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he should not be allowed to establish his title by proving such a transaction.s

Mr. Justice Miller, who delivered the opinion of the court, in the case just cited, said that the fact that the claimant did not intend to aid the Rebellion, but only to make money, did not relieve the case of its harsh features, and speaking of the government of the Confederate states said: "So far from being necessary to the organization of civil government, or to its maintenance and support, it was inimical to social order, destructive to the best interests of society, and its primary object was to overthrow the Government on which these so largely depended. Its existence and temporary powers were an enormous evil, which the whole force of the Government and the people of the United States was engaged for years in destroying. When it was overthrown it perished totally.. It left no laws, no statutes, no decrees, no authority which can give support to any contract, or any act done in its service, or in aid of its purpose, or which contributed to protract its existence. So far as the actual exercise of its physical power was brought to bear upon individuals, that may, under some circumstances, constitute a justification or excuse for acts otherwise indefensible; but no validity can be given in the courts of this country to acts voluntarily performed in direct aid and support of its unlawful purpose. What of good or evil has flowed from it remains for the consideration and discussion of the philosophical statesman and historian."9

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Sprott v. United States, supra. Justices Clifford and Davis concurred in the judgment. Mr. Justice Field dissented, and said there was no question of enforcing a contract in the ease, and that the only question was whether the cotton, at the time of seizure, was the property of the claimant. "If it was his property," said he, then he is entitled to its proceeds, and the judgment of the Court of Claims should be reversed; and in determining this question we are not concerned with the consideration of his loyalty or disloyalty. He was a

citizen of Mississippi, and resided within the lines of the Confederacy, and the Act forbidding intercourse with the enemy does not apply to his case. He was subject to be treated, in common with other citizens of the Confederacy, as a public enemy, during the continuance of the war. And if he were disloyal in fact, and if by his purchase of the cotton he gave aid and comfort to the rebellion, as the court adjudges, the impediment which such conduct previously interposed to the prosecution of his claim was removed by the proclamation of Pardon and Amnesty made by the President on the 25th day of December, 1868.

$ 30. Contracts to aid the confederacy void.-All contracts entered into for the purpose of aiding the Confederate government are considered illegal and void, and will not be enforced in the federal tribunals.10 An agent living in one of the states in rebellion had no right to take Confederate money, or bank notes secured by Confederate bonds, in discharge of a debt due to his principal, who lived in a state loyal to the Union.11

12

§ 31. Ordinance of secession a nullity.-The ordinances of secession passed by various southern states were absolutely void, and in no manner affected the jurisdiction of the supreme court of the state nor the relation it always bore to the appellate power of the supreme court of the United States.1 The state continued to be during the Rebellion the same political organization as before,13 and, therefore, a state adjudication in favor of the validity of an act of the Confederate Congress, which the state recognizes and enforces as a law, and which must, consequently, be considered as a statute of that state, is subject to review by the supreme court of the United States.1 In the jurisprudence of that court nothing is more firmly established than that all acts done in aid of the Rebellion were illegal and of no validity.15

He was in possession of the property at the time of the seizure, asserting ownership to it; and no one then disputed, and no one since has disputed his title. Who, then, owned the property, if he did not. The United States did not own it. They did not acquire by its seizure any title to the property. They have never asserted any greater rights arising from capture of property on land in the hands of citizens engaged in the rebellion, than those which one belligerent nation asserts with reference to such property captured by it belonging to the citizens or subjects of the other belligerent. All public property which is movable in its nature, possessed by one belligerent, and employed on land in actual hostilities, passes by capture. But private property on

land, except such as becomes booty when taken from enemies in the field or besieged towns, or is levied as a military contribution upon the inhabitants of the hostile territory, is exempt from confiscation by the general law of nations.""

10 Hanauer v. Doane, 79 U. S. (12 Wall.) 342, 20 L. ed. 439; Hanauer v. Woodruff, 82 U. S. (15 Wall.) 439, 21 L. ed. 224.

Fretz v. Stover, 89 U. S. (22 Wall.) 198, 22 L. ed. 769.

12 White v. Cannon, 6 Wall. 443, 450, 18 L. ed. 923.

13 Keith v. Clark, 7 Otto, 454, 24 L. ed. 1071.

14 Ford v. Surget, 7 Otto, 594, 24 L. ed. 1018.

15 Dewing v. Perdicaris, 6 Otto, 193, 24 L. ed. 654.

§ 32. Sale of property of loyal owners.-Neither a purchaser nor his assignee can obtain any title to the property of loyal owners, sequestered and sold under a statute of the Confederate states.1 16 A court created by an act of the Confederate Congress was a nullity, and could possess no rightful jurisdiction, and it afforded no protection to those who assumed to be its officers.17

§ 33. Laws in aid of insurrection void. The courts of the United States cannot recognize as valid or binding any law made to aid or promote the Rebellion. A law passed by a legislature of a state in rebellion authorizing and requiring a city to redeem notes issued by it as currency did not make such bills valid.18 So, treasury notes authorized to be issued by the legislature of Mississippi, when it was in insurrection, inasmuch as they were issued against the public policy and in violation of the Constitution of the United States, are illegal and void, and cannot be received in payment of taxes.19 While the courts declared that it was impossible to state by exact definitions what acts of such government were valid and what invalid, still, it was conceded that acts necessary to peace and good order among citizens, such as those sanctioning and protecting marriage and the domestic relations, governing the course of descents, regulat

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Dewing v. Perdicaris, 6 Otto, 193, 24 L. ed. 654; Central R. etc. Co. v. Ward, 37 Ga. 515. See, also, United States v. One Thousand Five Hundred Bales Cotton, 27 Fed. Cas. No. 15,958.

"Hickman v. Jones, 9 Wall. 197, 19 L. ed. 551. And see as to the nullity of ordinances of secession, Keppel v. Petersburg R. Co., Chase, 167, 14 Fed. Cas.. No. 7722; United States v. Cathcart, 1 Bond, 556, 25 Fed. Cas. No. 14,756; Shortridge v. Macon, Chase, 136, 22 Fed. Cas. No. 12,812; Penn v. Tollison, 26 Ark. 545; Hawkins v. Filkins, 24 Ark. 286; Scruggs v. Huntsville, 45 Ala. 222; Nosely v. Tuthill, 45 Ala. 621, 6 Am. Rep. 710; Ex parte Norton, 44 Ala. 180; Ray v. Thompson, 43 Ala. 434, 94 Am. Dec. 696; Pennywitt v.

Foote, 27 Ohio St. 600, 22 Am. Rep. 340; Harlan v. State, 41 Miss. 566; Hood v. Maxwell, 1 W. Va. 219.

18 Thomas v. City of Richmond, 12 Wall. 349, 20 L. ed. 453.

19

Taylor v. Thomas, 22 Wall. 479, 22 L. ed. 789. See, also, Evans v. Richmond, Chase (U. S.), 551, 8 Fed. Cas. No. 4570; Huntington v. Texas, 16 Wall. 411, 21 L. ed. 316; Hatch v. Burroughs, Woods (U. S.), 439, 11 Fed. Cas. No. 6203; Perdicaris v. Charleston Gaslight Co., Chase (U. S.), 435, 19 Fed. Cas. No. 10,974; Isaacs v. Richmond, 90 Va. 30, 17 S. E. 760; Rand v. State, 65 N. C. 194, 6 Am. Rep. 741; Mississippi Cent. R. Co. v. State, 46 Miss. 157; Buchanan v. Smith, 43 Miss. 91; Sequestration Cases, 30 Tex. 689, 98 Am. Dec. 494.

ing the conveyance and transfer, real and personal, of property, providing remedies for injuries to person and estate, and similar acts which would be valid if proceeding from a lawful government, should in general be. considered valid as though they had emanated from an actual, though unlawful, government. On the other hand, acts in furtherance or support of rebellion, or intended to defeat the just rights of citizens, must be regarded, in general, as invalid and void.20

§ 34. Judgments of courts, when void.-Where legislation of the revolutionary legislatures enacted for the purpose of aiding the Rebellion, or which deprived citizens of the United States of their just rights, was effectuated by judgments and decrees of courts, such judgments and decrees are void, and no subsequent legislation can validate them.21 After the state of Virginia had passed an ordinance of secession, a law was enacted which declared that after its enactment, no execution, except in favor of the state and against nonresidents, should be issued, and that no sales should be made under deeds of trust or decrees without the consent of the parties interested, until otherwise provided by law. This clause that no executions should issue or sales be made was, the court decided, clearly in conflict with the contract clause of the Constitution. The exception in the statute as to executions in favor of the commonwealth and against nonresidents obviously contemplated the confiscation of the latter as a war measure, and was invalid by reason of the treasonable motive and purpose which prompted its authors to pass it.22 Although the states were in rebellion, only such acts as impaired or tended to impair the national supremacy were invalid, but all others that tended to preserve order, protect property or maintain police regulations were valid.23

20 Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 733, 19 L. ed. 227.

" Van Epps v. Walsh, 1 Woods (U. S.), 598, 28 Fed. Cas. No. 16,850.

22 Daniels v. Tearney, 102 U. S. 419, 26 L. ed. 187.

23 Horn v. Lockhart, 17 Wall. 580, 21 L. ed. 657. And see, also, Thomas v. Richmond, 12 Wall. 357, 20 L. ed.

453; United States v. Horne Ins. Co., 22 Wall. 103, 22 L. ed. 816; Sprott v. United States, 20 Wall. 459, 22 L. ed. 371; Wallace v. State, 33 Tex. 445; Evans v. Richmond, Chase (U. S.), 551, 8 Fed. Cas. No. 4570; Cook v. Oliver, 1 Woods (U. S.), 437, 6 Fed. Cas. No. 3164; Chappell v. Doe, 49 Ala. 155; Calhoun v. Kellogg, 41 Ga. 240; Buchanan v. Smith, 43

§ 35. No general rule to be applied.-Between the extremes of what was unlawful and what was lawful there was a large variety of transactions, to which no general rule can be applied. Such transactions between individuals as would have been binding and legal under ordinary circumstances cannot be declared illegal and of no obligation because they were done in conformity with laws enacted by a usurping authority. But such transactions of the usurping power as prejudiced the interests of citizens of other states excluded by the insurrection and by the policy of the national government from the care and protection of their own interests within the states in rebellion cannot be sustained by the courts.24 In other words, when the decision of the court could not, from the nature of the case, be influenced by the rebellion in existence, the judgment of the court is binding on the parties who were actually within the jurisdiction of the court.25

§ 36. State cannot negotiate for extradition. Under this clause of the Constitution a state cannot enter into any negotiation with a foreign power on the subject of the extradition of those. charged with crime. This is included within the treaty-making power of the federal government and the corresponding power of appointing and receiving ambassadors and other public ministers. There is no reason why states should in their own name make a demand upon foreign nations for the surrender of fugitives from justice; nor should they enter into those relations with such nations as the extradition of fugitives necessarily implies.26 In 1872 an act of the legislature of the state of New York, authorizing the rendition to foreign states of fugitives from justice, was held to be in conflict with the Constitution of the United States.27

§ 37.

Holmes case. The power of a state to surrender a fugitive from justice came before the supreme court of the United

Miss. 90; Hill v. Boylan, 40 Miss. 618; Morgan v. Keenan, 1 S. C. 327; Prince William School Board v. Stuart, 80 Va. 81; Frierson v. Presbyterian Church, 7 Heisk. (Tenn.) 705. Keppel v. Petersburg R. Co., Chase (U. S.), 167, 14 Fed. Cas. No. 7722.

24

Treaties-3

25 Cook v. Oliver, 1 Woods (U. S.), 437, 6 Fed. Cas. No. 3164.

26 United States v. Rauscher, 119 U. S. 407, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 234, 30 L. ed. 425.

"People v. Curtis, 50 N. Y. 321, 10 Am. Rep. 483.

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