Several of your questions relate to why this international conference involving the five permanent members of the Council, why should we even be considering that. The Secretary addressed one aspect of that when he talked, I believe it was when he testified to the Obey committee last week. He was asked: Is it our policy to condition Soviet participation in the Middle East peace conference not only on diplomatic relations, but on a return to the high levels of the late 1970s of Soviet Jewish emigration? His reply is on the record, I just have a sentence or two from it I'd like to repeat. He said, "I don't think it is realistic to impose that kind of condition if we are able to get people to agree to the kind of international conference that we proposed recently." That is a very thoughtful sentence. The kind of international conference that we proposed recently.

But in any event, he had told the Soviets that whether they come to the conference or not they cannot expect to play a genuinely involved role in Middle East affairs as long as they treat Soviet Jewry the way they do and as long as they do not have diplomatic relations. But he was saying in effect it is not a price up front. But I underline for you "the kind of international conference that we have proposed."

Why the five? That request has been made consistently by the government of Jordan, by the King of Jordan over the last several years. Why has he said it? Why has he talked to five? Why not just the United States which was one possible way of proceeding, as the only mediator? Why not go back to Geneva of 1973, why not just the two, the super powers? Well, he feels very strongly about just the two as a prescription for polarization of the area. He does have friends in Europe, good friends in France and Britain. He would like to see them involved. He does not like the idea of a conference dynamic developing in any way that might draw the line ArabSoviet versus American-Israel. I respect his reasoning on that.

What happened to October 1987? Well, it did not work. It was an idea born out of a sense that there was no way that the parties could get together. It was an attempt to start the negotiations which each one had been telling us they were ready to have direct, face-to-face negotiations only if. Israel would like it simply as that, direct bilateral, face-to-face negotiations without any preconditions or any framework constructed which might obstruct the getting to those direct negotiations. But Israel stands alone among the parties of the region. The others are not willing to have that kind of negotiation. They want some kind of international framework to give legitimacy, to give guidance.

We felt we could not get there, so in October 1987, that idea that you referred to was raised in Israel and then subsequently raised with the Jordanians. The Israelis were not at ease with the concept. They had many reservations. Where would it lead? There were many unknowns, just how it would work, but the attractiveness of it was it would be a single event and then direct negotiations. That is what we found constantly in the effort to put the peace process on a movable track, a track which you can go down. The mirror image was that the Jordanians, for that precise reason, could not accept it. They did not, could not accept a negotiation which would be kicked off in a one day ceremonial event or a

meeting arranged at the Summit and then everyone leaves and there are just the two parties left to negotiate.

The Israelis, yes, gave a qualified acceptance, a green light, but with many concerns expressed at the same time, to be perfectly honest about it. But the proposal died. Its attraction to us was that with no other prospect of moving it just might be a way to jump start the very very cold engine of last fall.

The Chairman mentioned the relationship of the events in the territories beginning in December. I have to say yes, they have had their effect. It has changed perceptions. It perhaps has created a sense of more openness and flexibility throughout the region toward a new initiative. That is why you have the proposal that we are talking about today.

The nature of the forum, not defined in great specifics. Touched on in our proposal when we speak of the parties to each bilateral negotiation, and for us the heart of the whole effort has got to be accepted by everyone as direct negotiations and in geographic committees. The parties to each bilateral negotiation may refer reports on the status of their negotiations to the conference in a manner to be agreed. Here again, words that have quite a heavy meaning, and the meaning is limitation.

We are not going to tolerate efforts to turn this into an authoritative, a plenipotentiary conference such as some parties would like to see. And up to this moment I would have to put the Soviet Union in that category, the government of Syria in that category. We cannot accept it. I know that even if we could accept it, that Israel could not accept it, would not accept it.

It is a limited conference with a plenary to which reports may be referred by the negotiating parties.

Your words "permanent international tribunal" I think put a coloration on the concept which simply is not there.

The last thing we will accept is that any such conference would be a court of last resort. If the parties themselves in dealing with these terribly intractable issues have the sense that any hour of the day or night they can go to a plenary and get a ruling which will somehow with some authority, that is yet to be displayed by the Security Council itself, then they are deceiving themselves. There is going to be no such authority in the conference. There can be none. The issues are far too sensitive, far too existential for the states involved, and not one of them would be dictated to or imposed on by a plenary.

Your final questions about our preparedness to table a draft is what we have spoken of, for transitional arrangements.

U.S. PROPOSAL IS AN INTEGRAL WHOLE

Mr. LANTOS. It is the integral whole issue.

Ambassador MURPHY. But you mentioned, if I might just say a word on the idea of our tabling a draft. We are convinced that there is an opportunity to work with now, and that opportunities in the Middle East do not last, they never have. They come and they go and they are normally missed. We would like to make this one of the exceptions of the last 40 years. So to speed things along we are prepared to put our concepts down on paper as to what

would be workable, transitional arrangements. It would not be put down as a dictate to A, B, or C, but to negotiate against, to negotiate off of. The concept is it would speed things up.

Is it an ultimatum when we speak of integral whole? I can answer it this way, Congressman. We are working today with a set of ideas which have evolved from many hours, many visits, many contacts over the last several years. This is what we think is workable. We have said it is integral not to make it a dictate, not to make it an ultimatum, but to say gentlemen, if you pick this out, if you think you are standing in the cafeteria line and you want strawberries instead of peaches, forget it, because you take that and he's going to demand this. Then the whole package will unravel. We think the concept, particularly as regards procedures and the substance which has to be negotiated, the way we are ap proaching it makes sense and can work.

It can work only with difficulty, only with pain to each of the parties. They, I can assure you, have expressed that sense of pain very directly, openly, in frank and constructive talks throughout the region. But it is integral in that sense. It is not conceived as an ultimatum, but it is trying to share the sense that there are tradeoffs here for each of you. We think the proposal will meet each of your essential concerns.

But I do not bring, I do not sit here today to tell you that we have a yes from any party. What I am happy to tell you today is we do not have a no from any party. So far, so good.

Mr. LANTOS. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Levine?

CONCERNS EXPRESSED ABOUT THE PLO AND KING HUSSEIN

Mr. LEVINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me join in welcoming you, Mr. Ambassador, and in complimenting both you and the Secretary on the initiation of an extraordinarily important and sensitive process which we all very urgently hope succeeds.

I share your assessment that we are at a period of time in the region where we do have some unique opportunities. Some of those, incidentally, I believe were created by the success of the Persian Gulf policy that you outlined earlier, and I share your assessment of the success of that policy. I think it is now-after some initial wobbly beginnings-put on the appropriate footing and has made a big difference with regard to our presence and our credibility in the region.

I just briefly want to comment on two of the points you made in your answer to Mr. Lantos' questions. One is that I applaud your conclusion that nobody has yet said "no". I wish to underscore this point. At the same time, I would like to suggest a caveat that I hope will be in everybody's mind as this process proceeds; that is, almost nobody has said "no", or nobody has said definitely no, but certainly the PLO has come about as close to saying "no" as anybody can. When Mr. Arafat makes clear to the 15 Palestinians who were acceptable to all sides that their life expectancy would be significantly curtailed if they met with Secretary Shultz, and when Mr. Arafat proudly claims credit on Baghdad radio for the murder

of three innocent Israeli civilians in Dimona then that is not an encouraging sign. Further when he apparently suggests to his minions that a car bomb might be directed toward our Secretary, that is hardly the type of response which suggests that this hard-line terrorist group seeks to keep the door open. It causes me a great deal of anguish to see people who purport to want to have a role in the process playing a negative and terrorist role, while simultaneously, the Administration led by you and the Secretary-are trying to make the kind of strides and efforts that you have in order to try to open doors.

Secondly, I would like to draw your attention for a moment to the international conference issue you were just discussing. The fact is that the definition of the international conference has changed. The fact is, as you outlined in your response, that even though the Israelis in the form of Prime Minister Shamir-had a great deal of concern and a number of caveats about the Secretary's proposal to use the Reagan-Gorbachev summit as a jumpstart to some negotiations between the Israelis and the Jordanians, Prime Minister Shamir said yes and King Hussein said no.

I had hoped that that was merely symptomatic of King Hussein's concerns in advance of the Amman Conference. I had hoped that, subsequent to the Amman Conference-where he did as well as he did he would have had some additional security and felt a little bit more comfortable about saying yes to the type of jump-start that the Secretary had outlined before his trip to the Middle East. The fact is that the description of the international conference before the Secretary's visit to the Middle East was significantly more narrow than it is at present.

I would just like to throw a suggestion out for your consideration. If you don't feel like responding to it directly I would understand. But the suggestion might be that we might return a little bit closer to the definition of the international conference that the Secretary himself previously suggested if we pursued a framework similar to that which you have outlined, but lasting only until November of 1988 or January of 1989. Subsequently, there would be an opportunity to review it and perhaps renew something similar to it, depending upon the success of the discussions or the negotiations under the auspices of this administration.

I can definitely understand the sensitivity and skepticism of the Israelis about a process which will last well beyond the auspices of the people who are framing this procedure. Perhaps a way to bring us a little bit closer to what was originally suggested, but which would still meet the concerns that the other parties are offering, might be the one I just outlined.

I have a number of questions, even though my time is rapidly coming to a close. Let me ask you two very briefly now and I will hold the others until the second round.

First, have we said to King Hussein that his suggestion on PLO participation was not helpful and came at a most inopportune time. Do we believe that this suggestion was sincere-in other words, that the King actually wants the kind of PLO involvement that he outlined? Was he simply trying to protect his flanks regarding the type of caution that he may have about the dynamics

86-679 88 - 2

of the process? Or was he merely creating another condition in order to himself avoid coming forward and joining the process?

Can you give me your assessment of where the King is at this point? Is he likely to come forward? How serious was he regarding his suggestion on the PLO that we at least read about? And how accurate were the reports of the PLO involvement found in the American press as proposed by the King?

PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATION

Ambassador MURPHY. Let me speak more certainly to our understanding of thinking about Palestinian representation. We keep using the words "workable," "realistic." We consider the only way this negotiation is going to work is if it's in, as regards the occupied territories, if it's in a joint delegation, joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation.

Any Arab leader, not just the king, has to live with the slogan that the PLO is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, so I would not expect anyone to oppose PLO representation. But we have said, and actually I don't think there's any change in the King's position, I think he does understand, certainly we've spared no effort, on the concept of a joint delegation, that what has to be produced is delegation formed by the government of Jordan and Palestinians who are credible. To be credible they have to be credible with their own people. But they have to be people whose very presence are not going to drive Israel away from the table. If that happens, we have no conference, we have no negotiation of any nature.

So I think he does accept the concept of a joint delegation as a realistic one. That reflects the nature of the conversations we have had. In other words, I do not see that he is actually pushing for a separate Palestinian delegation.

NEED TO CONTINUE U.S. INITIATIVE INTO THE NEXT ADMINISTRATION

Mr. LEVINE. Do you wish to offer any response or thoughts or comments on the international conference suggestion I had, or would you prefer not to at this time?

Ambassador MURPHY. The concept of limiting the conference, or at least this outline of how the conference might proceed to the life of this administration, let me answer it indirectly.

Mr. LEVINE. This is a real bipartisan compliment, I want you to know.

Ambassador MURPHY. To answer indirectly?

Mr. LEVINE. No, to suggest this process.

Ambassador MURPHY. Yes, well I assume you have your own ideas of next January.

We have been asked by several of the governments in the region who know this is all very well and they see that the calendar is driven heavily by the life of the Reagan administration, and what then? The answer is very simple. If this is working there isn't any administration of any stripe that is going to walk away from this process. So I don't think there is any reason for doubts that if it turns into a workable negotiation.