during such temporary residence, to the municipal laws of such foreign country, so as to divest him of his home status, and to impose on him the status of the country in which he is temporarily resident. "The consequences of the latter doctrine are so disastrous that it is hard to believe that it was deliberately intended to have been advanced. Were a person domiciled in one of our States (whether an adult or a minor) subjected to the municipal laws of a foreign country, in which he is temporarily resident, and clothed with its status, he might be placed permanently under the control of a guardian appointed by the authorities of such country; his legitimacy would be subject to its laws; his marriage would be invalid if made such by its laws; by its laws would the succession to his property be determined; by its laws, as one of its subjects, would his property be distributed in case of his death. "For this Department, in its consular regulations and diplomatic instructions, to declare otherwise, would not only contravene the rulings of our courts and the opinions of the great body of modern international jurists, but would interpose a serious difficulty in the way of the obtaining, by persons domiciled in one of the United States, the rights abroad to which they are entitled by the law of nations and by the rulings of domestic courts. We will suppose, for instance, that a person domiciled in the United States, but temporarily resident abroad, is subjected to personal taxation, or to other laws determining status in the place of his temporary residence; or that an effort is made to subject his legitimacy, or the legality of his marriage, to the laws of such temporary residence; or to limit his business capacity by such laws, or, on his death, to declare that his estate by such laws is to be distributed. This is contested; and to support this adverse contention, we will suppose that it is said by the authorities of such place of temporary residence: Undoubtedly by the law of nations personal status is determined by the place of domicil, but by your consular regulations and diplomatic instruetions you preclude yourselves from claiming for persons domiciled in your States this right.' But that such a concession should not be made by this Department I maintain for the following reasons: "1. Even supposing the question were one of doubt, it ought not to be decided in this summary way against persons domiciled under our flag. "2. The case is one belonging to the States, as domicil is incident to residence in a State (or Territory, as the case may be), and not to resldence in the United States as a whole. A person, for instance, may be domiciled in the State of New York, and thus become enveloped in the municipal law of New York; but except as domiciled in New York, he cannot be domiciled in the United States. Domicil by the law of nations, it must be remembered, is residence within a particular state, with the intention to make it a final abode. It may or may not be coupled with domestic political privileges. Domicil, however, and not the possession of political privileges, internationally determines status. "But while intention to permanently remain is an essential incident of domicil, this is not inconsistent with temporary absence. It is in relation to persons temporarily absent, and to their children born during such temporary absence, that the rules I have cited bear harshly in denying to them rights to which they are entitled by the law of nations. "This leaves the question of status in such cases to the courts, unprejudiced by any utterances from this Department. It may be that a distinction now taken in England between civil and political domicil may be hereafter internationally accepted, and that it may consequently be held that while domicil without naturalization imposes a civil status, determining municipal rights, it does not impose political status conferring political immunities, e. g., relief from military or police duties. But be this as it may, no statement should be permitted to remain in the records of this Department sanctioning the view that a person domiciled in the United States is by our action precluded from claiming the municipal rights he is entitled to by the rules of private international law." (17 MS. Opinions of Solicitors of Dept. of State, 305.) With regard to this paper, it may be observed, in the first place, that a sharp distinction is made in laws and judicial decisions between the civil status derived from domicil and the political status derived from citizenship. This distinction is maintained not only in England and in the United States, but may also be found in various codes of Continental Europe. In some cases, indeed, as in Italy (see infra, p. 811), citizenship is made the test of civil as well as of political status; but in no case, it is believed, is political status made to depend upon the civil status of the individual, as derived from domicil, under the rules of private international law. In the second place, it is to be noted that citizenship is the creature of municipal and not of international law. It is true that a person may derive a qualified nationality from the rules of international law in certain relations, particularly in matters of prize; but this is a different thing from citizenship. It has never been supposed, for instance, that a passport might be issued to a British subject as a citizen of the United States, because, by reason of his having a belligerent domicil in the United States, his property perchance might be subject to seizure and confiscation on the high seas in a war to which the United States was a party. The opinion of Attorney-General Hoar referred, as is admitted, to an application for a passport, and the language which he employs is appropriate to that subject. He speaks of "citizens" and "subjects," and of the "allegiance" which they owe. These words fairly exclude the idea that he intended to deny to any person the civil rights derived from domicil, the determination of which rights, as Dr. Wharton observes, may be left, certainly primarily, to the courts. Passports are granted to an individual as an evidence of his political, not of his civil, status, and their issuance therefore is based, not on domicil, but on citizenship. By the laws of the United States they can be granted only to persons owing allegiance. The doctrine of "election" necessarily implies the existence of a double allegiance. This condition naturally arises where a person is born in one country to a father who is a citizen of another country. By rules of municipal law, which generally prevail, such a person has two citizenships by birth-(1) citizenship by virtue of the place of birth (jure soli), and (2) citizenship by right of blood (jure sanguinis), i. e., by virtue of the father's nationality. Unless this be so, the child on attaining his majority has nothing to elect. So far as domicil may play any part in the matter, its general tendency would seem to be to enhance the claim of the country of residence, since it can hardly be assumed that a person will usually be found to be domiciled in a country other than that in which he lives. "Robert W. Wilcox, Alexander Smith, and several others, born here of American fathers, have appealed for protection, which I have been unable to extend, they being at present under foreign jurisdiction, with no law or treaty exempting them from the usual rule." Mr. Willis, min. to Hawaii, to Mr. Gresham, Sec. of State, March 7, 1895, For. Rel. 1895, II. 850, in relation to persons arrested and held under martial law for complicity in the insurrectionary plot in Hawaii in 1895. Although Lazarus Marks, a native of Prussia, but a naturalized citizen of the United States, had, by reason of his permanent residence in Guatemala since 1870, apparently renounced his naturalization and had ceased to be entitled to an American passport, it was held that his minor sons, although they were natives of Guatemala, were, by virtue of section 1993 R. S., entitled to passports as citizens of the United States until, by attaining their majority, they became "competent to elect another nationality." Mr. Adee, Acting Sec. of State, to Mr. Combs, No. 71, Sept. 15, 1903, For. See, also, Mr. Adee, Acting Sec. of State, to Mr. Beaupré, min. to Arg. While the Department of State holds that the minor children of an American citizen who has taken up a permanent residence abroad are by virtue of section 1993, Revised Statutes, entitled during minority to passports, yet the Department has ruled: "If born after the father has become the subject or citizen of another power, or after he has in any way expatriated himself, the children born abroad are to all intents and purposes aliens, and not entitled to protection from the United States." (For. Rel. 1873, II. 1191.) And again: "If the father has, at the time of the birth of a son, abandoned his citizenship in the United States, the son can make no claim to such citi zenship." (For. Rel. 1885, 396.) These rulings were applied in the case of Robert Albert Böker, in Germany. Mr. Hay, Sec. of State, to Mr. Tower, ambass. to Germany, No. 192, May 31, 1904, For. Rel. 1904, 314, citing Van Dyne on Citizenship, 34. Compare For. Rel. 1873, II. 1191. (2) PARTICULAR APPLICATIONS. $ 427. "With regard to the proposed law naturalizing children born in the Argentine Republic of foreign parents, with its Argentine Republic. retrospective declaration, inasmuch as the AttorneyGeneral of the United States has decided that such individuals born in the United States become endowed with the rights and liabilities of our own citizens, the comity of nations enjoins that we should acquiesce in any analogous legislation." Mr. F. W. Seward, Act. Sec. of State, to Mr. Kirk, No. 35, Nov. 4, 1863, See 9 Op. 373, and 10 Op. 321; supra, § 373. See, to the same effect, Mr. Fish, Sec. of State, to Mr. Kirk, No. 4, June 18, 1869, enclosing a copy of Attorney-General Hoar's opinion of June 12, 1869. (MS. Inst. Arg. Rep. XV. 319.) Chile. "I have to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of July 17, 1867, in relation to your claim to American citizenship. You are correct in your belief that the circumstance of your mother's being an English woman does not impair the right to citizenship derived from that of your father. The act of Congress to be found in vol. 10 of Statutes at Large, page 604, was passed for the express purpose of removing any doubt on that point. Upon taking up your residence in the United States, you will become a citizen, in the full sense, without any naturalization. At present, however, you are in the position of having a double allegiance, the one which you owe to Chile, from your birth within its jurisdiction, the other due to this Government as the son of a citizen of the United States. Until you make your election to reside in this country, it is not in the power of this Government to protect you against the enforcement of any obligations you may be under as a citizen of Chile or any of the incidental consequences which may result from that character." Mr. Seward, Sec. of State, to Mr. Vantassel, Sept. 10, 1867, 77 MS. Dom. See, to the same effect, Mr. Hunter, Act. Sec. of State, to Mr. Dutton, By chapter 4, article 6, paragraph 1, of the Chilean constitution, all persons born in Chile are declared to be Chilean citizens. On this ground it was held that the minister of the United States at Santiago properly declined to intervene for the purpose of exempting from service in the national guard the Chilean-born children of American citizens. Mr. Olney, Sec. of State, to Mr. Strobel, min. to Chile, June 4, 1896, For. Colombia. In 1885 the British minister at Bogotá inquired of the Colombian Government as to its views concerning the nationality, while they were in Colombia, of certain children under the following circumstances: Their father was a native British subject; their mother was born in Colombia of British parents; the children were born in Chile, but had removed to Colombia with their widowed mother. The Colombian Government, in reply, referred to paragraph 2 of article 31 of the Colombian constitution, which provides that" the children of a Colombian father or mother, whether born within the territory of the United States of Colombia or not, provided in the latter case they settle in the country, are Colombians." On the strength of this provision, the Colombian Government stated that there seemed to be no doubt that the children of the Colombian mother were citizens of the country, provided they settled in it. For. Rel. 1885, 208. The Colombian Government published, Jan. 15, 1885, the following notice: "According to the tenor of article 31 of the national constitution, all such persons are Colombians, viz: "(1) Who have been or may be born in the territory of the United States of Colombia, although children of foreign parents transitory sojourners in the same, if they (the children) shall come and settle in the country. "(2) The children of a Colombian father or mother, whether born in the "(3) Foreigners who have obtained letters of naturalization. "As several cases have already occurred of Colombian citizens, merely on "Notice is likewise given that the issue of passports, whether for the use In communicating this notice to the Department of State, Mr. Scruggs, "I apprehend, in view of the Colombian fundamental law referred to, |