particular obligation immediately to secure the release of all U.S. nationals currently being detained and to assure that they are allowed to leave Iran safely; that the Government of Iran should pay reparation for the alleged violations of Iran's international legal obligations; and that the Government of Iran should submit to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution the persons responsible for the crimes committed against the premises and staff of the U.S. Embassy and Consulates.

On 29 November 1979, the day on which the application itself was filed, the United States of America submitted the present request for the indication of provisional measures. I now ask the Registrar to read from that request the statement of the measures which the United States asks the Court to indicate.

THE REGISTRAR

The Government of the United States of America requests that pending final judgment in this suit the Court indicate forthwith the following:

(i) that the Government of Iran immediately release all hostages of United States nationality and facilitate the prompt and safe departure from Iran of these persons and all other United States officials in dignified and humane circumstances;

(ii) that the Government of Iran immediately clear the premises of the United States Embassy, Chancery and Consulate of all persons whose presence is not authorized by the United States Chargé d'Affaires in Iran, and restore the premises to United States control;

(iii) that the Government of Iran ensure that all persons attached to the United States Embassy and Consulate should be accorded, and protected in, full freedom within the Embassy and Chancery premises, and the freedom of movement within Iran necessary to carry out their diplomatic and consular functions;

(iv) that the Government of Iran not place on trial any person attached to the Embassy and Consulate of the United States and refrain from any action to implement any such trial; (v) that the Government of Iran ensure that no action is taken which might prejudice the rights of the United States in respect of the carrying out of any decision which the Court may render on the merits, and in particular neither take nor permit action that would threaten the lives, safety, or well-being of the hostages.

PRESIDENT WALDOCK

The Government of Iran has not appointed an Agent. On the other hand, by a letter telegraphed to the President and received in the Registry in the late evening of yesterday, 9 December 1979, the Government of Iran has informed the Court of its view that on various grounds the Court cannot and should not take cognizance of the case submitted to it by the U.S. Government, or indicate the provisional measures formulated in the Request. A copy of that letter was communicated immediately to the Agent of the United States of America. I shall therefore ask the Registrar now to read the text of that letter.

THE REGISTRAR

[Translation from French]

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of the telegrams concerning the meeting of the International Court of Justice on 10 December 1979, at the request of the Government of the United States of America, and to submit to you below the position of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran in this respect.

1. First of all, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran wishes to express its respect for the International Court of Justice, and for its distinguished members, for what they have achieved in the quest for just and equitable solutions to legal conflicts between States. However, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran considers that the Court cannot and should not take cognizance of the case which the Government of the United States of America has submitted to it, and in a most significant fashion, a case confined to what is called the question of the "hostages of the American Embassy in Tehran".

2. For this question only represents a marginal and secondary aspect of an overall problem, one such that it cannot be studied separately, and which involves, inter alia, more than 25 years of continual interference by the United States in the internal affairs of Iran, the shameless exploitation of our country, and numerous crimes perpetrated against the Iranian people, contrary to and in conflict with all international and humanitarian norms.

3. The problem involved in the conflict between Iran and the United States is thus not one of the interpretation and the application of the treaties upon which the American Application is based, but results from an overall situation containing much more fundamental and more complex elements. Consequently, the Court cannot examine the American Application divorced from its proper context, namely the whole political dossier of the relations between Iran and the United States over

the last 25 years. This dossier includes, inter alia, all the crimes perpetrated in Iran by the American Government, in particular the coup d'état of 1953 stirred up and carried out by the CIA, the overthrow of the lawful national government of Dr. Mossadegh, the restoration of the Shah and of his regime which was under the control of American interests, and all the social, economic, cultural, and political consequences of the direct interventions in our internal affairs, as well as grave, flagrant and continuous violations of all international norms, committed by the United States in Iran.

4. With regard to the request for provisional measures, as formulated by the United States, it in fact implies that the Court should have passed judgment on the actual substance of the case submitted to it, which the Court cannot do without breach of the norms governing its jurisdiction. Furthermore, since provisional measures are by definition intended to protect the interests of the parties, they cannot be unilateral, as they are in the request submitted by the American Government.

In conclusion, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran respectfully draws the attention of the Court to the deep-rootedness and the essential character of the Islamic revolution of Iran, a revolution of a whole oppressed nation against its oppressors and their masters; any examination of the numerous repercussions thereof is essentially and directly a matter within the national sovereignty of Iran. I have the honour, etc.

MR. OWEN

Tehran, 9 December 1979

I have the honor to appear before the Court today as Agent of the United States of America in support of the request of the United States for provisional measures of protection against the Government of Iran. Mr. President, in view of the extraordinary nature of the matter which is to be argued before the Court this afternoon, the President of the United States has requested the Attorney General of the United States to appear before the Court as Counsel in support of our request for provisional measures. With the Court's permission, therefore, I would like at this time to introduce to the Court the Attorney General, Mr. Benajmin R. Civiletti, who will commence the presentation on behalf of the United States.

MR. CIVILETTI

I appear today as Attorney General of the United States and advocate in support of its request for provisional measures of protection from illegal acts of the Government of Iran. I feel privileged to appear on behalf of my government. I should also say that the United States is grateful to the Court for providing a hearing at this time.

If I may be permitted a personal introduction. I have spent my working life as a trial lawyer in the United States. I have been an advocate both for the gov ernment and for those who oppose the government, in both civil and criminal suits. Anyone who has been a trial advocate in any country would approach this Court with respect and awe. In a real sense this Court represents the highest legal aspiration of civilized man.

Yet I find myself addressing this Court with awe but with restrained anger. More than 50 of my countrymen are held prisoners, in peril of their lives and suffering even as I speak. This imprisonment and this suffering are illegal and inhuman. It takes no advocate to bring this cause to you. The facts are known worldwide, and every citizen of the world-trained in the law or notknows the conduct to be criminal.

I come to this Court, my government comes to this Court, not so that yet another body will reiterate the fact that what we are witnessing in Iran is illegal. The United States comes here so that this tribunal may demonstrate that international law may not be tossed aside, that the international fabric of civility may not be rent with impunity.

My government asks this Court to take the most vigorous and most speedy action it can not to settle a minor boundary dispute with regard to a small boundary, not to give to one national treasury from another, but to save lives and set human beings free. This is what people everywhere-not just monarchs and presidents, not just lawyers and juristsexpect of what a judge in my nation called the "omnipresence" that we know to be the law.

If I come to you with anger, I also come to you with urgency. We who speak the sober language of jurisprudence say the United States is seeking the "indication of provisional measures." What we are asking this Court for is the quickest possible action to end a barbaric captivity and to save human lives.

For the first time in modern diplomatic history, a state has not only acquiesced in, but participated in and is

seeking political advantage from the illegal seizure and imprisonment of the diplomatic personnel of another state. It even threatens to put these diplomatic personnel on trial. If our international institutions, including this Court, should even appear to condone or tolerate the flagrant violations of customary international law, state practice, and explicit treaty commitments that are involved here, the result will be a serious blow not only to the safety of the American diplomatic persons now in captivity in Tehran, but to the rule of law within the international community.

To allow the illegal detention and trial of U.S. diplomatic personnel and other citizens to go forward during the pendency of this case would be to encourage other governments and individuals to believe that they may, with impunity. seize any Embassy and any diplomatic agent, or indeed any other hostage, anywhere in the world. Such conduct cannot be tolerated; every civilized government recognizes that. We therefore submit that this Court has a clear obligation to take every action to bring this conduct to an immediate end.

We shall this afternoon discuss the simple, clear issues presented in the following order. I shall review the applicable basic principles of international law which bind both Iran and the United States, not only under customary international law but also under four treaties to which both states are parties. These treaties are directly in point. Mr. Owen will then briefly summarize the facts to demonstrate to the Court that the Government of Iran has committed, is committing and is proposing to commit-clear, flagrant violations of these principles of international law.

We will next demonstrate that the Court has jurisdiction over this dispute and the authority to indicate the provisional measures requested by the United States. Finally, we shall explain why, on the basis of article 41 of the Court's Statute, an indication of interim measures is urgently needed and amply justified.

The international legal standards here are of ancient origin. They have evolved over centuries of state practice, and in recent years have been codified in a series of international agreements. It is on four of those agreements that the Government of the United States relies here.

Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations

Since the subject of this proceeding is focused largely on the status and immunities of diplomatic agents, I shall

refer at the outset to the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. The purpose of that convention, to which both the United States and Iran are parties, was to codify a fundamental, firmly established rule of international law-that the immunity and inviolability of Embassies and diplomats must be absolutely respected and that in no circumstances may a state engage in the type of conduct that is involved here in this matter before this Court.

The first relevant provision of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations is article 22, relating to the physical premises of an Embassy or mission. The words of article 22 are clear:

"1. The premises of the mission shall be inviolable. The agents of the receiving State may not enter them, except with the consent of the head of the mission.

2. The receiving State is under a special duty to take all appropriate steps to protect the premises of the mission against any intrusion or damage and to prevent any disturbance of the peace of the mission or impairment of its dignity.

3. The premises of the mission, their furnishings and other property thereon and the means of transport of the mission shall be immune from search, requisition, attachment or execution."

As to the personnel of such a diplomatic mission, article 29 of the convention goes on to provide that every diplomatic agent "shall be inviolable" and that he shall be free from "any form of arrest and detention." The language is unqualified: It prohibits any form of arrest or detention, regardless of any grievance which the host state may suppose that it has against a particular diplomat. There is a remedy available against a diplomat who a state believes has engaged in improper conduct-to require him to leave the country. But the Vienna convention excludes any form of physical arrest or detention for the purpose of prosecution or for any other reason.

The convention reemphasizes the principle of diplomatic inviolability in several different ways. Article 29 requires the receiving state to prevent any attack upon the person, freedom, or dignity of a diplomatic agent. Article 31 requires that each such agent enjoy unqualified "immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the receiving State." There is no exception; no matter what the cause, the receiving state is precluded from allowing the criminal prosecution of a diplomatic agent. In the last few days, as we will explain later in our argument, this absolute immunity from criminal prosecution has taken on an overwhelming importance.

Article 37 of the convention extends the same absolute inviolability and absolute immunity from assault and from criminal trial to the administrative and technical staff of an Embassy. All but two of the more than 50 Americans currently being held hostage in Tehran are either diplomatic agents or Embassy administrative and technical staff, some of whom also perform consular functions.

Other immunities and privileges pertinent to this case are found in Articles 24, 25, 26, 27, 44, 45, and 47 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. Among these are the inviolability of the archives and documents of the mission, the right of diplomatic agents and staff to communicate freely for official purposes, and the right to depart from the receiving state at any time they wish.

Over the hundreds of years that these principles have been recognized and honored throughout the international community, there have been occasions when a particular state has felt dissatisfied or aggrieved by the conduct of a diplomatic agent of another state or his government; and Iran is claiming some such grievances now. For hundreds of years, however, states have uniformly recognized that the only lawful course open to them is to declare the diplomatic agent persona non grata. When a state declares a diplomatic agent persona non grata, his government must withdraw him or suffer the eventual termination of his diplomatic

status.

These uniformly recognized principles have been codified in article 9 of the Vienna convention. Under that treaty, a receiving state can in effect expel an objectionable diplomat-but under no circumstances may a state imprison an emissary or put him on trial. In diplomatic history and practice there is no precedent or justification for the seizure of a diplomat, let alone an entire diplomatic mission. There is also no precedent or justification of the imprisonment and trial of such persons in an attempt to coerce capitulation to certain demands. It is difficult to think of a more obvious, more flagrant violation of international law.

Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations

Both Iran and the United States are also parties to the second international convention on which the United States relies in this proceeding-the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. This convention reflects many of the same principles I have just described. Under the consular convention every state party, including Iran, has an international legal

obligation to protect the consular facilities and members of the consular posts of every other state party.

Of course, when personnel of a diplomatic mission are providing consular services, they are entitled to the full protection afforded by the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. The Convention on Consular relations also requires the receiving state to permit another state party's consular officers to communicate with and have access to their nationals. This right is manifestly violated when the consular officers are themselves held incommunicado by force.

New York Convention

Apart from these two Vienna Conventions, the United States and Iran also are parties to the New York Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents. One of the essential premises of the New York convention is stated in its preamble. It is that crimes against such internationally protected persons, including diplomatic agents, are "a serious threat to the maintenance of normal international relations" and "a matter of grave concern to the international community."

The convention defines a number of types of conduct as constituting crimes within its scope. Under article 2 it is a criminal act to participate as an accomplice in an attack on the person or liberty of an internationally protected person or in a violent attack on official premises. Under article 4 of the convention, every state party, including Iran, is required to prevent such crimes. Under article 7, every state party must take steps to see that those responsible for such crimes are prosecuted. The Government of Iran has violated every one of these provisions in the plainest way.

All three of the treaties I have discussed were drafted by the U.N. International Law Commission. They were adopted by conferences of plenipotentiaries or by the U.N. General Assembly --and thus by the vast majority of the states of the world. They have been so widely ratified as to demonstrate that they reflect universally recognized rules of international law.

Bilateral Treaty of Amity

Finally, the United States relies in this case upon a bilateral treaty-the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights between the United States and Iran. This treaty is in a sense

even broader than the three multilateral conventions to which I have previously referred. Under article II, paragraph 4, of the treaty of amity, each party has a legal obligation to insure that within its territory the nationals of the other party shall receive "the most constant protection and security."

In addition, article II provides that, if any U.S. national is in custody in Iran, Iran must in every respect accord him "reasonable and humane treatment." Under articles II and XIX any such national is entitled to communicate with his own government and avail himself of the services of his consular officials. Article XIII requires that the consular officers and employees themselves be accorded the privileges and immunities accorded by general international usage and that they be treated in a fashion no less favorable than similar officer and employees of any third country.

That completes my brief summary of the principles of international law that underlie the application of the United States. I could go on to discuss the provisions of Article 2, Paragraphs 3 and 4, of the Charter of the United Nations, under which Iran and all other U.N. members are obligated to settle their disputes by peaceful means and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force. But the United States believes that the three multilateral conventions and the 1955 bilateral treaty provide as clear a legal predicate as can be rationally required for its request for an indication of provisional measures.

MR. OWEN

The Attorney General has summarized the treaty provisions which form the legal predicate for the United States' pending request for an indication of provisional measures and I would like to open my portion of the argument by making one brief comment about those treaty provisions.

In my judgment, the most striking feature of the legal principles involved in this case is their clarity and simplicity. All of the substantive principles involved are well known and familiar, and they are clear and unambiguous. This is not a case involving complicated legal considerations or difficult questions of interpretation; the only question here is one of the application of the four treaties-and I suggest that the application of the treaties will become very clear indeed from a brief review of the facts-to which I now turn.

Like the legal principles involved, the facts are simple-and tragically so. I submit that a mere recitation of the

events will demonstrate beyond any doubt whatever that the Government of Iran is today engaged, on a continuing basis, in gross and obvious violations of the international legal obligations which it owes to the United States and to the international community at large.

The immediate factual story began on November 4 of this year. On that day, in the course of a demonstration of several thousand people immediately outside the U.S. Embassy compound in Tehran, several hundred demonstrators broke away and commenced a physical assault on the Embassy. I will not burden you with the details of the 2-hour attack on the Embassy or the manner in which the attackers physically cut their way into the Embassy. But I should emphasize that throughout the attack, U.S. officials were in contact with the office of the Prime Minister of Iran and the Iranian Foreign Ministry-vigorously calling for security assistance-and yet the Government of Iran made absolutely no effort to prevent the seizure of the Embassy and its personnel.

Indeed, in the days and weeks that have followed the initial attack and the siezure of more than 50 American hostages, the chief of the Iranian Government and the members of his council have repeatedly praised and approved the conduct of the captors. Instead of honoring its legal obligations and seeking to prevent or remedy the violations of the rights of the United States, the Government of Iran has actually ratified those violations and made them its own.

Since this last point is important in fixing the responsibility of the Government of Iran, let me pause to emphasize that government's complicity in the conduct involved. In response to a question from the President of the Court, we have submitted to the Court a collection of public statements made by Iranian officials in the last few weeks, and I would like to refer to two or three of those statements. On November 4, the very day of the Embassy seizure by the socalled Iranian students, the Ayatollah Khomeini, then the de facto Chief of State, approved the students' action, and the next day, November 5, a number of Iranian officials did exactly the same.

On that day, November 5, the Ayatollah Khomeini publicly refused to call upon the students to withdraw; the commander of the Revolutionary Guard congratulated the students and pledged the Guard's full support for the action; the public prosecutor and the judiciary announced their support; and then the Foreign Minister of Iran declared: "The

action of the students enjoys the endorsement and support of the Government." On November 18 the Ayatollah Khomeini declared "what our nation has done is to arrest a bunch of spies, who, according to the norms, should be investigated, tried, and treated in accordance with our own laws." He made clear at the same time that the hostages would be released only if the United States first met certain specified demands of the Iranian Government.

I ask the Court to bear in mind that these statements emanated from a government which is under a solemn and continuing legal duty to provide the most constant protection and security to U.S. personnel. Indeed, as documented in the materials we have submitted to the Court, two senior members of the Iranian Government have publicly acknowledged this legal duty, while at the same time approving its violation.

Continuing the story of the hostages, the fact is that since the time of their capture they have been subjected to a harrowing ordeal. Bound hand and foot and frequently blindfolded, they have been subjected to severe discomfort, complete isolation and threats, including repeated threats both by their captors and by the Iranian Government to the effect that, in certain cirumstances, they, the hostages, would be put on trial and even put to death. They have been paraded blindfolded before hostile crowds, denied mail and visitors, and essentially held incommunicado. Some time ago, it is true, 5 non-American captives and 13 American hostages were released, but more than 50 U.S. citizens continue to be held in these inhumane and dangerous circumstances. Moreover, recent reports suggest that some of the hostages may have been transferred from the Embassy compound to other places of confinement. We have no way of knowing the details of the conditions of their confinement or their treatment at any such new locations.

When these facts are held up against the standards of international law to which the Attorney General earlier referred, including the principles that every diplomatic agent must be kept inviolate from any form of arrest or detention and from any attack upon his person, freedom, or dignity, I suggest that it is not really possible to imagine any clearer violations of the four applicable treaties than the violations presented in this case. On this score, I might also add, there is true unanimity among international legal scholars. Since early November there has been an outpouring of pronouncements from leading international legal scholars throughout the world, and all have unan

imously condemned the Iranian treatment of the American nationals in Tehran.

In addition, the same view has received the public support of numerous well-known organizations of jurists, including various societies of international law, the International Law Association, and the International Commission of Jurists. Without exception, the scholars and learned societies have condemned the Iranian hostage-taking as the purest kind of violation of international law. To cite just a single example, the retired President of this Court stated in a recent interview as follows:

... the conduct of the Iranian authorities in this matter constitutes the most flagrant violation of the norms of international law honoring the privileges and immunity of diplomatic missions and their officials.

He went on to say that history will record Iran's actions as "the most complete list of infractions" against these universally recognized norms of international law.

I know of no dissent. Moreover, we are not speaking in the past tense. The violations are going forward and continuing as I stand here this afternoon. With each passing day-indeed with each passing hour-the rights of the United States and the rights of its citizens in Tehran are being assaulted in a manner which is totally inconsistent with the rule of law. That ongoing and continuing violation of plainly established rights is the essence of the problem before the Court this after

noon.

Jurisdiction of the Court

Having reviewed the substantive elements, legal and factual, of the dispute with Iran which the United States has brought before this Court, I would like now to turn to the question of the Court's jurisdiction over the dispute. As I understand the teachings of the prior decisions of the Court with respect to the indication of provisional measures, it is not necessary for a state requesting such measures to establish conclusively that the Court has jurisdiction. The urgency of the situations which call for provisional measures is such that an effort to reach final and conclusive determinations with respect to jurisdiction could well defeat the purpose of Article 41 of the Court's statute. For these reasons, as I understand it, the Court follows the principle that if the Party requesting interim protective measures makes a prima facie showing that the Court has jurisdiction

over the dispute, that showing provides a sufficient jurisdictional predicate for the Court to act affirmatively on the request.

In this case, I respectfully submit, the United States can make more than a prima facie showing. Indeed, I think I can demonstrate that the Court has jurisdiction over the present dispute beyond any doubt at all.

In this connection let me refer to the jurisdictional provisions of the Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. Article I of the Protocol provides unequivocally:

Disputes arising out of the interpretation or application of the Convention shall lie within the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice and may accordingly be brought before the Court by an application made by any party to the dispute being a Party to the present Protocol.

Needless to say, the United States is a party to a dispute with Iran. It has repeatedly called upon the Government of Iran to release the hostages pursuant to its international legal obligations, and Iran has repeatedly refused. Since both states are parties to the protocol, and since one of them (the United States) has presented an application to the Court, article I confers mandatory jurisdiction upon the Court.

It is true that articles II and III of the protocol go on to provide that the parties to the dispute may agree on other methods of settling the dispute, namely by arbitration or conciliation. That is to say, the compulsory jurisdiction of this Court under article I is unqualified, but under articles II and III the parties may mutually agree on arbitration or conciliation instead. I want to emphasize, however, that the settlement procedures contemplated by articles II and III are purely optional. In the English version of the protocol this is indicated not only by the permissive word "may" as it appears in articles II and III, but also by the preamble to the protocol, which indicates explicitly the intention that the Court shall have jurisdiction "unless" arbitration or conciliation have been agreed upon by the parties. Moreover, I am informed that the same conclusion flows from the equally authoritative texts of the protocol in French, Spanish, Russian, and Chinese.

And, finally, the same conclusionthe conclusion that the Court has jurisdiction if no such optional agreement on arbitration or conciliation has been reached-is confirmed by two articles by well-known scholars, both of which appear in a volume whose English title is A Collection of Studies on International Law, In Honor of Paul Guggenheim,

published in 1968. May I refer the Court respectfully to pages 634 and 695 of that volume, at which Herbert Briggs and Paul Ruegger emphasize that under treaty provisions of this kind the Court's jurisdiction is obligatory where the parties have not in fact resorted to other means of settlement.

The Court will not be surprised to hear from me that no agreement on other means of settlement has been reached in this case. In response to questions propounded by the President, the U.S. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Mr. Newsom, has provided the Court with a factual account of the efforts made by the United States to open negotiations with the Iranian authorities, and the total rejection of all such overtures by the Government of Iran. Specifically, in early November, after the seizure of the hostages, when the U.S. Government dispatched a distinguished emissary, a former U.S. Attorney General [Ramsey Clark), to visit Iran to discuss the hostage-taking with the Government of Iran, that government refused even to let him enter the country. He stayed in Istanbul for several days attempting assiduously to open discussions, but eventually he returned home without having been able to meet any representative of the Government of Iran.

Moreover, as Mr. Newsom has stated, subsequent efforts by the United States to negotiate have been equally unsuccessful. In fact, every one of the United States' repeated efforts to open direct communications between the two parties has been rebuffed by Iran which, incidentally, has even refused to attend the relevant meetings of the U.N. Security Council. Under such circumstances the United States respectfully submits that, even if articles II and III of the protocol required a prior attempt to arbitrate or conciliate as a condition on this Court's jurisdiction-and we do not believe that they do that requirement would have been obviated by this Iranian conduct. I should add that exactly the same is true with respect to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations whose jurisdictional provisions are identical to those of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.

Turning to the elements of the dispute which arise under the Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights between the United States of America and Iran, the jurisdiction of the Court is again, I submit, crystal clear. Article XXI, paragraph 2, of the treaty provides in its entirety as follows, and I quote:

Any dispute between the High Contracting Parties as to the interpretation or application of the present Treaty, not satisfactorily adjusted by diplomacy, shall be submitted to the International Court of Justice, unless the High Contracting Parties agree to settlement by some other pacific means.

Again, in view of the fact that the repeated efforts of the United States to deal with the dispute by diplomacy have been consistently rebuffed by the Government of Iran, it seems indisputable that under the treaty of amity, this case is properly before this Court.

A final jurisdictional issue arises under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents. With respect to that convention, the jurisdictional showing that we can make is admittedly less compelling than the showing we have made with respect to the other three treaties. In contrast with the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and on Consular Relations, article 13 of the convention on internationally protected persons might be read as requiring a 6-months' effort by the parties to arbitrate the dispute as a prerequisite to the Court's jurisdiction.

It is the position of my government, however, that where, as in this case, one of the parties has closed down the Embassy of the other and has flatly refused even to open communications, either through the other's special emissary or in any other fashion, the arbitration requirement is rendered inoperable. It is our position, therefore, that we have made out a prima facie showing of jurisdiction, even under the internationally protected persons convention. Moreover, even if no such showing had been made, all of the major claims presented in the Application of the United States are solidly based, I submit, upon the other three treaties as to which, in our view, the Court's jurisdiction appears not merely prima facie, but beyond dispute.

At this point, in response to a question raised by the President of the Court, I should make one final comment on the Court's jurisdiction. As the Court is aware, the Security Council of the United Nations has addressed the present dispute, and in Resolution No. 457, adopted 6 days ago, the Council called upon the Government of Iran to bring about the immediate release of the hostages. In such circumstances it might conceivably be suggested that this Court should not exercise jurisdiction over the same dispute.

I respectfully submit that any such suggestion would be untenable. It is, of course, an impressive fact that the 15 countries represented in the Security