McKinley Act-President's Proclamation. satisfied that the government of any country producing and exporting sugars, molasses, coffee, tea, and hides, raw and uncured, or any of such articles, imposes duties or other exactions upon the agricultural or other products of the United States, which, in view of the free introduction of such sugar, molasses, coffee, tea, and hides into the United States he may deem to be reciprocally unequal and unreasonable, he shall have the power and it shall be his duty to suspend, by proclamation to that effect, the provisions of this act relating to the free introduction of such sugar, molasses, coffee, tea, and hides the production of such country for such time as he shall deem just, and in such case and during such suspension duties shall be levied, collected, and paid upon sugar, molasses, coffee, tea, and hides the product of or exported from such designated country." Your first question is: "If I should find that our trade with a particular nation is reciprocally unequal and unreasonable and should so declare by proclamation, have I the power to make the proclamation take effect at a future indicated day, or does the law, of its own force, reimpose the duties from the date of my declaration of the fact?" The constitutional objection made to legislation of this character is that it is practically an attempt, by statute, to authorize the Executive to exercise the legislative function. The answer to this objection is that the Executive is, by the statute, required to ascertain, and by his proclamation declare, the facts, and that then the law authorizing the reimposition of the duties becomes operative as the expression of the legislative will. If it were to be held that the Executive could find the facts to exist at one time, but, by his own will, could declare that the duties should not be reimposed until some future date, to be determined by him, the constitutional objection would not seem to be clearly met. Moreover, upon the language of the statute, the meaning seems not doubtful. That language is, that "whenever and so often as the President shall be satisfied" that the state of facts calling for such action exists he shall have the power and it shall be his duty, to suspend by proclamation, etc. That is, it shall be his duty then, at that time, to make such suspension. The answer to this question, therefore, I think, McKinley Act-President's Proclamation. must be that you have not the power to make the proclamation to take effect at a future indicated date. Your second question is as follows: "As all of the articles enumerated in section 3 are to be taken into account in considering concessions which the United States has made to secure reciprocal trade, is it competent for me, if I find the existing conditions of trade with a particular nation to be reciprocally unequal andunreasonable, to suspend by proclamation the free introduction of one or more of these articles?" It seems to me quite clear that this statute groups sugar, molasses, coffee, tea, and hides in such a way as to be conclusive upon the President, so that when he shall be satisfied that the government of any country producing these five articles imposes duties or other exactions upon the products of the United States which we deem reciprocally unequal and unreasonable he is in duty bound to suspend, by proclamation to that effect, the statute providing for the free introduction of all of those articles from that country into the United States. I am unable to find in the Statute any warrant for a selection of one or more articles as subject to reimposition of duty. The second question is therefore answered in the negative. Thirdly, you ask, in substance, whether in the proclamation the countries with which this Government has satisfactory trade arrangements may be named, and the proclamation reimposing the duties made general as to all others, or whether the countries imposing duties or other exactions deemed reciprocally unequal and unreasonable shall be specifically named in the proclamation, and the duties imposed accordingly. This is, perhaps, a question of form rather than substance, but I can not doubt that the latter is the mode contemplated by the statute. This is the direct and natural course. Moreover, the last line of the portion of the statute above quoted seems to leave no room for doubt that the particular country on whose products the duties are to be reimposed is to be named. The language used is "such designated country." Very respectfully, The PRESIDENT. W. H. H. MILLER. Removal of Deposit of Ballast-Ocean Mail Service, Etc. REMOVAL OF DEPOSIT OF BALLAST. There is no power in the Secretary of War or in the supervisor of the harbor of New York to prevent the deposit of ballast in New York Harbor at a distance of more than 3 miles from the shore at low-water mark. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, SIR: I have, by reference, the letter of December 23, written by H. B. Robeson, supervisor of the harbor of New York, to Gen. Casey, Chief of Engineers, with the indorsements, touching the matter of the deposit of ballast outside of New York Harbor, and at a distance of more than 3 miles from the shore at low-water mark. You ask my opinion as to whether or not the supervisor of the harbor or the War Department can interfere to prevent these deposits. In answer I have to say: I know of no statute authorizing such interference, nor of any power to so interfere in the absence of statute. The indorsement of Col. Lieber, Acting Judge Advocate-General, seems to cover the subjectmatter. Very respectfully, The SECRETARY OF WAR. W. H. H. MILLER. OCEAN MAIL SERVICE-CONDITIONAL BIDS-DISCONTINU ANCE OF SERVICE-CONTRACT. Where the Government formally accepted the proposition of one party for carrying ocean mails over route No. 11, and the offer of another party for carrying ocean mails over routes Nos. 31 and 32, pursuant to the act of March 3, 1891, chapter 519: Held, that the position of the Post-Office Department that contracts for routes 31 and 32 would not be executed until the contract for route No. 11 had been executed and the claim of the successful bidder for route No. 11 that he would not execute the contract as to route 11 because another party had been awarded the contract as to a route known as No. 35, claiming it had verbally agreed that his bid as to route No. 11 was contingent on his obtaining the contract as to route No. 35, were equally untenable. Section 817, Postal Laws and Regulations, can not be applied to contracts for ocean mail service under this act. The bidder to whom the contract for route No. 11 was awarded, if he really understood that his Ocean Mail Service-Conditional bids-Discontinuance of Service-Contract. bid was contingent on his obtaining the contract for route No. 35, can not be prosecuted under section 3954, Revised Statutes, as amended August 11, 1876. Action can be brought against him and his sureties on his bid under section 3945, Revised Statutes, as amended January 23, 1874. The acceptances of the Government of the bids on routes Nos. 31 and 32 constituted a contract. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, January 18, 1892. SIR: It appears by your communication of January 12, instant, and the inclosures thereof, that, in obedience to the act of Congress of March 3, 1891 (26 Stat., 830), entitled "An act to provide for ocean mail service between the United States and foreign ports and to promote commerce," the Postmaster-General, by advertisement, invited proposals for carrying the mails between the United States and various other countries, and that William H. T. Hughes, of New York, sent in proposals for carrying the mail from New York to Buenos Ayres, Argentine Republic, being route No. 11, and that the New York and Cuba Mail Steamship Company, a corporation existing under the laws of the State of New York, sent in proposals for carrying the mail from New York to Tuxpan, Mexico, by Havana, Progreso, and Tampico, etc., being route No. 31, and that this same company sent in proposals for carrying the mail from New York to Havana, etc., being route 32. These proposals have been formally accepted by the Postmaster-General. You say, however, that "the Postmaster-General has declined to execute the contracts for routes 31 and 32 until that for route 11 has been executed, it having all along been stated by Hughes and the company he represents that they proposed operating the three routes together and as one interest, notwithstanding the contract for 11 was awarded to Hughes under his own bid." On the other hand, Hughes declines to execute a contract for route 11 because the bid of the New York and Cuba Mail Steamship Company for route 35 has not been accepted, stating that he had fully explained to you that his ability to perform mail service on route 11 was dependent on the acceptance of the bids for routes 31, 32, and 35. But I see no authority of law for introducing into the writ Ocean Mail Service-Conditional bids-Discontinuance of Service-Contract. ten contracts resulting from the proposals made by Hughes and the company, and their acceptance by you, verbal understandings and conversations which took place before said contracts were formed. Each of the said proposals was separately accepted, and stands upon an independent footing, and the execution of the contract under any one of the said proposals can not be made a condition to the execution of the contract under another. Indeed, it was one of the terms of advertisement inviting proposals that "consolidated or combined bids proposing one sum for two or more routes, or offering to perform one service on one route conditioned on the acceptance of any other bid will not be considered." It follows, therefore, that the position taken by the PostOffice Department, that the contracts for routes 31 and 32 will not be executed until the contract for route 11 shall have been executed, and that the position taken by Mr. Hughes that he will not execute the contract for route 11 because the bid of the New York and Cuba Mail Steamship Company for route 35 has not been accepted can not be sustained. Indeed, to sustain either of these positions would be to hold that one kind of contract might be advertised for and another kind actually executed, at the option of the parties, thus depriving the service of the main advantages of advertising for proposals. The next inquiry is whether section 817, Postal Laws and Regulations 1887, respecting the discontinuance of mail service and the allowance as full indemnity to the contractor of one month's extra pay, can be applied to ocean mail service under the act of March 3, 1891, which regulation reads as follows: "The Postmaster-General may discontinue or curtail the service on any route, in whole or in part, in order to place on the route superior service, or whenever the public interests, in his judgment, shall require such discontinuance or curtailment for any other cause, he allowing as full indemnity to the contractor one month's extra pay on the amount of services dispensed with and a pro rata compensation for the amount of services retained and continued." In my opinion, to hold that contracts for ocean mail service under the act of March 3, 1891, were subject to regulation 817 would introduce an element of instability into such con |