gress and will forfeit their claim to the protection of their country. No such persons," he added, “must expect the interference of this Government in any form on their behalf, no matter to what extremities they may be reduced in consequence of their conduct."

Proclamation of President Taylor, Aug. 11, 1849, Richardson's Messages,
V. 7.

In a proclamation issued in 1851, President Fillmore declared that there was reason to believe that a military expedition, instigated and set on foot chiefly by foreigners, was about to be fitted out in the United States for the invasion of Cuba; that such expeditions could be regarded only as adventures for plunder and robbery; and that they were, besides, expressly prohibited by the statutes of the United States. He therefore warned "all persons" who should "connect themselves with any such enterprise or expedition, in violation of our laws and national obligations," that they would "thereby subject themselves to the heavy penalties denounced against such offences, and will forfeit their claim to the protection of this Government or any interference in their behalf, no matter to what extremities they may be reduced in consequence of their illegal conduct."

Proclamation of President Fillmore, April 25, 1851, H. Ex. Doc. 2, 32
Cong., 1 sess., part 1, 27; Richardson's Messages, V. 111.

"Although Captain Clark individually may have been an American citizen, his captures, while in command of an Uruguay privateer, were Uruguay captures; and any claim to be preferred against Colombia, on account of the spoliations committed by the Venezuelan navy, must be preferred by Uruguay and can not possibly be made or enforced by the United States. That Clark's family resided in the United States, that he returned to the country of his birth and died there, does not change the aspect of the case, which is not determined by the nativity of the individual, but by the flag of the belligerent.” Opinion of Hassaurek, U. S. Comr., for the Commission, in the cases of the Medea and Good Return: Convention between the United States and Ecuador, Nov. 25, 1862, Moore, Int. Arbitrations, III. 2729, 2736. See, to the same effect, opinion of Sir Frederick Bruce, umpire, U. S. and Colombian Claims Commission, convention of Feb. 10, 1864, Moore, Int. Arbitrations, III. 2740–2743; and opinion of Findlay, U. S. Comr., for the Commission, convention between the United States and Venezuela, Dec. 5, 1885, Moore, Int. Arbitrations, III. 2743–2751.

A citizen of the United States who voluntarily enlists in a foreign army has no claim on this Government to intervene to procure his discharge.

Mr. Fish, Sec. of State, to Mr. Bliss, Nov. 4, 1872, MS. Inst. Mex. XVIII. 340.

For cases on this subject, see Moore, Int. Arbitrations, III. 2467-8, 2752. That a citizen of the United States enlisted in the service of a foreign belligerent can not claim the interposition of his own Government for redress for injuries suffered by him in such service, see Mr. Fish, Sec. of State, to Mr. Williams, July 29, 1874, quoted supra, § 225.

"A party whose goods are confiscated as tainted with insurgency can not claim compensation if he was himself implicated in such insurgency."

Mr. Bayard, Sec. of State, to Mr. Muruaga, Span. min., Dec. 3, 1886, For.
Rel. 1887, 1015, 1019.

It was reported in 1893 that Dr. Charles E. Boynton, a citizen of the United States, had been arrested at Rio de Janeiro and was in danger of execution on account of some act committed during the insurrection then existing in that quarter. The report proved to be erroneous. The facts appear to be that Dr. Boynton attempted, in the interest of the Brazilian Government, to use a torpedo against the revolted vessels of the Brazilian navy, employing for that purpose a small tug, over which he unlawfully hoisted the British flag. The commander of the British naval forces, seeing the British flag so used, seized the tug, but, finding that its master was an American citizen, turned him over to Captain Picking, of the U. S. S. Charleston, who reported the matter and was directed to hold Dr. Boynton till further orders. Captain Picking was afterwards directed to send him home, on sufficient funds being provided to pay his passage.

Mr. Adee, Second Assist. Sec. of State, to Miss Boynton, Oct. 21, 1893, 194 MS. Dom. Let. 76.

5. FUGITIVES FROM JUSTICE.

$ 482.

J. II. Mears, in view of the fact that he participated "in the enormous fraud perpetrated by Gardiner and others," and in view of other circumstances of his case," ought not to have expected any interference in his behalf by this Government on account of his alleged maltreatment by Mexico, for he certainly has no claim to it. It is not over criminals or fugitives from justice in foreign countries, though they may have been born or naturalized in the United States, that this Government is bound to throw the shield of its protection whenever they see fit to call on it to do so. It is to our citizens abroad for honest purposes, who still look to the United States as their home to which they intend to return, or in other words, to those who are still under allegiance to this Government, or have a domicil here, that our

Government extends its care, and will offer, when occasion requires, its guardian protection."

Mr. Marcy, Sec. of State, to Mr. Gadsden, min. to Mexico, No. 54, Oct. 22, 1855, MS. Inst. Mexico, XVII. 54. As to the case of Mears and Gardiner, see Moore, Int. Arbitrations, II. 1255, 1265.

"As a general principle, a fugitive from justice can not appeal for protection to the justice from which he flies. Thus, it is a familiar rule that a convict can not take out a writ of error, when a fugitive from justice. It might therefore be said that until Winslow shall have submitted himself to the justice of his native land, the laws of which he is charged with violating, he is not in a position to appeal to their protection against the justice of a foreign land. A passport, which is the primary form and evidence of protection given to a citizen by his government, has frequently been denied to persons residing in a foreign land, in contumacy or violation of the laws of the United States. Were Winslow merely an applicant for a passport, the fact that he is a contumacious fugitive from the justice of Massachusetts would be a sufficient reason for denying to him that evidence of the reciprocal duty of the law-abiding citizen and obligation of his Government. It does not, however, appear necessary to rest a conclusion in the present case upon this argument."

Mr. Bayard, Sec. of State, to Mr. Hanna, min. to Arg. Rep., No. 22, June
25, 1886, MS. Inst. Arg. Rep. XVI. 385.

This instruction related to an application of "D. Warren Lowe,” appar-
ently Ezra D. Winslow, for the intervention of the United States in
certain bankruptcy proceedings in which he had become involved in
the Argentine Republic. The decision of the Department of State not
to intervene rested not only upon the ground above stated, but also
upon the ground that he had abandoned the United States and settled
in the Argentine Republic animo manendi.
Winslow seems to be judicially domiciled in Massachusetts.
Rice, 130 Mass. 231.)

6. QUESTION OF MATRICULATION.

$483.

(Cobb r.

"The matriculation of foreigners as defined in article 21 of this chapter [iii., of the law of Salvador, of Sept. 27, 1886] is an inscription of their names and nationalities in a book kept for that purpose in the department for foreign affairs. In order to be so registered, they must produce to that department certain evidence, prescribed by law, of their right to the national status claimed. If the requisite evidence be exhibited, the name and nationality of the applicant. are registered, and in proof of this, he is given a certificate of matriculation, which is, however, only prima facie evidence of his national status. But without this certificate no authority or public

functionary of Salvador is permitted to recognize a foreigner's nationality (Chapter III. article 26).

"Upon the score of mere convenience it is evident how inexpedient as a matter of policy, in the present age of enlarged and liberal intercourse and of extensive commercial transactions, are municipal regulations which tend to impede and restrict the movements and business operations of foreigners.

"But the law in question, as understood by this Department, goes beyond considerations of convenience, and raises important questions of international right. By article 28, Chapter III.. it is provided that matriculation concedes privileges and imposes special obligations which are called by the laws of the Republic the rights of foreigners.' These rights of foreigners, as stated in article 29 of the same chapter, are as follows:

"(1) To appeal to the treaties and conventions existing between Salvador and their respective governments.

66

(2) To have recourse to the protection of their sovereign through the medium of diplomatic representation.

"Unless a foreigner possesses a certificate of matriculation, no authority or public functionary of Salvador, as has been seen, is permitted to concede to him any of these rights; and it is further provided in article 27 of the chapter in question, that the certificate of matriculation shall not operate retroactively upon a claim of right arising anterior to the date of matriculation. Thus the object and purport of the law in question is to make the enjoyment and assertion by a foreigner in Salvador of the consequent rights and privileges of his national character, whether they are guaranteed by treaty or secured by the general rules of international law, conditional upon his contemporaneous possession of a paper prescribed by the municipal law of the country as the proper proof of his citizenship.

"In order to appreciate the significance of such a requirement, it is only necessary to consider that, if admitted, its effect would be to leave the question of the national status of a foreigner wholly to the determination of the Salvadorian authorities, and that, in the event of his failure to exhibit such proofs of citizenship as they may deem sufficient, his right to claim the protection of his government would be lost. Conversely the right of his government to interpose in his behalf would also be destroyed; for to deny to a foreigner recourse to his government, by necessary implication, questions and denies the right of that government to intervene.

“Thus, by making the compliance of a foreigner with a municipal regulation a condition precedent to the recognition of his national character, the Salvadorian Government not only assumes to be the

sole judge of his status, but also imposes upon him as the penalty of noncompliance a virtual loss of citizenship.

Nothing would seem to be required beyond the mere statement of these propositions, fully sustained as they appear to be by the context of the law in question, to confirm the conviction that its enforcement would give rise to continual and probably grave controversies. Such has been the result of the occasional attempts elsewhere than Salvador to enforce similar regulations, and such would seem to be the necessary result of the attempt of particular governments to enforce laws which operate as a restriction upon the exercise and performance both by states and by citizens of their relative rights and duties, according to the generally accepted rules of international intercourse. Such intercourse should always be characterized by the utmost confidence in the good faith of nations, and by the careful abstinence of each from the adoption of measures which, by operating as a special restriction upon the action of other governments in matters in which they have an important if not the chief concern, seem to imply distrust of their intentions. It is proper to observe that the Government of Mexico, guided by the experience of an ample trial of her law of matriculation, modified it in June last by the repeal of those provisions which made the matriculation of foreigners compulsory and a condition of the exercise of their right of appeal to their government.

"It may be said that the question of citizenship is one which peculiarly concerns the government whose protection is claimed and in the decision of which that government has a paramount sovereign right. This results not only from the relation of a government to its citizens, but from the fact that international law recognizes the right of each state to prescribe the conditions of citizenship therein and regulate for itself the process whereby foreigners may, if they so desire, expatriate themselves and become naturalized. In the United States this process is defined by a statute, the administration of which is committed to the courts, who issue to the naturalized citizen certain evidence of his compliance with the law. The efficiency of this law, the basal principle of which is the voluntary action of the alien, is fully recognized by all states that concede the right of expatriation, and among these is Salvador.

"The principle and validity of our naturalization law being thus admitted, it would seem that the mere question of its administration and of the proper evidence of its administration was one for the determination of this Government. But by the matriculation law of Salvador that Government is made the first and the final judge of the sufficiency of the evidence of American citizenship, even in the case of a naturalized citizen of the United States not of Salvadorian origin.