coin a tender in payment of debts. The clause as amended by the convention then read: "No state shall coin money, nor emit bills of credit, nor make anything but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts; nor grant letters of marque and reprisal; nor enter into any treaty, alliance, or confederation; nor grant any title of nobility." Finally, on September 14th, after the report of the Committee on Style, to whom the clause had been referred, submitted their report, the phraseology was changed to the form in which it now appears.

§ 24. Confederate states had no legal existence. The organization known as the Confederate states cannot be regarded under this clause of the Constitution as having any legal existence. The Confederate states enacted a law sequestering the property and rights held by or for any alien enemy since May 21, 1861, except such debts as may have been paid into the treasury of one of the Confederate states before the passage of the law, and making it the duty of every agent or trustee holding or controlling any such interest or property to inform the receiver of the Confederate states of the fact, and to render an account thereof, and to place the same in the hands of the receiver, so far as practicable. The statute declared that the person placing the property in the hands of such receiver should be acquitted of all responsibility for the property thus transferred, and that any person failing to give the information described should be guilty of a misdemeanor. In an action of assumpsit for goods sold, a plea was interposed of this statute, and payment thereunder of the amount claimed by plaintiff to the receiver of the Confederate states. It was contended that the supreme court had no appellate jurisdiction, but the court held that the jurisdiction of the court could be sustained, among other grounds, upon the fact that the compact made by the states forming the confederacy was in violation of the clause prohibiting any treaty, alliance or confederation by one state with another. As the confederacy could not legally exist, whatever legal force the enactment possessed was due solely to the sanction given to it by the individual state. Any enactment, from whatever source it might originate, to which a state gives the force of law. was considered to be a statute of the state within the meaning of the provisions conferring appellate jurisdiction upon the supreme court. "It would be a narrow construc

tion," said Mr. Justice Field, delivering the opinion of the court, "to limit the term to such enactments as have gone through various stages of consideration by the legislature. There may be many acts authorized by the Constitution of a state, or by the convention that framed it, which have not been submitted to the consideration of its legislature, yet have all the efficacy of laws. By the only authority which can be recognized as having any legal existence, that is the state of Virginia, this act of the unauthorized confederation was enforced as a law of the commonwealth.” 2

§ 25. Constitutional objections to statute. It was asserted that this statute was repugnant to the Constitution of the United States because it impaired the obligation of a contract, and that it discriminated against the citizens of a loyal state and refused them the same privileges accorded to the citizens of Virginia violating the provision declaring that "citizens of each state shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens of the several states." It was also contended that the enactment of the Confederate states was that of an independent nation, but the court decided that it could not be treated either as the act of an independent nation or of a de facto government, but must be considered as the act of a portion of a state attempting unsuccessfully to establish a separate revolutionary government, which, with the overthrow of its military forces, perished completely with all its enactments. While belligerent rights may have been conceded to the Confederate states, this concession conferred no other rights, approved no hostile legislation, and impaired in no degree the rights of loyal citizens as they had existed when hostilities commenced. The Constitution was as much intended to preserve the government of the separate states as it was to preserve the government of the Union itself,

2 Williams v. Bruffy, 96 U. S. 183, 24 L. ed. 716.

Williams v. Bruffy, 96 U. S. 183, 24 L. ed. 716.

Mr. Chief Justice Chase, in Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 700, 19 L. ed. 227, said: "The Union of the States never was a purely artificial and arbitrary relation. It began among the Colonies, and grew out of common origin,

and, hence, the rights and ob

mutual sympathies, kindred principles, similar interests and geographical relations. It was confirmed and strengthened by the necessities of war, and received definite form, and character, and sanction from the Articles of Confederation. By these the Union was solemnly declared to be perpetual.' And when these Articles were found to be inadequate to the exigencies of

ligations of the citizens of the seceding states could not be altered or affected by any ordinance of secession.

§ 26. Surrender of treaty power to general government.-By this clause and the clause conferring upon the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, the power to make treaties, the treaty-making power has been surrendered by the states to the general government. "There can be no mistaking the significance or effect of these plain, concise, emphatic provisions."' 4 Under our system of government, the Constitution, laws and treaties of the United States are a part of the law of every state to the same extent as are its own Constitution and laws, for if the national government is not empowered to stipulate by treaty as to the rights, privileges and immunities of foreigners residing in the United States, the power does not exist at all, because it is denied to the states.

"Our conclusion, therefore, is, that Texas continued to be a State, and a State of the Union, notwithstanding the transactions to which we have referred. And this conclusion, in our judgment, is not in conflict with any act or declaration of any department of the National Government, but entirely in accordance with the whole series of such acts and declarations since the first outbreak of the Rebellion.

"But in order to the exercise, by a State, of the right to sue in this court, there needs to be a State Government, competent to represent the State in its relations with the National Government, so far at least as the institution and prosecution of a suit is concerned.

"And it is by no means a logical conclusion, from the premises which we have endeavored to establish, that the governmental relations of Texas to the Union remain unaltered. Obli

gations often remain unimpaired, while relations are greatly changed. The obligations of allegiance to the State, and obedience to her laws, subjeet to the Constitution of the United States, are binding upon all citizens,

whether faithful or unfaithful to them; but the relations which subsist while these obligations are performed, are essentially different from those which arise when they are disregarded and set at nought.

"And the same must necessarily be true of the obligations and relations of States and citizens to the Union. No one has been bold enough to contend that, while Texas was controlled by a government hostile to the United States, and in affiliation with a hostile confederation, waging war upon the United States, Senators chosen by her Legislature, or Representatives elected by her citizens, were entitled to seats in Congress; or that any suit, instituted in her name, could be entertained in this court. All admit, that during this condition of civil war, the rights of the State as a member, and of her people as citizens of the Union, were suspended. The government and the citizens of the State, refusing to recognize their constitutional obligations, assumed the character of enemies, and incurred the consequences of rebellion.''

In re Tiburcio Parrott, 1 Fed. 501, 6 Saw. 349, per Sawyer, J.

§ 27. Investment by guardian in Confederate bonds.-It was unlawful for a guardian to invest money of his ward during the war of the Rebellion, while both he and the ward were residing in the territory of the enemy, in bonds of the so-called Confederate states. The guardian is responsible to the ward for all the money so invested by him.5

"The so-called Confederate government was in no sense a lawful government, but was a mere government of force, having its origin and foundation in rebellion against the United States The notes and bonds issued in its name and for its support had no legal value as money or property, except by agreement or acceptance of parties capable of contracting with each other, and can never be regarded by a court sitting under the authority of the United States as securities in which trust funds might be lawfully invested."

§ 28. Discharge of executor investing in Confederate bonds.— An executor cannot be discharged from liability to the legatees, because, in pursuance of the terms of a state statute and with the approval of the probate court appointing him he had invested the funds of the estate in bonds of the Confederate states, which, while he held them, became worthless."

§ 29. Confederacy an organized treason.-While the acts of the states in rebellion in the ordinary course of administration of law should, in the interests of civil society, be upheld, still the government of the confederacy had no existence excepting as an organized treason. During its continuance, its purpose was to subvert the lawful government, and its laws and decrees. No validity can be derived from its authority, for any act performed in its service or in aid of its purpose. Hence a person purchasing cotton from the Confederate states, knowing that the money paid by him went to sustain the Rebellion, cannot recover the proceeds in the court of claims, when it has been captured and sold under the Captured and Abandoned Property Act. In a court of law, the moral turpitude of the transaction is such that

5 Lamar v. Micou, 112 U. S. 453, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 221, 28 L. ed. 751.

Mr. Justice Gray, in Lamar v.

Micou, 112 U. S. 453, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 221, 28 L. ed. 751.

Horn v. Lockhart, 84 U. S. (17 Wall.) 570, 21 L. ed. 657.