Council-15 countries of very diverse views and philosophies-have voted unanimously, 15 to nothing, in favor of the resolution to which I have referred. The fact remains, however, that the Security Council is a political organ which has responsibility for seeking solutions to international problems through political means. By contrast, this Court is a judicial body with the responsibility to employ judicial methods in order to resolve those problems which lie within its jurisdiction. There is absolutely nothing in the U.N. Charter or in this Court's Statute to suggest that action by the Security Council excludes action by the Court, even if the two actions might in some respects be parallel. By contrast, Article 12 of the U.N. Charter provides that, while the Security Council is exercising its functions respecting a dispute, the General Assembly shall not make any recommendation on that dispute; but the charter places no corresponding restriction on the Court. As Rosenne has observed at page 87 of his treatise, The Law and Practice of the International Court of Justice, the fact that one of the political organs of the United Nations is dealing with a particular dispute does not militate against the Court's taking action on those aspects of the same dispute which fall within its jurisdiction. To sum up on this point, the United States has brought to the Court a dispute which plainly falls within the Court's compulsory jurisdiction, and I respectfully submit that, if we can satisfy the Court that an indication of provisional measures is justified and needed in a manner consistent with Article 41 of the Court's Statute, the Court will have a duty to indicate such measures, quite without regard to any parallel action which may have been taken by the Security Council of the United Nations. As to whether the actions of the Security Council affect the need for provisional measures, I will have more to say a little later in my argument, but first I would like to explain the specific reasons which underlie our request for such an indication of such measures. Nature of Interim Measures On this subject I start from the premise that an essential purpose of such provisional measures is to preserve the rights of the parties pending the final decision of the Court. Putting the matter in other terms, it is familiar jurisprudence that the Court may look to see whether any injury which may be done to one party or the other during the pendency of the case will be, on the one hand, an injury which can be remedied through the Court's final decision or, on the other hand, whether during the pendency of the case one party will be subject to an injury which is actually irreparable. An injury of the former kind may or may not justify an indication of provisional measures, but where an irrepar able injury threatens or is actually being inflicted during the pendency of the case, there is clear justification—and indeed an urgent need-for interim protective measures. As the Court observed in the Fisheries Jurisdiction cases, the Nuclear Test cases, and the Aegean Sea cases, Article 41 of the Court's Statute, and I quote, "presupposes that irreparable prejudice should not be caused to rights which are the subject of dispute in judicial proceedings". Applying this standard of irreparable injury to the present case, I submit that the United States is clearly entitled to interim measures of protection. The simple fact is that the United States' rights of the highest dignity and importance are being currently and irreparably violated by the Government of Iran. Specifically, the international agreements upon which we base our claim have conferred upon the United States the right to maintain a working and effective embassy in Tehran, the right to have its diplomatic and consular personnel protected in their lives and persons from every form of interference and abuse, and the right to have its nationals protected and secure. As I indicated earlier, with each passing hour those rights are being destroyed, and the injury, once incurred, is plainly and completely irreparable. The trauma of being held hostage day after day in conditions of danger cannot be erased; the weeks of interruption of diplomatic functions cannot be repaired. If the hostages are physically harmed, this Court's decision on the merits cannot possibly heal them. Given the nature of the rights involved, an ultimate award of monetary damages simply could not make good the injuries currently being sustained as this case awaits the Court's judgment. That being so, I would direct the Court's attention to an early and similar case decided by the Permanent Court of International Justice. In that case, entitled The Case Concerning the Denunciation of the Treaty of November 2, 1865, Between China and Belgium, interim measures were requested in order to provide for the protection and security of nationals and property, the performance of consular functions and freedom from arrest and criminal penalties except in accordance with law. In indicating the requested protective measures, the President of the Court emphasized that the injury expected to occur during the pendency of the case "could not be made good by the payment of an indemnity or by compensation or restitution in some other material form." In that case, given the threat of irreparable injury, interim measures were indicated, and we seek the same relief here. Moreover, I should emphasize that the threat of future irreparable injury is growing. The situation in Tehran is volatile in the extreme, and the danger for the hostages can sharply increase at any moment. The current chief of the Iranian state himself has spoken of the possible destruction of the hostages-the ultimate in irreparable injury. In this connection it should be recalled that in recent months over 600 Iranian nationals have actually been executed after peremptory trials by revolutionary councils. The defendants in those trials were denied the right to counsel, the right to present defensive evidence, the right to appeal-indeed, the right to any legal process at all-and the penalty was death. Against that background, the often repeated threats to put the American hostages on trial for alleged crimes creates an ominous and an unacceptable threat not only for the hostages and for the United States but for the entire international community. In the words of the Secretary General of the United Nations, "The present crisis poses a serious threat to international peace and security," a threat which may well be alleviated if this Court promptly indicates the interim measures requested by the United States. I would like now to turn to an alternative standard under which the United States in our submission is now entitled to the requested relief. As the Court is aware, in many legal systems it is recognized that interim relief of the kind requested here is appropriate in order to preserve the status quo pendente liteand it is the position of the United States that this principle also cries out for immediate judicial action in this case. On this point, however, I do not wish to be misunderstood. Obviously I am not asking the Court to maintain the status quo as created by the Government of Iran over the past days and weeks. Obviously the status quo which we seek to preserve -or, more correctly, to which we seek to return-is the status quo ante, the situation immediately prior to the Iranian seizure of the Embassy and the hostages. There is, I submit, clear authority for such relief, as noted in Dumbauld's treatise, Interim Measures in International Controversies. Referring to the general principle of enforcing or sanctioning the status quo through indications of interim measures-and citing cases and authorities Judge Dumbauld states as follows (and I quote from page 187 of his treatise): It should be noted that the status quo thus sanctioned is not that at the time of the judgment, or at the date suit is brought, but the last uncontested status prior to the controversy. The controversy which we have brought before the Court arose with the seizure of the Embassy and the hostages in Tehran on November 4, 1979, and I submit that the situation cries out for interim measures calling upon Iran to release the hostages and the Embassy and thus return to the status quo as of November 3, 1979. In order to test the validity of this conclusion, I should like to pose for the Court a simple hypothetical case. Let us assume that on November 4, 1979, instead of allowing the Embassy and the hostages to be seized, the Revolutionary Council of Iran had announced that, unless certain demands were met by the United States by-let us say-December 10, 1979, the U.S. Embassy in Tehran would then be attacked and its personnel taken hostage. If in that situation the Government of the United States had brought its case to this Court and requested an indication of provisional measures calling upon Iran to desist from its threat, I suggest that the Court would have acted affirmatively on that request. In that situation, I submit, the Court would have called upon Iran to leave the American diplomatic staff in Tehran free and inviolable and immune from prosecution-and I want to emphasize that that, in essence, is exactly the basic provisional measure we are requesting from the Court now. In other words, we would have been entitled, in our view, to such a provisional measure if Iran had not yet violated its international legal obligations to the United States, and, in our view, that necessarily means that we are entitled to the same protective measures now-now that Iran has actually embarked upon a profound and continuing violation of our rights. To hold otherwise at this time-to withhold such protective measureswould be to allow Iran to benefit from actually using force instead of merely threatening to do so. For the foregoing reasons, we believe that we are clearly entitled, as a matter of law and logic, to the protective measures which we are seeking, and we submit that humanitarian considerations require no less. Possible Obstacles to the U.S. Request At this point I would like to turn to the question of whether there are any possible legal obstacles to our request. We have considered that question with care, and we, at least, have concluded that there are none. On this subject I would refer at the outset to the telegraphic message which has just been received by the Court from the Government of Iran and reference to which was made by the President at the opening of the hearing. Since that message constitutes Iran's only response to the United States' request for provisional measures, I should like to reply thereto on behalf of my government. I think it is significant that the opening paragraph of the Iranian statement expresses great respect for this Court and its achievements in resolving legal conflicts between states. It is our hope and expectation that this respect will lead the Government of Iran to honor in full whatever action the Court may take in response to the pending U.S. request. The main theme of the telegraphic statement of the Government of Iran is that the question of the American hostages in Tehran is only one of several problems or disputes that now exist as between the two governments. It is alleged in general terms that in various ways the Government of the United States has behaved improperly toward Iran in past years and that in this larger context the problem of the American hostages in Tehran is only a marginal and secondary problem. There are, I suggest, two short answers to this proposition. First of all, Iran's view of its treatment of the American hostages as a secondary problem is not shared by the Secretary General of the United Nations or the Security Council of the United Nations. They have unanimously characterized the hostages' captivity as a major threat to international peace. Secondly, to the extent that there are other disputes between Iran and the United States, Iran has made absolutely no effort to bring any such matters before the Court. The fact is that the only dispute which has been brought before the Court is the dispute relating to the taking of the American hostages, and, we submit, with the greatest respect, that that is the only dispute with which the Court can now deal. The Government of Iran asserts that the Court should not take cognizance of the dispute relating to the hostages, but for the reasons I have previously indicated, that is simply incorrect as a matter of law. The hostage question clearly lies within the Court's jurisdiction and, we submit, is properly presented for your decision now. Paragraph 4 of Iran's statement of yesterday goes on to suggest-albeit somewhat indirectly-that the United States is now improperly seeking part or all of the relief which it seeks on the merits. In fact, if the Court compares our request for interim measures with the form of judgment that we are seeking, it will find that the two pleadings request different forms of relief-except in one respect. The only respect in which our request and our application overlap is that both pleadings ask in effect for an order calling for the immediate release of the hostages and their safe departure from Iran. I submit, however, that this convergence of the two requests results merely from an excess of caution on the part of the United States. Frankly, we are hopeful that this Court will indicate measures calling for immediate release of the hostages and that Iran, consistent with its asserted respect for this Court, will comply long before it becomes necessary for the Court to write its final judgment. It is our hope and expectation, therefore, that the request for a judgment requiring release of the hostages will have become moot long before the Court acts on our application for such a judgment. In a very real sense, therefore, our request for release of the hostages, being one of the very greatest urgency, should have appeared only in our pending request for an indication of provisional measures and should not have been included in our application for judgment. Nevertheless, not wishing to presume as to how the Court will rule as a result of today's hearing, we took the conservative course of including a similar request in our application. I earnestly submit, however, that such conservatism on our part does not in any way militate against our request for an indication of interim measures; the need for such relief is urgent in the extreme. This brings me to the final point made in yesterday's statement by the Government of Iran. It is there suggested that if provisional measures are indicated by the Court, they cannot properly be made unilateral-the implication being that the Court could not properly call for the release of the hostages by Iran without calling for some equivalent action by the United States. That suggestion is simply, I submit, incorrect. Article 41 of the Court's Statute authorizes the Court, where circumstances so require, to indicate "any provisional measures which ought to be taken to preserve the respective rights of either party." I submit that clearly contemplates that where one of two parties is unilaterally causing irreparable injury to the other, a unilateral provisional measure is entirely appropriate. As I shall indicate in a moment, the United States would have no objection if the Court were to include, in an indication of provisional measures, the conventional provisions calling upon both parties to avoid aggravation of the dispute and preserve their rights-but we nevertheless assert an urgent need for unilateral action by Iran to release the hostages. Having provided that response to the recent statement of the Government of Iran, I should now like to return to the question of whether there are any legal obstacles which might militate against our pending request. In this respect we have considered with care the possibility that the Court's 1976 decision in the Aegean Sea Continental Shelf case might be viewed as contrary authority against our request, having in mind the recent action of the U.N. Security Council. I respectfully submit, however, that the facts and law of the Aegean Sea case are so distinguishable that, far from militating against an indication of provisional measures in this case, they actually support the present position of the United States. In the Aegean Sea dispute between Greece and Turkey, both parties participated in the Security Council debates on the dispute. Both parties agreed in the Security Council that a solution to the dispute could be achieved only through direct negotiations between the parties. After the Council called upon both parties to negotiate, both parties expressly agreed that they would do so. Moreover, in the Aegean Sea case the question whether violations of international law were occurring was open to legal question, and the jurisdiction of the Court was also in doubt. In that situation, when Greece requested that this Court indicate provisional measures calling upon Turkey to refrain from certain exploratory activities on the disputed Continental Shelf, the Court assumed that both states would honor their undertakings to negotiate and that aggravation of the dispute would thereby be avoided. Most importantly, the Court was not persuaded that the activities of which Greece complained were actually threatening irreparable injury. For those reasons, as we read that case, the Court concluded that an indication of provisional measures was unnecessary. The contrast with the present case, I submit, is very clear indeed. In the present case the Court plainly has jurisdiction; the authorities of Iran have refused to send a representative to take part in the proceedings of the Security Council; they have rejected the Council's resolution as "an American plot"; they have refused to communicate with the U.S. Government in any way at all; their violations of international law are clear; by threatening trials, they are continuing to aggravate the dispute; and truly irrepar able injury is proceeding day by day. In the present case the need for protective measures, I submit, could not be more imperative. If there were any doubt about the distinctions between the Aegean Sea case and the present one, I think it is laid to rest by the terms of the resolution of the Security Council in this case and the debate which attended its adoption. Resolution 457, to which the President of the Court has earlier referred, in its first operative paragraph, "Urgently calls on the Government of Iran to release immediately the personnel of the Embassy of the United States of America being held in Tehran, to provide them protection and to allow them to leave the country." The second operative paragraph "Further calls on the Governments of Iran and of the United States of America to take steps to resolve peacefully the remaining issues between them to their mutual satisfaction in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations." That is to say, the resolution calls upon the parties to take steps directed not to the release of these hostages, but to "the remaining issues" between the two states. Those remaining issues, however, are not before this Court, and the Court can take no responsibility for them. Under its Statute the Court's function "is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are submitted to it . . ." and that is a judicial function which has not been, and, of course, could not be, undertaken by the Security Council. In short, there is a clear division of responsibilities here and that division was clearly recognized during the proceedings in the Security Council. At that time U.S. Ambassador [to the United Nations] Donald McHenry stated as follows: The United States wishes to place on the record that the adoption of this resolution by the Security Council clearly is not intended to displace peaceful efforts in other organs of the United Nations. Neither the United States nor any other member intends that the adoption of this resolution should have any prejudicial impact whatever on the request of the United States for the indication of provisional measures of protection by the International Court of Justice. Before making that statement Ambassador McHenry and his colleagues informed Council members that the United States would speak in this vein during the debates about this pending case before the Court, and all of the members so consulted were in agreement with the statement. Moreover, after the statement was made, no member of the Council disagreed with the stated intention to the effect that the Council's action should not impede the United States' pending request before this Court. Thus all 15 members of the Security Council evidently agree that the Court is free to act affirmatively on the pending request of the United States if it is inclined to do so. Requested Measures Let me conclude my argument in favor of interim protective measures by reciting exactly what measures are being requested. The Government of the United States respectfully requests that the Court, pending final judgment in this case, indicate forthwith the following: First, that the Government of Iran immediately release all hostages of U.S. nationality and facilitate the prompt and safe departure from Iran of these persons and all other U.S. officials in dignified and humane circumstances. Second, that the Government of Iran immediately clear the premises of the U.S. Embassy, Chancery, and Consulate in Tehran of all persons whose presence is not authorized by the U.S. Government and restore the premises to U.S. control. Third, that the Government of Iran insure that all persons attached to the U.S. Embassy and Consulate should be accorded, and protected in, full freedom of movement necessary to carry out their diplomatic and consular functions. That is to say, to the extent that the United States should choose, and Iran should agree, to the continued presence of U.S. diplomatic personnel in Tehran, they must be permitted to carry out their functions in accordance with their privileges and immunities. Fourth, that the Government of Iran not place on trial any person attached to the Embassy and Consulate of the United States and refrain from any action to implement any such trial. Now, in connection with this fourth request, I should like to draw the Court's attention to recent reports that Iran may intend to continue the captivity of these hostages so that they may appear before some sort of international commission. Whatever the purpose of the continued detention, of course, it remains totally unlawful. Accordingly, in light of these recent reports, with the Court's permission, the United States wishes now to amend its fourth request for interim measures to add: that the Government of Iran must not detain or permit the detention of these persons in connection with any proceedings, whether of an "international commission" or otherwise, and that they not be forced to participate in any such proceeding. Finally, the fifth request of the United States is that the Government of Iran insure that no action is taken which might prejudice the rights of the United States in respect of the carrying out of any decision which the Court may render on the merits, and in particular neither take, nor permit, action that would threaten the lives, safety, or well-being of the hostages. This recitation of the provisional measures requested by the United States makes clear, we believe, that we are seeking an indication which is relatively specific as to the measures to be taken. We recognize that in some cases it may be appropriate simply to indicate, in general terms, that each party should take no action to aggravate the dispute or prejudice the rights of the other party in respect of the carrying out of the Court's decision on the merits. As I indicated earlier, the United States has no objection to the inclusion of such general provisions, subject, of course, to the usual specification that such measures will apply on the basis of reciprocal observance. I earnestly submit, however, that, in the circumstances of this particular case, any provisional measures indicated by the Court should be specific as to the release of the hostages, the clearing of the Embassy, and the inadmissibility of putting the hostages on trial, or bringing them before any international commission. Every effort should be made to insure that the Court's message will be clearly understood in Iran, thus maximising the chance that it will be effective. There is ample precedent, I submit, for the specificity of our request. In the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. case, the Court, in indicating provisional measures, included not only the usual language about avoiding prejudice to the rights of the parties and aggravation of the dispute; it also included particularized measures as to the method by which the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company should be managed during the pendency of the litigation. Similarly, as another example, in the Fisheries Jurisdiction case, the Court indicated very specific provisional measures as to the enforcement of fisheries regulations and even permissible annual catches of fish. I respectfully submit that, if such specific measures were appropriate in the context of these commercial cases, they are the more appropriate in a case which involves the lives and liberties of some 50 human beings and in which, because of divergences in culture and language, misunderstandings as to meaning may arise unless any provisional measures indicated by the Court are as specific and hence as clear as possible. The specific measures indicated in the case between Belgium and China which I have earlier discussed are illustrative of what is required; the measures there indicated are not unlike those sought here. Conclusion In concluding my argument this afternoon, I would respectfully-most respectfully-urge that the Court rule on the request of the United States with the maximum possible expedition. We have taken the liberty of reviewing the timing of the Court's actions on requests for provisional measures in years past, and we have found that in one case, the Court indicated provisional measures 13 days after the request was filed; in another case the Court ruled on the request in 9 days; and in a third case, the Court acted in only 6 days. Today is the 11th day since the pending U.S. request was filed, and we recognize, of course, that the Court will need some amount of additional time to deliberate and to act. Nevertheless, we respectfully request that the Court act with the maximum possible speed-because we are dealing here, again, not with commercial interests, but with the lives and liberties of persons who have now been under close confinement and imminent peril for more than 5 weeks. The danger for these 50 or more lives increases as each day goes by. It is critically important to my government to achieve the immediate release of these individuals, and I suggest that it is no less important to the world community and to the rule of law. Mr. President, distinguished and learned Members of the Court, we believe that this case presents the Court with the most dramatic opportunity it has ever had to affirm the rule of law among nations and thus to fulfill the world community's expectation that the Court will act vigorously in the interests of international law and international peace. The current situation in Tehran demands an immediate, forceful, and explicit declaration by the Court, calling upon Iran to conform to the basic rules of international intercourse and human rights. Only in that manner, I respectfully suggest, can the Court discharge its high responsibilities under the Charter of the United Nations. On behalf of the Government of the United States of America, I respectfully request that the Court indicate provisional measures calling upon the Government of Iran to bring about the immediate release of the U.S. nationals now held captive in Iran and the transfer of control of the American Embassy in Tehran to the Government of the United States. TEXT OF COURT ORDER INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE YEAR 1979 15 DECEMBER 1979 CASE CONCERNING UNITED States ORDER Present: President Sir Humphrey WALDOCK; The International Court of Justice, After deliberation, Having regard to Articles 41 and 48 of the Statute of the Court, Having regard to Articles 73 and 74 of the Rules of Court, Having regard to the Application by the United States of America filed in the Registry of the Court on 29 November 1979, instituting proceedings against the Islamic Republic of Iran in respect of a dispute concerning the situation in the United States Embassy in Tehran and the seizure and holding as hostages of members of the United States diplomatic and consular staff in Iran; Makes the following Order: 1. Whereas in the above-mentioned Application the United States Government invokes jurisdictional provisions in certain treaties as bases for the Court's jurisdiction in the present case; whereas it further recounts a sequence of events, beginning on 4 November 1979 in and around the United States Embassy in Tehran and involving the invasion of the Embassy premises, the seizure of United States diplomatic and consular staff and their continued detention; and whereas, on the basis of the facts there alleged, it requests the Court to adjudge and declare: "(a) That the Government of Iran, in tolerating, encouraging, and failing to prevent and punish the conduct described in the preceding Statement of Facts [in the Application]. violated its international legal obligations to the United States as provided by • Articles 22, 24, 25, 27, 29, 31, 37 and 47 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, • Articles 28, 31, 33, 34, 36 and 40 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, • Articles 4 and 7 of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, and • Articles II(4), XIII, XVIII and XIX of the Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights between the United States and Iran, and • Articles 2(3), 2(4) and 33 of the Charter of the United Nations; (b) That pursuant to the foregoing international legal obligations, the Government of Iran is under a particular obligation immediately to secure the release of all United States nationals currently being detained within the premises of the United States Embassy in Tehran and to assure that all such persons and all other United States nationals in Tehran are allowed to leave Iran safely; (c) That the Government of Iran shall pay to the United States, in its own right and in the exercise of its right of diplomatic protection of its nationals, reparation for the foregoing violations of Iran's international legal obligations to the United States, in a sum to be determined by the Court; and (d) That the Government of Iran submit to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution those persons responsible for the crimes committed against the premises and staff of the United States Embassy and against the premises of its Consulates"; 2. Having regard to the request dated 29 November 1979 and filed in the Registry the same day, whereby the Government of the United States of America, relying on Article 41 of the Statute and Articles 73, 74 and 75 of the Rules of Court, asks the Court urgently to indicate, pending the final decision in the case brought before it by the above-mentioned Application of the same date, the following provisional measures: "(a) That the Government of Iran immediately release all hostages of United States nationality and facilitate the prompt and safe departure from Iran of these persons and all other United States officials in dignified and humane circumstances. (b) That the Government of Iran immediately clear the premises of the United States Embassy, Chancery and Consulate of all persons whose presence is not authorized by the United States Chargé d'Affaires in Iran, and restore the premises to United States control. (c) That the Government of Iran ensure that all persons attached to the United States Embassy and Consulate should be accorded, and protected in, full freedom within the Embassy and Chancery premises, and the freedom of movement within Iran necessary to carry out their diplomatic and consular functions. (d) That the Government of Iran not place on trial any person attached to the Embassy and Consulate of the United States and refrain from any action to implement any such trial. (e) That the Government of Iran ensure that no action is taken which might prejudice the rights of the United States in respect of the carrying out of any decision which the Court may render on the merits, and in particular neither take nor permit action that would threaten the lives, safety, or well-being of the hostages": 3. Whereas, on the day on which the Application and request for indication of provisional measures were received in the Registry, the Government of Iran was notified by telegram of the filing of the Application and request, and of the particular measures requested, and copies of both documents were transmitted by express airmail to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iran; 4. Whereas, pursuant to Article 40, paragraph 3, of the Statute and Article 42 of the Rules of Court, copies of the Application were transmitted to Members of the United Nations and to other States entitled to appear before the Court; 5. Whereas on 6 December 1979 the Registrar addressed the notification provided for in Article 63 of the Statute of the Court to the States, other than the parties to the case, which were listed in the relevant documents of the United Nations Secretariat as parties to the following conventions, invoked in the Application: (i) the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961, and the accompanying Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes; (ii) the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 1963, and the accompanying Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes; (iii) the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, of 1973; 6. Whereas on 30 November 1979, pending the meeting of the Court, the President, in exercise of the power conferred on him by Article 74, paragraph 4, of the Rules of Court, addressed a telegram to each of the two governments concerned calling attention to the fact that the matter was now sub judice before the Court and to the need to act in such a way as would enable any Order the Court might make in the present proceedings to have its appropriate effects; and whereas by those telegrams the two governments were, in addition, informed that the Court would hold public hearings at an early date at which they might present their observations on the request for provisional measures, and that the projected date for such hearings was 10 December 1979, this date being later confirmed by further telegrams of 3 December 1979; 7. Whereas, in preparation for the hearings, the President put certain preliminary questions to the Agent of the United States Government by a telegram of 4 December 1979, a copy of which was communicated on the same date to the Government of Iran; whereas, in |