tary of the Treasury, who shall, upon the presentation of the cer tificates of the Secretary of State, pay the amounts so found to be due. Each of the trust funds covered into the treasury as aforesaid is hereby appropriated for the payment to the ascer tained beneficiaries thereof of the certificates herein provided for." 54 § 579. Payment of interest on claims.—In the absence of an express statute, there is no obligation on the United States to pay interest on claims against it. If, acting through the Secretary of State, the government of the United States has unlawfully withheld money paid under an agreement of arbitration between the United States and a foreign country, a claim for such unlawful withholding against the Secretary of State is a claim against the government of the United States. Consequently, the government of the United States is not liable for interest on the money so withheld.55 "It has been established as a general rule in the practice of the government," said Mr. Justice Blatchford, "that interest is not allowed on claims against it, whether such claims originate in contract or in tort, and whether they arise in the ordinary business of administration or under private acts of relief passed by Congress on special application. The only recognized exceptions are where the government stipulates to pay interest, and where interest is given expressly by an act of Congress, either by the name of interest or by that of damages.'' 56 Where it does not appear that the parties to a contract had some particular place in view, their contracts, so far as their nature, validity and interpretation are concerned, are to be controlled by the law of the place in which they are made. North Carolina, by the decisions of that state, where there is no statute on the subject, is not liable for interest, and although bonds of that state may be payable in New York, they do not bear interest and are not subject to the law of New York as to the payment of interest on such obligations.57 "Interest," said Mr. Justice Gray, 29 U. S. Stats. at Large, 32. United States v. Bayard, 127 U. S. 251, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1156, 32 L. ed. 159. United States v. Bayard, 127 U. S. 251, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1156, 32 L. ed. 159. 57 United States v. North Carolina, 136 U. S. 216, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 922, 34 L. ed. 336. "when not stipulated for by contract, or authorized by statute, is allowed by the courts as damages for the detention of money or of property, or of compensation, to which the plaintiff is entitled; and, as has been settled on grounds of public convenience, is not to be awarded against a sovereign government, unless its consent to pay interest has been manifested by an act of its legislature, or by a lawful contract of its executive officers."' 58 § 580. Default not attributed to government.-Mr. Justice Strong said that whenever interest is allowed, "either by statute or by common law, except in cases where there has been a con tract to pay interest, it is allowed for delay or default of the debtor. But delay or default cannot be attributed to the government. It is presumed to be always ready to pay what it owes. 1159 Where internal revenue taxes have been paid without protest, the allowance of interest has been denied.60 In New York, interest was paid by the state to its canal fund for money borrowed from it under an agreement by its officers to pay such interest. This expense was incurred by the state in raising troops for the national defense, to be repaid to the state by the United States. The supreme court of the United States held that the interest was an expense properly incurred as a part of the "costs, charges, and expenses properly incurred" within the meaning of the act of Congress to be reimbursed to the state by the government of the United States. The decision was placed upon the ground that the state could not legally borrow from the canal fund without the payment of interest. By the statute creating the court of claims, when the judgment appealed from is in favor of the claimant, and the same is affirmed by the supreme court, interest 61 58 United States v. North Carolina, supra. United States v. Sherman, 98 U. S. 565, 25 L. ed. 235. Commissioners of Sinking Fund v. Buckner, 48 Fed. 542. See, also, United States v. Barber, 74 Fed. 484, 20 C. C. A. 616, 41 U. S. App. 424; Baxter v. United States, 51 Fed. 675, 2 C. C. A. 411; Walton v. United States, 61 Fed. 487; Bunton v. United States, 62 Fed. 172; United States v. Barber, 74 Fed. 484, 41 U. S. App. 424, 20 C. C. A. 616; Carr v. State, 127 Ind. 218, 22 Am. St. Rep. 624, 26 N. E. 783, 11 L. R. A. 375; Hawkins v. Mitchell, 34 Fla. 421, 16 South. 316; Seton v. Hoyt, 34 Or. 272, 75 Am. St. Rep. 643, 55 Pac. 968, 43 L. R. A. 635. 61 United States v. State of New York, 160 U. S. 619, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 410, 40 L. ed. 551. is allowed on it at the rate of five per cent per year from the date of its presentation to the Secretary of the Treasury for payment, but no interest is allowed subsequent to the affirmance, unless it is presented to the Secretary of the Treasury.62 § 581. Questions involving title to real estate. The descent, alienation and transfer of land is controlled by the laws of the state in which the land is situated, as likewise the construction and effect of instruments by which its conveyance is affected. The rule may be said to be universal "that every question involving title, to real estate, whether by descent or purchase, must be determined by the law of the country wherein such real estate is situated, and all remedies for injuries in respect thereof must be pursued by the aggrieved party before the duly constituted tribunals of such country. 64 Still, the United States held that a Mexican statute which discriminated against its citizens and other aliens relative to the capacity to hold real estate in Mexico, conflicted with the treaty. then existing.65 But it is to be observed that trespasses and evictions, when they may be characterized as a forcible deprivation without recourse to law, may become the subjects of diplomatic intervention.66 § 582. Claims arising on contracts.-As a general proposition, the United States will not interfere, except by its good offices in the prosecution of claims based on contracts made with foreign governments.67 But there may be cases where diplomacy is the U. S. Rev. Stats., sec. 1090. S. 627, 24 L. ed. 858. "Mr. Marcy, Secretary of State, to Mr. Selding, March 3, 1856, 45 MS. Dom, Let. 123. Mr. Evarts, Secretary of State, to Mr. Foster, June 23, 1879, MS. Inst. Mex. XXI. 2 Wharton's Int. Law Dig. 667, note. "Mr. Olney, Secretary of State, to Mr. Meyer, Nov. 16, 1895, 206 MS. Dom. Let. 78; Mr. Day, Secretary of State, to Mr. Buchanan, Minister to Argentine Republic, No. 362, May 31, 1898, MS. Inst. Arg. Rep. XVII, 363; Mr. Day, Secretary of State, to Mr. Ketcham, July 28, 1898, 230 MS. Dom. Let. 414; Mr. Hay, Secretary of State, to Mr. Powell, Minister to Hayti, No. 338, April 12, 1899, MS. Inst. Hayti, IV, 143; Mr. Hay, Secretary of State, to Messrs. E. Becker & Co., April 12, 1899, 236 MS. Dom. Let. 298. 68 only method by which redress can be obtained. It has been frequently said that the government of the United States will insist on a fair and impartial examination and adjudication without discrimination as to nationality of a claim based on contract made by a citizen of the United States against another government. It is not required by the United States that rights which its citizens have forfeited should be maintained, but that they should not be arbitrarily deprived of those rights without a fair examination by an impartial tribunal.69 It was claimed by an American citizen that the Russian government was using an invention made by him in its fortifications and vessels, and he sought the aid of the United States to obtain reimbursement from the government of Russia, but Mr. Fish, Secretary of State, held that the matter was not one which could properly be presented through diplomatic channels.70 Governments have also frequently made reparation for false or irregular arrests,71 but if the proceedings have been regular, indemnity is not demanded.72 § 583. The court of claims.-The court of claims has jurisdiction of all claims founded upon any law of Congress, or upon any regulation of an executive department, or upon any contract, expressed or implied, with the government of the United States, and all claims that may be referred to it by either House of Congress. But its jurisdiction, however, does not extend to any claim against the government not pending therein, on December 1, 1862, growing out of or dependent on any treaty stipulation entered into with foreign nations or with the Indian tribes.74 A suit brought against the United States for the purpose of recovering an unsatisfied part of a judgment rendered in the Court of Commissioners of Alabama Claims, which the Secretary of the Treasury illegally withheld from the party entitled to it, is not a case growing out of and dependent on the treaty between the United States and Great Britain. The court of claims is not prohibited from taking jurisdiction of this claim, because the claimants are seeking to recover upon the specific Moore's Int. L. Dig. 717. 6 Moore's Int. L. Dig. 724. To To Mr. Meyers, M. C., Jan. 27, 1875, 106 MS. Dom. Let. 311. See 6 Moore's Int. L. Dig. 767. 72 6 Moore's Int. L. Dig. 765. 73 Rev. Stats., sec. 1059. "Rev. Stats., sec. 1066. appropriation made by Congress and not upon any obligation created by the treaty itself. While it might be said that a claim of this nature in one sense is dependent upon the treaty, the dependence is too remote to be affected by the statute, which contemplates a direct connection between the treaty and the claim, to prevent the court of claims from having jurisdiction of it.75 But if the petition bases the right to recovery on the provisions of the treaty itself, and no statute is invoked nor is it charged that the United States is directly and primarily liable on the claim, the court has no jurisdiction.76 As the jurisdiction of the court of claims is limited to claims against the United States, it has no jurisdiction of a claim against the District of Columbia which Congress referred to the court." A state is competent to maintain a suit.78 A claim for unliquidated damages on contract exists where the Secretary of War dispossessed a lessee who had a valid lease before the expiration of his term.79 The law of the state where the cause of action arose or where the claim accrued is considered by the court in all cases where questions arise affecting the validity of contracts, the title to property, the distribution of estates, or the proper parties to prosecute a case.80 § 584. Jurisdictional requirements. While it is a general rule that the courts of one state will not lend assistance to the officers of another to withdraw funds or property of a decedent, without making provision for local creditors, this rule does not require the treasurer of the United States, in paying the amount due to a claimant against the United States, to prefer his creditors residing in the District of Columbia over the receiver of personal property of such claimant appointed by a court of chancery of the United States v. Weld, 127 U. S. 51, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1000, 32 L. ed. 62. Great Western Ins. Co. v. United States, 112 U. S. 193, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 99, 28 L. ed. 687; Alling v. United States, 114 U. S. 562, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1080, 29 L. ed. 272. These cases are distinguished in United States v. Weld, 127 U. S. 51, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1000, 32 L. ed. 62. "Strachan v. District of Columbia, 20 Ct. of Cl. 484. TS Louisiana v. United States, 22 Ct. of Cl. 85. 19 Dunbar v. United States, 22 Ct. of Cl. 109. So Borcherling v. United States, 35 Ct. of Cl. 312; United States v. Borcherling, 185 U. S. 223, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 607, 46 L. ed. 884. |