and to review the relative potentials of some of the program options. Also, we have looked at the impacts of varying warning device costs and effectiveness figures in order to assess the models' sensitivities to these parameters. As part of our review of possible warrants, we have tried to size and compare the program implications of various thresholds. But the stress has been on comparisons, not absolutes and, for the most part, this work has been done in the relatively sterile and protected environment of the analyst's desk. We have not attempted to incorporate real-world situations such as the fact that only 66 percent of obligated funds are spent on active warning devices. Question. What recommendations, if any, do you have for means of increasing safety at railroad grade crossings other than those already mentioned in answering earlier questions? Answer. There have been numerous ideas tendered from both within and outside the Department during the past few years on ways to increase crossing safety. Most of them have been covered in the answers to previous questions. On others, including the development of national uniform criteria for active warning devices, assistance to the States and railroads for maintenance of warning devices, and a look at railroad and State liability associated with the crossing problem the Department has not yet formulated specific recommendations. Each of these areas is being studied through research efforts or, in the case of the development of uniform criteria, an advance rulemaking notice has been issued. As research studies are completed on these issues the Committee will be advised as well as being kept apprised of the results of our rulemaking initiative. GENERAL Promotion and regulation Question. The Federal Railroad Administration is both a regulatory agency and a promotional agency for the railroads. Are these two functions incompatible? Should they be entirely separated? Answer. These functions are not at all incompatible. They are complementary. Perhaps the best example of this is the system-wide safety assessment recently conducted on the L&N Railroad in conjunction with Emergency Order 11 which led to a 40 percent reduction in the number of accidents on that line. FRA inspectors and safety program managers spent many days engaged in investigations across the breadth of the L&N system and in conferences with L&N officials. The resulting dialogue led to a clearer identification of a number of underlying problems and the institution of remedial efforts. As conditions improved, FRA began lifting the order from portions of the L&N system. The clear resolve of FRA to employ the emergency powers in appropriate cases has often made use of those powers unnecessary. In a number of instances, the prospect of emergency action has had the effect of producing prompt and significant improvements in safety. Concentrated monitoring can produce dramatic results and bring about voluntary compliance. The role of promoting safety by working with railroad management and labor in cooperative efforts such as hazardous materials training programs, carrier training programs, the Railroad Operating Rules Advisory Committee (RORAC), Employee and Public Awareness Programs, and National Rail-Highway Crossing Safety Conferences is an invaluable one. System safety plan budget Question. It is our understanding that you are putting together a System Safety Plan. How much of your funding and manpower is directed to this project? Answer. Funding for contractual support for the System Safety Plan (SSP) has been as follows: The Planning and Evaluation Staff is primarily responsible for preparation of the SSP. However, program managers throughout the Office of Safety are responsible for support and guidance of the contractual effort in their respective safety impact areas. These so-called safety-impact areas include hazardous materials, human factors, motive power and equipment, grade crossing, track, etc. In addition, the Office of Federal Assistance, the Office of Policy and Program Development, the Office of Research and Development and other elements of FRA have participated in this process. OST, MTB, ÚMTA and NTSB have also been involved. It would therefore be difficult to estimate the total manpower invested in this effort. Schedule for system safety plan Question. When do you believe that the System Safety Plan will be completed? Answer. The System Safety Plan is scheduled for submission to Congress by December 31, 1980. We will meet that deadline. Five top priorities Question. Can you state from the work already completed what are the five top priorities in the railroad safety area and the basis for this choice? For each of these priorities, please state what you are presently doing and what you plan to do in these areas in the next fiscal year? Answer. It would be premature to state the top priorities based upon a plan which is still under development. However, my top priorities, in addition to the completion of the System Safety Plan, in the administration of the railroad safety program are as follows: 1. The effective integration of the state inspection forces with the Federal inspection forces. A report has been issued to Congress this month outlining our plans to accomplish this. 2. Development of a program for addressing performance problems of certain "bad actor" cars, particularly, covered hopper cars. This problem was identified in car size study recently submitted to the Congress. 3. Evaluation and development of specifications for the overhaul of all FRA safety regulations and complete all technical drafting, justification, impact analysis, and scheduling of implementation phasing by January 1, 1982. Revisions to the Freight Car Safety Standards and Glazing Standards were issued in the Federal Register on December 31, 1979 and proposed revision of the Locomotive Regulations are in final review. In addition, EPA's revised noise standards will be evaluated by January 1, 1981. 4. Minimize the risk associated with the rail transport of hazardous materials. The retrofit program on 112/114 tank cars is progressing ahead of schedule, and will be completed by December 31, 1980. DOT plans to issue an NPRM concerning shelf couplers and tank head protection on 105 cars in June, 1980. A study on the effect or rerouting hazardous materials traffic in order to avoid population centers has been completed. In this study, such rerouting was found to be counter-productive—it actually resulted in an increased number of expected casualties. 5. Determine whether additional hi-rail vehicles are needed. If additional vehicles are required, develop a 5-year plan for their acquisition and deployment by November 1, 1980. Unnecessary regulations Question. The Federal Railroad Administration has stated that it is trying to get rid of unnecessary regulations. Would you provide us examples of such regulations and what you have done to eliminate them? Answer. Since the issuance of Executive Order No. 12044 on March 23, 1978, the FRA has taken a series of actions designed to implement the policy objectives of the President concerning regulatory reform. FRA began by announcing a General Safety Inquiry for the purpose of updating the railroad safety regulations and deleting those requirements which were based on maintenance standards rather than immediate safety concerns. During the period June 1979 through February 1979, five major public hearings were held covering locomotives, freight cards, safety appliances, power brakes, track, and signal systems. FREIGHT CAR SAFETY STANDARDS The primary goal of FRA in the freight car area has been to eliminate regulations dealing with maintenance, which are in part derived from industry practices of several years ago. This is in order to concentrate on the safety performance of the railroads rather than the means used to achieve safety. The revised freight car rules were published on December 31, 1979. Two petitions for reconsideration of the final rule have been filed. We will rule on these petitions within the next few weeks. LOCOMOTIVE INSPECTION REGULATIONS Locomotive inspection requirements are one of the oldest areas of Federal safety regulations, dating back to 1911. Revisions to the Locomotive Inspection require ments have been completed. A final rule was published in the Federal Register March 31, 1980. TRACK SAFETY STANDARDS The FRA has received extensive comments on the proposed revisions to the Track Safety Standards published for public comment in September of 1979. The areas of principal concern to the commenters were: The elimination of the knowledge requirement for liability; regulation of track on private industrial property; the use of rail weight to determine speed limitations; the elimination of the differential between maximum speeds for passenger and freight trains; and the increase costs said to be associated with the proposed revisions. The FRA found much of the analysis submitted in support of the commenters' positions to be persuasive. As a result, we have decided to withdraw the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and reevaluate our approach to revision of the Track Safety Standards. SAFETY GLAZING On December 31, 1979, FRA published final rules requiring the progressive installation of improved glazing materials in the windows of locomotives, passenger cars and cabooses. The purpose of this rule is to protect the occupants of rail vehicles from death or serious injury resulting from objects thrown at railroad trains or objects suspended from bridges. The new glazing will also resist intrusion by small caliber bullets. This rulemaking resulted from a joint petition filed by the Association of American Railroads and the Railway Labor Executives' Association, both of which were active participants in the proceedings. The technical basis for improved glazing standards was provided by the FRA research and development program. Penalties Question. Would you please provide us with how many penalties were instituted in the last three years and the levels collected in each of these years? Answer. Not all claims transmitted during a particular period are settled or otherwise resolved in that period because of time consumed by (a) investigation of the allegations by the respondent and (b) negotiations leading to resolution of the claims. Settlement negotiations were slowed during fiscal year 1979 by the litigation workload associated with FRA Emergency Order No. 11. 2 Initial assessment based on penalty schedule (FCCA, FRSA) or preliminary application of statutory criteria (HMTA). 3 Includes settlements and court judgments (FCCA, FRSA) and final administrative assessments (HMTA). 4 Gross number of claims in files settled. Terminations of individual claims are reflected on the case settlement tables provided with this response. 5 Not available. Legend: FCCA-Federal Claims Collection Act of 1966, 31 U.S.C. 951-953. This is the general authority under which the FRA collects penalties for violations of the Safety Appliance Act, Hours of Service Act, Locomotive Inspection Act, and Signal Inspection Act; FHSA-Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970, 45 U.S.C. 421 et seq.; HMTA-Hazardous Materials Transportation Act, 49 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.; Court-Final judgment of district court. Derailment Question. In our 1978 hearings, the Federal Railroad Administration testified that the increased rate of derailment appeared to be caused by increased track problems caused by deferred maintenance and increased axle loadings of trains. It was stated "additional research is being conducted to determine the specific relationship between increased axle loading and track caused accidents with respect to the types of problems generated and appropriate remedial action." What is the status of this research and what remedial actions have been taken? Should there be any requirements to lessen axle loadings of trains? Answer. FRA completed a Congressionally mandated study on the relationship of freight car size to the safety and efficiency of rail transportation. This study compared the safety record of cars of various sizes, including the 100-ton cars. From a safety viewpoint, the 100-ton cars were not found to be more likely to derail. However, the more drastic wheel/rail contacts from these heavier cars can accelerate track degradation. This means that the level of safety and efficiency becomes more dependent on the design, quality and maintenance level of the track. Many railroads are able to safely and profitably use 100-ton cars. Research being conducted which will address the economic effects of operating 100-ton cars, examining both car maintenance and track maintenance requirements. Track Train Dynamics studies will investigate new designs for high axle load vehicles aimed at reducing dynamic force levels to levels comparable to those of lighter cars. It is not anticipated that reduction in the present maximum loading limits now in force for four axle freight cars will be necessary. Alcohol and drugs Question. A number of recent accidents described by the National Transportation Safety Board have been related to alcohol or drug use by train personnel. What can be done to assure that train personnel are not under the influence of alcohol or drugs while operating railroad equipment? Answer. Since 1977, the FRA has sponsored Project REAP (Railroad Employee Assistance Programs). This is a major research effort aimed at defining the nature and severity of the problem of alcohol abuse in the railroad industry, and developing a set of general recommendations which the railroad industry can use to control the problem. There has been direct participation by rail management through the AAR, the Employee Assistance Section of the Railroad Personnel Association, and individual railroads. Rail labor is an active participant through the Rail Labor Executives Association (RLEA) and individual unions. This was the first time that there has been an industry-wide study. The railroad industry should be commended on its progress in combating alcohol and drug abuse. Employee Assistance Programs have been established in twentythree railroads. In addition, several railroads have indicated that they are initiating similar programs, and that they are using the findings of Project REAP to guide them in developing their programs. Railroads with existing programs represent over 411,000 employees or 87 percent of the employees of Class I railroads, as well as Amtrak and Canadian National Railways employees. On balance, we believe that the railroad industry has done a commendable job of attempting to control problem drinking. However, there is much more work that needs to be accomplished to obtain the maximum potential benefits from the mechanisms and programs already in place. Project REAP concluded that at least for the time being, job-related drinking problems should be addressed by voluntary company efforts and the Federal government should confine itself to supporting these efforts through the delivery of technical assistance and the development of training packages. We agree with this conclusion. Control of such problems is manifestly in the railroad companies interests, as indicated by the following conclusions reached in the REAP study: It costs more to dismiss a problem drinker than it does to rehabilitate him. The job-related drinking problems was relatively low on the one railroad in the study which permitted rule violators to maintain their employment status with the company, if they would undergo counseling and treatment for their problem. Project REAP indicated that in 1978 the seven railroads studied suffered productivity losses of up to $100 million due to alcohol related absenteeism and reduced work performance. Liability Question. In the Committee's railroad safety hearings in 1978, Jim King, the Chairman of the National Transportation Safety Board stated that one of the problems that stood in the way of tank car safety was the fact that "98 percent of those cars are owned by investors or shippers, not by the railroads. These investors are not held liable for the sort of disasters that occur out in the field . . . People who own those cars and had no liability, we have never gathered testimony of anyone of the car owners who were really responsible for the car ever having been held liable and paying one nickel to any injured party." Do you believe this is an accurate description of the liability situation in the railroad area today, and if so, do you believe that anything should be done to alter this situation to create greater incentives by the owners of these cars to take a greater interest in assuring the safety of this equipment? Answer. If a tank car tank is involved in an accident and it is found not to meet specifications provided in the regulations, the tank car owner or the tank car tank builder may incur liability. Normally, the railroad will initially settle all claims resulting from a railroad accident. If part of the problem can be traced to a failure of the tank car owner to meet Federal specifications, the railroad may in turn file suit against that owner. However, the railroads are responsible for equipment maintenance. Nonregulatory incentives Question. Beyond increased liability insurance requirements, what other nonregulatory incentives do you believe could be created in the railroad safety area to increase safety in equipment and operating practices? Answer. FRA has not, as yet, been able to develop promising concepts for incentive programs. However, alternative methods are being explored by FRA for motivating carriers to improve safety. System-wide assessment of three railroads was completed in 1979. Assessments of the Illinois Central Gulf Railroad, and the Louisville and Nashville Railroad included analyses of track, equipment, signals and operating practices. A number of improvements have been made by these carriers following the FRA analysis. FRA's assessment of the L&N led to a 40 percent reduction in the number of accidents on that line. HAZARDOUS MATERIALS TRANSPORTATION IN THE RAILROAD AREA Extent of hazardous materials transportation Question. Would you please tell the Committee how much hazardous material has been transported by the railroads in each of the last three fiscal years? Answer. There has been a steady increase in the number of carloads of hazardous materials shipped by rail over the past five years. Since tank car capacity has also increased during this period, the actual volume of hazardous materials shipped by rail is somewhat larger than indicated by the table below. Estimated number of car loads of hazardous materials shipped by rail Accident statistics in the hazardous materials area Question. For the last four fiscal years, please provide the Committee with the number of deaths, injuries, property damage, and number of people who have had to be evacuated due to railroad accidents involving hazardous materials. |