Palestinian People and the Special Unit on Palestinian Rights in the Office of the Under-Secretary General for Political and General Assembly Affairs. Other Western States abstained, but the majority, the Eastern bloc and the Third World supported appropriations for the Committee and the Special Secretariat Unit. On the recommendation of the Fifth Committee, the Assembly also adopted several other pertinent resolutions. One resolution 34 adopted without a vote concerned medium-term planning in the U.N. and is intended to contribute to more rational management, better interagency coordination and achieving the aims of international development strategies. The resolution identified principles and guidelines for medium-term planning and requested the Secretary General to prepare such a plan for the period 1984-89. In another resolution adopted without a vote, "Identification of Activities That Are Completed, Obsolete, of Marginal Usefulness or Ineffective," U.N. members requested the Secretary-General to provide a thorough report on such activities, the criteria used to identify them, the resources which have thereby been released and the effect on the program budget as well as to propose at the 1980 regular General Assembly an efficient procedure for identifying these activities.35 The General Assembly adopted without a vote several other resolutions requesting the Secretary-General to review procedures for the award of contracts,36 and to improve the U.N. financial management system by strengthening the role of the Comptroller, and creating a systems group to deal with the overall financial management and control.37 EVALUATION OF U.N. ACTIVITIES For several years, the United States and other Western States have advocated the need for evaluation of the quality, timeliness, and impact of U.N. activities. Several U.N. agencies and programs are reviewing, restructuring, or establishing internal evaluation systems, though not without difficulty because of the problem of achieving commonly agreed criteria on evaluation concepts and techniques. The Joint Inspection Unit of the U.N., created in January 1968 and composed of roughly 11 inspectors, 7 professional staff, and 11 general service staff, has prepared a number of studies for participating organizations, including several on evaluation of U.N. activities. The latter include its Report on Evaluation of the U.N. System; 38 a Glossary of Evaluation Terms; 39 Medium-Term Planning in the U.N.; 40 and Initial Guidelines for Internal Evaluation Systems of U.N. Organizations.41 Following its discussion of status of the implementation of the JIU's recommendations in this field, the Fifth Committee recommended and the General Assembly adopted a Mexican-sponsored resolution.42 34 A. Res. 34/224. 35 A. Res.34/225. 20 A. Res. 34/228. 37 A. Res. 34/233 III. 38 JIU Rep. 77/1, March 1977. 30 JIU Rep. 78/5, November 1978. 40 A. Res. 34/84. 1979. 41 A/34/271, 1979. 42 A. Res. 34/164. This resolution recognized the importance of expert and independent evaluation and advice on the improvement of the programs and activities of the U.N. and the fundamental role the JIU has played in providing such evaluation and advice to U.N. members and administrations. It went on to approve the "Glossary of Evaluation Terms" and recommended its use throughout the U.N. system, endorsed the conclusions and recommendations of the "Initial Guidelines for Internal Evaluation Systems of the U.N.," commended the JIU and SYG for their efforts in this area and urged them to confine their efforts to improve the administrative and budgetary efficiency and effectiveness of the U.N. system. THE IRANIAN CRISIS AND THE UNITED NATIONS The Iranian crisis overshadowed everything else the U.N. did last fall. It was handled not in the General Assembly but in the Security Council and the International Court of Justice in the Netherlands at the Hague. Although our official responsibilities were to the United States in the General Assembly, since we were at the mission in New York, we were able to follow the day-to-day activity in the mission and the U.N. as efforts to manage this crisis unfolded. This proved to be particularly eye-opening and stimulating because it gave us first-hand insight into the high politics and intense consultations among Security Council members in preparation for a formal, public meeting of that body. It also afforded us a better understanding of the importance of procedures in seeking peaceful settlement as well as the limits of Security Council action. As we said in several newsletters, the Iranian crisis was a major test for the U.N. If the U.N. can help resolve the crisis, it certainly will be strengthened. At this writing, however, the crisis is still unresolved and the United States and our allies have exhausted the legal remedies available to us under the Charter, to seek a peaceful resolution of that conflict: specifically, supporting the "good offices" of the SecretaryGeneral, bringing the matter to the Security Council, seeking support for economic sanctions and taking our case to the International Court in the Hague. The Security Council members held numerous private consultations and several public meetings on the Iranian crisis. The Council took the following action. December 4, 1979.-The Council unanimously (15-0) adopted Resolution 457 (1979) urgently demanding that Iran immediately release the American hostages in Tehran, calling on Iran and the United States to resolve peacefully the remaining issues between them, and requested the Secretary General to lend his good offices to implement the resolution. December 31, 1979.-The Council voted 11-0-4 (the U.S.S.R. Czechoslovakia, Kuwait, and Bangladesh) to authorize the Secretary General to travel to Iran to investigate and report on the situation by January 7 and required the Iranian Government to release the hostages in 1 week; otherwise, the Council would meet January 7 to impose economic sanctions. January 13, 1980.-The Council voted 10-2 (U.S.S.R., G.D.R.)-2 (Bangladesh, Mexico) with China not participating in favor of U.S.sponsored resolution calling for economic sanctions except for food and medicine against Iran. The Soviet veto prevented the application of multilateral sanctions. As the United States mounted its campaign in late November for the first Security Council debate on Iran, the Government also took its case to the International Court of Justice in The Hague. Following the U.S. application on December 3 (app. 5), the Court held a hearing on the U.S. case. Iran denied the Court's jurisdiction in this matter and refused to appear. However, Iran's absence did not bar the Court from hearing the U.S. case or from granting provisional measures as the U.S. application had requested. The outcome of the case was really open and shut. The United States had both the law and the facts on its side. As you know, the Court, a 15-member U.N. body, unanimously ordered Iran to release the American hostages and to return our Embassy in Tehran to American control. These provisional measures do not prejudice the 15-member Court's deliberations on the merits of the case. However, since Iran failed to comply with the Court's decision, the United States, under U.N. Charter, chapter VII, requested another session of the Security Council to discuss the imposition of economic sanctions. The upshot of this request were the Council decisions of December 31 and January 13. The former called on the Secretary General to travel to Iran and seek ways to release the hostages. In the latter, the United States failed to obtain agreement on the draft resolution calling for the application of sanctions because of the Soviet veto. With this action, the United States has really exhausted the legal remedies to settle the Iranian crisis according to the options available under the U.N. Charter. Although it would be possible to refer the issue of economic sanctions on Iran to the General Assembly, Ambassador McHenry believes that the United States may have considerable difficulty in mustering the necessary majority there to recommend them. Since the U.N. hasn't yet been able to resolve the Iranian situation, what good is this world body? Three points should be made here. First, it became clear to us during the debates on Iran, that, notwithstanding the many and varied shortcomings of the General Assembly, its activity in developing international law, as the U.N. Charter requires it to do, has been essential to the U.S. effort in the Security Council. Otherwise, diplomats would have had no basis for arguing that Khomeini was breaking established principles of treaty law and the United States would probably not have been in a position to take its case to the Court. It was under the U.N. General Assembly's auspices that both the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and the 1973 Convention on the Prevenion and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, including diplomats, were adopted. Second, a major tenet of U.S. foreign policy is to uphold principles of international law and to seek peaceful settlement of disputes. Thus the U.S. effort in the Security Council and the International Court have been diplomatically correct. Had the United States not sought to exhaust the legal remedies available, we would have set a dreadful example for the rest of the world. Despite the slow and very painstaking effort that going this route required, we have lived up to these foreign policy principles and set an example for the rest of the world. Third, the Council's failure to apply sanctions only serves to point up a basic fact about the United Nations: it can only do what its members want it to do. When the superpowers-the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics-cooperate, the majority of U.N. members are likely to agree. When they do not cooperate, the initiative of one or the other will be frustrated. It takes two to tango. SUPPLEMENTARY VIEWS OF REPRESENTATIVE One of the most interesting series of meetings that I participated in during the 1979 General Assembly session were those organized by two members of the Australian delegation who were themselves Members of Parliament. Prior to this 34th U.N.G.A. session, the desirability of · holding such meetings of U.N. parliamentarians had been discussed; however, not until the 34th session did the meetings actually convene. The Australian parliamentarians invited parliamentarian delegates of all U.N. member states attending the U.N. General Assembly session. The first meeting took place in early October and subsequently five or six additional meetings were held. At the first couple of meetings, we considered procedures and mechanics. We agreed that all meetings would be closed and minutes kept of only those parts of the proceedings related to procedures or to requests of the U.N. Secretariat should be kept. On political issues, only the topic and list of speakers were to be recorded and no motions would be received or votes taken. The Secretariat provided French and English translation services. Although all U.N. members were invited to send parliamentary delegates to these meetings, not all governments included parliamentarians in their delegations. Of those that did, we found that different governments assigned parliamentary delegates for varying periods of time and that the procedure authorizing their appointment varied considerably. In regard to the former, some parliamentarians attended. for 2 weeks; others for 3 to 4 weeks; still others, such as the United States and Sweden, assigned delegates for the duration of the session. The Canadian experience was exceptional in this respect. Besides the two Members of Parliament assigned to the delegation the Canadian Government also assigned five parliamentarians to be observeradvisers for 1 week during the U.N.G.A. session for the purpose educating them about the United Nations. In contrast, the Federal Republic of Germany stopped sending parliamentary delegates several years ago because they felt they had nothing to do. The Canadian example seemed particularly useful because it enabled a large number of M.P.'s to learn about the U.N. by observing-advising for a short period of time. I believe the United States should seriously consider adopting this practice so that more House and Senate Members could have an opportunity to gain firsthand knowledge and experience at the United Nations. of The meetings provided a forum for myself and counterpparts in other delegations from Bangladesh, Canada, Denmark, India, Madagascar, Norway, the Netherlands, Sweden, Zambia, Upper Volta, Israel, Senegal, Philippines, Belgium, Uganda, Sri Lanka, and Australia to compare notes on our role as parliamentary delegates and to exchange views on a number of important issues. Among the topics discussed were global negotiations on economic matters; decoloniza |