ment. No point was made as to the jurisdiction of the court, and the opinion was silent upon the subject.14 It was said, however, in a later case, that the question of jurisdiction did not escape the attention of the court, and that the judgment would not have been rendered except upon the theory that jurisdiction of a suit by the United States against a state is vested in the supreme court of the United States.15

§ 48. Suits by state to recover penalties.-It does not follow that because a state is the plaintiff that the controversy is one in which the supreme court of the United States is empowered to grant relief against another state or its citizens, for it was not intended to confer upon the courts of the United States jurisdiction of a suit by one state of such a nature that, on the settled principles of public and international law, it could not be entertained by the judiciary of the other state. It is a well-recognized rule that the courts of one country do not execute the penal laws of another. This principle applies not only to prosecutions and sentences for crimes and misdemeanors, but to all suits in favor of a state to recover pecuniary penalties for violations of statutes, for the protection of its revenue or other municipal laws. The nature of the cause of action is not altered by a judgment recovered upon it, and, hence, when a judgment is presented to a court for enforcement, it may ascertain whether the claim is one that it is authorized to enforce. The supreme court of the United States has no jurisdiction over an original action brought to compel an insurance corporation of one state to pay to another state the amount of a judgment recovered by such state for a penalty imposed by its own statute upon such corporation for doing business within the state, without having first given to the proper officer of the state a statement of its property and business which the statute required.16

14 United States v. North Carolina, 136 U. S. 211, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 920, 34 L. ed. 336.

15 United States v. Texas, 143 U. S. 640, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 488, 36 L. ed. 291.

16 Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U. S. 288, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1373, 32

L. ed. 242. Said Mr. Justice Gray, in delivering the opinion of the court: "The statute of Wisconsin, under which the state recovered in one of her own courts, the judgment now and here sued on, was in the strictest sense a penal statute, imposing a penalty upon any insurance company of

§ 49. Approval of Congress implied from subsequent legislation. While there may be no direct legislation on the subject, a compact entered into between two states as to the boundary line between them may be fairly implied from subsequent legislation and proceedings. Even if a boundary line between two states varies in some particulars from the courses given in the original grant, still if it has been run out, located and marked upon the earth, and the states have for a long course of years recognized and acquiesced in the line, it becomes conclusive.17 Mr. Justice Field, delivering the opinion of the court, said: "The Constitution does not state when the consent shall be given, whether it shall precede or may follow the compact made, or whether it shall be express or may be implied. In many cases the consent

another state, doing business in the state of Wisconsin without having deposited with the proper officer of the state a full statement of its property and business during the previous year. Wis. Rev. Stats., sec. 1920. The cause of action was not any private injury, but solely the offense committed against the state by violating her law. The prosecution was in the name of the state, and the whole penalty when recovered would accrue to the state, and be paid, one-half into her treasury, and the other half to her insurance commissioner, who pays all expenses of prosecuting for and collecting such forfeitures. Wis. Stats. 1885, c. 395. The real nature of the case is not affected by the forms provided by the law of the state for the punishment of the offense. It is immaterial whether by the law of Wisconsin, the prosecution must be by indictment or by action; or whether under that law, a judgment there obtained for the penalty might be enforced by execution, by scire facias or by a new suit. In whatever form the state pursues her right to punish the offense against her sovereignty, every step of the proceeding

tends to one end, the compelling the offender to pay a pecuniary fine by way of punishment for the offense. This court, therefore, cannot entertain an original action to compel the defendant to pay to the state of Washington a sum of money in satisfaction of the judgment for that fine. The original jurisdiction of this court is conferred by the Constitution, without limit of the amount in controversy, and Congress has never imposed (if indeed it could impose) any such limit. If this court has original jurisdiction of the present case, it must follow that any action upon a judgment obtained by a state in her own courts against a citizen of another state for the recovery of any sum of money, however small, by way of a fine for any offense, however petty, against her laws, could be brought in the first instance in the Supreme Court of the United States. That cannot have been the intention of the Convention in framing, or of the people in adopting the Federal Constitution."

"State of Virginia v. State of Tennessee, 148 U. S. 518, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 728, 37 L. ed. 537.

will usually precede the compact or agreement, as where it is to lay a duty of tonnage, to keep troops or ships of war in time of peace, or to engage in war. But where the agreement relates to a matter which could not well be considered until its nature is fully developed, it is not perceived why the consent may not be subsequently given. Story says that the consent may be implied, and is always to be implied, when Congress adopts the particular act by sanctioning its objects and aiding in enforcing them; and observes that where a state is admitted into the Union, notoriously upon a compact made between it and the state of which it previously composed a part, there the act of Congress, admitting such state into the Union is an implied consent to the terms of the compact. Knowledge by Congress of the boundaries of a state, and of its political subdivisions, may reasonably be presumed, as much of its legislation is affected by them, such as relate to the territorial jurisdiction of the courts of the United States, the extent of their collection districts, and of districts in which process, civil and criminal, of their courts may be served and enforced. '' 18

§ 50. Creation of mutual estoppel.-Where a boundary line has been recognized by two states for a long term of years, it becomes the established line between them on the principle of mutual estoppel. But if a boundary line has been actually run and established, it cannot be changed by the action of the state authorities in recognition of another line, unless both states have continuously recognized such line for such a length of time as to create a mutual estoppel and to operate as an adoption of such line as the true and established boundary.19

If two states have by acts of their legislatures confirmed the boundary line between them as run and marked by a joint commission, such line must, in a suit between private persons, be accepted by the courts as the true and ancient boundary, although

18 State of Virginia v. State of Tennessee, 148 U. S. 518, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 728, 37 L. ed. 537. That was an original suit in the supreme court of the United States, to establish by judicial decree the true boundary line between the states of Virginia and

Tennessee. The court adjudged that the boundary line as established in 1803 by compact was the true boundary line.

19 Belding v. Hebard, 103 Fed. 542, 43 C. C. A. 296.

a different line between two points may more accurately conform to a general call.20

§ 51. Contract of state to exempt property from taxation.— The provisions of the Constitution prohibiting a state, without the consent of Congress, entering into any agreement or compact with another state came before the supreme court for consideration in a case where the validity of a contract between a state and a railroad company exempting the latter from taxes in consideration of a percentage of its gross earnings was involved. The Constitution of the state of Minnesota contains clauses providing that all taxes to be raised in the state shall be as nearly equal as may be, and that all property on which taxes are to be levied shall have a cash valuation, and shall be uniform throughout the state; and also declaring that laws shall be passed taxing all real and personal property according to its true value in money.21 Congress granted certain lands to the state to aid in building a railroad, and provided "that the said lands hereby granted, when patented to said state, shall be subject to the disposal of said state for the purposes aforesaid and no other; and the said railroad shall be and remain a public highway for the use of the government of the United States free from all toll or other charge, for the transportation of any property or troops of the United States." 22 The legislature of that state passed an act accepting the grant and transferring the lands to a railroad company to aid it in the construction of the railroad, and providing that, in consideration of this grant, the company should, after the completion of its railroad, pay into the treasury three per cent of its gross earnings, "which sum shall be in lieu and in full of all taxation and assessments upon the said railroad, and its appurtenances and appendages, and all other property of said company, real, personal and mixed, including the lands hereby and heretofore granted to said company, or so intended to be granted." But the lands were to be taxed when they were sold and conveyed to purchasers. An amendatory act was passed, making some alterations, and providing that when its provisions should be accepted, "the same shall become obligatory upon the

2 Stevenson v. Fain, 116 Fed. 147, 53 C. C. A. 467.

"Minn. Const., art. 9, secs. 1, 3.

22 13 Stats. at Large, 64; 14 Stats. at Large, 93.

state and upon said company." The railroad company continued for many years to pay taxes in accordance with this contract, and no attempt was made by the state to levy taxes upon its lands.

§ 52. Subsequent statutes directing taxation of such property. An amendment, years after the making of this contract, was adopted to the Constitution of the state, declaring that any law providing for the repeal or amendment of any law similar to that in question should, before it became effective, be submitted to a vote of the people and ratified by them. Finally, a law was passed by the legislature and adopted by the people, by the terms of which all lands granted to any railroad company were to be assessed and taxed as other lands in the state, but the provision requiring the payment of a percentage of its gross earnings into the treasury was retained.

Under the provisions of this act the state proceeded to levy taxes upon the lands of a railroad company with which such contract was made, and the validity of such taxation was the question involved. The decision of the supreme court of Minnesota was adverse to the railroad company.23 The supreme court of the United States held that the power reserved in the constitutional amendment to alter, amend or repeal the statute exempting the railroad company from all other taxes in payment of the percentage of its earnings could not be exercised so as to continue in full the obligation as to the payment of the percentage, and to deny at the same time to the company the exemption given by the contract.24 This contract, it was said by Mr. Justice Brewer, was not in violation of the provisions of the Constitution of Minnesota, because it was made by the state as a trustee of the public lands granted to it in aid of railroads, and as the state had accepted the property as a trustee, it was not forced to diminish the full performance of the trust by subjecting the lands to taxation if in its opinion as trustee the transfer of the land subject to a limited taxation would more effectually accomplish the trust.25

23 State v. Stearns, 72 Minn. 200, 75 N. W. 210.

24 Stearns v. Minnesota, 179 U. S. 223, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 73, 45 L. ed. 162.

25

Stearns v. Minnesota, 179 U. S. 223, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 73, 45 L. ed. 162. The supreme court of the United States possesses paramount au