9. Biggest concern-Future prospect of epidemic of hazardous material catastrophies on "weak link" interchange carriers.

10. Past work has developed understandings, testing methods and candidates for significantly improving safety and economics.

11. Lack of immediate returns to railroads diminishes attractiveness of many options for improvement.

CHART NO. 1

Mr. PARSONS. This morning I would like to highlight five or six. The first finding is the size, weight, and length of cars is increasing, particularly hazardous material cars. I have a backup chart #2 that shows from about 1960 through the current period there has been a dramatic increase in the car-carrying capacity of the fleet. Senator LONG. Would you mind turning it back?

Mr. PARSONS. Yes, sir.

Senator LONG. Is that the average amount of weight carried per car?

Mr. PARSONS. No, sir, that is the potential weight, the capacity of the car.

Senator LONG. That is the capacity. It's moved up from about 45,000 to 80 tons.

Mr. PARSONS. Close to 80 tons, yes sir.

Senator LONG. 45 to 80 tons; is that it?
Mr. PARSONS. That's correct.

Senator LONG. Go ahead.

Mr. PARSONS. The amount actually carried was somewhat less than the car capacity in both cases.

Senator LONG. Liquefied gas, coal and petroleum, about 70 tons? Mr. PARSONS. Yes, sir, the growth of these particular hazardous products grew rapidly during the time period from 1960 to 1980. This is the reason for the concern. In about 1969, after this initial high-growth, we had our first large hazardous materials accident. Senator LONG. Yes.

Mr. PARSONS. The next finding I would like to discuss is that the profitable railroads have offset the effects of this increased weight and hazardous materials in regions of high traffic densities. Chart #3 contains a relative index of derailments of six railroads. You can see the-we have normalized the data-the best railroad

having an index of one. On this chart, a "15" would be a not-sofortunate railroad.

The study shows that the railroads that have the higher derailment rates are the ones that are economically in poor shape. The better railroads have put money into their track and their derailment rate reflects that.

The next finding is that we could not attribute any major level of fatalities directly to larger cars. The car-fatality rate is low. It's random and it's not in correlation with the weight of the vehicle. Injuries are a function of the configuration of the vehicle, such as the work force having trouble getting off and on some cars. But for fatalities, we couldn't find a correlation.

The next finding is that 100-ton cars have comparable rates of derailment to smaller cars, particularly if you make it on a volume basis. We ran different comparative analyses, using five or six variables. You can make anyone of these car-types look a little better than the rest, depending on the variable you use. But there is really not a significant difference between the large cars and the small cars with regard to derailments, particularly on a ton-mile basis. This is the point that the Administrator previously maintained. In this process we were somewhat hampered because the data had never been analysed to this degree before. However, three car types aid stand out as having a higher derailment rate than the rest of the car population. They were the covered hopper, general flat, and auto flat.

Perhaps the biggest concern for the future is the hazardousmaterials growth and possible poor track conditions on the weak or railroads during interchange. There are some railroads that still have marginal track. The point is that if we don't, through increased financing or through mergers with more healthy railroads, in some way get good track, and if hazardous material shipment continue to grow at the rate of the forecasts, we could have a problem in the future.

I want to take one moment to discuss solutions, as summarized in chart No. 4.

SOLUTIONS

1. Stop crucial network track from deteriorating from present levels.

2. Concentrate safety improvement efforts in hazardous material transport and identified "Bad Actor" cars.

3. Find ways for compensating owners of cars used in interchange service for investing in improvements.

4. Maintain prudent restrictions on size, weight and length of cars while more specific guidelines and testing requirements are being put into place.

5. Convene a Government/industry/labor task force to analzye findings and recommendation, determine steps that are feasible and recommend plan of action.

CHART NO. 4

Mr. PARSONS. The first one, the main thrust of the Administration's bill, is to stop crucial track deterioration, pump some lifeblood into the industry, and concentrate on the three "bad actor" cars in the next year and come up with corrective action. In addition, there must be some way to compensate the healthy railroads for any improvements they put into cars that are interchanged. Once they put the safety equipment in service, and if it

goes on to a poor railroad, there is no economic mechanism for them to make a return on these improvements.

We must maintain prudent restrictions on the weight and size of cars. Here I can report some good news. As you know, we cosponsor the track-train-dynamics program with the Rail Progress Institute and AAR. It's now been redirected to assume use of the 100-ton car but work on the car dynamics and new under carriages that will make the 100-ton car act, from the track viewpoint, as if it were an 80-ton car. The industry is starting to put its resources in this area. The last point is the one that the Administrator indicated, to establish a task force to oversee improvements. One example of things that task force could look at is a snubber device that acts like a shock absorber acts on an automobile. On a freight car without any type of dynamic retrofit, the car has a high dynamic response as indicated by the roll angle. With the simple insertion of snubbers on cars, you can see we can make the car act better, maybe two or three times better dynamically than it would without those devices, as indicated by chart No. 5.

Senator LONG. What I understand is that the way the chart goes up and down means that as the speed gets greater, at a certain point it gets very dangerous; then as you go faster, the car seems to stay on the track better. Why is that?

Mr. PARSONS. It's the resonance speed. First, you hit the natural frequency of the vehicle's dynamic response. If you pass through that point, a car will become better stabilized.

Mr. SULLIVAN. It's like pushing a swing, Mr. Chairman. If you are pushing at the right moment, you get a better swing, whereas if you are pushing before it reaches the top, you are actually dampening the motion.

Mr. PARSONS. This task force will also look at operational and maintenance solutions, then report back to the Administration. With that, sir, that completes my report on the study.

Mr. SULLIVAN. Mr. Chairman, we would be happy to take any of your questions.

Senator LONG. Would you identify for the record those specific carriers and lines where the accident rates are the highest?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, sir, we can give you a complete summary. Senator LONG. I would like to have that.

[The following information was subsequently received for the record:]

RAILROAD CARRIERS WITH THE HIGHEST ACCIDENT RATE IN CALENDER 1978

Senator LONG. You refer to a study done on the possibility of rerouting hazardous materials through less populated areas. It was found that rerouting could result in worse accidents.

Would you please give us additional information on that.

Mr. WALSH. Mr. Chairman, we have compared routings and, to date, the study has not supported the use of new routing like the Material Transportation Board has used in the highway area. We are continuing to study it, so that we have better information if we do go into routings.

Senator LONG. Senator Pressler.

Senator PRESSLER. Yes. I understand that the Department of Transportation is considering lowering the GS salary level of certain rail safety inspectors. What effects, if any, will this have on our recruitment program for rail safety inspectors?

Further, the states have indicated in the past that their recruitment program for safety inspectors was hampered by the fact that