The anticipatory nature of the proposed Convention carries with it many of the basic uncertainties of the future, and I anticipate criticisms of different aspects of the agreement from several sides. The alternative to action now would be to attempt restraint at a later time, when the possibilities of hostile use of environmental modification techniques may be more real. An agreement on prohibitions might then be more difficult to achieve. I appreciate your strong interest and support in this effort, and trust that this responds to your inquiry. We will keep you advised of progress as it occurs. Sincerely, FRED C. IKLE. It is my view that this correspondence, along with a meeting I had with Dr. Ikle and two members of his staff clarifies a number of the questions that have been raised about the treaty, though some of our basic concerns about the scope of Federal weather modification activities remain. The correspondence does make clear the scope of the treaty, and though it is clearly not as ironclad as I had hoped, it is fair to say that it is not as weak as some originally suggested when it was first made public. If the CCD approves the draft convention and the United States becomes a party to it, I would hope to raise some further questions about it at that time. In addition, I intend to further pursue the questions we began with the creation of a lead agency and the shifting of weather modification research into civilian agencies. We have yet to receive a satisfactory response from the White House on these issues, and I am now in the process of drafting appropriate legislation to remedy the situation, which may be the only answer. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, The PRESIDENT, DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: In keeping with our long-standing interest in the international implications of the use of environmental modification, we now write you requesting a statement of intent on U.S. policy regarding the hostile uses of environmental modification. The Subcommittee on International Organizations held a hearing Tuesday, July 29, 1975 to receive testimony on H. Res. 28 (which is enclosed), and to explore progress and prospects for efforts to secure an international agreement banning research, experimentation, or activities involving environmental modifications for hostile purposes. Unfortunately, the scheduled Administration witness, Admiral Thomas Davies of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, was withdrawn, and clarification of the Administration's position on this issue was not possible. Attached are some questions whose answers will help clarify public and Congressional understanding of this issue area. We are most concerned that this Government not advance any proposal, or enter into any agreement legitimizing-directly or indirectly-any form of environmental warfare. Although the technology for exotic environmental modification is distant, the potential for some environmental warfare is still real. Therefore, we urge you to take a clear stand, publicly and internationally, against any hostile uses of any form of environmental modification, and that this position be articulated in all U.S. talks on this issue. As one step in this direction, we further urge you to remove any environmental modification research, Experimentation, or activities from the Department of Defense, its service components, and U.S. intelligence agencies, placing them instead in full public view within appropriate domestic civilian agencies. Also, because we know so little of the possibilities and consequences of environmental modification, we encourage you to support as well the upcoming international scientific research to be conducted by the World Meteorological Organization in 1977. This is an issue with great and long-lasting import for the American people and mankind. Environmental modification of some types can conceivably be beneficial to both, and we fully support its development and use for peaceful, humanitarian purposes. We look forward to your response to the attached questions, and hope for your favorable consideration of our recommendations. With best wishes. Sincerely yours, DONALD M. FRASER, M.C., GILBERT GUDE, M.C. QUESTIONS REGARDING U.S. POLICY ON HOSTILE USES OF ENVIRONMENTAL Specifically regarding current talks between U.S. and Soviet representatives, pursuant to the Joint Statement on Environmental Warfare issued during the 1974 Moscow Summit, we ask your answers to the following questions: In U.S./Soviet negotiations on environmental warfare, is the United States Government seeking (1) a U.S./U.S.S.R. bilateral treaty prohibiting research, experimentation, or use of any form of environmental modification for hostile purposes, and/or, (2) a draft convention-with possibly joint American/Soviet sponsorship for consideration as a multilateral treaty in a UN forum, such as the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament? Will any such agreement or draft convention allow the use of any alreadydeveloped techniques, such as rainmaking (or prevention), on either a large or small scale for hostile purposes? Will any such agreement or draft convention exclude weather modification, defined as actions seeking temporary alteration of specific weather conditions for hostile purposes, from its prohibitions or control? In U.S. talks on hostile uses of environmental modification, both bilateral and multilateral, what, if any, distinctions are being made between climate, weather, and environmental modification? If any distinctions are being drawn, how are these various terms defined or understood? Lastly, if any agreement regarding hostile uses of environmental modification is to be signed, or any draft convention on this subject to be offered, we will greatly appreciate being informed of current expectations or goals regarding the timing of such actions. Just less than a month after our letter was sent, the administration made public a draft convention on environmental modification that had been negotiated with the Soviet Union and tabled at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva. While publication of the draft convention resolved some questions about the status of the negotiations, ambiguities in the draft language raised new questions about the inclusiveness of any possible treaty. A letter from Fred Ikle, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, in response to our July 31 letter attempted to clarify some of the questions. That response follows: Hon. GILBERT GUDE, U.S. House of Representatives. U.S. ARMS CONTROL DEAR CONGRESSMAN GUDE: The White House has asked me to reply to your letter to the President of July 31, 1975, requesting information on United States' policy regarding the hostile uses of environmental modification. At the outset, I want to apologize for the delay in answering your letter; it was just recently brought to my attention. As you know, last August 21 the United States and the U.S.S.R. each tabled, at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) in Geneva, identical drafts of a Convention on the Prohibition of Military or any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques. Although my office sent you advance copies of the U.S. draft and Ambassador Martin's tabling speech, I am enclosing another set for your ready reference. I expect the draft to be discussed at the United Nations General Assembly in the fall and to be the subject of serious negotiations in the CCD next spring. As the draft treaty and Ambassador Martin's remarks make clear, the current parallel U.S. and Soviet texts would lead to the prohibition of any substantial or significant military or other hostile use of environmental modification techniques. The second article of the draft convention defines the term "environmental modification techniques" to include weather as well as climate modification techniques. Distinctions that are sometimes drawn between the weather and the climate would not in any way exclude weather modification from the prohibition of the draft convention. Thus, hostile uses of weather modification techniques having widespread, long-lasting, or severe effects would be prohibited. The draft does not include a prohibition on research and development activities for military purposes. Such a prohibition was not included because of the difficulty of distinguishing between military and civilian research and development in terms of their end use or purpose. There may be merit in your proposal to place all U.S. environmental modification research, experimentation and activities under the control of domestic civilian agencies; however, I want to note that all present U.S. research and development activities related to the use of environmental modification techniques are already in full public view, since they are carried out on an unclassified basis, whether they are under the auspices of the Department of Defense or another agency. Concerning your suggestion that the U.S. support the international scientific research to be conducted by the World Meteorological Organization, I wish to assure you that the U.S. will support such research. I would also like to correct a possible misunderstanding regarding the fact that Thomas Davies, this Agency's Assistant Director for Nuclear Weapons and Advanced Technology, did not appear at the hearings of the Subcommittee on International Relations on H. Res. 28. I understood that we had reached mutual agreement that Mr. Davies would not testify at that time because the subject was still under negotiation with the Soviet Union and, therefore, could not be discussed except in executive session. Mr. Davies or other executive branch witnesses would be happy to appear before the Subcommittee to explain the U.S. position as embodied in the current draft convention tabled at the CCD. I hope that these comments respond to the questions raised in your letter. I am sure that the President shares my appreciation for your interest in and support of our efforts to work out international restraints on hostile environmental modification activities. Sincerely, FRED C. IKLE. Senator PELL. Thank you very much. I regret, Congressman Gude, that you who have done so much in these fields of arms control and weather modification, are retiring from Congress. I hope that others will take up the banner, but there are all too few people interested in these causes. I must say I regret your decision, but I understand it. Mr. GUDE. Thank you. Senator PELL. Thank you very much for being with us. Mr. GUDE. Thank you, sir. Senator PELL. The next witness was scheduled to be Dr. Ikle, but he was summoned to a White House meeting this afternoon and could not be with us. Admiral Davies, who has followed these negotiations very closely will be speaking in his stead. He is Assistant Director, ACDA Nonproliferation and Advanced Technology Bureau. Will you come forward, please. STATEMENT OF THOMAS D. DAVIES, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY NONPROLIFERATION AND ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY BUREAU; ACCOMPANIED BY DR. PIERCE S. CORDEN, PHYSICAL SCIENCE OFFICER, NONPROLIFERATION AND ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY BUREAU; MR. JAMES E. GOODBY, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF POLITICO-MILITARY AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE; AND MR. JAMES L. MALONE, GENERAL COUNSEL, U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY Mr. DAVIES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Ikle, as he explained to you on the telephone, is unable to be here and regrets that, but it is an obligation that he must fulfill, and he has asked me to come here and read his statement that he would otherwise have made, and answer any questions that the committee may have. Senator PELL. You might, just for the record, introduce your colleagues. Mr. DAVIES. Ah, yes, sir. On my left is Dr. Pierce Corden, who is our specialist within the Agency in this field, and we have Mr. Goodby from the Department of State at the end of the row, and on my right is Mr. James Malone, the General Counsel of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Senator PELL. Thank you. Mr. DAVIES. Mr. Chairman, and members of the subcommittee. It is a pleasure to appear before your subcommittee this afternoon to testify for the executive branch on the prohibition of military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques. DESIRABILITY OF PROHIBITING ENVIRONMENTAL WARFARE The desirability of prohibiting "environmental warfare" is apparent. None of the areas which have been opened by the explosive growth of science and technology over the past several decades is more international in character than the environment. Today the potential for purposeful modification of the environment is still in its early stages. But, in the future, modification of the environment for military or other hostile purposes may pose the threat of serious consequences unless action is taken now. Mr. Chairman, you will recall that you were present last August at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva, when the United States and the Soviet Union tabled identical draft texts of a Convention on the Prohibition of Military or any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques. The draft convention is intended to address the concerns shared by many governments that, unless prohibited, the use of environmental modification techniques for hostile purposes might become an accepted means of warfare. The presently primitive state of development of environmental warfare techniques enhances the possibility of early negotiation of a binding international arms control agreement respecting these uses, before they develop in any country an institutional momentum that could obstruct this effort. TEXT OF DRAFT CONVENTION Let me turn to the text of the draft convention itself. Article I expresses the undertaking of the parties not to engage in military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques as a means of destruction, damage or injury to another state party if such use would have widespread, long-lasting, or severe effects. This undertaking would extend to the hostile use of such techniques both under circumstances in which a state was also employing other means of warfare and under circumstances in which a state was utilizing only environmental modification techniques. The convention covers the direct manipulation of the environment itself for hostile purposes, and not the incidental environmental impact produced by the use of other weapons. The draft convention, by prohibiting the use of environmental modification techniques having widespread, long-lasting, or severe. effects, focuses on those potential uses which could cause significant harm to man and his environment. It would prohibit any substantial or significant military or other hostile use of environmental modification techniques. In connection with the scope of the prohibition in article I, the question of verification is of importance. Verification of compliance is related to the scale of the activity. The possibilities for verification decrease as the size, duration, or severity of the activity diminish. The draft convention does not include a prohibition of research and development activities, since a broad prohibition of such activities would raise significant difficulties for its verification: the techniques for peaceful and for hostile uses are similar or even identical. As you know, the U.S. Government now carries out all of its research and development activities on environmental modification techniques on an unclassified basis. Hence, in the case of U.S. Government actions, their peaceful intent is verifiable. But the same cannot be said for other countries having closed societies. The second article of the convention explains the term "environmental modification techniques." As the draft states, this term "refers to any technique for changing-through the deliberate manipulation of natural processes the dynamics, composition or structure of the Earth, including its biota, lithosphere, hydrosphere, and atmosphere, or of outer space." An illustrative list of specific activities, at the present time having varying degrees of potential application, follows and complements this more formal definition. It is noteworthy, Mr. Chairman, that many of the specific examples in article II were included in the text of the draft treaty which was appended to Senate Resolution 71, of which you were the chief sponsor, as long ago as 1972. Of particular interest to me is inclusion in the list of modification of the state of the ozone layer. Uncontrolled attempts to modify this region in the upper atmosphere might have serious effects on the population of the entire globe. Article III makes clear the convention does not apply to the use of environmental modification techniques for peaceful purposes; nor does it prevent international cooperation in this regard. The remaining articles deal with matters of implementation, amendment, duration, and entry into force. Unless you so desire, Mr. Chairman, I would propose not to comment on these today except for noting the compliance procedures outlined in article V. This article provides that, as a first step, problems would be resolved by consultation between states parties on a bilateral basis. If necessary, a State which suspects that it has been the object of hostile use of environmental modification techniques may seek recourse to the U.N. Security Council through the mechanism of filing a complaint with that body. COMMENTS ON U.S. AND SOVIET DRAFTS Following the tabling of the Soviet and the U.S. drafts, several states made preliminary comments thereon at the CCD, the Conference on the Committee of Disarmament, and at the United Nations General Assembly during its 30th session this past fall. The General Assembly adopted by consensus a resolution noting with satisfaction that the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. had tabled identical drafts of a convention at the CCD and urging the committee to seek early agreement on a text. |