ble by reason and by Scripture, of the_modus of which we have no clear ideas; and I take the doctrine of the Trinity to come under this class: I fhall then evidence that Mr. Watts has not afforded us an hypothefis attended with clear ideas, but has darken'd matters more than they have, whose unhappiness it is, to want those clear ideas, which he hopes he has attained: I shall next undertake to fhew, what his fcheme is, and fhall prove, that he has denied the real perfonality of the Son and Spirit: then I fhall demonftrate their real perfonality from Scripture: afterwards I fhall examine his account of the perfon of Christ God-man: and in the conclufion, I shall throw together fome confiderations on a few miscellaneous paffages, which feem to me to deferve notice, and which do not come under the former heads. I hope I fhall not omit any thing material; but I find I must often confider fancies instead of arguments. I have nothing else in view, but a fincere fearch after truth, in this undertaking; and if any fuccess may attend it, I would afcribe it all to the divine affistance, which can enable the weak things of this world to confound the wife and the mighty. CHAP. СНАР. I. That there are many things in Reason, and Scripture, which are incomprehenfible; that the Doctrine of the Trinity is peculiarly fo; and that it is a fruitless Attempt, for Mr. Watts to endeavour to give us clear Ideas of it. T HERE is nothing of which men have more full evidence, than of the imperfection of their knowledge; and the more knowledge they attain to, the more real conviction they have, that the things they are utterly ignorant of, are more than the things they imperfectly know. The things that make up the material world, are the things we must be fuppofed to have the cleareft notions of, because they come under the view of our fenses; but yet, if we take an exact furvey of one of the meaneft things in nature, we shall find a great deal in it, that we can give no manner of account of, which yet we are forc'd to believe as fact, on the evidence of our senses; and when we have certain evidence that a thing is, it is no plea for our difbelieving it, that we cannot comprehend how it is. As for inftance, no man can pretend to tell, what it is that makes the particles of matter cohere, and keeps them from falling in pieces; and yet, I believe, whoever would be fo hardy as to deny that they actually cleave together, would be fufficiently laughed at for his incredulity. We have not as yet, from all the fearches into nature, receiv'd light enough to guide us into an explication of the manner, in which our limbs move; and yet, would it not be moft ridiculous, for a man that is in motion, ftiffly to maintain that he ftands ftill, because he cannot give an account how he moves? Tho' we cannot have any full, and adequate ideas of the cohesion of the parts of matter, or of the way in which animal motions are performed; yet we have fufficient evidence, that the parts of matter really cohere, and that our limbs actually move. So that it must be granted, that we have ideas of many things clear enough to command our affent, nay, our firm and indubitable perfuafion; where yet we have no notion how the things, of the truth of which we are perfuaded, are. a If we raise our thoughts higher, to immaterial Beings, and duly confider ourselves, we must conclude, that there is a spiritual thinking fubftance, that goes to our conftitution, which, by its rational powers, makes a certain difcrimination between us and brutes; and yet we are very little acquainted with the nature of those fouls we carry about with us; nor can we give an account how they apply themselves to the organs of our fenfes, to produce motions in our material parts, fubject to the command of the will. In the mean time, this is certain, that we can move our hands, our feet, nay, our whole bodies, juft as our wills direct. This inftance, as it fhews the imperfection of our knowledge, fo it gives us a convincing proof, that we may be pofitive of the certainty of a matter of fact, when we can give very little, scarce any account, how that matter of fact is brought about. If we are fo in the dark about the common operations of nature, and if we can give fo lit 2 See my true Scripture doctrine stated and defended, in oppofition to the Arian scheme, p. 3.-12. tle account of our own conftitution, it is not to be wonder'd at, that we should be more in the dark about things of an higher nature. If there are depths that we cannot fathom, in finite things, furely we should not pretend to a perfect comprehenfion of things infinite; but we ought rather to bring ourselves firmly to believe, and receive thofe myfteries, that can never be span'd by the short measure of our reafon. It is furprizing, when men have the greatest proof how imperfect their knowledge is, that they fo generally aim at what is above their reach; and that they cannot learn wisdom and humility enough, to forbear catching at things too big for their grafp. Ignorance and pride put perfons on endeavouring to give an account of every thing; whereas, on the contrary, prudence and wisdom make a man unfhaken in his belief of a mystery, of the reality of which he has full evidence, and keep him from unhinging his brain, and racking his understanding, to give an account of the modus of it. The neceffity of believing myfteries, is a thing against which conceited mortals make loud outcries; and it has been a subject for many tragical complaints. Indeed, where the terms of a propofition are not at all understood, there can be no affent of the mind, neither can a contradictory propofition ever be believ'd; for what a man knows to be falfe, he can never really give his affent to. As for example, an affertion that two and three do not make five, is rejected by every one that has the ufe of reafon; not because he does not understand the terms of the propofition, but because he does understand them, and thereby knows them to be falfe. Nothing can be the fubject of our belief, which our reafon, reason, or our senses tell us is false; fo that when fenfe tells us, that the bread in the Eucharift, after confecration, is bread still, and not the body of our Lord and Saviour, it is a vain thing for any to tell us, we muft bring faith to believe it; for nothing that is false to reason and sense, can be true to faith. When we make these conceffions to the defpifers of myfteries, ftill we maintain, that there are things we must believe, which after all enquiry we cannot fully comprehend; and this the hardieft fcoffer at the mysteries of revelation muft himself grant, unless he will run the matter fo far as to fettle in Atheism; for when he' hath display'd his rhetoric ever so much against myfteries, if he be not an Atheift, he receives myfteries of reason, which are altogether as incomprehenfible, as any can be fuppos'd, that are known only by divine revelation. A mystery of reafon is a truth, of the reality of which we have a fufficient evidence from reafon; but which we can no more fully comprehend, than we can utterly disbelieve. A mystery of revelation is a truth reveal'd in the Scriptures, which we could never have known, had it not been by God reveal'd to us; and which after it is reveal'd we are incapable of comprehending fully. Of both these kinds of myfteries we have ideas; that is, we have ideas of the certainty of them, but our ideas of them are confufe, inadequate, and indeterminate. Such myfteries we may fee the greatest reafon to believe, tho' we may be fo far from having clear ideas of them, that our ideas may be only general and inadequate; and tho' they may carry in them ideas feemingly, but not plainly, and really, repug nant. C The |