improve program management by strengthening the ties between the Headquarters office, the states, and the FRA regions. STATE ROLE IN PROMOTING STATE PARTICIPATION PROGRAM The states are responsible for promoting and administering the State Participation Program through: 1) reports to FRA, 2) training, 3) coordination with regions, 4) cooperation with FRA special assessments, and 5) advice to FRA. Reports to FRA State inspector supervisors submit to the FRA Regional Directors their own Planned Inspection Activities-Monthly Work Schedule Report. FRA uses these reports in conjunction with accident data and data from automated track inspection vehicle surveys to plan a coordinated inspection effort. Duplication of inspections by Federal and state inspectors is thereby minimized. In addition to the Planned Inspection Activities, the states supply semi-annual reports which describe the inspection activities during that period and provide a detailed breakdown of expenses. Training FRA encourages states having Federally certified inspectors already on board to play a major role in the training of state trainees. The states should permit their trainees to cross state lines in the course of an investigation. FRA realizes that the vast majority of a trainee's time should be spent in his (her) state. However, there are a number of states that have imposed a blanket restriction on such out-of-state training and this has, in some cases, reduced the effectiveness of the on-the-job training by Federal inspectors. Coordination with regions Most states are doing their part in informing the regions of their activities through their Planned Inspection Activities reports. Cooperation with FRA in special assessments During 1979, FRA made special assessments of two carriers. The assessments involved a comprehensive examination of all facets of the railroads' operations. State inspectors were a significant help to the FRA in taking over routine inspections while FRA conducted the special assessment. In the future, FRA believes that the state inspectors can play a role in the special assessments as well. Advice to FRA FRA has not taken full advantage of the rapidly developing expertise of state inspectors. This expertise can be of help to us in shaping policy and providing input to revisions of track and equipment regulations. FRA plans to solicit state views on such projects in the same way that the views of our field staff are sought. LEVEL OF PARTICIPATION There are currently 30 states with a total (including trainees) of 55 track and 29 equipment inspectors participating in the program.2 Two years ago, there were only 19 states with a total of 27 track and 12 equipment inspectors in the program. We are optimistic that as many as 10 more states will join the program in 1980 and that the total number of state inspectors and trainees will increase to 180. CONCLUSION The Federal and state inspection efforts must be well integrated. This can only be done if there is a clear understanding of the respective roles of the two inspection forces. FRA must demonstrate its commitment to the program by seeking to put the state inspection forces in the mainstream of the overall inspection effort. At the same time, the states must recognize the need for a coordinated national effort. If these objectives can be realized, continued advances in the effectiveness of the State Participation Program are assured. APPENDIX I.-DUTIES OF RAILROAD SAFETY INSPECTOR 1. Correctly and uniformly apply Federal Standards. 2. Provide instruction to carrier personnel in the requirement of law and regulation and the preparatory steps required to acheive compliance. 2 A complete listing of states currently in the program is shown in Appendix II. 3. Display a level of technical competence equal to that of carrier supervisors with whom the inspector works. Conduct thorough accident investigations utilizing extensive background knowledge of railroad equipment facilities and operations to identify fruitful avenues of inquiry. 5. Effectively communicate by written memoranda the circumstances and significance of alleged violations, setting forth evidence supporting each element of the civil offense. 6. Acquire technical data related to developing problems which may be the subject of future regulation. 7. Evaluate waiver petitions and other requests for special approvals. 8. Investigate complaints and seek remedial action in areas where regulations do not exist. 9. Identify and evaluate serious conditions which may warrant the removal of track or equipment from service. Senator PRESSLER [presiding]. I will call at this point the Honorable Jim King, chairman of the National Transportation Safety Board here in Washington. Chairman King, we thank you for being here. We welcome your testimony which perhaps you could summarize and submit the full text for the record. STATEMENT OF JAMES B. KING, CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD; ACCOMPANIED BY WILLIAM H. GOSSARD; AND ELMER GARNER Mr. KING. Mr. Chairman, my brief is my full text. It's considerably shorter than anything else submitted. We like to go directly to the heart of the matters concerned to us. If that is agreeable, Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to be here to present testimony on behalf of the National Transportation Safety Board dealing with rail safety and the reauthorization of the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970. Before I begin, however, I would like to introduce the members of the Safety Board's staff with me here today. On my right is Mr. William H. Gossard, Transportation Safety specialist, Office of Evaluations and Safety Objectives and on my left is Mr. Elmer Garner, chief, Railroad Accident Division, Bureau of Accident Investigation. The National Transportation Safety Board is an independent agency created by the Congress to investigate major transportation accidents and to issue safety recommendations to prevent a recurrence of similar accidents. In carrying out this mandate, the Safety Board investigates all railroad accidents in which there is a fatality: Substantial property damage of at least $150,000; or involves a passenger train with damage of $10,000 or more. In the last year, the Board investigated 512 railroad accidents and issued 85 safety recommendations (32 percent of these were directed to the Federal Railroad Administration). In addition to its work involving individual accidents, the Board's broader oversight responsibility also makes it concerned with safety trends. In this respect, the Board has been alarmed at the steady growth in the number of railroad accidents over the last 12 years. When the Federal Railroad Administration first reported rail safety statistics in 1967, this was shortly after they assumed rail safety responsibility from the Interstate Commerce Commission. American railroads registered 7.72 train accidents for every million train miles. In a little more than a decade, that rate has doubled (in 1978, the rate was 14.99). There is agreement in both industry and government on the single most powerful force in this upward surge of train accident rates-that force is deferred maintenance of way. What is lacking is agreement on causes and effective solutions. Over the years, the Board has made a number of safety recommendations to the Federal Railroad Administration on subject ranging from improving track conditions to establishing special routes for the shipment of hazardous materials. The response to our recommendations by the FRA has been mixed. While the acceptance rate of NTSB recommendations by the FRA over the last three years was 62 percent, the Board feels that there are some vital safety areas which are not being addressed in a timely manner. I would like to take a few moments to highlight five of these areas for the Subcommittee. These areas include: (1) The installation of shelf couplers on all DOT 105 tank cars which transport chlorine gas and Class A and B poisons; (2) The routing of hazardous materials through populous areas; (3) Adequate grade crossing protection; (4) Improved employee training; and (5) FRA's track safety and inspection program. As you know, Mr. Chairman, the Board has had a long-term interest in insuring a safer railroad environment through hazardous materials tank car improvements. The Board waged a long campaign to achieve the installation of headshields and shelf couplers on all DOT 112A/114A jumbo tank cars carrying LPG or Anhydrous ammonia. We are pleased to report that as of today, shelf couplers have been applied to all U.S. and Canadian DOT 112A/114A cars. The headshield program, though not completed in the time frame requested by the Board, stands at a little over 75 percent completion based on DOT's retrofit requirements (13,274 tank cars completed of 17,542). All headshields are to be applied by December 31, 1980. And I must say, Mr. Chairman, the Board was heartened to see that FRA intends to stand with that and won't permit a tank car that isn't protected on the tracks of the United States Rail System after that date. However, the Board is not satisfied with the response of the FRA in accelerating the issuance of a rulemaking proposal for application of shelf couplers to DOT 105 tank cars which transport Chlorine gas and Class A and B poisons. The recent evacuation of one-quarter million people in Mississauga, Ontario, Canada after a spill involving lethal chlorine gas, reinforces our concern. Based upon our accident investigation history, the Board issued the original recommendation for shelf coupler action on DOT 105 tank cars on November 2, 1978 and a followup safety report was issued September 13, 1979 stating: "Issue promptly a regulation to require that all DOT specification 105 tank cars which transport hazardous materials be equipped with top and bottom shelf couplers by December 25, 1980." To date, the Federal Railroad Administration has taken no action to implement this recommendation. The second concern of the Board is the absence of a clear policy regarding the routing of rail shipments of hazardous materials through populous areas. Nearly 1,700,000 tank cars of hazardous materials moved on our nation's rails in 1978. In March, 1979, the Safety Board published a special study evaluating the Federal Railroad Administration's hazardous materials and track safety programs. As a result of that evaluation, we recommended that the Federal Railroad Administration, in cooperation with the Interstate Commerce Commission, determine the feasibility of establishing special routes for hazardous materials to bypass dense population centers where possible. In response to our recommendation, the Federal Railroad Administration has undertaken a study to identify the risks involved in the rail transportation of hazardous materials in the United States, This study, in combination with population density information, should allow for assessment of the current and future exposure from such shipments, and the feasibility of minimizing this exposure through routing controls. This can also be done as the study goes, Mr. Chairman, as to see which are the safest routes. So you are not only talking population centers, but the accident experience of those properties transporting these materials. The FRA anticipates completion of this study in the near future. And as I gather this morning, they are well on their way to having a formal report ready. In the meantime, we are pleased to note that at least two major hazardous materials shippers-Du Pont and Dow-have initiated steps to determine the safest rail routes for their shipments. The third area of concern to the Board is grade-by the way, that Du Pont and Dow, Mr. Chairman, is a decision made by the industry to move ahead before the Federal Government. The industry is really providing important leadership in this important area. Our third area of concern to the Board is grade crossing safety. The board believes that the FRA must take a stronger leadership role in the area of grade crossing safety. Grade crossing accidents cost the Nation 1,000 lives a year and cause over 4,000 injuries. Preliminary figures for 1979 show that 62 percent of all rail fatalities are as a result of grade crossing accidents. The Board has undertaken a safety objective that the FRA take immediate steps to enhance train conspicuity to address this problem. Since there are approximately 217,000 public grade crossings in the United States, we believe the FRA should develop safety programs that will enhance the safety level at each and every location. In addition, the Board believes that FRA should include as a part of its system safety plan detailed actions it will take to reduce fatalities, injuries and accidents at grade crossing locations. To date, FRA has not undertaken a formal program to address this safety area. The fourth area of concern to the Board involves accidents which are triggered by human error. The Board's accident investigations show that human error is an increasing cause of train accidents. These errors are often made due to poor judgment, lack of knowledge and experience, or inattentiveness, if you will. The Safety Board has two concerns with this type of accident: (1) The need for improved training for employees and, (2) effective enforcement with regard to alcohol abuse. The Safety Board believes that employee errors can be mitigated if the railroad industry provides supervised training based on a uniform understanding and interpretation of rules and regulations. In a recent Board special investigation report, we reviewed occupational training in the railroad industry and highlighted our safety recommendation that all federal and state programs must be reviewed and integrated to provide training programs which insure relevant training for the skilled railroad crafts. We believe that the FRA should be in a position to examine on a periodic basis the various railroads' training programs to insure |