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country, or the said consuls, vice-consuls, or commercial agents should require their assistance to cause their decisions to be carried into effect or supported. It is, however, understood, that this species of judgment or arbitration shall not deprive the contending parties of the right they have to resort, on their return, to the judicial authority of their country." 39 It is almost uniformly decided that such a treaty takes away all right of action for wages in the courts of the United States by a seaman coming within the purview of the treaty, regardless of the question whether the action is in rem or in personam.40

A libel for wages brought by an American seaman against a German vessel, where he had shipped on board and claimed to be entitled to a discharge, was dismissed, although the judge. stated that if the fact had been proved that a discharge had been granted, he would have been inclined to assume jurisdiction.41

A citizen of the United States brought a libel against a Norwegian steamship for damages and for wages. He alleged that he shipped on the vessel at Mobile for a round voyage to Tampico, and that when he arrived in Mobile Bay, on the return trip,

398 U. S. Stats. 346, 352.

40 Tellefsen v. Fee, 168 Mass. 188, 60 Am. St. Rep. 379, 46 N. E. 562, 45 L. R. A. 481; The Elwine Kreplin, 9 Blatchf. 438, Fed. Cas. No. 4426; Norberg v. Hillgren, 5 N. Y. Leg. Obs. 177; The Salomoni, 29 Fed. 534; The Burchard, 42 Fed. 608; The Marie, 49 Fed. 286; The Welhaven, 55 Fed. 80.

In Tellefsen v. Fee, supra, the court said: "An examination of the treaty and authorities above cited makes it plain that the court has no discretion in the matter, and that the local authorities have no right to interfere. Where jurisdiction is given by a treaty to a consul, vice-consul, or a commercial agent, he alone has authority to act in determining in the first instance whether wages are due and the amount. It is to be remembered that the United States

government has the same right by the treaty in regard to its vessels in Norway; and this right is insisted upon by our government. In the United States Consular Regulations of 1888, page 25, paragraph 66, under the title Jurisdiction over Disputes Between Masters, Officers and Crews,' appears the following: 'Exclusive jurisdiction over such disputes in the vessels of the United States, including question of wages, is conferred by treaties or conventions with' several governments named, and among them Sweden and Norway. And on page 92, paragraph 273, is also the following: 'In many instances, by treaty and consular convention, the United States have secured to their consular officers jurisdiction over question of wages, shipment and discharge of sea

men.

"The Burchard, 42 Fed. 608.

he was put ashore, manacled and finally discharged without full pay. The Norwegian consul intervened, asserting jurisdiction, and his position was sustained and the libel dismissed.42 The United States district court in Maine, however, entertained jurisdiction of a libel against a Swedish vessel on the ground. that Sweden has no consular representative in that district.43

§ 213. Municipal ordinances.-The supreme court of the United States has had before it several cases in which it was called upon to consider the extent of the police power of the states in the prescription of regulations for the promotion of the health, peace, morals, education and good order of the people. It is recognized that the state possesses supreme power over police regulations. Thus, a municipal ordinance which prohibits the carrying on of public laundries and washhouses within certain defined limits of a city, between certain hours during the night, is a police regulation. Such an ordinance is within the power of the city to make, and it cannot be supervised by a federal tribunal.45 Such an ordinance is not void on the ground that it creates a discrimination between those engaged in the laundry

The Welhaven, 55 Fed. 80. In The Elwine Kreplin, 9 Blatchf. 438, Fed. Cas. No. 4426, the question is considered fully.

The Amalia, 3 Fed. 652.. "Commonwealth v. Alger, 7 Cush. (Mass.) 84; Taunton v. Taylor, 116 Mass. 254; Watertown v. Mayo, 109 Mass. 315, 12 Am. Rep. 694; Slaughter-house Cases, 83 U. S. (16 Wall.) 36, 21 L. ed. 394; Lake View v. Rose Hill Cemetery, 70 Ill. 191, 22 Am. Rep. 71; Daniels v. Hilgard, 77 Ill. 640; Boston Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U. S. 25, 24 L. ed. 989.

It is competent for the state to forbid the carrying of concealed weapons (State v. Wilforth, 74 Mo. 528, 41 Am. Rep. 330); or to require professional graduates to possess certain qualifications. State v. Hayward, 3 Rich. 389; Regents v. Williams, 9 Gill & J. 365, 31 Am. Dec. 72.

A state has the right, under its police power, to prohibit by a subsequent statute the transportation of dead animals under a charter which permits their use as fertilizers, as the police power of a state is adequate to give an effectual remedy against nuisances. Northwestern Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U. S. 659, 24 L. ed. 1036; S. C., 70 Ill. 634. Under this power regulations may be imposed for the protection of markets against the sale of commodities unfit for commerce. New Haven etc. T. B. Co. v. Bunnell, 4 Conn. 59; State v. Fosdick, 21 La. Ann. 256.

45 Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 357, 28 L. ed. 923. Mr. Justice Field, in delivering the opinion of the court, said that neither the fourteenth amendment nor any other amendment "was designed to interfere with the power

business and those in other classes, nor on the ground that it deprives a person of his right to labor at all times or that it is unreasonable.46

If, however, a law be impartial in its appearance, yet if it is administered unequally and with partiality, so as to cause illegal discriminations between persons similarly situated, such administration will constitute a denial of equal justice within the prohibition of the Constitution.47

§ 214. Special rights to American citizens.-A treaty which provides that the citizens of a foreign country shall have free access to the tribunals in their affairs of litigation on the same terms which are granted by the law and usages of the country to native citizens and subjects refers only to ordinary litigation. It does not prevent the government from subsequently bestowing special rights of action on its own citizens against itself

of the state, sometimes termed its 'police power' to prescribe regulations to promote the health, peace, morals, education and good order of the people, and to legislate so as to increase the industries of the state, develop its resources and add to its wealth and prosperity. From the very necessities of society, legislation of a special character, having these objects in view, must often be had in certain districts, such as for draining marshes and irrigating arid plains. Special burdens are often necessary for general benefits, for supplying water, preventing fires, lighting districts, cleaning streets, opening parks, and many other objects. Regulations for these purposes may press with more or less weight upon one than upon another, but they are designed, not to impose unequal or unnecessary restrictions upon anyone, but to promote, with as little inconvenience as possible, the general good. Though in many respects necessarily special in their character, they do not furnish just ground of com

plaint, if they operate alike upon all persons and property under the same circumstances and conditions. Class legislation, discriminating against some and favoring others, is prohibited; but legislation which, in carrying out a public purpose, is limited in its application, if within the sphere of its operation it affects all persons similarly situated, is not within the amendment."'

Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U. S. 703, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 730, 28 L. ed. 1145.

47 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1064, 30 L. ed. 221. Mr. Justice Matthews, in delivering the opinion of the court, said: "When we consider the nature and the theory of our institutions of government, the principles upon which they are supposed to rest, and review the history of their development, we are constrained to conclude that they do not mean to leave room for the play and action of purely personal and arbitrary power.''

to the exclusion of aliens. Hence such foreign subjects are not entitled to maintain an action in the court of claims for Indian depredations under an act of Congress giving this court jurisdiction of claims for property of citizens of the United States taken or destroyed by an Indian tribe or nation.48

§ 215. Right of nonresident aliens to damages for death of relative. Statutes have been passed in many of the states giving a right of action to the husband or wife or next of kin of a person who has been killed by the negligence of another. There is a diversity of opinion upon the question whether a nonresident alien may claim the benefits of such statutes. On the one hand it is asserted that a construction of the statute which would include nonresident aliens is contrary to its spirit and policy.49 In Colorado a similar construction was placed upon the statute of that state.50 So in Wisconsin, it was held that such statutes had no extraterritorial force, bound only those within the limits of the state, and hence nonresident aliens could not claim the benefit of the statute.51 On the other hand, it is declared that while no duties can be imposed by statute upon persons within the limits of another state, still, rights can be offered to such persons, and there is nothing to prevent them from accepting the offer.52 This is on the theory that statutes of this character are enacted for the benefit of the employee, and this is the reason that a cause of action is given to the next of kin.

Valk v. United States, 29 Ct. of Cl. 62.

Deni v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 181 Pa. 525, 59 Am. St. Rep. 676, 37 Atl. 558. "Our statute," said the court, was not intended to confer upon nonresident aliens rights of action not conceded to them or to us by their own country, or to put burdens on our own citizens to be discharged for their benefit. It has no extraterritorial force, and the plaintiff is not within the purview of it. While it is possible that the language of the statute may admit of a construction which would include nonresident aliens, husbands,

The statute is equivalent to

widows, children, and parents of the deceased, it is a construction so obviously opposed to the spirit and policy of the statute that we cannot adopt it."

50 Brannigan v. Union G. M. Co., 93 Fed. 164.

51 McMillan v. Spider Lake Sawmill etc. Co., 115 Wis. 332, 95 Am. St. Rep. 947, 91 N. W. 979, 60 L. R. A. 589.

52 Mulhall v. Fallon, 176 Mass. 266, 79 Am. St. Rep. 309, 57 N. E. 386, 54 L. R. A. 934. "In all cases,'' said Mr. Chief Justice Holmes, "the statute has the interests of the employees in mind. It is on their ac

a penalty placed upon the employer for his negligence, and its primary object is to secure the protection of the life of the employee. It may be said that the weight of authority is in favor of the proposition that the statute is intended to protect the laboring man by enforcing the observance by the employer of the rule requiring him to furnish his servant with a safe place in which to work, and there can be no valid reason for limiting the right to recover damages to resident aliens.53

§ 216. Prevention of intrusion on Indian lands a police regulation. As an instance of a police regulation not inconsistent with a treaty, attention may be called to a statute of New York which authorized the summary removal of persons other than Indians, settling or residing upon lands belonging to or occupied by any nation or tribe of Indians. This statute, it was contended among other grounds, was invalid, because in conflict with a treaty made with an Indian tribe. The court upheld it, however, as a police regulation for the protection of Indians from intrusion and for the preservation of the peace, and remarked: "The power of a state to make such regulation to preserve the peace of the community is absolute, and has never been surrendered.'' 54 The state can exercise its police power over an Indian reservation.55 An Indian may be indicted under the criminal laws of a state for a murder committed out of the reservation.5

count that an action is given to the widow or next of kin. Whether the action is to be brought by them or by the administrator the sum to be recovered is to be assessed with reference to the degree of culpability of the employer or negligent person. In other words, it is primarily a penalty for the protection of the life of a workman in this state. We cannot think that workmen were intended to be less protected if their mothers happen to live abroad, or less protected against sudden than against lingering death. In view of the very large amount of foreign labor employed in this state, we cannot believe that so large an exception was silently left to be read in.”

53 Alfson v. Bush Company, 182 N. Y. 393, 108 Am. St. Rep. 815, 75 N. E. 230; Kellyville Coal Co. v. Petrayis, 195 Ill. 215, 88 Am. St. Rep. 191, 63 N. E. 94; Renlund v. Commodore Min. Co., 89 Minn. 47, 99 Am. St. Rep. 534, 93 N. W. 1057; Romano v. Capital City Brick Co., 125 Iowa, 591, 106 Am. St. Rep. 323, 101 N. W. 437; Pittsburgh etc. Ry. Co. v. Naylor, 73 Ohio St. 115, 112 Am. St. Rep. 701, 76 N. E. 505, 3 L. R. A., N. S., 473.

State of New York v. Dibble, 21 How. (U. S.) 366, 16 L. ed. 149. Benson v. United States, 44 Fed.

182.

56 United States v. Sa-coo-da-cot, 1 Abb. (U. S.) 383, Fed. Cas. No.

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