their nature; whereas on the contrary we find, that whereas their nature neither is nor can be altered, yet their goodness or necessity is. For as, before God adopted them into the rubric of religion by his own positive institution, they were indifferent things; so after this institution was repealed by a contrary command, they became unlawful. So that it is now as necessary that we should not offer them in the worship of God, as it was before that we should. And the same may be said of all the other rights of the Mosaic law: which being in their own nature indifferent, could no otherwise be converted either into necessary or sinful, but by God's express command or prohibition. Whereas justice and mercy, &c. are good in themselves abstractly considered from all will and command; and are not good merely because they are commanded, but are commanded because they are good; because they carry with them such unalterable reasons as do in themselves render the practice of them eternally necessary. For though there be very good reason why men should not offer material sacrifices, notwithstanding they were once enjoined; yet it can never be reasonable for them to be unjust, or cruel, or proud, because the contrary virtues carry such fixed and immutable reasons with them as will bind and oblige us to eternity; insomuch, that though we had a dispensation to be proud under the broad seal of heaven, yet it would still be very absurd and unreasonable to be so. And as things that are only positively necessary or sinful derive all their necessity and sinfulness from God's direct or express command and prohibition; so they cannot be commanded or forbidden by consequence.

For if the matter of them be antecedently lawful or indifferent, it must necessarily remain so till it be directly commanded or forbidden; there being no other reason to bound and limit it, but only the will of the lawgiver in whose disposal it is; and therefore, till he directly signifies his will either for or against it, it must remain as it is, i. e. free and indifferent. But you will say, suppose God hath commanded such an indifferent thing for such a reason, doth it not thence follow, that he thereby commands every other indifferent thing that hath the same reason for it? I answer, No; for if the reason why he commands it be necessary and eternal, it is not a thing indifferent, but morally necessary, and so is every thing else that hath the same reason for it: and consequently the reason of the law, though it be applied but to one thing, extends to every thing of the same nature; because in all moral cases the reason of the law is the law. But if the thing commanded be in itself indifferent, the reason why it is commanded cannot be necessary; and therefore though there be the same reason why another thing of the same nature should be commanded, yet it doth not necessarily oblige, unless it be commanded actually, because in such cases it is not the reason but the authority of the law that obliges; and therefore, where there is only the reason, and not the law, it lays no obligation to the conscience.

From the whole therefore it is evident, what is the difference between things that are positively and morally necessary and sinful; which I thought very necessary to explain at large, for the giving a fuller light to the ensuing discourse, in which I shall endeavour to shew,

First, That there is such an intrinsic goodness in some human actions, as renders them for ever necessary and obliging to us.

Secondly, That God hath sufficiently discovered to us what those human actions are which carry with them this perpetual obligation.

Thirdly, That these actions which carry with them this perpetual obligation are the main and principal parts of religion.

SECT. I.

That there is such an intrinsic good in some human actions, as renders them for ever necessary and obliging to us.

The

Its

GOOD is twofold, absolute or respective; or the good of the end and the good of the means. good of the end is that which is the perfection and happiness of any being; the good of the means is that which tends and conduces thereunto. As for instance, the absolute good of a brute animal consists in the perfection and satisfaction of its sense, or in having perfect feeling and sensation of such things as are most grateful to its appetite and senses. respective good is the means by which its senses are perfected, or rendered lively and vigorous, and by which it is provided for with such things as are grateful and pleasing to them. For there being in every animate nature a principle whereby it is necessarily inclined to promote its own preservation and well-being; that which hath in it a fitness to promote this end is called good, as on the contrary that which is apt to hinder it, evil. Now man, being

not only a sensitive but a rational creature, hath a twofold good belonging to his nature: the first sensitive, which is the same with that of brute animals,

consisting in the perfection and satisfaction of his bodily senses and appetites, and in those means which conduce thereunto; and this for distinction sake is called his natural good: the second rational, which consists in the perfection and satisfaction of his rational faculty, and in those means which tend thereunto; and this is styled his moral good, though in reality it is as much natural as the former. For man being naturally as well rational as sensitive, that which promotes his rational perfection and happiness is no less naturally good for him than that which promotes his sensitive. Nay his rational nature being the much more noble and excellent part of him, that which naturally promotes the perfection and happiness of it, is in itself a much greater good to his nature, and ought to be preferred by him before any of those natural goods which conduce only to the happiness of his sensitive nature; and he who indulges his sensitive part in any pleasure which his rational disallows, doth thereby create a torment to himself, and raise a devil in his own mind. For though reason and religion do allow that the sensitive nature should be gratified in all its natural appetites and desires; yet neither allow that it should be pampered and indulged in any such excesses, as are prejudicial either to itself or to that rational nature whereunto it is joined; and he who indulges his sense in any such excesses renders himself obnoxious to his own reason, and to gratify the brute in him displeases the man, and sets his two natures at variance. So that there is nothing can be naturally good for us, that is any way inconsistent with what is morally so, i. e. with what conduces to the perfection and happiness of our rational nature; and

though this natural and moral good are no way inconsistent with one another, yet it is the moral that is the supreme good of a man, because it is the good of his most excellent nature. Having thus premised what I mean by good in general, and particularly by moral good, I proceed to shew that in some human actions there is such an intrinsic moral good as renders them for ever obliging to us. And this I shall endeavour in these following propositions:

First, That the happiness of human nature is founded in its perfection.

Secondly, That the perfection of human nature consists in acting suitably to the most perfect rea

son.

Thirdly, That the most perfect reason is that wherein all reasonable beings do consent and agree. Fourthly, That there are certain rules of moral good, wherein all reasonable beings are agreed.

Fifthly, That to act suitably to those rules hath been always found by universal experience conducible to the happiness of human nature, and the contrary mischievous thereunto.

I. That the happiness of human nature is founded in its perfection. For the perfection of beings consists in their being completely disposed and adapted for the end whereunto they are designed. Now the end of all beings that have life and sense is that sort of happiness that is suitable to their natures; for it is thither that they all of them naturally tend, and therein that their faculties do all concentre. When therefore their faculties or powers of action are completely disposed to enjoy the proper happiness of their natures, then they are perfect in their kind. Thus for instance, the end of brutes, which