THE WAR, AND ITS POLICY.*

THE prominent fact, the leading influence in all histories, has ever been the antagonism of great empires. Notwithstanding the moral grandeur and intellectual superiority of the Greeks, we should in all probability have cared little for their squabbles, and heard less of their heroism, their philosophy, and their literature, had it not been for their great and successful antagonism to the Persian Empire. Their great glory was to have established the ascendancy of Europe over Asia, an ascendancy which Rome continued. The supremacy of ancient over modern history consists, indeed, in this, the magnitude, the might, of its chief antagonisms.

Modern history hitherto, at least previous to the present century, affords few examples of the kind. The old rivalry between European States, between France and England, England and Spain, Austria and France, Austria and Prussia, resemble the wars and rivalries of the Grecian republics, before Asia offered a scope for their ambition, and a field for their armies. But with the nineteenth century commence, for Europe, those greater wars and more vast antagonisms, which, when they are put into action, fill the theatre of the world, and arouse the interest and attention of all mankind.

The great fact of the present mid-century is, no doubt, the closing of the old and well-fought out rivalry of France and England, and the commencement of a far more vast antagonism, that between England and Russia, between England; as the most advanced power of civilisation and freedom, and Russia, as the last remaining stronghold of barbarism and despotic rule. There are some who deem that antagonism to be but the affair of a day or a year. The English, generous in their enmities, look upon short and brief combats as the best way of testing the superiority of two stout rivals, and their idea is, that victor and vanquished may shake hands even after mortal combat. The world is not so generous as the Englishman, and is not so ready to accept discomfiture and forgive defeat. We are now sailing and marching not only to destroy Russian fleets and armies, and to haul down her flag of supremacy in the north, in the south, and in the east, but we are flinging ourselves and our power athwart the most cherished hopes and ambition of that country. One war, even a war of some years, instead of settling the feud between Russia

* In the present number of Miscellany several papers will be found on the all-absorbing subject of the day, the War with Russia. Various opinions are given by the respective writers, with some of which we do not entirely agree. On reflection, however, it has been thought best to give the articles without further comment, thus leaving the reader to draw his own conclusions from the facts which they contain. The present paper proceeds from an able correspondent, whose communication merits attentive perusal.-EDITOR.

VOL. XXXV.

с с

and England, will but first open it. And what we must prepare for is, not merely the war of a few campaigns, but the antagonism of perhaps a century.

Let us not deceive ourselves. The present war has not for its cause a mere bone of contention, or a couple of provinces on the Danube. What England and Russia are really about to dispute is the empire of Asia, as well as ascendancy in Europe. We have had the signal address or great good fortune to commence that war for an apparently European question, and so we have been able to marshal upon our side the most puissant of European powers. But they will soon find out that the true object in dispute is not Europe, but Asia; and then, instead of being, as we hoped, but one of an alliance for the reduction of Russia, we shall, in fact, be compelled to bear, by and by, the whole weight of it.

The Czar sees this well, and has shown in his words and preparations, a full sense of his and of our position. In the present war he has one great safety, one great buckler of defence. this, that in consequence of the alliance with which we undertake the war, we cannot fight it with popular weapons. We cannot invoke the cause of liberty, the nationality of races, or the independence of countries now subject. The Emperor of the French will not join us in any appeal to popular insurrection, and Austria will oppose any scheme for Slavonian freedom and independence. Whilst Prussia covers Poland in a manner to protect that weak point of Russia from all European agression, Austria will forbid the formation of any nucleus of Slavonian or Servian freedom. And thus, without the people for our allies, we must go to war with fleets and armies, and with these alone. Let us consider what we can do with them.

The first hostile shots will now no doubt be fired in the Baltic. Decisive they will be, as far as the establishment of naval superiority may go, with the destruction of every Russian vessel that may have dared to remain in a port of less than first-rate strength. We should doubt, however, the expediency, if even there was the possibility, of attacking Cronstadt. Such a feat might prove an admirable crowning one at the close of the war, when both monarch and people were overcome by a series of disasters, and when both might prefer to terminate the war, rather than see their capital destroyed and its fortress stormed. At the present moment, however, an attack upon Cronstadt, whatever its success, would be provocative, not conclusive. Russia is not like Denmark or Portugal, a nation whose capital is its all-worth surrendering a kingdom to save. Russia has sacrificed a capital before now; it has the spirit to do so again, rather than succumb.

A powerful and hostile fleet in possession of the Baltic, and led by an enterprising commander, even although that fleet did nothing, must be a source of the greatest expense and anxiety to Russia. We have at present a sufficient number of marines to form an army, and this might be employed upon any point,

whether of Finland or Lithuania. As the Russians would be deprived of the passage across the Gulf of Finland, the Czar will be obliged to keep distinct armies north and south of it, without which his very capital would not be safe. Poland may be bridled by strong fortresses, and hemmed in by Prussian troops and police; but should the war last, it will be impossible to prevent the Poles from endeavouring to profit by it. Their only mode of doing so, is by opening a communication with the coast. So that this we may say, at least: a British fleet, mistress of the Baltic, will necessitate the employment by Russia of fully one-half of her armies, her vigilance, and her resources at the northern extremity of her empire, leaving her but the other half wherewith to prosecute the gigantic task of pushing her way south, or even holding her ground in that direction against the united forces of England, France, and Turkey.

Whilst this at least is the service to be performed by the Baltic fleet, and notwithstanding all the hopes entertained of Sir Charles Napier, it will be far more politic to make use of this fleet in the way of menace than of either provocation or destruction,-what are we to expect from the naval and military force soon to be concentrated in the Bosphorus? And here we must confess, that whilst deprecating any gigantic act of aggression in the Baltic, we, as well as the public, will be much disappointed, if something grand, something worthy of the cause, and of such powers, be not achieved in the Black Sea. Here it is that we want to fling back the power of Russia. Here we want to display to every race and every country in the Levant, that Western Europe is too strong for her. Here we want to convince the Russians themselves what any further aim at conquest west of the Pruth is certain to cost them.

From all, however, that has transpired or can be conjectured, there is more of defence than of offence contemplated at present by French and English on the shores of the Black Sea and the Straits. The first certainty seems to be, that the old Chersonesus (that peninsula which forms the European shore of the Dardanelles) is to be fortified and occupied by the troops of the western powers. It was by the possession of the Chersonesus that the ancient Greeks kept possession of the Dardanelles, as well as a strong influence in these regions,-to them so productive in political influence and mineral wealth. The possession of the Chersonesus is now of far greater import. If, at any future time, the Russians passing the Balkan, and occupying Adrianople, should advance into Thrace, they might, previous to attacking Constantinople, pass that capital, and pushing on a division to Gallipoli, occupy the Chersonesus. Nothing could be more easy than to fortify themselves there, landward and seaward, and they would thus command the passage of the Dardanelles, and either prevent a fleet entering, or cut off communication with any fleet that was already within the Sea of Marmora. The fortification of the isthmus of Gallipoli is therefore one of the first military objects to be accomplished by the defenders of Turkey. And