resided in New York between 1945 and 1950. In the course of the hearings, Edward C. Carter, Secretary General of the Institute, was shown to have been engaged in devising ways and means of having Epstein's book The Unfinished Revolution in China read by the Secretary of State George C. Marshall, John Foster Dulles, and other leading policymakers of our Government. Epstein had been identified by Miss Bentley and other witnesses as a Communist agent.

An Associated Press story, dated July 29, 1953, with a dateline of Panmunjom, reported that Epstein turned up as a witness to the signing of the Korean armistice. He had arrived there in company with Communist correspondents Alan Winnington, of the London Daily Worker and Wilfred Burchett of the Paris Daily L'Humanite, from Communist truce headquarters at Kaesong. According to the dispatch, Epstein described himself as a stateless person who went to Communist China in 1950.

THE SAME WITNESSES BEFORE THE F. B. I.

By way of corroborating the impressive evidence the subcommittee had received concerning the witnesses appearing before this and certain other congressional committees, the subcommittee asked the Federal Bureau of Investigation if it interviewed these witnesses. Thirty-five cases were selected at random. The FBI review of these 35 cases shows the following:

(1) Thirty-three of these individuals had some type of identification with the Communist Party. Of the remaining 2 persons 1 was reported as a Communist sympathizer and the other as 1 who associated with Communists.

(2) Of these 35 individuals 7 had appeared before a congressional committee on a prior occasion. They proved uncooperative before the committee on each appearance.

(3) All 35 were interviewed by FBI agents; 26 were interviewed before their appearance before the congressional committee; 9 were interviewed subsequent to their congressional appearance.

(4) Of the 35 interviewed by the Bureau, 28 flatly refused to talk to agents. Of the 7 that did talk to agents, 3 denied allegations as to their Communist connections. They were not under oath.

One refused to deny or affirm Communist Party membership and refused to make any statement.

One denied knowing he was engaged in espionage activity from 1939 to 1945. On a subsequent interview he refused to talk on the grounds of his privilege against self-incrimination.

One furnished some information about communism but did not admit Communist Party membership. On a subsequent interview he refused to answer any questions.

One gave seemingly false information regarding his knowledge of a certain individual. On a subsequent interview 2 years later he refused to talk.

(5) The 35 uncooperative individuals refused to answer questions not only about their own Communist affiliations but about communism in general. They refused to cooperate in any way with the congressional committee.

Ten out of the thirty-five individuals were called before congressional sessions prior to the outbreak of the Korean war in June 1950. All 10 were uncooperative. Of these 10, 8 were called to testify after the outbreak of the Korean war; they remained uncooperative.

Three out of the thirty-five individuals were called before an executive session. They refused to cooperate. Of these 3, 2 were then called before public sessions; again they refused to cooperate.

FALSE SWEARING

The record is replete with instances of identified Communists, appearing before the subcommittee and invoking their privilege against self-incrimination in the face of the evidence, who have sworn

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on Government applications they have never been members of the Communist Party. In one case the subcommittee had as many as 14 affirmations 31 made by one such witness, denying Communist membership. In many of the cases it was apparent to the subcommittee that there was false swearing when the oath was taken. But under the law at the time, the statute of limitations provided that no action could be initiated after 3 years from the commission of that offense. The subcommittee feels that the seriousness of false swearing on membership in an organization, an affiliate of which has been killing our troops in Korea, is certainly of sufficient seriousness to warrant extension of the time within which the crime can be prosecuted. And if the time is extended, a Government employee would weigh more seriously his sworn denial.

The subcommittee has had considerable experience with the difficulty of establishing Communist Party membership from the testimony of recent defectors from the conspiracy. In its report of July 17, 1953, on subversion in education, the subcommittee observed:

The length of time involved for a Communist to make a complete break with the organization and its ideology and to acquire the outlook necessary to reveal the details of his participation in the Communist Party was such that it was impossible to determine from ex-Communists the present status of the infiltration. This is so because communism so pervades the whole being of an individual Communist that it is not easily or quickly put aside.

Bella V. Dodd, for instance, broke with the Communist Party in 1948. She testified that it was not until 1952 that she became sufficiently disentangled, emotionally, from her Communist ties to see her way clear to testify before a Senate committee. But by that time her competency to testify to direct events after 1948 had vanished, because she no longer had access to Communist secrets after her defection. The subcommittee recognized that her interpretations of events between 1948 and 1953 were those of an expert because of her experience but were in no sense testimony of an active participant (p. 520, education hearings).

Consequently, it is an exceptional case when an ex-Communist can testify to another's Communist membership less than 3 years back.

The subcommittee also recognized the complete inadequacy of certain Government application forms. The form used by the Office of War Information asked an employee if he were presently a Communist Party member (p. 794).32 A Communist could with impunity answer no to this if he effected a tactical resignation from the Communist Party the day of the signing of the form and rejoined the next day. The experience of Government agencies in enforcing the Taft-Hartley non-Communist affidavits shows how resourceful Communists are on this issue. Even if the element of a tactical resignation were not present, the prosecution agency would have to prove a person to be a Communist at the particular moment of signing to punish a violation of the regulation. This is virtually an impossible task.33

WARNINGS IGNORED

The subcommittee sought to determine precisely what aspect of the loyalty machinery failed, and allowed so many Soviet agents to remain

See testimony of Charles S. Flato, pp. 487 ff.

32 Furthermore, there was a vagueness and lack of precision in some of the application forms that the subcommittee encountered.

33 The climate of the period in which Communist infiltration made its greatest headway is demonstrated by the following statement by Alfred Klein, Chief General Counsel of the United States Civil Service Commission, in a case under litigation:

"If I had to express my opinion as to whether the applicant is a Communist, my reply would be in the affirmative. However, I am constrained to recommend that the applicant be rated eligible." (Soe Myers v. United States (272 U. S. 50; 30 Op. Atty. Gen. 79, 83).)

in positions of influence in the United States Government, in the face of impressive derogatory security information. The subcommittee reviewed the evidence with a view toward determining this. There is ample evidence that the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other agencies learned the underlying facts of the Communist conspiracy and time and time again performed their duty and notified the proper administrative agencies of this information.

The Chambers information on Alger Hiss, as we set forth above, was known to the Federal Bureau of Investigation some years before 1945. The Nixon memorandum reveals that by November 1945 there were three distinct sources of information on Hiss' connection with the Communist underground-Gouzenko, Bentley, and Chambers and yet, it was not until after the House Un-American Activities Committee had its hearings in 1948, 3 years later, that any action was taken on the Hiss case. This same inactivity was apparent in the cases of other persons mentioned as Communist agents in the 1945 Nixon memorandum, namely, Harold Glasser, Nathan Gregory Silvermaster, Edward J. Fitzgerald, Harry Magdoff, and others.34 These people stayed in their jobs, received promotions, and influenced policy for several years after impressive information had been marshalled.

In the case of this subcommittee's inquiry into American citizens at the United Nations, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, in virtually all the 26 cases, had transmitted derogatory information to the proper authorities in the State Department years earlier. These people had also appeared before a Federal grand jury in New York which had this derogatory evidence. Yet, it was not until the Internal Security Subcommittee brought this information forth in its public hearings in the fall of 1952, that any action was taken to remove these obvious security risks from their positions of trust and influence.

It is the function of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to uncover and compile security information and make it available, without evaluation and without recoinmendation, to the proper executive agencies. The Federal Bureau of Investigation cannot expose and cannot force action once it has reported the results of its investigation. This fact is basic in the understanding of the function performed by a congressional committee.

The breakdown in the loyalty machinery, encountered in this series of hearings, was basically not in the detection of evidence. Primarily, the breakdown came in the failure on the part of the responsible executive agencies to act on the information which was available.

There is a mass of evidence and information on the hidden Communist conspiracy in Government which is still inaccessible to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and to this subcommittee because persons who know the facts of this conspiracy are not cooperating with the security authorities of the country. In the course of its report on Subversion in the Educational Process, this subcommittee pointed out that:

If all the secrets now possessed by ex-Communists were made available to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and this committee, long strides would have been taken to expose fully the Communist conspiracy in the United States (p. 8, interim report 1).

"The subcommittee learned during this series of hearings that the Federal Bureau of Investigation had received derogatory security information and had conducted investigations during 1941 and 1942 on Alger Hiss, Harry Dexter White, Harry Magdoff, Maurice Halperin, and Harold Glasser.

The subcommittee recognizes not only that ex-Communists could be a source of much additional information, but, in addition, many Government workers who have always been loyal to the United States Government did learn by their contact with conspirators some details of subversion. If these people will come forward, either to the Federal Bureau of Investigation or to the congressional committees, great strides will be made in protecting the security of this country.

The subcommittee is aware of the campaign being conducted against the fact-gathering agencies of the Government, both of the executive and legislative, and must deplore the inroads this campaign has made.35

This campaign is based, in part, on misstatements of the powers and functions of the respective security agencies which are clearly not understood.

NET IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT

During the course of the hearings, the subcommittee encountered significant infiltration into the following agencies: The Coordinator of Information; the Office of Strategic Services; the Office of War Information; the Board of Economic Warfare; the Foreign Economic Administration; and the Office of Inter-American Affairs. These were all war agencies and their personnel was often assembled in the haste that wartime urgency impelled. It was apparent to the subcommittee that either these agencies had no security safeguards whatever, or else had no disinclination toward hiring Communists. There was evidence concerning scores of such employees whom the subcommittee never had an opportunity to hear, so pressing were its time exigencies. It did hear in open session 25 persons from these agencies, and they invoked their privilege against self-incrimination rather than deny the subcommittee evidence of their Communist. Party membership. The positions that these people held were often important and at a policymaking level.

În 1945, there emanated from the Bureau of the Budget a plan that provided that the personnel of all these agencies be consolidated and infused into the State Department. J. Anthony Panuch, the State Department Deputy Assistant Secretary who was designated by Secretary of State James F. Byrnes to supervise this consolidation, testified, on June 25, 1953, that it was this transfer of personnel, involving as it did vast numbers of what he termed "unscreened personnel", that changed the entire complexion of the State Department and still was having an adverse effect, securitywise, on the present Department of State.

Mr. PANUCH. In September of 1938 I became special counsel to the Securities and Exchange Commission in corporate reorganizations (p. 842).

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35 In a letter to William Frauenglass, a teacher who invoked his constitutional privilege regarding his Communist affiliations before this sub committee, made public on June 11, 1953, Dr. Albert Einstein, Princeton scientist, urged that "Every intellectual who is called before one of the committees ought to refuse to testify."

Max Lowenthal, whom several witnesses before our subcommittee refused to acknowledge as an associate on grounds that it might incriminate them, and who was the subject of a hearing before the House Committee on Un-American Activities on September 15, 1950, is the author of a book attacking the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The book was favorably reviewed in the Communist magazine,-Political Affairs for January 1951, under the title, "J. Edgar Hoover's American Gestapo."

Carl W. Ackerman, dean of the faculty of journalism at Columbia University, announced that he was discontinuing his practice of cooperating with Federal, State, and police investigating agencies except on written request and on advice of counsel (the Bulletin of the American Society of Newspaper Editors, April 1, 1953).

In October of 1945, upon Mr. Byrnes' request, I joined him in the State Department in the capacity of Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Administration and as coordinator of the merger of the Department under the three Executive orders which blended with the Department the wartime agencies operating in the foreign field.

These agencies were the Office of War Information, the intelligence units of the Office of Strategic Services, the Office of Inter-American Affairs, the Foreign Economic Administration, and the Office of Foreign Liquidation Commissioner. There were also certain units of the War Department General Staff concerned with occupation planning (p. 842).

Mr. MORRIS. What was the origin of this particular reorganization? How did that get its start?

Mr. PANUCH. That was in the Bureau of the Budget (p. 844).

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us, Mr. Panuch, how this reorganization became effective?

Mr. PANUCH. It added to the Department functions which had theretofore never been in the Department; specifically, propaganda functions in the Office of War Information *** (p. 849).

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The Office of Strategic Services brought in about 1,000 people from their Research and Intelligence Branch, and they were to be used under the President's order to create the nucleus of the centralized intelligence operation (p. 849).

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Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Panuch, to your knowledge, and drawing on your own experience, were there any political changes to be wrought by this reorganization? Mr. PANUCH. Well, it was a thoroughgoing reorganization of the Department by the addition of functions which necessarily changed the political or rather the policy structure of the Department.

The Intelligence directive to set up coordinated intelligence on a national level in a centralized unit of the Department presented a problem as to whether your tail would be wagging your dog; in other words, whether the intelligence units, coming in from these agencies, which would be the focal core of national intelligence organization, would, by a preemption of your high-level estimates which go to the Secretary of State and the President and the National Security Council, be really exercising an influence over policy beyond that which was traditionally exercised by the Foreign Service of the United States, through the geographic divisions of the Department (p. 850).

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Subsequently the President issued a directive to Secretary Byrnes, directing him to undertake the coordination of all foreign intelligence under the leadership of the State Department. I believe that that was on September 20, 1945. At the same time there was before the President a proposed directive for setting up a Central Intelligence Agency, which was submitted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Department then had the problem of advising the Secretary of State and the President as to what combination or correlation of these two entirely different concepts of mobilizing foreign intelligence at the national level should be blended into a forward operation (p. 849).

Senator WELKER. How did the reorganization which you have described, Mr. Panuch, seek to change the level of control in the various policy agencies? Mr. PANUCH. Senator, if I may offer a correction before answering your question, as to semantics, I know in Government, everybody talks about levels, but I would like to say "pattern."

Senator WELKER. Let us call it "pattern."

Mr. PANUCH. If I may, sir; I think the pattern, the essential part of the pattern was to shift your policy formulation, the essential basis on which your ultimate policy estimates are made into a central intelligence group which would overbalance your policy offices of the Department. In that way, while there would be no change in level, there would be a change in pattern impetus, control, and direction. The other change, of course, was the historic change which was initiated by our entry into the United Nations Organization, which placed a large part of foreign policy on an international basis rather than on the traditional country-to-country or bilateral basis. So that at the end of the war you would have had three groupings of policy formulation: Your international work in the