"

Atlantic Division, Army Piers 1, 2, 3, and 4; United States Navy Naval Communications Service, 90 Church Street, New York, N. Y.; Governors Island and Fort Jay, 2d Service Command. The importance of the Western Union Telegraph Co. and the Western Union Cable Co. in our country's defense program can be judged by the following, which appeared in the company's annual report for 1952: More deep-sea amplifiers were placed in service, further increasing international-cable capacity. Increased service requirements of the Armed Forces, other governmental departments, and defense industries were fully met. Of special importance was the expansion of the extensive leased communication systems furnished by Western Union for governmental and other large customers. The company was awarded Government contracts by the Air Force, the Navy, and the Signal Corps for the development of special electronic equipment and for other projects, involving a total of $6 million."

The Senate Internal Security Subcommittee takes cognizance of this situation as possessing a threat to the internal security of this country.

Yesterday, the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee met with Ivar Peterson, Acting Chairman of the National Labor Relations Board, and members Abe Murdock and John Houston, and entered into executive discussion. A copy of the transcript of that discussion is attached herewith.

At the termination of this session, as chairman of the Internal Security Subcommittee, I made the following recommendations:

1. That the whole matter be brought to the attention of the President of the United States;

2. That the NLRB not certify the American Communications Association as the bargaining representatives of the employees of Western Union and the American Cable & Radio Co.

3. That in view of the NLRB's objection that they could not withhold certification with possibly being held in contempt of the district court, the NLRB obtain a stay from Judge Letts which would enable it to withold certification of the ACA as a bargaining agent.

4. That appropriate legislation, now pending before the Congress which would remedy the present situation, be expedited.

Accordingly, as chairman of the Internal Security Subcommittee, I ask that you give consideration to the enactment of whatever legislation there is before your committee that would remedy the present danger to the country.

Sincerely,

WILLIAM E. JENNER, Chairman Internal Security Subcommittee.

Despite this, the NLRB did certify the ACA as the bargaining unit of Western Union employees on June 3, 1953.42

The so-called Chicago "massacre," the San Francisco dock and general strike, and the movement into California of migrants from the Dust Bowl, were central themes in the troubled labor history of the 1930's. Through their key posts in the Maritime Labor Board, the LaFollette Subcommittee, the NLRB, the House Committee on Interstate Migration and the Labor Division of the Farm Security Administration, Silvermaster, Kramer, Abt, Witt, Rosenberg, Smith, Weber, Collins, and Flato were intimately involved in one or the other of these disturbances.

The subcommittee did not attempt to decide who was right or who was wrong in any of these employer-labor clashes. It does however, call attention to the fact that secret Communist agents were speaking and acting on behalf of the United States Government in these struggles. The same agents were preparing reports and documents on which national labor policy was being made, and out of which a vast quantity of labor history has since been written.

2 See letters of Ivar Peterson, Acting Chairman of NLRB and of J. L. Wilcox, vice president of Western Union to the chairman of the subcommittee (pp. 670-073).

THE NET OVER AGRICULTURE

The man who founded the first Communist cell in the United States Government was the late Harold M. Ware. Ware's mother, the late Ella Reeve Bloor, was openly advertised by Communist officials as "the First Lady of the Communist Party, United States of America." In her autobiography, "We Are Many," she tells how her son, Hal, served in the U. S. S. R. as a leader in the Soviet collective farm program under both Lenin and Stalin (We Are Many, pp. 266-279).

When Ware came to Washington in the early 1930's, he called himself an "agricultural engineer," attached to Farm Research, Inc., 1343 H Street NW.

Charles J. Coe joined the Farm Research organization in 1936. He became editor of the Farm Research publication, Facts for Farmers, in 1937 (pp. 722, 723).

Coe, the brother of Virginius Frank Coe, was listed in the 1939 Berle memorandum. He refused to answer all questions regarding his Communist connections-including even his present editorship of "Facts for Farmers"-when he took the stand in this series of hearings.

Six members of Hal Ware's parent Communist cell identified as such in sworn testimony worked for the original Agricultural Adjustment Administration of the Department of Agriculture.

They were Alger Hiss, Lee Pressman, John Abt, Nathan Witt, Nathaniel Weyl, and Charles Kramer.

Margaret Bennett Porter also worked for the original AAA. She invoked the fifth amendment when asked by us if she were a secret Communist during the period of employment there.

George N. Peck, who was appointed by President Roosevelt as AAA's first administrator, wrote a book, Why Quit Our Own, to tell what happened within the agency in the period when the members of the Ware cell were actively at work there. Pertinent passages from that book are included here.

A plague of young lawyers settled on Washington *** in the legal division were formed the plans which eventually turned the AAA from a device to aid the farmer to a device to introduce the collectivist system of agriculture into this country (Why Quit, etc., p. 20).

***The inner ring was evidently out to "get" Mr. Brand; they also wanted to be rid of me. They wanted to purge the AAA of all businessmen or any others who did not welcome the coming of the new day of revolution (ibid., pp. 143, 144).

These prattlers were for the most part employees of the Government and had taken the oath of allegiance. But they took the position that their high purposes gave them a supermorality that could not be confused with the morality the Nation had been using. They were quite above such old-fogy, Tory, reactionary stuff as oaths of office or other religious antiquities. They owed allegiance, not to the United States-patriotism was for the nonthinking. They had a higher allegiance-an allegiance to the "Cause." The end justified the means (idem, pp. 115, 116).

*

***Most of that crowd, in their effects, were Communists. Indeed one day one of the co-op leaders told me that he could get tips from the Communists' headquarters in New York City as to what was going on before I knew what was in the wind (idem, p. 156).

Peek tells his own story of what happened to him for standing out against the "inner ring."

I resigned as Administrator of the AAA, setting out in my letter to the President that it was at his request. (idem, p. 25.)

*

The "economists" and professors knew what they wanted and were determined to get it. I thought I had them checked, but events proved that I was mistaken (idem, p. 91.)

Peek's successor, Chester A. Davis, made a heroic effort to drive most of these people from Government, in the famous Triple-A Purge of 1935 (Washington Post, February 6, 1935). But they found lodgment elsewhere, as the record of our hearings abundantly demonstrates.

THE HIDDEN COMMUNISTS

The subcommittee sought, while sketching the design of Communist penetration into Government and while interrogating persons the subcommittee knew to have been members of the various rings in the network, to learn the identity of the Communists who are presumably still in Government, as indicated by Miss Bentley's testimony. Virtually all of the witnesses, however, invoked their privilege against incrimination when asked about the details of the conspiracy.

The subcommittee made every inducement to assure each witness that it was searching for evidence and was not seeking to harass him. in any way. However, virtually all elected to exercise their privilege under the Constitution and thwarted this purpose of the subcommittee. For this reason, the subcommittee has strongly supported S. 16, recently passed by the Senate. The subcommittee believes that an early enactment of this bill will cause many secrets to be unlocked in the interest of our security. Senator Jenner on April 25, 1953, made the following statement in connection with his support of this bill:

The Internal Security Subcommittee has been experiencing a long series of abuses on the part of witnesses invoking the fifth amendment to the Constitution. This amendment provides that no witness shall be required to give testimony against himself. However, it is our observation that in addition to performing its historic function-the protection of the individual under the Bill of Rightsthe fifth amendment is being perverted into a shield to conceal the facts of the Communist conspiracy.

The subcommittee has labored, under its senatorial mandate, to produce for the record evidence outlining the pattern and design of the Soviet conspiracy against our Government and against our academic institutions. It has tried unremittingly to elicit its evidence from original sources. But this conspiracy yields up its secrets grudgingly and in meager portions.

This

For the most part, these secrets come from the former participants in the conspiracy in whom the indestructible desire for truth has prevailed, and led them to return from the ranks of the Communists into the legions of free men. subcommittee has done everything to make clear that it will aid those who wish to extricate themselves from the shackles of their past. And we are happy to observe that academic institutions are recognizing that there is a place for those who, after a transgression, have rejoined the fellowship of freedom. Too often, noisy and fearsome abuse flowing in some public channels has been the reward for those who recaptured their integrity-a phenomenon indeed hard to comprehend and one that has retarded our acquisition of truth.

When our subcommittee has elicited its evidence from these sources, it summons as witnesses those who seem to be involved in the present conspiracy. These witnesses almost invariably prove belligerent and unyielding. Most of them, when asked about the evidence, invoke the privilege which they claim accrues to them by virtue of the fifth amendment to the Constitution. Many try to sense the scope and the nature of the subcommittee's evidence and gage their tactics accordingly. These witnesses deny what they think the subcommittee cannot prove, but where they think denials under oath will involve them in perjury, they resort to the Bill of Rights.

A witness is not justified in claiming privilege under the fifth amendment when he feels that his testimony will involve other people. The justification for invoking the amendment is that the witness asserts under oath and in good faith that if he testifies in response to a certain question, he will put into the record evidence which will prove to be at least a link in a chain of evidence that will ultimately lead to his conviction for a crime that he has committed. It is a privilege that belongs to him and is for his protection and not the protection of others.

As chairman of this subcommittee, and recognizing that the abuse of the fifth amendment to the Constitution is, in fact, preventing the exposure of the Communist conspiracy, I feel that the enactment of S. 16, a bill introduced by Senator McCarran, granting immunity to witnesses appearing before congressional committees, will aid the Internal Security Subcommittee in bringing to light a great many new facts of the Communist conspiracy.

This proposed new law is carefully worded and provides that if a witness is given immunity by a committee, he can never be prosecuted at any time for the offense. The bill, however, is not in any sense a denial of the Bill of Rights, but rather an affirmation since it insures that a person, once he is granted immunity, can never be prosecuted.

Even though this bill should be passed, however, the subcommittee will continue to take cognizance of the reluctance to give testimony which seems to be experienced by those witnesses who are in the intermediate stage of disassociating themselves from the Communist intrigue.

This subcommittee is mindful that in this intermediate stage, a person will experience reluctance to give the names of those who have been involved with him. It is an understandable phenomenon in the process of transformation. This subcommittee has taken testimony in executive session from many people who it believes reside in this intermediate zone and it is exercising its proper discretion in allowing them to return home and to reflect upon the significance of their testimony.

It has never been the position of the Internal Security Subcommittee to hold up to punishment or to pillory past misdeeds. At the same time, however, it is charged with the duty of exposing the Communist conspiracy. Its function is to prepare future legislation and to expose present subversion. The proposed bill will greatly aid in carrying out these purposes.

THE JOHN P. DAVIES CASE

In its report on July 2, 1952, the Committee on the Judiciary concluded that John P. Davies, Jr., testified falsely with respect to his recommendation that Central Intelligence Agency employ and utilize certain persons with Communist associations.

Prior to that time the subcommittee had come into possession of a copy of a memorandum prepared by Lyle Munson, a former employee of the CIA, as follows:

APRIL 11, 1950.

I, Lyle H. Munson, make the following voluntary statement to Albert C. Hayden, Jr., and William S. Hyde, who have identified themselves to me as special agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

On Wednesday, November 16, 1949, I participated in a conference with John P. Davies, Jr., of the Department of State. My memorandum for record, written subsequent to that meeting, reports the following as the substance of Mr. Davies'

comments:

1. That as regards Chinese personnel, the persons most helpful to OPC would be Chinese with American wives or husbands, who consequently had close ties with this country.

2. That he (Davies) had discussed with other OPC staff members the matter of employing certain persons through appropriate cutouts, to consult and guide OPC in certain activities affecting the Far East.

3. That the persons he had indicated to them should be used were Benjamin K. Schwartz, Edgar Snow, Agnes Smedley, Anna Louise Strong, Professor (John) Fairbank and wife.

Mr. Davies expressed the feeling that the above-mentioned persons should be used by OPC, and that the consultation and guidance and materials prepared by them would represent the proper approach. Mr. Davies said that he would be

perfectly confident to put Professor and Mrs. Fairbank at the head of a unit charged with producing such materials. He said that he was aware that they were considered Communists by some uninformed persons, but that they were not Communists, but "only very (politically) sophisticated.'

It was Davies' suggestion that the above persons be situated physically in an office or suite of offices somewhere other than Washington (probably New York or Boston), and that through a cutout of OPC choosing, these persons provide not only guidance, but actually produce materials, for OPC utilization.

Davies was particularly insistent that Dr. Schwartz, of the Russian Research Institute at Harvard, be retained by OPC for policy guidance in certain fields of its activities, and noted that Dr. Schwartz had been most helpful to him as a consultant.

The suggestions and recommendations made by Mr. Davies did not constitute an order or directive, nor were they so interpreted by me or my superiors.

LYLE H. MUNSON:

At that time John P. Davies, Jr., was a member of the Policy Planning Staff of the State Department and Munson and one other CIA representative had been called in by Davies for the conference described in the April 11 statement.

During the course of testimony Munson stated that OPC was a subordinate portion of CIA and that Davies made unsolicited recommendations to him and one other CIA representative about personnel for that subordinate portion of the CIA operation. Munson considered that Davies at the time was acting as an official of the State Department.

Munson proceeded to testify that Davies recommended that all six persons as a group or unit be employed by CIA to give guidance to, consult with, and prepare materials for the CIA. Munson testified that he did not understand that they were to be used as double agents, that they were to be used through a cutout or a person officially connected with the CIA so that they would not be brought directly within CIA operations; that all six were to be used in the same way as part of the same team, performing one and the same function; that it was his recollection that Davies had said that Professor Fairbank and his wife were not Communist as some persons believed but were rather to be characterized as "very politically sophisticated" (IPR hearings, p. 2763); that it was not his understanding Miss Smedley or Miss Strong were being recommended as Communists but that they could be used for "consultation and guidance" (IPR hearings, pp. 2267, 2768).

Previously, on August 8 and August 10, 1951, Davies had been called to testify before the subcommittee, and did make certain unqualified and categorical assertions under oath. Davies' testimony was, for security purposes, kept in executive session.

After the testimony of Davies, the subcommittee, noting the discrepancies between that testimony and the sworn statement of Munson, had transmitted on September 21, 1951, a copy of the Davies transcript to the Department of Justice and asked that the Department determine whether it should take any action thereon. October 29, 1951, the Department of Justice replied that it appeared to the Department that there was insufficient evidence of perjury or any other Federal violation on Davies' part.

After Munson's testimony on February 15, 1952, the subcommittee again wrote to the Justice Department (on February 21, 1952) and enclosed the transcript of the Munson testimony and asked if the amplification of Munson's sworn statement, represented by the