Hon. FRED C. IKLE, U.S. SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, D.C., January 23, 1976. Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Department of State, Washington, D.C. DEAR DR. IKLE: I am sorry that you were not able to appear before my Subcommittee's hearing on the environmental modification treaty. I appreciate, however, your sending Admiral Davies to represent you. He was a most cooperative and forthcoming witness. I would like you to know and to make known to the rest of the Washington community involved in the environmental modification negotiations that based on all of the testimony which I heard at the January 21 hearings, I find no persuasive reason justifying the Administration's retention of the qualifiers "widespread, long-lasting or severe." Your letter of September 24, 1975 to Congressman Gude suggested that anything that is effective militarily would be prohibited by these criteria. If that is so, I see no reason to adhere to criteria which only preserve ineffective options. I urge you to re-examine these criteria and the other areas of ambiguities which were raised by me, Congressman Gude, and Dr. Weiss with a view toward strengthening the treaty to make it a more effective means of arms control. In my view Senate approval of a treaty could be jeopardized if the prohibition against hostile uses of environmental modification techniques is not an unqualified one. Finally, during the course of the hearing, I mentioned that several questions would be submitted for replies to be inserted in the record. Those questions are enclosed, and it is my hope that responses could be forthcoming as quickly as possible so that the printing of the hearing can be expedited. With every good wish, CLAIBORNE PELL. U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY, Hon. CLAIBORNE PELL, DEAR SENATOR PELL: By way of follow-up to your Subcommittee's hearings, held earlier this year on the draft environmental modification treaty, I am pleased to submit the attached answers to the questions you submitted to us subsequent to the hearings. Again, let me express my appreciation for your kind willingness to permit Assistant Director Davies, who as you know led the U.S. Delegation during negotiations with the Soviets, to testify in my absence. I understand your concern over the use of the criteria "widespread, longlasting or severe" and will make it known to the appropriate agencies involved in the negotiating process. At the same time, I wish to correct an apparent misunderstanding of the statements contained in my letter of September 24, 1975, to Congressman Gude. I did not mean to suggest that "anything that is effective militarily would be prohibited by these criteria." My letter stated that if the technique of precipitation modification should become effective "so that its use had widespread, long-lasting or severe effects, its use would be prohibited." As a practical matter, depending on the specific circumstances, it would appear that most militarily effective activities would have the prohibited effects. You may be assured that we are continuously re-examining these criteria, as well as other provisions of the draft which have come under criticism, with a view to determining what changes may be warranted. Sincerely, FRED C. IKLE. ACDA RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS OF SENATOR PELL Question 1. Aren't there some forms of research and development which are verifiable and therefore could be included in the treaty's prohibition? I am thinking, for example, of experiments-if they are someday feasible to induce earthquakes or tidal waves. Answer. The draft does not include a general prohibition on research and development activities because of the difficulty of distinguishing between research for hostile purposes and for peaceful purposes. In theory, there may be some developmental activities, for example, those related to the generation of tidal waves, which could be distinguished from peaceful activities. However, arriving at a practical treaty provision that would prohibit only those developmental activities that could be distinguished presents problems we have not yet solved. Question 2. In your opinion, would military involvement in Government research and development of environmental modification affect the credibility of the developing agreement? Answer. As noted in the Executive Branch statement at the hearing on January 21, the United States Government carries out all of its research and development activities regarding environmental modification techniques on an unclassified basis. There are clearly uses of environmental modification techniques which are not restricted by the Convention, such as the dispersal of fog at one's own airfield, which might warrant military involvement in research and development activities. Such involvement by the military should not affect the credibility of the draft Convention. Question 3. In Article I of the draft Convention, it states that the prohibition applies only to actions against other parties to the Convention. Why is that necessary? Answer. The purpose of the limited prohibition, which is common in treaties of this type, is to provide an incentive to join the Convention. Question 4. What have other delegations said on this point (application of the use prohibition only to actions against other parties to the Convention)? Answer. Since the CCD has just begun its consideration of the draft Convention this question has not been generally addressed. However, the Netherlands Government has observed that the commitment should apply to all states, not just to States Parties. Question 5. In Article V, paragraph 2 of the Convention, it states that complaints must be lodged with the Security Council. Wouldn't it be more effective to have some other body of the U.N. hear complaints in order to avoid vetos? Answer. It is unlikely, as a practical matter, that a permanent member of the Security Council would exercise its veto to prevent an investigation of a complaint brought against it (or an ally), since such an act would probably be taken as confirmation of a violation by many UN members. Question 6. What have other delegations said on this point? Answer. Sweden has expressed concern about the complaint procedure, and argued that States bound by the Convention should be treated on an equal basis. It has stated that another more acceptable complaint procedure must be developed or that the permanent members of the Security Council must bind themselves formally not to use their right of veto. Australia has stated that it shares Sweden's concern and supports the Swedish suggestions with some qualifications. Australia has proposed that in view of a lack of technical expertise in the Security Council, it should have the power to call upon technical advice from any expert body, within or outside the U.N. system, when investigating a complaint. Australia has further noted that it does not believe it to be possible or desirable for U.N. technical bodies such as the United Nations Environment Programme to adjudicate disputes. The Netherlands CCD delegation has stated that the complaints procedure in Article V is unsatisfactory for several reasons. The delegation has said that responsibility for investigating suspected violations should be given to the U.N. Secretary-General instead of to the Security Council and has suggested the creation of a committee of 10-15 treaty parties to assist the Secretary-General in fact-finding. In their view the committee could also advise the SecretaryGeneral on what to do with the results of an investigation, including reporting to the Security Council, and making preparations for periodic review conferences. Question 7. What are your responses to the specific suggestions and observations made in the testimony given by Congressman Gude and Dr. Weiss? Answer. Representative GUDE. Mr. Gude's first observation deals with the scope of the prohibition in Article I of the draft Convention. He raises the question whether the phrase "widespread, long-lasting, or severe" should be deleted because of its ambiguity. This observation is addressed in the letter to which these answers are attached. It is correct, as Mr. Gude has stated, that weather modification may produce unintended results. In this respect, the language of the draft is quite clear. Any hostile use having widespread, long-lasting, or severe effects, regardless of the intended scope, would violate the Convention. The hostile uses of some techniques, such as earthquake and tsunami generation, are considered as invariably having widespread, long-lasting or severe effects, and are, therefore, prohibited outright. Representative Gude's second observation deals with the analogy to the Biological Weapons Convention, which he suggests can provide a model for a prohibition on research and development of environmental modification has been addressed in the response to the first question of this set. Finally, Mr. Gude suggested that all environmental modification research be removed from the Department of Defense and the intelligence agencies. This suggestion has been addressed in the response to the second question in this set. Dr. WEISS. Dr. Weiss' first observation questions the advisability of restricting the scope of the draft Convention to widespread, long-lasting, or severe effects. The comments in the letter to which these answers are attached and those above apply to this observation. Dr. Weiss' second observation questions whether certain uses of environmental modification techniques are covered by the draft Convention. She cites as examples the non-hostile use of fog dispersal techniques to facilitate aircraft movement at one's own airfields, and precipitation modification techniques to increase snowpack in mountain passes or to increase rainfall to wash out jungle trails. It is clear that non-hostile uses of environmental modification techniques are not covered by the terms of the draft Convention. Thus, fog dispersal over one's own airfields would not be prohibited by the Convention. With respect to other types of activities affecting another State Party, if such use constitutes a means of damage, destruction, or injury and has widespread, long-lasting, or severe effects, it would be prohibited. Snowpack enhancement and washing out jungle trails would therefore be prohibited. The third observation made by Dr. Weiss concerns the correlation of the prohibition contained in Article I with the list of effects of the use of environmental modification techniques in Article II. Because certain effects are not listed, she questions whether all uses are prohibited. The presence or absence of any technique in the list does not indicate that it is allowed or prohibited—all hostile uses of all environmental modification techniques having widespread, long-lasting, or severe effects would be prohibited by the Convention. Dr. Weiss' fourth observation concerns possible damage that might be caused to international cooperation in meteorology and the atmospheric sciences. The Executive Branch attaches great importance to international cooperation in this area and would not wish to jeopardize it in any way. If it became clear that the draft Convention would have a serious adverse effect on international cooperation, we would, of course, review our position very carefully. The fifth observation by Dr. Weiss concerns the use of environmental modification techniques to facilitates the effectiveness of other weapons. Admiral Davies noted in his testimony that the Treaty would not prohibit clearing fog from an airport to facilitate landing of aircraft after a mission. He also indicated that clearing fog over an enemy airport to facilitate bombing it, while perhaps unrealistic, would be permitted under the draft Convention. Dr. Weiss' sixth observation concerns the complaint procedure. This has been addressed above in the response to the fifth and sixth questions of this set. Dr. Weiss' seventh observation concerns the obligation to provide assistance to other States Parties to the Convention harmed or likely to be harmed as a result of a violation. Dr. Weiss cites Principles 21 and 22 of the Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, which have been agreed to by the U.S., as inconsistent with this obligation. It should be noted that the Stockholm Declaration was developed in the context of peaceful activities of States. As her eighth observation Dr. Weiss cites the terms biota, lithosphere, hydrosphere and atmosphere in Article II and asks whether all parts of the environment are included. By using the terms "Earth" and "outer space", Article II makes it clear that "environment" is to be interpreted in a very broad sense. In order to illustrate some of the components of the environment, the terms "biota", "lithosphere", "hydrosphere" and "atmosphere" were used. They should not be taken as limiting the scope of the treaty. Techniques for modifying any part of the environment are envisioned as coming under the Convention. Dr. Weiss' last observation concerns the need to develop regulations on the peaceful uses of weather modification. The view of the Executive Branch re mains that, when and if the need for such regulation develops, the draft Convention and whatever regulations on peaceful uses are deemed appropriate should be consistent, but that it is not necessary or desirable to attempt to regulate peaceful uses in this Convention. STATEMENT OF MR. DWAYNE S. ANDERSON, DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR NEGOTIATIONS AND ARMS CONTROL, OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE; ACCOMPANIED BY CAPT. KENNETH W. RUGGLES, RESEARCH AND ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY DIVISION, OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE. Mr. ANDERSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, the Department of Defense is pleased to be able to appear before you to discuss developments in negotiations on an environmental modification treaty. My statement will be brief, but I believe that it is to the point. The Department of Defense fully supports the administration's efforts to secure an international treaty prohibiting the military or other hostile use of environmental modification techniques having widespread, long-lasting or severe effects. The Department is completely in accord with the draft treaty that has been developed by the administration, and we will participate in and support negotiations on this treaty both bilaterally with the Soviet Union, and multilaterally in such forms as the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. Since extensive testimony has already been given by other representatives of the Department of Defense at previous hearings about our past environmental modification operations and research activity, I will have nothing new to add on those subjects today. I would, however, like to review very briefly the status of our limited current activity in this field. STATUS OF DOD WEATHER MODIFICATION ACTIVITY All Department of Defense weather modification operations are reported to the Department of Commerce and details of our domestic operations are made public annually in Department of Commerce weather modification reports issued in accordance with Public Law 92-205 of December 18, 1971. All Department of Defense weather modification research and development activities worldwide are published in the Interdepartmental Committee for Atmospheric Sciences report on the National Atmospheric Sciences Research Program, issued yearly. Defense is not conducting any classified research in this area. Currently, the Department is engaged in weather modification operations involving cold fog dispersal at selected military airports and is developing improved methods for cold fog dispersal. We are also testing various warm fog and cloud dispersal techniques, and are conducting theoretical studies and statistical analyses of data from previous precipitation enhancement experiments. For fiscal year 1976, the total Defense budget for these R. & D. activities is $1.75 million. This comprises about 10 percent of the total national research and developmental funding for weather modification. Defense has no programs involving environmental modification outside of the above noted weather modification activity. Captain Kenneth W. Ruggles of the Research and Advanced Technology Division, Office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, has accompanied me today to assist in responding to any questions you might have in this area. This completes my statement, my prepared statement. However, Mr. Chairman, if you would like me to respond to your questions, I can do that at this time. Senator PELL. Thank you very much. SPEECH OF BERNARD POWER I have questions concerning the speech of Bernard Power. Mr. ANDERSON. Yes, sir. I have not heard the speech, or the details of the speech; but we have received from the Senate the allegations, and we have responded to them. I would like to say that we have given the precise data, and we have no reason to change the data, that was given in the 1974 briefing. Senator PELL. Could I read to you, so it makes sense in the record here, the points he raised? Mr. Power stated that, "In addition to the inland rainmaking operation in Laos and Cambodia which are covered by the code name Intermediary-Compatriot-Footmark and which were reported to the Senate in 1974, there were additional military weather modifications, not so reported. "These additional secret projects were covered by other code names and were carried out in the coastal zone over North and South Vietnam proper. "One project involved many operations in the DMZ area between North Vietnam and South Vietnam. "The U.S. Marine Corps was involved as well as the Seventh Air Force. "There was extensive seeding of typhoons over the southern part of North Vietnam and over the South China Sea. The precise purpose of these operations on typhoons was not clarified. "The R. and D. work on weather modification, repeatedly stated by the DOD in 1972 and 1973 to the Senate to be all unclassified, actually involved R. and D. facilities other than those now commonly believed by the profession to be the principal source of the DOD technology, i.e., other than the Naval Weapons Center at China Lake, California. The additional technology was not specified to me. "The figure of 47,409 seeding units reported in 1974 as being the total used in Southeast Asia is grossly in error and understates the whole program." These are the statements Mr. Power made. I wanted very much to get the reaction of the Department of Defense to them. If you would proceed. Mr. ANDERSON. Yes, sir. |