"So long as a Chinese remains an American seaman he is entitled to the same protecting care of the authorities of the United States as other American sailors. Our law recognizes the changed status of a Chinese while a sailor, and it has been held that a Chinese seaman coming into the ports of this country is not inhibited by the Chinese exclusion acts from temporarily landing on shore without any attempt to remain. (In re Moncan, 14 Fed. Rep. 44; In re Ah Kee, 22 Fed. Rep. 519.) But if such a person should not depart with his vessel or with some other vessel in the ordinary pursuit of his vocation upon the high seas, his presence in the country would become unlawful. And so, without respect to his status, so long as he remains a sailor a vessel could not be permitted to discharge a Chinese in one of our ports and leave him in this country in violation of our laws prohibiting the importation of Chinese laborers. “On the 25th of November last the British minister complained to this Government that the authorities of the port of Baltimore had warned the captain of the British ship Oxford, lately arrived at that port manned by a Chinese crew, that any member of the crew who landed would under existing law be liable to arrest. The matter was called to the attention of the Treasury Department, which, on the 2d day of December, replied that it would instruct the collector of the port that as the Chinamen are seamen their temporary landing for the purposes of the vessel, without any attempt to remain in the United States, may be permitted, but that care is to be taken that they depart from the United States in the ship.' "The present law of this country excludes Chinese laborers, and its execution requires reasonable regulations. We can not deny the same right to any other government. The proper distinction is whether such regulations are a reasonable incident of such laws. The imposition of a fine or fee under the circumstances and for the purposes indicated in your dispatch does not seem to have been such a regulation, and I therefore learn with pleasure that it is proposed to discontinue it. This Government, however, can not object to a regulation prohibiting or regulating the discharge of Chinese sailors in Hawaii which is general in its application and is warranted by the laws of that kingdom." Mr. Blaine, Sec. of State, to Mr. Stevens, min. to Hawaii, Feb. 25, 1892, In December, 1893, some seamen belonging to the American schooner Henry Crosby were fired upon, under the impression that they were escaping criminals, by soldiers of the Dominican Republic. When the firing took place, the seamen were proceeding to the schooner in a yawl. Two of them were wounded, and as to one of these the Department of State said: "If Smith were an American citizen I should say that he was entitled to the intervention of this Department to secure an indemnity for his injuries. He is not, however, an American citizen, nor does he come within that statute which provides that a foreigner serving as a seaman on an American vessel shall be entitled to American protection, if he has declared his intention to become a citizen; for it does not appear that he ever made such a declaration.” Mr. Uhl, Act. Sec. of State, to Messrs. Goodrich et al., April 10, 1894, This position was reaffirmed in a letter of Mr. Uhl, Act. Sec. of State, to Seamen born in the Philippine Islands are not citizens of the United States within the meaning of any statute concerning seamen or any other statute of the United States. Griggs, At. Gen., Feb. 19, 1901, 23 Op., 400. wife. "I have received your No. 511, of the 16th ultimo. You therein inquire, with reference to the application of Joseph Case of seaman's or John Ratcliffe to have his wife registered at the consulate-general at Kanagawa, whether protection shall be granted in Japan to Japanese wives of seamen, not American citizens, serving on American vessels. The case as presented in your dispatch has had the Department's consideration. "The first question that arises is whether a British subject who has served seven years on an American national vessel, but who is not shown to have taken any steps toward naturalization, is to be regarded as an American seaman, and as such entitled to protection by the United States consular and diplomatic officers in the East. Section No. 170 of the consular regulations for 1888 goes far to settle this question. It provides that the term American seamen shall be held to include "(1) Seamen, being citizens of the United States, regularly shipped in an American vessel, whether in a port of the United States or in a foreign port; 666 "(2) Foreigners regularly shipped in an American vessel in a port of the United States; "(3) Seamen, being foreigners by birth, regularly shipped in an American vessel, whether in a port of the United States or a foreign port, who have declared their intention to become citizens of the United States and have served three years thereafter on an American merchant vessel.' "It would seem from this that a foreigner, to come under this section, must have been regularly shipped in a port of the United States (as to which in the present case there is no evidence before the Department), or have declared his intention of citizenship; and even in such cases the citizenship so imputed is defined as within the meaning of the laws relating to the discharge, relief, wages, and extra wages of seamen.' "It is true that in the case of John Ross (with which your legation is familiar), a British subject, serving on an American vessel, who, while on such vessel in the harbor of Yokohama, committed a crime, was held by the Department to be subject to consular jurisdiction at Yokohama; but between consular jurisdiction over an offense committed by a person while serving on an American ship and consular jurisdiction over such a person as a permanent landsman the distinction is great. The first relates to the flag and its incidents; the second relates to a person on shore as permanently detached from the flag. The United States can sustain jurisdiction in the first case on the ground that the flag imparts nationality. They can not sustain jurisdiction in the second case, because, except in cases in Mohammedan countries of protected foreigners, which exception is rigidly marked, the only way, outside of the flag, of obtaining national protection is by naturalization. In the present case it is not alleged that Ratcliffe has even attempted to obtain naturalization. "It is not necessary to discuss the question whether Ratcliffe's marriage at Hongkong in 1887 is, on the principles determined by the Department in this relation, to be regarded as valid in international law. Assuming its validity, the Department is clearly of opinion that the woman claiming on this marriage to be his wife is not entitled, as such, to the protection now claimed, even supposing he is entitled to such protection. Ratcliffe's only claim to protection would be his distinctive character as a seaman; and his wife can not be held to take this character for the purpose of protection any more than she could take it for the purpose of navigation." Mr. Bayard, Sec. of State, to Mr. Hubbard, min. to Japan, Nov. 10, 1888, XVII. CORPORATIONS. § 485. See infra, §§ 984, 985. Corporations, under the treaties between the United States and Great Britain of 1783 and 1794, are entitled, in respect of security for their property, to the same rights as natural persons. Society for the Propagation of the Gospel v. New Haven, 8 Wheat. 464. The treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo between the United States and Mexico makes no distinction, in the protection it provides, between the property of individuals and the property held by towns under the Mexican Government. Townsend v. Greeley, 5 Wall. 326. The rule that a suit by or against a corporation in its corporate name in a court of the United States is conclusively presumed to be a suit by or against citizens of the State creating the corporation, does not apply to a limited partnership association organized under the Pennsylvania statute of June 2, 1874, entitled "An act authorizing the formation of partnership associations in which the capital subscribed shall alone be responsible for the debts of the association except under certain circumstances." Great Southern Fire Proof Hotel Co. v. Jones (1900), 177 U. S. 449. "There is an indisputable legal presumption that a State corporation, when sued or suing in a circuit court of the United States, is composed of citizens of the State which created it. That doctrine began, as we have seen, in the assumption that State corporations were composed of citizens of the State which created them; but such assumption was one of fact, and was the subject of allegation and traverse, and thus the jurisdiction of the Federal courts might be defeated. Then, after a long contest in this court, it was settled that the presumption of citizenship is one of law, not to be defeated by allegation or evidence to the contrary. There we are content to leave it." St. Louis & San Francisco Railway Co. v. James (1896), 161 U. S. 545, 562-563. The rule that the stockholders of a corporation are, for purposes of See, also, Muller v. Dows, 94 U. S. 444; National Steamship Co. v. A corporation under the laws of the State of Minnesota brought suit against the United States in the Court of Claims, under the act of March 3, 1891, 26 Stat. 851, in relation to the payment of Indian depredation claims, for the value of certain horses and harness taken or destroyed by Sioux Indians. The act authorized the payment only of "claims for property of citizens of the United States." The H. Doc. 551-vol 3-51 Court of Claims found as a conclusion of law that the claimant, as a Minnesota corporation, must be presumed to be a citizen of the United States for the purposes of the action. The United States appealed. The decision of the Court of Claims was affirmed. United States v. Northwestern Express Co. (1897), 164 U. S. 686. Mr. Justice White, delivering the opinion of the court, observed that Congress had frequently in its legislation, as also had the treaty-making power, used the words "citizens. of the United States" as embracing corporations created under State laws. This was the case in Kevised Statutes, secs. 2319 and 2321, relating to the purchase of mineral deposits in public lands, and also under the French Spoliations Act of January 20, 1885, 22 Stat. 283. In these cases Congress had entered upon no inquiry as to whether the stockholders were composed in whole or in part of any but citizens of the United States. So, in various treaties of the United States, the phrase "citizens of the United States" had been used as including corporations, companies, and private individuals. By the act of March 3, 1891, the United States had designed to pay for injuries committed by the Indians, its wards. In order to make such restitution the word "citizens" would require a construction embracing Federal and State corporations, since redress must be denied unless the corporation holding legal title to property might bring a claim for damages, the stockholders being legally incompetent to present such a claim. It had been argued that, if corporations were embraced in the terms of the act, an alien who was a corporator might be benefited. But the argument of inconvenience on this ground was overwhelmed by the preponderance of inconvenience on the other side, for, while the alien corporator might be an exception, the corporator who was a citizen both of the State and of the United States was the rule. Henry Chauncey, a citizen of the United States, and two other persons, also such citizens, made a claim against the Chilean Government as surviving members of the firm of Allsop & Co. The claim was based on alleged interference by the Chilean Government with certain property or property rights, which were transferred in 1875 to that firm, and which, the firm having gone into liquidation, were embraced in a contract of settlement in 1876 between the liquidating partner of the firm and the Government of Bolivia. Subsequently, on the death of the partner in question, Mr. Chauncey became the liquidator of the firm, and as such liquidator he appeared as the firm's representative in presenting the claim. It appeared that the firm was formed in 1870 under the laws of Chile, with its domicil at Valparaiso, and that it constituted under those laws a society of partnership en comandité, which constitutes under the law of Chile, which is based on the civil law, a juridical person or entity distinct from its individual members. On this ground it was held that the firm was to be considered for international purposes as a citizen of Chile, and was therefore incapable of prosecuting through its representative |