Imagini ale paginilor
PDF
ePub

ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Our 3-month assignment at the United Nations was an excellent opportunity to learn first-hand about the U.N. It was a stimulating and thought-provoking, but sometimes frustrating, experience. Yet we acquired a better understanding of the U.S. mission and the United Nations, its strengths and weaknesses.

Both of us found the Department of State orientation useful and the U.S. Ambassadors and the U.S. mission staff professionally competent and responsive to our interests. We appreciated and benefitted from their efforts to involve us in U.S.-U.N. delegation meetings, briefings and task forces. However, our long involvement in formulating foreign policy in Congress led us to expect to be more involved in U.S. policy making on General Assembly issues than we were. Our primary responsibility as delegates was not to make policy but to represent the United States in General Assembly meetings and to advise the Ambassadors and mission staff on Congress action or reaction to issues.

As we noted earlier, certain institutional factors seemed to militate against our full integration into U.S.-U.N. policymaking. First, U.S. policy decisions are made not at the U.S. mission in New York but in the Department in Washington. Instructions from the Department generally governed voting positions and the content of policy statements. Second, the duration of our assignment as Delegates and the fact that we were Members of Congress also seemed to inhibit our fuller involvement. We could ably carry out our duties as representatives and advisers, but had a modest role in policymaking otherwise. In view of our modest role in U.S. policymaking in the General Assembly, we have questioned whether Members of Congress in the future should devote 3 months to this assignment. The practices of U.N. member states vary in this respect. About 40 member states assign parliamentarians to their delegations for periods primarily ranging from 1 to 3 or 4 weeks. In contrast, the U.S. practice is to assign two Members for 12 weeks. Canada's practice, however, is exceptional. Its Government aims to educate its Members of Parliament about the U.N. by assigning five Members,2 in addition to two regularly appointed delegates, to attend 1 week of General Assembly meetings as observers-advisers for 6 weeks of the 12-week session. As a result, 30 Members of Canada's Parliament are exposed to the work of the U.N. General Assembly every year. If more Members of Congress could attend part of the session as observers, the level of awareness in Congress of the U.S. role in international institutions might be increased. Our experience leads us to make several recommendations:

(1) The Congressional Relations Office at the State Department should, as soon as Members of Congress are appointed, consult with them to shape their expectations of their role as delegates. The Office should emphasize the representational and advisory nature of the assignment as well as the institutional limitations on the extent to which Members can be involved in policymaking. (2) The Department of State's 2-day briefing of public delegates to the General Assembly session should be continued and expanded to include a discussion of the U.N. political process and the role of multilateral diplomacy in U.S. foreign policy.

2 Canada's Parliament appoints 2 Conservatives, 2 Liberals, and 1 National Democrat so that all 3 political parties are represented.

(3) The Department of State and the U.S. mission should continue to involve Members of Congress in delegation meetings, briefings and task forces during the General Assembly session. (4) More Members of Congress should have the opportunity to learn firsthand about the U.N. and how it works. We should follow the Canadian example and encourage the Speaker of the House or President of the Senate to schedule the appointment of four or five Members per week during the General Assembly session in addition to the regularly appointed congressional Members of the delegation. Such appointments should contribute to improving the understanding of the U.N. within the Congress and, over time, throughout the country.

(5) It is common knowledge that the press only publicizes U.N. issues when some terribly important event occurs: The Iranian crisis and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan being two current examples. The 146 agenda items and 12 weeks of General Assembly debate suggest that a lot of issues dealt with by the U.N. do not see the light of the printed page.

Public understanding of the United States and the United Nations needs to be improved. One way of achieving this would be for a nongovernmental organization with expertise in U.N. affairs to sponsor regional seminars on the United Nations. UNA-USA or the League of Women's Voters, for instance, might sponsor such meetings in regions of the United States in cooperation with the Department of State. Such meetings could provide an educational forum as well as a mechanism for certain groups to air their views for and against the U.N. and the agencies. These meetings might also serve as orientation seminars for public delegates.

UNA's useful publication, "Issues Before the General Assembly," if available by May or June, could provide the background material for these meetings.

SELECTED ISSUES BEFORE THE 34TH GENERAL
ASSEMBLY

The United Nations General Assembly is the major international forum where representatives from all U.N. member states can meet and discuss an increasing number of common problems. In the past, the U.N. has not always dealt with the central or immediate issues of our times. The issue of Vietnam was not raised in the U.N. because the United States and Russia refused to let it be, in spite of U Thant's efforts to encourage both states to discuss it. A striking characteristic of the 34th General Assembly was that it dealt with with such central issues as Kampuchea, the Middle East, apartheid, Cyprus, arms control and disarmament, peacekeeping, human rights, administrative and budgetary matters, international economic cooperation and development, and proposals for reform and restructuring.

Although the confrontational atmosphere of several years ago seems to have subsided, some difficult issues, as Ambassador McHenry has noted, were being discussed outside the U.N. framework-Rhodesia and Namibia-or were postponed to subsequent meetings of the General Assembly, for instance, global negotiations and the international development strategy.

Overall, however, the General Assembly's 1979 session was overshadowed by the Iranian situation that has been played out not in the Assembly, but in the U.N. Security Council and the International Court of Justice in the Hague.

In the following section, we report on several selected issues before the General Assembly that seems relevant to the work of the Congress and the Committee on Foreign Affairs. In addition, in a subsequent section, we report briefly on the U.N.'s handling of the Iranian crisis during our assignment in New York.

THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION

In perhaps no other issue area was the record of the General Assembly so dismal as it was on the situation in the Middle East. At the 34th session, the opponents of the Camp David accords emerged victorious, the majority position against Egypt hardened, and the Palestinians succeeded in further institutionalizing their demands for recognition. One example of this was the plenary debate on the report of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, which resulted in the adoption of a four-part resolution,1 which the United States opposed. Although the United States strongly opposes the existence of this Committee and its secretariat arm, the Special Unit on Palestinian Rights, the majority in the Assembly in one part of the resolution endorsed the committee's continued work and in another elevated the Special Unit on Palestinian Rights to a Division for Palestinian Rights and expanded its 1980 work program to include seminars, an internship program, lecture tours, visual materials, and the issuance of U.N. commemorative postage stamps to publicize the grave situation of the Palestinian people.

[blocks in formation]

In a third part of the resolution, the Assembly called for PLO participation in all U.N.-sponsored deliberations and conferences on the Middle East on an equal footing with other parties, and reaffirmed that a just and lasting peace could only be based on the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, including their right to national independence and sovereignty. The resolution was adopted 117 to 14 (United States) with 16 abstentions.

In the fourth part, the Assembly declared the Camp David accords and other agreements to have no validity insofar as they purport to determine the future of the Palestinian people and their territory. Egyptian and American efforts narrowly failed to remove the reference to the Camp David accords, and the resolution was adopted 75 in favor, 53 against, including the United States, Egypt, and Israel, and 37 abstentions. This vote was not lopsided as it would have been had the United States, Egypt, and Israel not lobbied hard against the resolution. Indeed, had there been more time to lobby, the resolution might have been defeated.

What disturbs us about this resolution is the patent disregard by the nonaligned for the Camp David accords, which, in our view, offer the best hope yet for peace in the Middle East. They say these negotiations will not result in a political settlement. Yet this attitude can become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Critics of Camp David have been quick to damn that approach, but so far no one has even tried to propose a realistic alternative. The action on this resolution is in no one's long-term interest, particularly the Palestinians, and we are deeply concerned about the negative impact this resolution is likely to have on the current stage of the peace negotiations. Obviously, peace must take precedence over polemics.

Indirect reference to Camp David also appeared in a resolution on the situation in the Middle East. Though it did not specifically mention the Camp David accords, the resolution in one operative paragraph condemned all partial agreements and separate treaties 2 by a vote of 103 to 16 (United States, Egypt and Israel) with 20 abstentions.

ISRAELI PRACTICES

The majority in the Assembly pounced on Israel in debate on the report of the Special Committee on Israeli Practices in the Occupied Territories. In an omnibus resolution, the Assembly reaffirmed the applicability of the 1949 Geneva Convention to the occupied territories, a serious obstacle to peace, and called on Israel to comply with the 1949 convention. While the United States supported these parts of the resolution, it opposed the third part which, inter alia, "deplored the continued and persistent violation by Israel of the 1949 convention," and "condemned" such Israeli policies and practices as mass arrests, torture of persons in detention, interference with religious freedoms and practices. The United States maintains that evidence does not warrant this type of condemnation and, therefore, opposed this part of the resolution. Congressman Rosenthal declined to give the U.S. statement on this item and opposed consideration of the report.

2 A. Res. 34/70.

3 A. Res. 34/90 A, B, and C.

UNRWA

UNRWA has a new Commissioner General, Olof Rydbeck, former Swedish Ambassador to the United Nations. Both of us met with him during the General Assembly session. In private meetings, he stressed the importance of UNRWAS operations for the stability of the region during the current stage of peace negotiations. UNRWA currently has a $53 million gap between its promised assistance and its 1980 budget. If the agency does not get its funding next year, UNRWA says it will have no choice but to cut its education program and abandon 90,000 teenagers and 3,000 teachers to the streets. Rydbeck also said the congressional provision that $9.5 million of the $52 million U.S. contribution to UNRWA be matched by OPEC states creates some real problems. For example, he said he wants to try to get the Arabs to treat that sum as a starting point for their contributions, while many of them, resenting that the United States is telling them in this manner what they should pay, want to consider the $9.5 million instead as a ceiling. The Commissioner General later met with Members of Congress, Hill staff, and the administration in Washington on this issue.

After the Special Political Committee discussed UNRWA, it recommended an omnibus six-part resolution to the UNGA. The Assembly adopted Resolution A (140 (United States)-0-1 (Israel)) which called attention to the serious financial position of UNRWA and asked Members "as a matter of urgency" to make the most generous efforts possible; Resolutions B (assistance to persons displaced due to the June 1967 hostilities) and D (working group on financing UNRWA) were adopted by consensus. It adopted Resolution C, an appeal to member states and U.N. agencies for grants and scholarships for higher education for Palestinian refugees (138-0-2 (Israel, United States)); Resolution E, reaffirming the inalienable rights of people displaced since 1967 to return and considering "any and all agreements embodying any restriction on or condition for the return of displaced inhabitants null and void" 121-3 (Australia, U.A., Israel)-16; and Resolution F, calling on Israel to desist from removing and destroying Palestinian refugee shelters in the Gaza (136-1 (Israel)) with five abstentions (United States) by wide majorities.

PEACEMAKING AND PEACEKEEPING

5

The Assembly addressed several issues of peacemaking and peacekeeping in the Middle East. Following debate in the First Committee on Political and Security Affairs on an Iraqi proposal on Israeli nuclear armament, the Assembly adopted a resolution calling on all states to end any nuclear or nuclear-related cooperation with Israel, condemning Israel's efforts to manufacture, acquire, store, test, or introduce nuclear weapons in the Middle East, and requesting the Secretary General to report to the 35th General Assembly: 98-10 (the United States, the Scandinavian and Benelux States opposed)-38 (other Western states).

A. Res. 34/52 A, B, C, D, E, and F.

5 A. Res. 34/89.

« ÎnapoiContinuă »