by our Whig Ministers listening to the first proposals of Russia, and entering fully into reciprocal engagements with the Czar, not as to what was to be done, but as to what was to be avoided, in case of the dissolution of Turkey.

It is often said that England should never wage a little war, and the same may be said of every country; for a little war produces expense without result, and ill blood without the decision of one disputed point. But a great war, undertaken and pursued with the aim of permanently weakening and crippling a powerful enemy, is a serious quarter of a century's work. A great war carried on against Russia must be without result, if it leaves her in possession of Poland, or allows her to retain her influence over the Slavonian races of the south. A war that would deprive her of these would indeed be great, for it would fully restore the balance of power in Europe, as well as the chances of peace in Asia. But a war which aims at less than this, which merely seeks to reprimand Russia and give her some raps on the knuckles, will not attain any of the desired objects. If we contemplate a great war and its great results, then, indeed, Lord John Russell was right in rejecting the first overture of the Czar, in considering them as insidious and a covering for the most dangerous ambition. But if Lord John Russell contemplated and contemplates a little war merely to be confined to the coast of the Baltic and the Black Sea to succour just sufficient, and no more, to enable the Turks to hold their ground-then, we repeat, an early understanding and accommodation with Russia would have been better than this little war, because in truth, the little war will tend to no more satisfactory or complete result than the understanding.

In order to explain what we mean by this, we will venture to delineate what is likely to be the result of the present war, which we persist in calling a little one. Let us recollect that we are engaged in it with allies, who have no more faith in the regeneration of the Ottoman than Nicholas himself has. Our allies are France and Austria. Now, there is not a single political party or personage in France who does not agree with the Czar in considering Turkey upon its death-bed. The Legitimists, we know, were prepared to give up the Sultan to the Czar long ago. Louis Philippe, M. Guizot, and all their schools, declared Turkey in a state of dissolution, and they consider the kingdom of Greece to be its natural heir. If we go from them to the Bonapartists,and one of the great and honourable peculiarities of the present Emperor is, as far as possible, to follow the policy of his uncle,we shall find that the great Napoleon gave Moldavia and Wallachia to Russia, intending to take Albania for himself, uncertain what he should do with Constantinople, but merely determined that it should not belong to Russia. We are thus engaged in a war with allies who entertain pretty much the same opinion of Turkey as its enemies do. Are we able to maintain the integrity of the Ottoman Empire against the opinions of both?

Not only are our opinions respecting the maintenance of the

Ottoman Empire opposed to those of our two allies, France and Austria; but even if we give in to their views, and consent to restrict still further the limits of the Sultan's dominions, are we in accord with these allies as to what is to be put in the place? We would certainly be for a Slavonian State, united and strengthened by representative and popular institutions. Taking Servia, the most really independent of all, as a nucleus, a kingdom of the Lower Danube might be founded. But as England could never agree with either France or Austria about the government of Greece, even when France was constitutional, how could it agree with them now that France is imperial. Austria would object to any Slavonian or Danubian kingdom, even despotic. Austria agrees with Russia in wishing to see the Principalities separated and isolated. What then, with such allies, could come, even in the event of triumphant war, but the re-establishment of the status quo ante bellum ?-Bulgaria, and Albania, and Thessaly, endowed with Christian communities, which must amount to virtual independence, and their rule, if not by Christian princes, at least by their Christian clergy. Whilst the Sultan, for the integrity of whose European empire we took up arms, will, in reality, be limited to reign over Roumelia and occupy Constantinople, whilst his true home, power, and empire will exist on the other side of the Bosphorus, and be more Asiatic than ever.

It is only with the prospect of such a termination as this to the war, that we venture to say, that an early understanding with Russia would have been preferable. A thorough war, that would reduce Russia from weighing upon the rest of the old continent—which would leave Turkey to free reconstruction-which would allow Germany to develope representative institutions—and which would give Asia repose from Russia's ambition and intrigue,— such a war would be worth the waging, and worth the expenditure. But a war undertaken in concert with Austria, whom we must not offend by advancing beyond the Pruth-a war undertaken in concert with the French Emperor, who will not hear of popular movements or free institutions,-a war, in short, to be waged in subordination to Turkey; and our troops allowed to proceed merely where Turkey may choose,-such a war as this will not amend what is wrong, strengthen what is weak, nor fix what is uncertain in the state of the Levant:-it is a war which, commencing in insincerity, must end without result.

We should say, without result in Turkey; for result elsewhere, in diplomacy and in the political relations, alliances, and prospects of Europe and Asia, there will be abundance. The first result must be more strenuous efforts on the part of Russia to conciliate France. In those papers lately published, nothing is so manifest and striking as the contempt entertained by the Court of St. Petersburg for the ruler and the government of the French. He scarcely deigns to take them into consideration. Politically, and even socially, the Emperor Napoleon was thrust into a kind of Coventry -princesses forbidden to marry him, courts to receive him, and cabinets advised to enter into the most solemn engagements affect

ing the balance of Europe without consulting that of Paris. It will now be otherwise. Already, in his behaviour at the time of Sir H. Seymour's departure, the Czar covered the French ambassador with orders, whilst dismissing the English envoy without an interview. In this policy Nicholas may not succeed in detaching Napoleon the Third from the alliance which he has formed. The conduct of the French Emperor has been as frank and straightforward as that of the Czar was the contrary. But years roll on; and years, that bring changes everywhere, bring them nowhere more potently and surely than in France. In the antagonism which, at the commencement of the century, prevailed between France and England, Russia alternately sided with one and with the other. At the present epoch the great antagonism is between England and Russia; and France certainly begins by taking a cordial part with England. But how long will this last? French views in the Levant may be easily satisfied. France in Western Europe has much to gain or to regain that Russia has in her gift, and which the Emperor Napoleon requires for the honour of his house and the vindication of his country; and thus a war which has commenced on the Bosphorus may terminate on the Scheldt.

But let us not be pessimist; this is a possibility, not a probability. The French have not only a great interest in the Mediterranean, but a permanent interest in the independence of eastern and central Europe; and neither can the Bosphorus be preserved from the grasp of Russia, nor Germany freed from its dictation, without an honest and zealous prosecution of the present war, and the pursuing it, if necessary, from being a little to a great one. Napoleon the Third is sufficiently sagacious to perceive this. One characteristic of his temper is persistence; and he who would achieve great things in policy, or in war, must follow them in one direction, without wayward caprice or sudden turns. The necessity of humbling Russia must be manifest to France, if France with the rest of Europe is to be emancipated from its dictation and control.

In accordance with the plan of conciliating France would be a kind of war-policy, which even Russian statesmen have always, and all along, strongly recommended. This is to turn Russian efforts, resources, intrigues, and armies away from Europe, and concentrate them on the extension of the Russian empire in Asia. Were Russian armies of defence posted behind the Pruth, and all its powers of aggression directed towards Persia, so as to destroy the Mahommedan power there, and attack the Ottoman from the East, such a war might be pregnant with results menacing the English ascendancy in Asia, whilst slightly affecting French or European interests in the Levant. Such a war, extending, as it probably would, from the walls of China to the Sea of Asoph, and extending south to the tribes of Affghanistan and Arabia, would require tremendous efforts and give rise to marvellous events. It would be one of the most gigantic wars ever waged, and which would probably end in one of two alternativesit would either expel us from Asia, or leave us masters of it in

toto; for the word of Alexander is still true: Asia can no more have two masters, than the firmament have two suns.

We are far from thinking that such a move, if adopted by Russia, would prove a successful one. Wars in Asia are in a great measure financial wars; and in this we need not assert our superiority. There is no point, even of the large continent of Asia, to which we could not bring forces by water more quickly than Russia by land. We can get to Trebizond and Asoph, to the ports of Syria and of the Persian Gulf, and can advance from them long before Russia could pour her armies through the passes of Daghestan, or by the deserts of the Sea of Aral; and it seems to us, that Russia has less chance of having a signal success in an Asiatic than in a European war. But if Napoleon, without fleet or credit, dared that colossal enterprise, why may not Nicholas undertake it?

It is time to sum up a result, and deduce an opinion, from all these varied considerations. That opinion is, that if the war we have undertaken is to be a little one, if it is to be confined to the burning of fleets, the exclusion of Russian vessels from the Black Sea, to the fortification of Gallipoli, and to an easy and contemplative military attitude assumed at Varna or elsewhere, then we must say it would have been better to have received the first overture of Russia more attentively and more amicably, and have come to such an arrangement as would have secured to the Turks fair play and opportunity for living out their time, if they are to die, or resuscitating them vitally and their energies, if they are to live. Meeting Nicholas frankly, but firmly, at first, instead of turning from him and shirking the whole question, might have led to this. However, in default of this, our next duty was to rouse the Turk to maintain that independence, vitality, and integrity, which we rather gratuitously guaranteed to him. Having thrown away both opportunities of preserving peace, there remained the alternative of undertaking a serious and a great war, one that would effectually humble Russia, and procure to the races not her own, over whom she tyrannises, national independence, and a fair commencement of freedom. This is what is wanting to Greeks, Slavons, Romans, Hungarians, and Poles. These, we may depend upon it, are to us true allies, the only efficient, desirable, grateful, real ones. We have, however, lost so many opportunities of saving them. We have allowed ourselves to be so tied and fascinated by Austria and her insidious alliance, and are so bound down to combat despotism merely by those means which despotism itself may change and permit, that we doubt much the seriousness, the largeness, and the sincerity of the war. In that case, we had far better have stayed as we were, and taken Mr. Bright for our Prime Minister; for to the disappointments and oppression of the races of the east of Europe, will be added the supreme discontent of the public at home, and its distrust of its constitutional rulers for any enterprise or effort that is great or good.

VOL. XXXV.

D D

THE WATCHET PITCHER.

AWAY, ye simple ones, away!

Bring no vain fancies hither:

The brightest dreams of youth decay,
The fairest roses wither.

Aye! since this fountain first was planned,
And Dryad learnt to drink,
Have lovers held, knit hand in hand,

Sweet parley at its brink.

From youth to age this waterfall

Eternally flows on,

But where, aye! tell me where, are all
Those constant lovers gone?

The falcon on the turtle preys,
And lovers' vows are lither,

The brightest dream of youth decays,
The fairest roses wither.

"Thy Watchet Pitcher set adown,

Fair maid, and list to one

Who much this sorry world hath known,— A muser thereupon.

"Though youth is ardent, gay, and bold,
It's flattery beguiles,

Though Giles is young-and I am old,
Ne'er trust thy heart to Giles.

"Thy oft-filled Watchet Pitcher may
Be broken coming hither;

Thy doting slave may prove a knave,—
The fairest roses wither."