against the piracy which Lord Byron's moral lessons have no trifling tendency to foster, it will be time enough to call upon the Chancellor for his more effectual interposition. The Press will never suffer in freedom or in character from the recent decisions respecting Messrs. Lawrence and Co. As long as they continue to publish with impunity, the press is free enough in all conscience. When they cease to make money by their bad principles, the press will have a chance of recovering its respectability. Books, which like Peter Pindar's razors, are only made to sell, are the books which the community can best spare, and we anticipate no serious evil from a diminution of the compounder's profits.

With these views of the origin, nature, and tendency of the radical attack on Lord Eldon, we have derived much satisfaction from a perusal of the pamphlet now before us. It states clearly and fairly, the principal causes of expence and delay in the courts of Chancery, contrasts their state with that of the courts of Common Law, and makes material reductions from the apparent arrears of causes, which has excited so much dissatisfaction. The writer assures us that he is not even personally known to the Chancellor; but we regret that his statements have not received the confirmation and authority which is derived from the appearance of a name in the title page. The following passages are the most material:

"Among ignorant men it seems plausible reasoning to censure the Lord Chancellor and his Court, because suits of great importance to settle a testator's affairs, and to determine the rights of legatees, continue in Chancery many years undetermined; but the fallacy of this reasoning becomes apparent, when it is known that the division of his property cannot with justice be made, till his debts are paid, or the state of his debts and credits is minutely ascertained; and such suits in Chancery, and at Common Law, as contending parties `institute affecting his property, are disposed of. And indeed sometimes it happens, that a safe and honest judgment cannot be made as to a testator's, or an embarrassed man's affairs, till several suits in succession have been determined. Sandford v. Gibbon (Sweet.)-Comber v. Comber (Dowdeswell.)

"It is fit, however, that the statesmen and parties, who consider these matters, should be informed, that in the greater part of Chancery suits the delay occasioned by them is attended with very few, if any, very grievous inconveniences to the parties; for I venture to assert, that in suits where there is a clear fund, and a clear claim, and the solicitor knows his business, that fund is always accessible to infants for education, and to those who are entitled to it, for all reasonable and proper purposes; and that it may be got at with almost

as much facility as it could be got at from funds in the hands of any prudent executor or trustee, where there is not any suit pending in Chancery." P. 14.

"The subject of costs of suits was, in the late debate, greatly exaggerated; and Mr. Brougham is represented to have said, He would ask any professional man, common law as well as equity lawyers, (and upon the answer he would be content to rest the issue of this part of the argument,) whether, when the case had been sent him of a person kept out of a property of small amount which belonged to him, and by his skill he had discovered the precise nature of the wrong, if he found that the only remedy was to be obtained in the Court of Chancery, he would not think he had reduced the problem ab absurdum. No man who ever put a forensic habit on his back would think of advising a suit in equity to recover 50%. or 80l. or 1007. Could there, then, be a greater libel on the law of a country, than to say that a man must be kept ont of his right, because, if he sought it, the costs of the Court of Chancery must be his inevitable ruin ?

"This interrogative reasoning is founded on imaginary premises, which do not exist. I know not from what source Mr. Brougham acquired the knowledge on which he founded his argument, but I do not suppose he got it from Sir Samuel Romilly, though I find he has on several occasions (when speaking of the Court of Chancery) appealed for assistance to the shade of that gentleman, and sometimes he talks as if Duke Humphrey's ghost were by his side.'

"Now, notwithstanding Mr. Brougham's positive assertion to the contrary, I am of opinion that no well-informed lawyer, who has a practical knowledge of Chancery suits, would hesitate to advise a suitor to file a Bill to enforce a claim, pretty clear in its nature, although it should be for so small a sum as 50l. or 801. or 100%; and if the defendant was not insolvent, the plaintiff might expect to put a much greater portion of his demand into his pocket, on the close of his suit, than he would get by trying an action at common law for the same sum depending on contradictory testimony, even though Mr. Brougham were his adviser from the issuing of the writ to the signing of the final judgment. I know, an anonymous individual's opinion may be despised; but, that its worth may be properly estimated, it may be well to state one or two authorities on which it is founded, because no man can deny that suits often occur, in a court of equity, with various knotty points to be decided, which, from first to last, do not cost so much as one hundred pounds on both sides. But to the proof: the cases of Dixon v. Dixon (Jennings), and Wright . Livesey (Lloyd, exparte Jones (Cox), are proofs of the truth of my assertion.

"In the first case the bill was filed for a specific performance of a purchase of lands in Staffordshire; the title was disputed; the defendants appeared by different solicitors, the cause was heard,

and referred to Master Cox; an abstract was left and proceedings on the title taken in the Masters's office; different solicitors were employed; a report was obtained, and objections to the report taken; the cause was again heard a second time on further directions, and the costs of the suit on both sides as between attorney and client were not 110. This suit lay dormant for several months, owing to circumstances over which neither the Court nor its practice had any controul, and yet the suit was commenced and terminated in less than twelve months.

"In the case of Wright v. Livesey, a question arose as to the construction of a will; there were different defendants, appearing by three different solicitors, setting up claims adverse to the plaintiff, and counsel were employed in three different interests for the different suitors, some of whom were infants, and the sum total of costs on all sides, as between attorney and client, was not more than 70%. This case was commenced and terminated in less than six months.

In the case Ex parte Jones, the father of several children who were entitled to a considerable property on coming of age, wished to have the interest of part of it to educate them during their minority, and for this purpose he applied to the Court of Chancery; different solicitors were employed, and the father obtained an allowance of 500l. a year, and the costs on all sides did not exceed, as between attorney and client, 100%-In this case, the order from the Court was obtained in August, 1819, and nothing done on it by the former solicitor for several years; but in March, 1823, the newly-appointed solicitor stated the facts to Master Cox, and on the 18th of that month he made his report, and the business was at an end, which neither the principles nor the practices of the court would have prevented being ended in August, 1819, or in the November following, had proper steps been taken for the purpose." P. 16.

"Of the 236 Chancery causes which were down for hearing when an account of them was delivered to the House of Commons in February, 1822, and which appeared to be in arrear, there were not, in fact, (as I would have proved, if I had had power to have directed the necessary enquiry,) fifty really in arrear." P. 38.

"To make out my case as to causes really in arrear I have been obliged to enter into a tedious and wearisome detail of facts, and I have not the ability to render them interesting to the general reader; but this detail is necessary here, and I know that the House of Commons would not listen to it; and having done this, I will now state a fact or two by way of contrasting the arrears of causes in the Court of Chancery with the arrear of causes in the Court of King's Bench. The arrears of causes in the King's Bench for London only, when the Lord Chief Justice took his seat after last Trinity Term, were 203, beginning with Walker v. Creak, Ff

VOL. XX. OCT. 1823.

and ending with Swiney v. Howes: the present arrears, now the sittings are ended, are 250; and there are similar arrears, though not so many, in the Court of Common Pleas. These are real arrears, and in that respect unlike the alleged arrears in Chancery; but they are unavoidable, and I refer to the fact only to illustrate and set off the speeches of the learned gentlemen on which Mr. Denman appears, in the debate on the 10th of July, to have commented very luminously*. If the learned common lawyers are determined to reform courts of justice, let them direct their attention to SHAM PLEAS and WRITS OF ERROR in their own courts, and suspend their patriotic labours in the Court of Chancery till they have studied more deeply its principles, or till they have at least acquired from respectable sources, a better knowledge than they at present possess of its practice and proceedings." P. 42.

These are important statements. They do not prove that it is impossible to expedite Chancery business, or to diminish Chancery costs. They do not prove that one individual can discharge the complicated duties which custom and accident have cast upon the Chancellor. But they shew that the real evil is much less than the apparent; that exaggeration and misrepresentation are the order of the day; and that we shall make a large and liberal allowance if we believe one hundredth part of what is said in Parliament, and one thousandth part of what is said out of Parliament, respecting the defects of the Chancery and its chief Magistrate.

ART. X. Heraldic Anomalies; or, Rank Confusion in our Orders of Precedence. With Disquisitions, Moral, Philosophical, and Historical, on all the existing Orders of Society. By It matters not Who. In Two Volumes. 8vo. 17. Whittakers. 1823.

THIS is one of the works which neither reader nor critic can have the heart to condemn. It belongs to the genus much-ado-aboutnothing; and is an agreeable addition to that department of literature. Generally speaking, books of this sort are written with great facility, and read with much labour. Availing ourselves of the rule of contraries, we infer, from the amuse

*It is probable that of these arrears in the King's Bench one tenth part, and certainly not more, stand as arrears to accominodate the parties. 1

ment which the Anomalies have afforded us, that they must have been the cause of some trouble to "It matters not Who." Complete success in the gossiping line is one of the rarest things in life. Wit, and good-humour. and anecdote, are never so severely taxed as when required to make a book without any particular object. No party to please; no problem to solve; no romancing appetite to gratify; no discovery to communicate; such are a few of the fearful odds against which the author of facetious disquisitions takes the field. If, as in the present case, he is a friend to order, and morals, and religion, the chances against him are greatly increased. And we know not whether a higher compliment can be paid to the cleverness of a writer than to say, that his volume amuses and sells, without containing any precise information, any thrilling narratives, any ill-nature, or any blasphemy.

Take for instance, the work before us: one-third of its stories and jokes, well mixed up with the subject matter of a Minerva press novel, would make a more than ordinarily entertaining book. The classical, historical, and antiquarian scraps, which are set before us in the most unpretending shape, might have been dished up with eclat as leading articles in the reviews, or moulded, without much trouble, into so many valuable treatises. And the cheerful, contented disposition, sound principles and sober piety, which shed such a pleasing light over the whole performance, might command attention and respect in whatsoever character or situation they appeared. Why then, it may be asked, should such ingredients be thrown away upon an attempt to re-adjust our Orders of Precedence?" If "It matters not Who" wrote Heraldic Anomalies, much less does it matter whether we preserve the original distinction between a Knight Bachelor and a Baronet, or assign fitting honours to a Serjeant at Law. The "Confusion" that has been pointed out with so much minuteness is to be found, rather in the minds of the percipient, than in the things perceived. Those who are ignorant of the niceties of the art, cannot duly marshal the various ranks of our countrymen. And, in order to remedy this inconvenience, the "Anomalies" have been submitted to an enlightened public. But we fear, that the evil would continue under the most improved system. An immense esta. blishment of Heralds and Masters of the Ceremonies, a direct Censorship upon the daily press, and additional Professors at the Public Schools and Universities would be necessary in order to introduce the proposed reforms. And it is probable that John Bull, with his accustomed obstinacy, will choose to