be regarded as his brethren and sisters, because the legal possession of the wife is altogether from the husband's point of view, not from that of the begetting father. It is precisely this mode of looking at things which McLennan has failed to recognize. It is equally difficult to reconcile the Bechuana Levirate with the assumption that there was a prior female line, since the Levir-son is indeed the son of the dead man's wife, whose children are not brethren to the begetting father on the maternal side, since the son never had intercourse with his own mother. On the other hand, these strange conditions of kinship are altogether in agreement with the conditions of inheritance which we have described above. When only legal considerations prevail, posthumous children are placed on an equality with those born in their father's lifetime, because the mother served as the bond of union to the children while the father lived; they all belonged to the circle which was defined by her. This circle was not broken by the husband's death, although the connection between the wives was changed, and thus it was that even when years had elapsed since the husband's death, the children born to his wife still belonged to the circle of the dead man's children, and to the fraternal circle of the other children. Haxthausen writes of the Ossetes of Transcaucasia that every child born in wedlock, even if its mother's adultery be proved, is entitled to the family name, succession, and right of inheritance. A married woman who has borne children cannot marry out of the family after her husband's death; she has been bought, and becomes a family possession. The father or brother of the dead man may marry her, and this, indeed, is regarded as a duty and honour. But, in accordance with the Ossetes' ideas of law, this is only a continuation of the first, sole, and perpetual marriage, to which the children of this fresh marriage are still ascribed, and they inherit the name and property of the dead man, in conjunction with those who are really his children. But this conception is still further enlarged. If the dead man leaves no father nor brother, and the widow is consequently obliged to remain unmarried, yet there is nothing to prevent her from living with other men, and the children which she bears to them are held to be just as legitimate as those born of the marriage which was dissolved by death. On the other hand, a childless widow may marry again, but her new husband must repay to the family which she then forsakes half of the purchase money which had been paid for her. And if a child be born within the year of her husband's death, it will still belong to his family.1 After they have borne children, or when they have been married for four years, the women live unchastely, although up to that time they are chastity personified. In like manner, a widow in Assam does not marry again, and yet the children which she may possibly bring forth are held to be legitimate.2 We learn from Wilkes that among the Iakali on the Fraser River the priest can inspire any person he chooses with the soul of a dead man, whose name he then adds to his own. According to Waitz's version of the fact, the first child born after his father's death receives his soul, and assumes his name and rank.4 1 Haxthausen, vol. ii. pp. 24, 25. 3 Wilkes, vol. iv. p. 453. 2 Cooper, p. 102. * Waitz, vol. iii. p. 195. We cite the analogous case in which the new husband assumes the skin of the dead : Whenever a distinguished warrior falls in battle, or otherwise, it is considered a great privilege to marry his squaw; and whoever does, is obliged to assume the name of her former husband, and to sustain, as far as possible, his reputation and character. This custom of continuing families is indulged to a considerable extent; sometimes the brother of the deceased becomes the husband; but the most frequent source of continuance is from the prisoners taken in battle; who, but for this kind of preferment, are generally condemned to suffer tortures and death" (Hunter, pp. 245, 255. See Adair, p. 189, for a less clear account). "Married by jujur, his brother, the eldest in preference, may succeed to his bed. If no brother chooses it, they may give the woman According to the Levirate, children were raised up to the dead man, that is, to a man who was no longer able to beget children. But this also occurred in all cases in which a man obtained children which were quite certainly not begotten by him, whether because he, like the Arabs we have mentioned, was temporarily separated from his wife, or because, on account of impotence, he had recourse to the Niyoga, or because he had not attained to the age of puberty. It was in this way that among the Ossetes and the Russians a man would marry a son of six years old to a girl of fourteen, and would himself have intercourse with his daughter-in-law and beget children, which were, nevertheless, reckoned to belong to her childish and lawful husband.1 This custom is also found among the Reddies, only in this case the wife has intercourse with one of her own kinsfolk.2 In addition to the juridical character of fatherhood, of which we have now given so many proofs, we must adduce instances in which the wife also becomes the mother of a child born of another woman. These instances are strongly in favour of the opinion that the juridical character of fatherhood was in no way due to the fact that the female line became predominant on account of uncertainty with respect to the actual paternity. Among the Chinese, marriage with only one wife is ordained, and any further connection is simply concubinage. Only one wife is authorized and lawful, and the children belong to her; she and the children inherit the husband's property together, to the exclusion of all the concubines, whose lot in their subordinate position is a in marriage to any relation on the father's side, without adat or purchase money, the person who marries her replacing the deceased. If no relation takes her, and she is given in marriage to a stranger, he may be either adopted into the family, to replace the deceased, without adat, or he may pay her jujur, or take her by semando, as her relations please" (Marsden, p. 228). 1 Haxthausen, vol. ii. p. 23. Klemm, Culturgeschichte, vol. x p. 59. 2 Lubbock, Origin of Civ., p. 80. very sad one. Bought for a small sum of money, they are treated like household slaves, and are not only subject to the man, but to his lawful wife, who in this way again appears as the authorized housewife. They are exposed to all sorts of ill-usage and oppression; they may be sold again at a higher price, and the children they bring forth are not even regarded as their own. The children themselves regard the lawful wife as their mother, and treat the woman who bore them with contempt."1 McLennan quotes the story of Sarah : 2 "And Sarai said unto Abram, Behold now, the Lord hath restrained me from bearing: I pray thee, go in unto my maid; it may be that I may obtain children by her." Hagar's subsequent behaviour, however, makes this story somewhat obscure, and the story of Jacob, Leah, and Rachel is clearer and more instructive. Rachel was childless, and said, "Behold my maid Bilhah, go in unto her; and she shall bear upon my knees, that I may also have children by her. And she gave him Bilhah her handmaid to wife and Jacob went in unto her. And Bilhah conceived, and bare Jacob a son. And Rachel said, God hath judged me, and hath also heard my voice, and hath given me a son: therefore called she his name Dan. And Bilhah Rachel's maid conceived again, and bare Jacob a second son. And Rachel said, With great wrestlings have I wrestled with my sister, and I have prevailed: and she called his name Naphtali. When Leah saw that she had left bearing, she took Zilpah her maid, and gave her Jacob to wife. And Zilpah Leah's maid bare Jacob a son. And Leah said, A troop cometh: and she called his name Gad. And Zilpah Leah's maid bare Jacob a second son. And Leab said, Happy am I, for the daughters will call me blessed : and she called his name Asher."3 1 Unger, p. 17. 2 McLennan, Patr. Theor., p. 273. Gen. xvi. 2. CHAPTER IV. INHERITANCE BY BROTHERS, AND OTHER SUPPOSED PROOFS OF POLYANDRY. Inheritance of rank and property-Personal and family property-Partition and stewardship of property-Suitability of inheritance by brothers-Right of firstborn-Polyandry and female line-Inheritance by widow -Marriage between widow and brother-Aryan polyandry. TAKEN alone, there is nothing in the Levirate which can be referred to polyandry. The ideas that the Levir-son might be substituted for an actual son, and that the brother of the deceased was bound to act as Levir, were disconnected both with each other and with polyandry. We cannot suppose that the Levir obligation differed from the other duties which the conceptions of primitive men imposed upon the surviving brother, and especially since this duty presents itself as the simple consequence of the survivor's succession to the position of the deceased. As we have already remarked, it may be difficult to connect the development of the Levirate, which excluded the brother from the inheritance, with the custom of inheritance by brothers; yet this difficulty must not be overestimated. We have to do with the joint family group, within which personal property played a quite insignificant part; the management of the property devolved upon the Levir-brother as guardian, and among primitive peoples guardianship can hardly be distin |