Separate entry for packages contained in one importation.

dise imported in one vessel at one time for one and the same actual owner or ultimate consignee.

"SEC. 2. That the importer, consignee, or agent's oath prescribed by section twenty-eight hundred and forty-one of the Revised Statutes is hereby modified for the purposes of this act, so as to require the importer, consignee, or agent to declare therein that the entry contains an account of all the goods imported in the whereof is master, from for account of; which oath, so modified, shall, in each case, be taken on the entry of one or more packages contained in an original package. But nothing in this act contained shall be construed to relieve the importer, consignee, or agent from producing the oath of the owner or ultimate consignee in every case now required by law; or to provide that an importation may consist of less than the whole number of parcels contained in any packed package, or packed packages, consigned in one vessel at one time, to one importer, consignee, or agent.

"SEC. 3. That all provisions of law inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed."

It appears that at the time the act of 1876 was passed, a large express business, in the way of bringing small parcels from other countries to this country, had grown up, but, owing to the fact that such small parcels were usually brought packed together in large packages, such as trunks or boxes, there was no way, under the existing law, by which any one of the several parcels belonging to different persons contained in a packed package could be admitted to separate entry at the custom-house, nor was there any way by which the packed package could be entered by the express carrier, until the owners of all the parcels contained in the package, generally living more or less remotely from the port of entry, had sent in their invoices. This produced vexatious delays to those owners of parcels who were ready with their invoices aud desirous to get their property, but were compelled to wait for the arrival of the invoices covering all the other parcels packed in the same packages with theirs.

It was this inconvenience of the old law, requiring the packed package to be entered as an entirety, that was remedied by the act of 1876, which, as we have seen, expressly

Separate entry for packages contained in one importation. authorizes the owner of one or more parcels contained in a packed package to make separate entry thereof.

Section 2785, Revised Statutes, which is the provision that caused the inconvenience remedied by the act of 1876, is still in force, there being no express or implied repeal thereof by the act of June 10, 1890; and I discover nothing in the latter act which is inconsistent with the act of 1876, for the act of 1890 relates to the entries of entire packages covered by one invoice, while the act of 1876 relates to separate entries of several parcels contained in one package and belonging to several owners.

It is to be observed, furthermore, that as the act of 1876 relates only to the manner of making entry, all the other regulations of a general character, touching the collection of the revenue by customs, apply to merchandise entered under that act.

The repeal of section 2841, Revised Statutes, by the act of June 10, 1890, had no effect on the act of 1876, because the latter formed no part of section 2841. It is true the act of 1876 adopted, with a modification, the form of oath prescribed by section 2841 to be taken on entering merchandise by an importer, consignee, or agent, but that did not make the act a part of the section.

When section 2841 was amended and reenacted by the act of March 3, 1883, no notice was taken of the act of 1876 in the section as reenacted, but the act of 1876 was treated as in force and unaffected by the act of 1883.

The act of 1876 is not incorporated into section 2841 in the revised edition of 1878 of the Revised Statutes, but is printed therein in brackets, as a separate law between that section and section 2842.

Moreover, the act of 1876 is legislation of a very limited and special character, and, according to a well-settled rule of statutory interpretation, it is not to be presumed from any general expressions used that Congress had that act in contemplation when the statute of June 10, 1890, was passed. (Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U. S., 556, 570; State v. Stoll, 17 Wall., 425, 436; Movins v. Arthur, 95 U. S., 144, 146; Rounds v. Waymart Borough, 81 Pa. St., 395; Endl. Stat., 223.)

Vacancy in head of Departments.

The view above taken is much strengthened by the consideration that it is hardly reasonable to infer that Congress intended to produce such an inconvenience to the importing business of the country as would have been involved in the repeal of the act of 1876.

The act of 1876 being still in force, your attention is called to the point that the form of oath prescribed by that act, by reference to section 2841, Rev. Stats., is not affected by the subsequent legislation modifying and afterward repealing that section, and substituting a declaration by the importer, consignee, or agent in the place of the former oath. ( (Endl. Stat., 233; Sedgw. Stat., p. 229, ed. 1874; Turney v. Wilton, 36 Ill., 385; Spring, etc., Works v. San Francisco, 22 Cal., 434; Sika v. Chicago, etc., R. R., 21 Wis., 270.)

This, I believe, disposes of the question submitted.

Very respectfully, yours,

W. H. H. MILLER.

The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

VACANCY IN HEAD OF DEPARTMENTS.

Where there is a vacancy in the head of a Department, it can not be temporarily filled for a longer period than ten days, either by operation of law or by designation of the President. 17 Opin., 535, in so far as it holds that twenty days may be taken by the President, by allowing the statutory occupation of the office for ten days without designation and then making a designation for an additional ten days not accepted.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
January 31, 1891.

SIR: In obedience to your request that I submit to you an opinion as to whether the vacancy caused by the death of the Hon. William Windom, late Secretary of the Treasury, can be temporarily filled for more than ten days, either by statutory succession, or by designation of the President, or both, I have the honor to submit the following:

Provisions for temporarily filling such a vacancy are found in sections 177, 179, 180, and 181 of the Revised Statutes. Section 177 is as follows:

"In case of the death, resignation, absence, or sickness of the head of any Department, the first or sole assistant thereof

Vacancy in head of Departments.

shall, unless otherwise directed by the President, as provided by section one hundred and seventy-nine, perform the duties of such head until a successor is appointed, or such absence or sickness shall cease."

Section 178 makes a similar provision for chiefs of bureaus. Sections 179, 180, and 181 are as follows:

"SEC. 179. In any of the cases mentioned in the two preceding sections, except the death, resignation, absence, or sickness of the Attorney-General, the President may, in his discretion, authorize and direct the head of any other Department or any other officer in either Department, whose appointment is vested in the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to perform the duties of the vacant office until a successor is appointed, or the sickness or absence of the incumbent shall cease.'

"SEC. 180. A vacancy occasioned by death or resignation must not be temporarily filled under the three preceding sections for a longer period than ten days."

"SEC. 181. No temporary appointment, designation, or assignment of one officer to perform the duties of another, in the cases covered by sections one hundred and seventy-seven and one hundred and seventy-eight, shall be made otherwise than as provided by those sections, except to fill a vacancy happening during a recess of the Senate."

Section 182 provides that any officer performing the duties of another officer under the foregoing sections is not to receive any extra compensation.

It seems to me impossible to escape the effect of section 180 in limiting to a period of ten days the time during which the vacant office may be filled, either by the statutory succession provided in section 177, or the designation by the President provided in section 179, or by both. The temporary filling of the vacancy is that provided under the three sections preceding section 180. The first of those sections is section 177, which provides only for succession by operation of law, while section 179 refers to succession by designation of the President.

This construction is fully borne out by opinions of my predecessors. On September 11, 1884, Mr. Attorney-General Brewster (18 Opin. of Attys. Gen., 58) advised the President upon the occasion of the death of Secretary Folger "that

Vacancy in head of Departments.

under sections 177, 179, 180, and 181 of the Revised Statutes no statutory succession or assignment of some other officer to the vacancy is valid for a longer period in all than ten days." An opinion to the same effect was rendered by Mr. Acting Attorney-General Phillips (18 Opin., 50) on August 27, 1884, in construing sections 178 and 180 of the Revised Statutes. See also opinions of Mr. Attorney-General Brewster (17 Opin., 530); of Mr. Attorney-General Devens (16 Opin., 596; of Mr. Attorney-General Hoar (13 Opin., 7).

The sections under discussion are a mere revision of the act of July 23, 1863 (15 Stats. at Large, 168), a reading of which supports the view here taken.

It has been urged that the ten-day limitation applies only to the designation by the President and not to the temporary supplying of the vacancy by operation of law.

The reasons of much cogency against such a construction

are:

First, that it would place no limitation upon the time in which the "first or sole assistant" might fill the vacancy, which does not seem consistent with the expressed legislative purpose; and,

Second, it makes the reference in section 180 to the three preceding sections mean exactly the same as if the language had been the two preceding sections. In other words, it makes the reference to section 177 meaningless; for the use in section 177 of the words "unless otherwise directed by the President" is an exception out of that section and not an affirmative provision to which reference could properly be made under section 180.

In an opinion by Mr. Attorney-General Brewster (17 Opin., 535) it seems to be held that twenty days may be taken by the President under section 178 by allowing the statutory occupation of the office, without designation for ten days, and then making a designation for an additional ten days. To this construction I can not assent. If the ten days' limitation applies to a statutory occupation by an assistant or deputy at all, then it seems to me the period of temporary occupancy can not be lengthened by tacking the ten days by designation upon the ten days by succession.

It is proper to say that this last opinion of Attorney-General Brewster is directly in conflict with the opinion of Act