As I thought over the problem, a possible solution occurred to me for securing the teachers without undue recourse to Federal aid. Why not tap the resources of our school districts at home, on a kind of people-to-people basis? My idea was to send teachers from the Denver metropolitan area to the binational center in Guatemala City on a sabbatical basis for a year to teach English as a foreign language.

I broached the idea with Instituto officials and educators in the Denver area, receiving an enthusiastic response. Then I queried the Department of State and the U.S. Information Agency regarding the feasibility of the undertaking. With excellent cooperation on the part of all concerned, the plan already is in operation.

Briefly, here is how it functions: The school superintendents were informed of the plan, and in turn requested the approval of their school boards. Teachers then were informed of the opportunity and requested to write a letter to their superintendent if interested. The qualifications required of our teachers were an undergraduate degree or higher in one of the following fields: English, Spanish, linguistics, Latin American studies, education, anthropology, sociology, archeology, economics, political science, library science, journalism; a minimum of 3 years of teaching experience, and good health. Proficiency in Spanish was not demanded."

Teachers were asked to accept a position for a full year, to teach 25 hours weekly, and to take part in the binational center's activities program. They are to be paid by receiving a sabbatical stipend from the school district and $2,400 from the binational center. If necessary, and with the approval of the director of the Instituto, teachers could supplement their income by obtaining additional employment while in Guatemala. Teachers would also be free to use leisure hours in research projects. The grant includes 4 weeks' leave during the course of the year.

The result was a flood of serious inquiries, and the director of the Instituto flew to Denver to select four teachers from among the plethora of talent that had come foward. Among those chosen are a man who teaches English, two who teach Spanish, and a lady who instructs the sixth grade in all subjects. They received orientation regarding Guatemala and the operation of binational centers from a USIA-Washington staff man. Three of the Denver teachers are now in Guatemala, and the fourth is scheduled to follow shortly.

The families of the teachers were able to accompany them to Guatemala through the generosity of an anonymous donor who provided funds for their travel. The necessity of resorting to the benevolence of a private citizen, however, is cause for apprehension for the future success of similar enterprises. People are not likely to undertake nor should they be expected to-a year's separation from their families. Assured funds should be available for this type of

expense.

The Denver-Guatemala arrangement is by way of a pilot project. I am convinced that this type of program, if expanded to other school districts in the United States, could provide the binational centers in Latin America with a tremendous infusion of talented, trained, qualified, and enthusiastic personnel, all with teaching degrees and experience. They would enable the binational centers to realize their full potential without creating an expensive new bureaucracy.

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Furthermore, it seems to me, the purposes of the Alliance for Progress would be greatly served by providing a two-way opportunity to contribute to inter-American understanding: on the one hand, our teachers would fill a vital gap in Latin American binational centers; on the other hand, their experiences in Central and South America would enrich their own knowledge, enhancing their competence in their classrooms back home.

III. HOUSING

In Panama I visited several housing projects, funded through U.S. assistance. One apartment house I saw, financed by a Social Progress Trust Fund loan, administered by the Inter-American Development Bank, was literally tattered and torn, although only about 5 years old. The tenants are supposed to pay $3.50 a week rent and have paid nothing for 2 years. The building and grounds looked totally uncared for.

Another apartment, less than a mile away, which was rehabilitated by Panama's housing agency and converted to a cooperative, was strikingly different in appearance. This project, benefiting from a U.S. bank loan and AID's technical assistance, looked new and exuded pride and loving care. The inhabitants purchase their apartments through small monthly payments and none are in arrears. In addition, a credit union has been established where deposits from members are in turn loaned back for improvements to the individuals' apart

ments.

The difference in these two buildings reflects the dramatic difference that American foreign aid has recently undergone.

In El Salvador, I went through the Miramont middle-class housing project. A major loan from a New York bank backed by our guaranty has made possible a housing project for the middle class. Miramont houses sell from $8,000 to $11,000, with 10 percent downpayment. Interest rates are at approximately 9 percent overall.

A waiting list of hundreds and hundreds testifies to the success of this new venture. Interestingly, the Alliance for Progress was given top billing on the Miramont billboards and American private investment companies were given equal billing.

The Foreign Affairs Committee has made improved housing in the Americas a priority objective and much needs to be done. I have emphasized, as have my colleagues, that the officials in AID do not seem to be pushing the housing guaranty program in Latin America, in spite of the spectacular success of projects that are underway or have been completed. Dispensing with the direct use of U.S. Government dollars, Government guaranties are used to attract private money. This works in Latin America as it does in our own country.

The officials of AID, by cutting some bureaucratic redtape and reducing the enormous amount of checking and duplication of forms, could and should stimulate these projects. They have not pushed as hard as they might or should.

Greater reliance on U.S. private investment, more private ownership of housing through cooperatives and credit unions-that which we take for granted-means so much more than just giving out our dollars. The fact that it did not happen a decade ago and there has been much waste-does not preclude our reaching constructive agreements with our Latin American neighbors in excitingly new and vital directions.

APPENDIXES

APPENDIX I

A REPORT ON CENTRAL AMERICA'S COMMON MARKET AND ITS ECONOMIC INTEGRATION MOVEMENT

(Observations on the history, operations, and U.S. support of increasingly successful international agreements among Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica)

CONTENTS

Page

Introduction..

13

Section I. Genesis and progress of the Central American Common Market and the integration movement_.

14

Section II. Growth and patterns of trade, industry, and investment.
Section III. Role of the United States.

21

23

27

Summary of Central American economic data.......

INTRODUCTION

During the last 2 weeks of January 1966 a brief but comprehensive study was made of the Central American Common Market (CACM). The time seemed propitious. The General Treaty for Economic Integration by which Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica agreed to establish the Common Market had marked its fifth anniversary and the CACM itself was approaching the close of 5 years of activity under that agreement. The Comité de Cooperación Económica del Istmo, the first of the Central American economic integration bodies, was about to meet for the first time in 3 years to evaluate the integration movement in conjunction with the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) which had been highly instrumental in bringing the partner countries into integration channels. President Johnson had, in his January 1966 budget presentation to the Congress, once again confirmed the strong interest by the U.S. Government in Latin American integration and the high priority it gives to such movements.

A concomitant consideration was the forthcoming presentation to the Congress of the appropriation bill for the Agency for International Development (AID) which has been keenly interested for more than 4 years in the CACM, more or less paralleling the course of the Alliance for Progress-an interest indicated by its funding more than $83 million for CACM purposes. This sum is apart from the loans and grants made by AID to the five individual nations (and Panama) and the additional financial assistance provided by the United States through other U.S. agencies and the international organizations such as the Interamerican Development Bank (IDB).

It is stressed here that this statement on the U.S. assistance to the CACM should in no way be construed as depreciating the efforts of the Central Americans themselves who not only fathered the idea for economic fusion but contributed virtually all of the direction and economic means for the erection of this historic economic edifice.

The United Nations and the U.S. Government are not alone in showing high interest in the Central American mechanisms and success in knitting together their economic interests. As indicated by publications and correspondence, close observation is manifested in the world's principal centers of marketing and finance on the ability of the five small, generally underdeveloped countries to bind their economic relations despite political differences and national and private interests.