formation with respect to the reasons which led to Draupadi's connection with the five Pandavas, and also with respect to the ideas which justified this marriage.1

1 Lenormant, vol. iii. p. 497. McLennan, Fortnightly Rev., 1877, p. 699. Bachofen, Das Mutterrecht, §§ 94, 195. Wilkes, vol. i. p. 54. J. D. Mayne, p. 57,

CHAPTER V.

NOMENCLATURES.

Modern and primitive ideas-Descriptive and classifying nomenclaturesTheir persistence-Descriptive nomenclature and monogamy-Classifying nomenclature and clan organization-Polygamy and polyandry -Malayan nomenclature-Punalua family-Turanian nomenclature -Distinction between the Turanian and the Ganowanian-Patriarchal family-Descriptive nomenclature-Nomenclature and the clanImportance of ceremonial-Paternal and maternal kinship-Punalua kinsfolk of Malayan nomenclature-Priority of kinship of cousinsDistinction between Turanian and Ganowanian nomenclatures-Ganowanian mother's brother-Development of special names-Son and nephew-Turanian marriage of cousins-Fijian nomenclatureSimpler nomenclature of Ganowanian women- -Cayugan peculiarities -Tonganese nomenclature-Descriptive nomenclature-Karen and Eskimo nomenclature Chinese nomenclature Their general meaning.

THE readiness with which a husband in the primitive community permitted other men to hold sexual intercourse with his wife, was closely connected with the slight importance which he ascribed to the actual descent of his children. The idea is historically untenable that, even in the case of the primitive man, the chastity of his wife was an indispensable condition of marriage, and that lascivious customs consequently pointed to a time when promiscuous intercourse prevailed, and there was no tie of marriage. McLennan seeks to confirm the existence of such conditions by means of polyandry, an attempt which we have shown to be wholly unsuccessful. We must now turn to other writers, such as Morgan,

Bachofen, and Lubbock, who have had recourse to another category of facts to establish the already tottering hypothesis of a primitive state of promiscuous intercourse. Such a state seems to them to have been produced, not so much by jealousy and conflicting lusts, as by a privilege conferred on all by all, which was prompted by tribal feeling and religious ideas. We do not, however, lay much stress on the difference between this theory and that of McLennan; since, if clear and definite conceptions of rights and duties are not supposed to be innate in primitive man, we must start from a state of things in which men strove with each other, and only after many conflicts found peace in a condition of promiscuous intercourse. It is certain that man was not originally addicted to promiscuous intercourse, either from inclination or from sense of duty. In later times, when this condition had been accepted, it may have become so firmly established by custom that the ideas of men might instinctively start from it, as from a fixed point; and I think that it is only this mode of thought which is advocated by Lubbock. When, therefore, McLennan finds fault with this writer for speaking of the rights of all men, since such rights do not exist in a state of promiscuous intercourse, he takes the word too literally.1 Subsequently, as social relations were further developed, the time might come for the occurrence of new desires, to which the old customs were opposed. Wherever there was this sense of conflict, the sense of rights would arise.

Morgan believes that in nomenclatures, that is, in the systems of names which define the degrees and stages of the kinship of primitive men, we may clearly trace the existence of promiscuous relations within larger or smaller circles, consisting in a common right to sexual intercourse between given groups of men and women. Nomenclatures do not follow the same principle throughout the world, and Morgan makes a distinction between

1 McLennan, Studies, p. 426.

that which is descriptive and that which is classifying. The systems of relative kinship serve to organize families into groups of kinsfolk allied in blood, and as such it possesses great vitality. The descriptive form, as it is found among the Aryan, Semitic, and Uralian families, is a numerical form, and it describes the collateral kinsfolk by a combination of the first and second terms of kinship. On the other hand, the classifying form, in use among the Turanians, the American Indians, and the Malays, is unacquainted with descriptive names, and applies the same name to all those who belong to a class of kinsfolk of which the limits are apparently quite arbitrary.1

Morgan makes an attempt to solve various ethnological questions by these nomenclatures, since he is of opinion that when the same form occurs in different races, it points to their common origin. He also proposes to solve by its aid the great question of the origin and development of the family. He holds that a nomenclature was neither introduced nor abandoned from arbitrary motives; it therefore shows us the way in which definite causes influenced a given community at a given time, and also how they were gradually modified in a definite way. The nomenclature was due to custom, and not to legal constraint, and the motive for its alteration must therefore be as universal as the custom itself. On this point we quite agree with Morgan, but we doubt whether it is likely that the important features of a system of nomenclature could long be maintained under a social order which was no longer in agreement with it, since there is nothing to show that the social order changes more quickly and easily than the nomenclature.

No special difficulty is presented by the descriptive

1 Morgan, Systems, pp. vi. 11, 12, 468.

2 Ibid., p. 15. See Giraud-Teulon, p. 100. Lubbock, Origin of Civ.,

p. 161.

nomenclature; it agrees with the natural line of descent, influenced by the marriage of individual pairs.1 Morgan believes that juridical considerations prompt the definitions of the degrees of kinship, and he believes that this becomes possible, owing to the form of marriage. It is only where marriage between individual pairs prevails that the degrees of kinship can be defined with descriptive accuracy; and the order of inheritance supplies the desire to regulate the motive for this definition. There is greater difficulty in the classifying system, which cannot be explained on the theory of descent, as it is understood by civilized races. It might, perhaps, be possible to bring it into agreement with descent under other conditions of marriage, and Morgan takes this view, without, however, showing that no other solution is possible.

Two causes in particular may have influenced the development of the classifying system: the sexual relations due to the necessity of mutual protection, and tribal organization. The classifying system is marked by the endeavour to prevent the destruction of the tie of blood, while the descriptive system allows us to lose sight of a tie which has always tended to become more remote. The interests of the clan also aim at keeping together the most distant kinsfolk, yet this will not enable us to explain the classifying system, for the cohesive tendency of the clan is not helped by any special plan of the degrees of kinship, and it is therefore the cause, rather than the consequence of the system. It is equally useless to try to explain this system from tribal organization. When the American form regards the children of different sisters as brothers and sisters, it agrees with the definition of the clan, which in this particular follows the female line; the husband's brother's son is, however, held to be his son, 2 Ibid., p. 14.

5

1 Morgan, Systems, p. 473.
3 Ibid., p. 471.

Ibid., p. 13.

5 Ibid., p. 475.