divine. But they are not individually distinct from the Father, as separate existences. Their individuality is not that of three men, or three angels, or three distinct intelligent beings of any sort; but they constitute in fact one being, and possess individuality only in a limited and modified sense. We have now the theory which in its essential features, though with various modifications, has been generally held, in modern times, by orthodox trinitarians; substantially the theory of Calvin and his disciples. Its distinctive characteristic is a modification of the element of individuality. While it maintains the full and absolute divinity of the Son and of the Spirit, it holds also the strict, absolute unity of God;-that he is one in essence or being-numerically, and not merely specifically one. It admits at the same time a distinction to exist in the nature of the Godhead, which distinction, for want of a better name, and in the absence of any word that, in the poverty of human language and human conception, can exactly describe or define what man does but imperfectly comprehend,-it terms hypostasis, or person; a distinction not clearly understood by us, but the existence of which is plainly revealed; a distinction existing from eternity, but devel oped in time, and in the scheme of redemption, by the incarnation and mission of the Logos, and by the office of the Holy Spirit in renewing and sanctifying the hearts of men. Such is substantially the modern Trinitarian theory. While it admits a certain distinction eternally existing in the nature of the Godhead, to which it applies the term hypostasis or subsistence or person, it does not for a moment attach to this distinction the idea of so many separate individual existences. Not in any such sense does it employ the word person-Calvin himself is careful distinctly to disavow any such idea.* The three hypostases, subsistences or persons are not three distinct spiritual existences, three minds, acting, devising, willing, each for itself; they denote simply such a distinction as can belong to a being strictly and numerically one. Just what that distinction is, just what relation The following passages sufficiently indicate what were the views of Calvin as to this point. "But they deceive themselves in dreaming of three separate individuals, each of them possessing a part of the divine essence. * They even foolishly suppose that our opinion implies a quaternity; whereas they are guilty of falsehood and calumny in ascribing to us a judgment of their own; as though we pretended that the three persons are so many streams proceeding from one essence; when it is evident from our writings that we separate not the persons from the essence, but though they subsist in it, make a distinction between them. If the persons were separated from the essence, there would perhaps be some probability in their argument; but then there would be a trinity of Gods, not a trinity of persons contained in one God." "Therefore let such as love sobriety, and will be contented with the measure of faith, briefly attend to what is useful to be known; which is that when we these hypostases hold to each other and to that divine nature in which they subsist, it is neither for this theory, nor any other, to define; neither Calvin has attempted this nor any other man in his right mind. The characteristic feature, as we have observed, of this theory as distinguished from others, is a limitation of the element of individuality. We have but to carry out this principle however to its extreme, and we strike another of those ancient and diverging paths along which the human mind has wandered in its anxious but erring search for truth. Press this limitation so far as virtually to deny the existence of any personal distinction in the deity prior to the manifestations made of himself in time and to man, and we stand at once on the old Monarchian or more strictly speaking the Patri-Passian ground. Praxeas, Noëtius and Sabellius went that way. While they held the supreme divinity of Christ, they denied his distinct personal subsistence as the Logos, prior to the incarnation. The Deity, ever one and the same in all the manifestations of himself to man, now assumes the character and office of Father, now of Son, and now of Holy Spirit. These are not distinctions eternally existing in the nature of the deity, but simply inodal developments, the forms under which he passes before men; like the successive transformations of Vishnu in the Indian mythology. Sabellius speaks of μla 'vnéσruσis, by which he means person or subject, and tola nobσoma, meaning by the latter term forms, manifestations, or works. The divinity or Morús embodying itself in the Logos or Son, is not distinct from, but identical with, the Morús embodying itself under the form of the Spirit. The whole deity goes into each: and back of these impersonations, and prior to them, there is in the divine nature itself no distinction of persons. Diverse as this scheme is from the proper trinitarian theory, it has nevertheless in common with it, these two things; it starts from the same point, and proceeds in the same direction. In common with the other, it seeks to solve the problem of the Trinity by a limitation not of the unity, nor yet of the divinity, but of the individuality of the three. It falls therefore into the same general classification of doctrines. profess to believe in one God, the word God denotes a single and simple essence, in which we comprehend three persons, or hypostases." "Wherefore let us not imagine such a trinity of persons as includes an idea of separation or does not immediately recall us to the unity. The names of Father, Son and Spirit certainly imply a real distinction; let no one suppose them to be mere epithets by which God is variously designated from his works: but it is a distinction, not a division." How much importance Calvin attached to the use and retention of the word "person" in connection with this doctrine, is evident from the following truly noble sentiment. “Utinam sepulta essent nomina, constaret modo hæc inter omnes fides, PATREM ET FILIUM ET SPIRITUM SANCTUM ESSE UNUM DEUM!" We find then as the result of this analysis, that the various methods of stating the doctrine of the Trinity and of reasoning upon it, reduce themselves essentially to these three;-a modified unity, a modified divinity, a modified individuality. We are now prepared to proceed with some advantage in the investigation. The question is, which of these is the right method? Which best elucidates the subject? Which best accords with the general spirit and teaching of the sacred oracles? The field of inquiry contracts itself within these narrow limits. Two simple questions, in fact, cover the whole ground. I. Is that divinity which the Scriptures ascribe to the Son and the Spirit in any sense limited, or is it absolute and supreme like that of the Father? II. Do they represent the Son and Spirit as possessing individuality in the sense of distinct spiritual existence, separate from that of the Father, or only in some limited and secondary sense, such as may consist with strict numerical unity of being in the Godhead? These questions fairly answered, we can no longer be in doubt as to the proper method of viewing and stating the doctrine of the Trinity. It will be sufficient for our present purpose to conduct these inquiries with reference simply to the Son, without extending them farther, inasmuch as the Scriptures are more full and explicit on this point, and inasmuch also as the bearing of such an examination on the subject before us, will be equally decisive in the one case as in the other. If the Scriptures teach the supreme and absolute divinity of Christ, then the first of the three methods or theories can not be correct. If they teach the distinct separate individuality of the Son, then the last method can not be the right one. It is evident moreover that these inquiries should be made with reference not to Jesus Christ in his mediatorial character and earthly condition, the God-man, but rather to the Logos, existing with the Father before the world was, in his original and proper nature and condition; since, by the assumption of the mediatorial office, and by his incarnation in order to that, there accrued necessarily to the Son both an individuality and a dependence, altogether human, and not at all pertaining to his own proper nature, and which therefore ought not to be introduced as elements into any inquiry respecting the mode of the divine existence,—a subject which lies infinitely beyond and above these adventitious circumstances. Our inquiries relate not to the divine man of Nazareth, the man Christ Jesus, but to that divine nature which became incarnate in the person of Christ, and which in its preëxistent state sustained certain relations to the Father,-was, or was not, individually distinct from him,-was, or was not, absolutely equal with him in all the attributes of deity. ས་ I. Is that divinity which the Scriptures ascribe to the Son as preexistent, in any sense limited, or is it absolute and equal to that of the Father. A thorough exposition of the various passages which bear upon this question is of course beyond the limits of a single article. A brief survey is all that can be attempted. For the sake of convenience we shall arrange the various passages into classes as we proceed. 1. Passages which apply to Christ the unqualified appellation' θεος, Οι ὁ θεος. These are not decisive in the present inquiry: for although they imply divine honor, in some sense, yet as it is possible the term may be employed in a secondary or figurative sense, they can not be appealed to as necessarily denoting full and supreme divinity. 2. Passages which ascribe to Christ the work of creation. 66 1 Cor. 8:6-" by whom are all things ;"—" di 'ov.”—Heb. 1: 3, "by whom he made the worlds.”—Col. 1: 16, 17, "all things were created by him and for him;” δι αὐτοῦ καὶ εἰς αὐτὸν ;——“ and by him, ev avto—all things consist." This passage is somewhat stronger than the others. Yet not any of them seem decisive as to the question whether full and supreme divinity, like that of the Father, belongs to the Son; for it is certainly not impossible to conceive of the power to create, and to govern, being conferred and exercised instrumentally, an idea which the form of expression, genitive with preposition dia, seems to indicate. - 3. Passages which speak of divine power and honor being conferred on the Son by the Father. Such are Heb. 1: 2, "whom he hath appointed heir of all things;" and in the following verses, "sat down on the right hand of the majesty on high,"-i. e., in the place of honor and power next the highest-" being made so much better than the angels," &c. Also, Eph. 1: 20, "and set him at his own right hand in the heavenly places, far above all principality and power and might and dominion," &c., "and hath put all things under his feet," &c. Also, 1 Pet. 3: 22, "Who is gone into heaven, and is on the right hand of God, angels and authorities and powers being made subject unto him.” These passages, and those of like import, while they ascribe to the Son an eminence and honor peculiarly divine, do nevertheless plainly convey the idea of subordination in some sense to a higher power. His seat is next that of the majesty on highthe honor and dominion are conferred upon him; he is appointed to them. These passages would be decisive of the question before us, were it not that they all manifestly refer to Christ in his mediatorial character, the risen, ascended, exalted Redeemer, and not to the preexistent One, the Logos, such as he was before his incarnation and voluntary humiliation. They can not, therefore, according to the principle just laid down, be admitted as bearing upon the question before us. The inquiry is not whether the man Christ Jesus, the Savior upon earth, or the Savior risen and ascended, is in any sense subordinate to the Father; that is conceded by all; but whether this subordination pertains to his original nature and proper condition, or is only assumed along with the vesture of humanity, and the mediatorial office. This is a question which the passages now under consideration do not meet, and were never designed to meet. They belong to the same class with those which speak of the Father as sending the Son, of the Son as being sent, and as doing the will of him who sent him, of the Father as being greater than the Son, &c. &c., all which relate to the Messiah as such, and have no bearing, therefore, on the present question. 4. More to the purpose, though not perhaps altogether conclusive, is a class of passages in which the Son is directly compared with the Father. In Col. 1: 15, he is termed "the image of the invisible God." This is a strong expression, but not decisive, for a child may be said to be the very image of its father, and yet not in all respects his equal. Indeed, the very comparison suggests some sort of inequality, for we compare the less with the greater; we liken him whom we would honor to one whose reputation and dignity are still greater. In the present instance, it is not quite clear that the reference is not to Christ as mediator, God manifest or revealed, in distinction from the "invisible God," or God concealed. The same remark applies to Col. 1: 19, "It pleased the Father that in him should all fullness dwell;" and also to Col. 2: 9, "In him dwelleth all the fullness of the Godhead bodily." These are strong expressions. They mean that whatever pertains to the Godhead pertains also to Christ. When we compare them however, with Eph. 1: 23, in which the same expression is applied to the Church,-" which is his body, the fullness of him who filleth all in all"-we hesitate to ascribe to them the sense of absolute and supreme divinity. For if the language necessarily implies that idea in the one case, why not in the other? If the fullness of the Godhead dwelling bodily in Christ constitutes. him strictly and in the highest sense a divine being, then why does not the fullness of him who filleth all in all, pertaining as it does to the church, constitute that equally and in the same sense divine? Other passages there are, however, in which the comparison of the Son with the Father seems to be made with special reference to the Logos as preexistent; which are therefore more decisive in their bearing upon the present discussion, e. g., Phil. 2: 6, where we meet with the following expressions, "who being in |