Senator FERGUSON. Was there a ring in Washington, where Communists were active, to get other Communists into the United States Government? Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer *** (IPR 4745).

Shortly after this testimony, Kaplan took the stand before the House Committee on Un-American Activities on June 10, 1952. His combined testimony fills about 61 pages. On those 61 pages we find that he believed it might incriminate him if he gave true answers to 244 questions.

Kaplan said it might incriminate him to tell who got him his first Government job in the Works Progress Administration, or to tell who his superior was in his second Government job with WPA's national research project, or to tell who arranged the appointment with Assistant Attorney General Thurman Arnold, which got him his third Government job as special assistant to the Attorney General, or to tell how he got his jobs with the War Production Board, the Foreign Economic Administration, the Treasury and the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion.

How did he get them? Who hired him? Who helped him? Who promoted him? Whom did he, in turn, hire, and help and promote? What kind of record did he make as a Government servant?

The man who gave Irving Kaplan his job as associate director of the national research project of WPA in 1935 was David Weintraub (IPR, p. 4647). The man who helped Irving Kaplan get his job with the Division of Economic Stability of the United Nations 12 years later was the same David Weintraub, who by that time was Director of that U. N. division (IPR, p. 4630).

Whittaker Chambers involved both Kaplan and Weintraub as Communists. He said that Kaplan gave him, Chambers, a job with the National Research Project of WPA in the 1930's as a service to the Communist conspiracy (IPR, p. 4756).

Elizabeth Bentley testified that Kaplan was one of the espionage ring who gave her stolen Government secrets in the 1940's.

Edward J. Fitzgerald, who got started in Government at the national research project, used Kaplan's name for reference to help him on his way up (p. 251).

When Kaplan applied for a post with the Federal Works Agency in 1942, he used the names of Lauchlin Currie and Abraham George Silverman as character references (exhibit 316). Currie, it will be recalled, was described by Elizabeth Bentley as one of her most important "avenues of influence." She named Silverman as a member of the underground. Silverman sought the shelter of the fifth amendment when questioned about these charges (IPR Report, p. 181.) Kaplan used the names of Currie and Silverman again, 2 years later, when he sought a job with Foreign Economic Administration. He got the job (exhibit No. 318). He used the same names, with the same success, in an application to the Treasury in 1945 (exhibit 322). When Kaplan went to the Treasury in June 1945, it was Frank Coe who appointed him (exhibit 322A). Coe's name was on the Berle notes and he was identified by Bentley as a Communist. He invoked the fifth amendment before us last December 1, 1952 (p. 227ff—U. N. hearings).

In July 1945, Harry Magdoff gave a "favorable comment concerning Mr. Kaplan's character," when Kaplan was preparing to join the United States Group Control Council in Germany (exhibit 321A).

Five months after he vouched for Kaplan's loyalty, Magdoff himself was named in the Nixon memorandum. In December 1945, a month after the memorandum was circulated, Magdoff was made Chief Economic Analyst in the Office of Business Economics, Department of Commerce, at $7,437.50. A year later, after five promotions, Harry Magdoff 21 was drawing $9,975 (p. 292).

After his return from Germany both Coe and Harold Glasser rated Kaplan's Treasury work E, for excellent. Glasser was the man, according to Chambers, who persuaded Harry Dexter White to produce more documents out of the Treasury (pp. 74-75).

On May 17, 1946, Kaplan was transferred by Coe to the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion (exhibit 322B). He left there, with accumulated leave and a clean bill of health, only when the agency itself ceased to exist.

The facts stated above hardly need interpretation, against the backdrop of Miss Bentley's previously quoted testimony.

We didn't have too much trouble (in moving these agents) * * *. Two of our best (avenues for placing people in positions) were Harry Dexter White and Lauchlin Currie ***. Whoever we had as an agent would automatically serve for putting some one else in ***. Once we got one person in, he got others, and the whole process continued like that ***. We trained our agents to make what good contacts they could here in Washington in order that should they need to get into a better job, they would have the contact ready. "We" tried to keep members "out of the real fighting," so they would not "get knocked off.”

There are certain other facts regarding Kaplan's record. At the National Research Project, he was in charge of "planning, developing, and directing the research work." He was "in charge of research section" at the Federal Works Agency. As special assistant to the Attorney General of the United States, he "planned and directed studies in connection with investigations of the TNEC (Temporary National Economic Committee) and the antitrust division." At the War Production Board he had full access to "secret monthly reports on the United States production program" (exhibit 318A). At the Treasury he "advised and conferred with the Secretary" (exhibit 322C).

When he was assigned to Germany, the Treasury asked the Secretary of State for a special passport, because of the "vital importance" of getting Kaplan to Germany "as soon as possible" (exhibit 319A). General McNarney designated him an official courier to carry classified documents (exhibit 319).

Here is a description of the job Irving Kaplan was supposed to do in Germany:

JOB DESCRIPTION, ECONOMIC ADVISER, P-8, IRVING KAPLAN

Serves as chief adviser on the most complex financial economic problems in connection with the comprehensive investigative and research work being undertaken to trace through captured and other records all German assets and looted property; renders expert advice and participates in planning major investigative and research projects with respect to uncovering German assets and tracing methods of financial and economic manipulation practiced by the German Government, such projects covering the investigation of individuals, banks, international holding companies and corporations, industrial combines, cartels and other kinds of business and financial enterprises, and involving questions in connection with 21 Magdoff's present occupation is somewhat obscure. He told the subcommittee he was self-employed, and then sought shelter under the umbrella of the fifth amendment when asked about his clients (p. 287).

such enterprises, such as: organization structure; states or political entities or laws under which organized; type and volume of commercial and financial transactions in which engaged; ownership and control of securities and obligations; devices used to cloak real control, such as dummy organizations, trust agreements, option contracts, repurchase agreements, interlocking directorates, industrial agreements; cartels, community of interest arrangements, copyright and patent agreements, etc.; also, engages in a planning and advisory capacity in organizing projects to trace millions of dollars of hoarded gold bullion, coin, foreign currency, art treasures, and other looted property seized by the German army and believed cached in neutral nations; and performs other work of equal importance and responsibility

HOW MANY SECRETS?

How many priceless American secrets have been conveyed to Moscow through the tunnels of the American Communist underground will never be known. The fact that documents were accumulated by unauthorized persons has been well established. For instance, in the winter of 1945, agents of the Office of Strategic Services invaded the New York office of an obscure, little magazine called Amerasia. This publication has been closely identified with the Institute of Pacific Relations and its connection with the Communists who had infiltrated IPR was set forth when that organization was the subject of a special inquiry by the subcommittee.

THE AMERASIA CASE

This subcommittee has not addressed itself specifically to the Amerasia case, which has been the subject of inquiries by other congressional committees, and it does not know whether any of the documents found in the Amerasia office were, in fact, transmitted further. But the testimony of Frank Bielaski, who in his capacity of director of investigations for the OSS, conducted the investigation is most significant.

Mr. BIELASKI. *** Of the documents we saw, I made the comment at the time, that we had documents there from every department of the Government, with the exception of the FBI. We didn't find any FBI documents in that office; but, the State Department Military Intelligence, Naval Intelligence, Bureau of Censorship, British Intelligence, OŠS, and possibly some others which I have forgotten.

They were not documents that were primarily of literary value, they were not literary documents. They were documents that had very definite value of a different kind, not all, but many of them. Every document I saw was stamped with the mail receipt stamp of the Department of State. I would not say that all 400 were stamped that way, but all I saw were so stamped. All those that I saw, also, were marked with a paragraph, I can read it exactly to you, I wrote it down in a memorandum, but it was to the effect that "The possession of these documents by an unauthorized person constituted a violation of the Espionage Act," and it quoted the paragraph, and so forth, of the act.

Oh, among these documents which I recall, and which we discussed while we were sitting there, to determine how we were going to handle this thing, was one all of us remember because it startled us. It was a lengthy document detailing the location of the units of the Nationalist Army of China, their strength, how they were armed, where they were located, the town in which they were located (ibid, p. 933).

Of my knowledge, the total number of documents involved exceeds a thousandthere is 400 that we saw, and I think the FBI seized 467 in Jaffe's office later.

36548 -53

Senator LODGE.22 Different ones?

Mr. BIELASKI. Different ones, and 280-some that they seized in Larsen's apartment, here in Washington.

Senator LODGE. What happened to them?

Mr. BIELASKI. The Department of Justice has them.

Senator LODGE. Still has them?

Mr. BIELASKI. Yes, sir (State Department Employee Investigation, hearings pursuant to S. Res. 231, 81st Cong., 1950, pp. 933, 945, 949, 950).

THEFTS OF SECRETS BY SOVIET AGENTS

The subcommittee took cognizance of the records of other committees and investigative bodies and observed the extensive thefts of secret documents by Communist agents.

THE CANADIAN ROYAL COMMISSION

23

In September 1945, Igor Gouzenko slipped away from the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa with the files which ultimately provoked a fullscale investigation by a Canadian Royal Commission. The report of this Royal Commission, based as it was on irrefutable documentation from the fountainhead of the conspiracy, demonstrates beyond challenge the international and intercontinental nature of the Kremlin's net. The report had some vitally significant things to say about the secrets which passed to Moscow through the North American and European tunnels of the underground:

***The evidence indicates that there were agents working along the same lines in the United Kingdom, the United States, and elsewhere. The Russians would know from their agents in Canada that information was being pooled: By getting some information on a subject here, some in England, and some in the United States, and then assembling it, a very large body of data could be built up.

*

However, much secret and valuable information was handed over.

Some of it is so secret still, that it can be referred to only obliquely and with the greatest care, and this is especially so in the case of certain secret information shared by Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

From the beginning there was the closest cooperation in scientific research between Canada, the United Kingdom and, later the United States.

22 Henry Cabot Lodge, presently United States Ambassador to the United Nations, was a member of the Special Senate Committee which made some inquiries into the Amerasia case. In his minority report on the results of these inquiries, Mr. Lodge gave the following statement about the Amerasia documents: At the time of the arrests, some 1,800 documents, the majority of which were of Government origin or were Government property, were recovered. These documents represented reports from the State Department, the Navy Department, OSS, Office of War Information, Federal Communications Commission, Foreign Economic Administration, and the War Department. According to the testimony of the chief FBI agent in charge of the Amerasia investigation, Mr. D. Milton Ladd: "some of them dealt with military matters, political affairs, etc. Many of these documents bore the classification 'secret,' 'confidential' or 'restricted.' Some were originals, some were copies prepared at the time the originals were made, and others were copies from the originals.'

That many of these documents were of great importance is shown by the following brief descriptions of some of the documents: A "top secret" document dealing with targets in Japan; a "top secret" document on the Japanese Air Force; a "top secret" report on Japanese resources; a "top secret" document which revealed the United States breakdown and mastery of Japanese codes; a "confidential" Office of Naval Intelligence report on the organization of Japanese naval forces; a "strictly confidential" communication from Ambassador Gauss on the reorganization of the Chinese Air Force; a "classified" report on airplane and seaplane anchorages in Japan, Formosa, and Korea prepared by Military Intelligence; an Office of Naval Intelligence "confidential" report on China coast physical geography and coastwise shipping routes, bearing the penciled notation "war plans, coastal areas, inner passage, mined areas"; a "very secret" document containing a memorandum to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington; two "secret" documents of the Military Intelligence Division entitled "Changes to Order of Battle of Chinese Army"; a document marked "top secret for eyes only," the very highest classification given; a "confidential" forecast of the Pacific war by Secretary Grew, which indicated the location of American submarines, together with other classified documents dealing with such subjects as the composition of United States forces in Manila and an operations plan for Naval Intelligence for their entire counter-intelligence organization in the United States.

23 The Report of the Royal Commission appointed under Order in Council P. C. 411 of February 5, 1946, To Investigate the Facts Relating to and the Circumstances Surrounding the Communication, by Public Officials and Other Persons in Positions of Trust of Secret and Confidential Information to Agents of a Foreign Power, June 27, 1946.

Next to the atomic bomb it would appear to us that the development of radar was perhaps the most vital work accomplished by the English-speaking democracies in the technical field during the period in question. British scientists had already done valuable pioneering work before 1939, but the improvements made since then had been considerable and many of these are still in the top secret category. Information of the greatest importance in this field was communicated to the Russians by agents.

The work done in connection with antisubmarine devices, asdic, is as important as the work done on radar-some authorities say that it is more important. Much of it is still in the top secret category. The information before us leads us to the conclusion that much, and very possibly all, of the information available in Canada on this subject has been compromised. It would at least be unwise to assume anything else.

The advances made in Canada by Canadians in developing and improving explosives and propellants were outstanding. Canadian scientists were given very full information on the work being done in the same fields in the United Kingdom and the United States. The very names of many formulas are still supposed to be secret: the production methods even more so. But the names and much of the secret information were given to the Russians as well as continuing information about trials, experiments and proposed future research. This information was of great value.

Another development in which Canada played a leading role is the "V. T. Fuse," the name being a code name. "This is the fuse that knocked the Japanese Air Force out of the air" *** One of the agents upon whom we are reporting had the wiring diagram of this fuse. There are certain details of the manufacture which were known only to the Americans; and the United States of America is, we are told, the only country that can build the fuse at the present time. This fuse is the "electro bomb" referred to in some of the Russian documents. None of the armaments sent to Russia during the war included this fuse.

In conclusion, therefore, we can say that much vital technical information, which should still be secret to the authorities of Canada, Great Britain and the United States, has been made known to the Russians by reason of the espionage activities reported on herein. The full extent of the information handed over is impossible to say; as we have already pointed out, these operations have been going on for some time. We should emphasize that the bulk of the technical information sought by the espionage leaders related to research developments which would play an important part in the postwar defenses of Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

*

*

*

Much of the political information obtained was classified as top secret and related not only to the policies of the Canadian Government but to those of the Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States. The value of information of this type needs no particularization.

Again, Canadian citizenship documents such as passports, naturalization certificates, and marriage or birth certificates were sought for illegal purposes and in some cases obtained. Such documents were sought not only for use in Canada but also, as illustrated for example by the Witczak passport case dealt with in section V of this report, for use in the United States. Sam Carr accepted in 1945 an assignment to facilitate the entry of other planted agents into Canada in the future, and it is clear that this type of operation, which was not a new development, was intended to be used more extensively in the future. Such planted agents could in time be used not only for espionage but for sabotage, leadership of subversive political groups, and other purposes. It is unnecessary to comment on the possible gravity of these operations. (The report of the Canadian Royal Commission pp. 616-620.)

THE BENTLEY RING'S HARVEST

About the time Gouzenko was telling his story to the Canadian authorities, Miss Bentley was telling hers to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. In 1948 she made her first public statement under oath.24

24 Hearings regarding Communist espionage in the United States Government by House of Representatives, Un-American Activities Committee, 80th Cong., 2d sess., pp. 522–531.