other individuals who have planned or carried out, or otherwise been involved in the policy of genocide in the Darfur region, and should also freeze the assets of businesses controlled by the Government of Sudan or the National Congress Party; (8) the Government of the United States should not normalize relations with Sudan, including through the lifting of any sanctions, until the Government of Sudan agrees to, and takes demonstrable steps to implement, peace agreements for all areas of Sudan, including the Darfur region;

(9) those individuals found to be involved in the planning or carrying out of genocide, war crimes, or crimes against humanity should not hold leadership positions in the Government of Sudan or the coalition government established pursuant to the agreements reached in the Nairobi Declaration on the Final Phase of Peace in the Sudan; and

(10) the Government of Sudan has a primary responsibility to guarantee the safety and welfare of its citizens, which includes allowing them access to humanitarian assistance and providing them protection from violence.

SEC. 5. AMENDMENTS TO THE SUDAN PEACE ACT. * * *2

SEC. 6. SANCTIONS IN SUPPORT OF PEACE IN DARFUR.

(a) SANCTIONS.-Beginning on the date that is 30 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the President shall, notwithstanding paragraph (1) of section 6(b) of the Sudan Peace Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 note), implement the measures set forth in subparagraphs (A) through (D) of paragraph (2) of such section.

(b) BLOCKING OF ASSETS.-Beginning on the date that is 30 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the President shall, consistent with the authorities granted in the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), block the assets of appropriate senior officials of the Government of Sudan.

(c) WAIVER.-The President may waive the application of subsection (a) or (b) if the President determines and certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that such a waiver is in the national interest of the United States.

(d) CONTINUATION OF RESTRICTIONS.-Restrictions against the Government of Sudan that were imposed pursuant to title III and sections 508, 512, and 527 of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Act, 2004 (division D of Public Law 108-199; 118 Stat. 143), or any other similar provision of law, shall remain in effect against the Government of Sudan and may not be lifted pursuant to such provisions of law unless the President transmits a certification to the appropriate congressional committees in accordance with paragraph (2) of section 12(a) of the Sudan Peace Act (as added by section 5(a)(1) of this Act).

(e) DETERMINATION.-Notwithstanding subsection (a) of this section, the President shall continue to transmit the determination required under section 6(b)(1)(A) of the Sudan Peace Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 note).

2 For amended text, see page 636.

SEC. 7. ADDITIONAL AUTHORITIES.

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the President is authorized to provide assistance, other than military assistance, to areas that were outside of the control of the Government of Sudan on April 8, 2004, including to provide assistance for emergency relief, development and governance, or to implement any program in support of any viable peace agreement at the local, regional, or national level in Sudan.

SEC. 8. TECHNICAL CORRECTION.

Section 12 of the International Organizations Immunities Act (22) U.S.C. 288f-2) is amended by striking "Organization of African Unity" and inserting "African Union".

(2) Sudan Peace Act

Public Law 107–245 (H.R. 5531], 116 Stat. 1504, approved October 21, 2002; amended by Public Law 108 497 [Comprehensive Peace in Sudan Act of 2004; S. 2781], 118 Stat. 4012, approved December 23, 2004

AN ACT To facilitate famine relief efforts and a comprehensive solution to the war in Sudan.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1.1 SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the "Sudan Peace Act". SEC. 2.1 FINDINGS.

The Congress makes the following findings:

(1) The Government of Sudan has intensified its prosecution of the war against areas outside of its control, which has already cost more than 2,000,000 lives and has displaced more than 4,000,000 people.

(2) A viable, comprehensive, and internationally sponsored peace process, protected from manipulation, presents the best chance for a permanent resolution of the war, protection of human rights, and a self-sustaining Sudan.

(3) Continued strengthening and reform of humanitarian relief operations in Sudan is an essential element in the effort to bring an end to the war.

(4) Continued leadership by the United States is critical.

(5) Regardless of the future political status of the areas of Sudan outside of the control of the Government of Sudan, the absence of credible civil authority and institutions is a major impediment to achieving self-sustenance by the Sudanese people and to meaningful progress toward a viable peace process. It is critical that credible civil authority and institutions play an important role in the reconstruction of post-war Sudan.

(6) Through the manipulation of traditional rivalries among peoples in areas outside of its full control, the Government of Sudan has used divide-and-conquer techniques effectively to subjugate its population. However, internationally sponsored reconciliation efforts have played a critical role in reducing human suffering and the effectiveness of this tactic.

(7) The Government of Sudan utilizes and organizes militias, Popular Defense Forces, and other irregular units for raiding and enslaving parties in areas outside of the control of the Government of Sudan in an effort to disrupt severely the ability of the populations in those areas to sustain themselves. The tactic helps minimize the Government of Sudan's accountability internationally.

150 U.S.C. 1701 note.

(8) The Government of Sudan has repeatedly stated that it intends to use the expected proceeds from future oil sales to increase the tempo and lethality of the war against the areas outside of its control.

(9) By regularly banning air transport relief flights by the United Nations relief operation OLS, the Government of Sudan has been able to manipulate the receipt of food aid by the Sudanese people from the United States and other donor countries as a devastating weapon of war in the ongoing effort by the Government of Sudan to starve targeted groups and subdue areas of Sudan outside of the Government's control.

(10) The acts of the Government of Sudan, including the acts described in this section, constitute genocide as defined by the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (78 U.N.T.S. 277).

(11) The efforts of the United States and other donors in delivering relief and assistance through means outside of OLS have played a critical role in addressing the deficiencies in OLS and offset the Government of Sudan's manipulation of food donations to advantage in the civil war in Sudan.

(12) While the immediate needs of selected areas in Sudan facing starvation have been addressed in the near term, the population in areas of Sudan outside of the control of the Government of Sudan are still in danger of extreme disruption of their ability to sustain themselves.

(13) The Nuba Mountains and many areas in Bahr al Ghazal and the Upper Nile and the Blue Nile regions have been excluded completely from relief distribution by OLS, consequently placing their populations at increased risk of famine. (14) At a cost which has sometimes exceeded $1,000,000 per day, and with a primary focus on providing only for the immediate food needs of the recipients, the current international relief operations are neither sustainable nor desirable in the long term.

(15) The ability of populations to defend themselves against attack in areas outside of the control of the Government of Sudan has been severely compromised by the disengagement of the front-line states of Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Uganda, fostering the belief among officials of the Government of Sudan that success on the battlefield can be achieved.

(16) The United States should use all means of pressure available to facilitate a comprehensive solution to the war in Sudan, including

(A) the multilateralization of economic and diplomatic tools to compel the Government of Sudan to enter into a good faith peace process;

(B) the support or creation of viable democratic civil authority and institutions in areas of Sudan outside of government control;

(C) continued active support of people-to-people reconciliation mechanisms and efforts in areas outside of government control;

(D) the strengthening of the mechanisms to provide humanitarian relief to those areas; and

(E) cooperation among the trading partners of the United States and within multilateral institutions toward those ends.

SEC. 3.1 DEFINITIONS.

In this Act:

(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.-The term "appropriate congressional committees" means the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.

(2) GOVERNMENT OF SUDAN.-Except as provided in section 12, the 2 term "Government of Sudan" means the National Islamic Front government in Khartoum, Sudan.

(3) OLS.-The term "OLS" means the United Nations relief operation carried out by UNICEF, the World Food Program, and participating relief organizations known as "Operation Lifeline Sudan".

(4)3 SPLM.-The term "SPLM" means the Sudan People's Liberation Movement.

SEC. 4.1 CONDEMNATION OF SLAVERY, OTHER HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES, AND TACTICS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF SUDAN. The Congress hereby

(1) condemns

(A) violations of human rights on all sides of the conflict in Sudan;

(B) the Government of Sudan's overall human rights record, with regard to both the prosecution of the war and the denial of basic human and political rights to all Suda

nese;

(C) the ongoing slave trade in Sudan and the role of the Government of Sudan in abetting and tolerating the practice;

(D) the Government of Sudan's use and organization of "murahalliin" or "mujahadeen", Popular Defense Forces, and regular Sudanese Army units into organized and coordinated raiding and slaving parties in Bahr al Ghazal, the Nuba Mountains, and the Upper Nile and the Blue Nile regions; and

(E) aerial bombardment of civilian targets that is sponsored by the Government of Sudan; and

(2) recognizes that, along with selective bans on air transport relief flights by the Government of Sudan, the use of raiding and slaving parties is a tool for creating food shortages and is used as a systematic means to destroy the societies, culture, and economies of the Dinka, Nuer, and Nuba peoples in a policy of low-intensity ethnic cleansing.

SEC. 5.1 ASSISTANCE FOR PEACE AND DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE.

(a) ASSISTANCE TO SUDAN.-The President is authorized to provide increased assistance to the areas of Sudan that are not controlled by the Government of Sudan to prepare the population for

2 Sec. 5(a)(2)(A) of the Comprehensive Peace in Sudan Act of 2004 (Public Law 108-497; 118 Stat. 4017) struck out "The" and inserted in lieu thereof "Except as provided in section 12, the". 3 Sec. 5(a)(2)(B) of the Comprehensive Peace in Sudan Act of 2004 (Public Law 108-497; 118 Stat. 4017) added para. (4).