Reuters reports that Albanian Ambassador in Warsaw was asked not to return to his post because of objectionable "personal conduct” which reportedly included ideological activities.

October 12: Two U.S. Embassy Moscow officers were forced to leave Moscow lecture hall where lecture on "peaceful coexistence" was underway.

October 18: Albania and CPR sign scientific-technical agreement providing for sending of Chinese experts to Albania.

Pravda editorial on the 43d anniversary of the revolution lauds Khrushchev's performance at the United Nations and attacks "the blind, the dogmatists" who "cannot see the great changes in life * * *.'

October 19: People's Daily editorial asserts that "U.S. imperialism *** has pushed around the socialist camp headed by the Soviet Union and all peoples of the world in a most outrageuos way at the 15th session of the General Assembly." (See differing appraisal by Pravda below, on October 27.)

October 20: Khrushchev, in speech on Soviet delegaton's activities at UNGA session in New York, reiterates Soviet views on war and peace.

October 24: Albanian and CPR sign cultural agreement; agreement hailed as based upon a "struggle to protect purity of Marxism-Leninism."

Mao telegram to Albanian leaders thanking Albania for anniversary congratulations hails Albanian Communist Party's "great contribution to the cause of saving the purity of Marxism-Leninism ***."

People's Daily article by Gen. Yang Yung states that Chinese people have never "relaxed vigilance against 'peace' tricks or have been afraid of imperialist war threats," and have "even dared to use war to put down the imperialist war of aggression."

October 25: Albanian Premier Shehu, in speech reaffirming Albanian support of Communist China's position, rejects Balkan disarmament proposal advanced by Bulgaria without, however, specifying the authorship of the proposals. Shehu also rejects, again without reference to authorship, Polish proposal advanced at U.N. in Gomulka's address for "freeze" on number of military bases on foreign territories.

October 27: Pravda editorial states that "Soviet people have noted with unanimity and with great satisfaction the enormous political success in the activities of their delegation, headed by Comrade Khrushchev, at the 15th session of the U.N. General Assembly."

October 30: Radio Peking broadcasts two Red Flag articles (in combined Nos. 20-21 issues) citing examples of the Russian and Chinese revolutions to prove correctness of Peking's views on revolutionary struggle which are at variance with those of the USSR; implies that concept of peaceful seizure of power contradicts basic Marxist-Leninist principle of dictatorship of the proletariat. November: Chou En-lai and Foreign Minister Ch'en I, in series of interviews granted to Japanese journalist and U.S. writer Edgar Snow, respectively, discuss differences with Soviet Union with unusual candor. Admit differences exist and play down importance of Soviet economic assistance to Communist China.

November 4: Pravda article reiterates Soviet position on the possibility of peaceful seizure of power.

November 6: Sino-Soviet commentaries on occasion of 43d revolution anniversary celebrations in Moscow stress present and future solidarity of Sino-Soviet alliance and contain some apparent minor ideological concessions by both sides but contniue to reflect wide differences in outlook between Moscow and Peking. CPR delegation to revolutionary celebrations, headed by CPR Chairman Liu Shao-chi, arrive in Moscow.

Deputy Premier Kozlov, on occasion of October revolution anniversary reiterates Soviet formulation on the noninevitability of war which Peking has attacked, avows that even local wars can be prevented, emphasizes Communist economic successes as significant factor in spreading communism, and places stress on "dogmatism" as present danger in Communist movement and "creative Marxism" as major test of Communist solidarity.

November 10-December 1: A Communist "summit," attended by party leaders from 81 countries, met in Moscow. Mao Tse-tung was significantly absent. The meeting continued long beyond its scheduled closing of November 15, lending credence to reports that it had become enmeshed in arduous arguments over the correctness and applicability of varying Chinese and Soviet views on key issues. The entries below sketchily outline the highlights of the meeting and of its aftermath.

November 21: People's Daily editorial, ostensibly devoted to third anniversary of November 1957 Moscow declaration, indirectly charges Moscow with "emasculating" revoluntionary spirit of Communist doctrine.

November 23. Pravda editorial reiterates in moderate and nonpolemical tone form Moscow's position on certain issues at dispute with Peking, but contains apparent concessions to latter's point of view. Admits, for example, that revisionism is main danger at present and does not reiterate in categorical terms Soviet thesis on noninevitability of war.

November 25: Departure for home of Albanian leaders from Moscow conference appears to be a deliberate walkout and expression of pro-Chinese sympathies. November 28: Pravda editorial restating Soviet position on issues at dispute with Peking has stronger anti-Chinese flavor than previous editorial of November 23. (See above.) Editorial reiterates that revisionism is main danger but places marked emphasis on need to struggle against "dogmatism” and “national restriction."

November 29: CPR Premier Chou En-lai, on occasion of Albanian liberation day anniversary observance in Peking, praises Albanians as people who “fear no difficulties or crude pressures."

November 30: Khrushchev and CPR Chairman Liu Shao-chi confer in Moscow; first mention of Liu's presence in Soviet capital since November 6-7 revolution anniversary celebrations.

December 1: Communique on conference of Communist and workers' parties in Moscow issued. Asserts 81 Communist Parties met during November to discuss topical problems of the international situation and the Communist move ment and to "familiarize themselves" with one another's views.

December 6: Moscow publishes "Statement of the Conference of Representatives of Communist and Workers' Parties," adopted by the Moscow conference of parties. Statement is a mish-mash of conflicting Sino-Soviet views. Insofar as language of document is concerned, Chinese Communist attitude of greater militancy toward the West appears to have gained large measure of acceptance. On the other hand, broad doctrinal bases of Moscow's peaceful coexistence line which Communist Chinese contested; i.e., that peaceful coexistence is the general line of world Communist strategy; that communism can win out over capitalism through peaceful economic competition; that Communists should seek power through gradualist methods, and that some portions of bourgeoisie in capitalist states view world situation soberly-partly counterbalances militant tone of statement.

December 7-January 21, 1961: Bloc party plenums meet and approve Moscow statement: Czechoslovakia (7-8), Bulgaria (10), East Germany (15-17), Albania and Rumania (19-20), Hungary (21), North Korea (20-23), and Poland (January 20-21). North Vietnam announced January 12 that Vietnamese Workers' Party CC plenum had met and adopted resolution on Moscow conference but gave no data for the plenum. Plans to hold CC plenum of Outer Mongolian Workers' Revolutionary Party at end of January announced January 5 but to date no report of any such plenum has been issued. All plenums except Albanian, North Vietnamese, North Korean take pro-Soviet line on issues of the Sino-Soviet dispute. Other bloc commentary on Moscow conference follows same pattern. Report by East German Politburo member H. Matern to East German plenum (published December 23) frankly states that "in the beginning and as the discussions developed, there were differences of opinion" but that these were "clarified during frank discussions." East German Leader Ulbricht's report to plenum (published December 18) raises in argumentative fashion numerous doctrinal issues of dispute, citing "some comrades" as holding erroneous views and defending Soviet position in each case. In particular, be notes that "somebody" raised the question of "who is the one who determined what is the truth, and what complies with Marxism-Leninism." Ulbricht specifically attacks Albanian regime, noting that Albanian representative at conference developed a dogmatic and sectarian concept. Ulbricht also claims that Soviets requested that their party not be designated in the statement as "top leader."

December 10: "Appeal to the People's of the World "adopted by the Moscow Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties, published by Moscow. Of lesser importance than the statement, the appeal is intended primarily to set the propaganda line for Communist-front organizations.

December 15: Communist Chinese publication Red Flag, commenting on Moscow conference of Communist parties, contains near-public admission of con

tinuing disagreement with Moscow; states that Communist parties in Moscow arrived at a unanimous conclusion "on many important questions." Generally reiterates Communist China's militant line, and indirectly claims the conference statement was a justification and embodiment of thoughts earlier expressed by Mao and other Communist Chinese leaders, and rejects any notion of Communist Chinese concessions with assertion that implementation of statement of Moscow conference "is completely in harmony with the line and policy traditionally implemented by the CCP***."

December 19: CPSU Presidium Member Kozlov reports on Moscow conference at Moscow City Party aktiv.

December 24-29: CPSU leaders talk at regional party meetings throughout the Soviet Union on Moscow conference results. Soviet-published summaries of talks indicate that Sino-Soviet differences persist and that differences are delicate domestic political issue in the U.S.S.R.

December 31: Coverage of the Soviet Union in People's Daily dropped by onethird from 1959, perhaps as a result of the ideological and policy differences between the two Communist countries.

1961

January 6: Khrushchev, in speech to party ideologists on November 1960 conference of parties, although casting East-West relations in militant framework, essentially reiterates Soviet version of peaceful coexistence (to which Chinese Communists have objected) as basic line. Reaffirmation of Soviet position on issues prominent in Sino-Soviet dispute makes clear that Sino-Soviet disagreements persist.

January 18: CPSU CC plenum resolution on Moscow November Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties restates Soviet views on peaceful coexistence and the question of the preventability of war. States that CPSU will continue to pursue "Leninist foreign policy of peaceful coexistence," and that policy of peaceful coexistence "is the only correct and reasonable principle of international relations." Acknowledges revisionisms as "No. 1 danger" but, stresses that sectarianism and dogmatism can also become main danger if not combated consistently. Soviet Presidium Member Suslov, in report to plenum, echoes Khrushchev speech of January 6 (see above), although on question of improving relations with West he goes much further; i.e., expresses determination "to strengthen in every way *** personal contacts with the heads of state and governments of the capitalist contries." Chinese Communist Party Central Committee resolution diverges in some respect from Soviet CP resolution, particularly in militant attitude toward United States.

January 20: Albanian Party organ Zeri i Popullit article on struggle against revisionism contains a thinly veiled attack on Khrushchev; reiterates Albanian support of Communist Chinese positions in opposition to those of Moscow; and asserts Albania's intention to stoutly maintain its present stand.

January 21: Chinese Communist NCNA summary of Soviet January 18 CO resolution on Moscow conference (see above) omits several passages expressing Soviet views on issues in Sino-Soviet dispute, including resolution's concluding emphasis on high appraisal which Moscow conference made of CPSU's role and decisions of 20th CPSU in international Communist affairs.

January 22: People's Daily carries excerpts of CPSU resolution on Moscow meeting, which apparently were selected to exclude points disputed by the Chinese or not enthusiastically endorsed by them.

January 26: Pravda carries Chinese Communist January 18 CC resolution on Moscow conference in such a way as to imply full text published, but, in fact, several passages are omitted, most notably those attacking United States and one emphasizing adaptation of Communist doctrine to special conditions in China. January 31: Khrushchev's January 6 speech was belatedly released by Peking in long summaries which were apparently carefully selected and tailored to reflect Chinese views on Sino-Soviet differences.

February 8-March 27: Sino-Soviet negotiations on economic relations get little propaganda fanfare, and available media output tends to indicate that talks were not progressing smoothly, particularly when they were recessed for a time. April 8: Joint Sino-Soviet communique announces conclusion of long drawnout trade talks, and its text has undertones of Soviet condescension toward Chinese agricultural difficulties.

[U.S. Information Agency, Research and Reference Service. R-65-63 (AF). Apr. 16, 1963. This is a research report, not a statement of Agency policy]

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SINO-SOVIET CONTROVERSY-WITH A CHRONOLOGY

I. KEY ISSUES IN THE CONTROVERSY

Communist bloc disunity became apparent to the discerning in 1956 and flared up again in 1958 and in 1961, but differences between Moscow and Peking were partially concealed behind joint emphasis on the imperative need for bloc unity. However, evidence of open discord has multiplied rapidly in recent months. The Chinese, beset with domestic failures and irritated by the lack of Soviet assistance, claimed to see opportunities for world revolution sabotaged by Russian caution. Moscow, itself struggling to overcome domestic difficulties, fought shy of too many foreign entanglements and saw the Chinese as immature adventurists.

By the fall of 1962, two events pressed the two protagonists into open contention, reinforcing the unfavorable images each held of the other. In Cuba, the Soviet Union retreated under U.S. pressure, to the shrill cries of “Munich” from Peking's propaganda organs. Posing as champion of world peace, the Kremlin instead found itself called appeasor and coward. And along the Sino-Indian border, Khrushchev saw alarming confirmation that the "adventurist" Chinese might yet drag the world into an unwanted conflict.

For the Chinese, the same two events also confirmed their worst suspicions that the interests of world revolution were being abandoned to the selfish interests of a "have" nation which was increasingly identifying itself with Peking's enemies and with the forces favoring a status quo in the world.

Chinese comment throughout the fall of 1962 became increasingly detailed and vociferous as it cataloged the evidence of what it considered Soviet betrayal. Moscow, at first concerned with keeping the differences within the private confines of the Communist elites, soon found its hand forced. Kremlin spokemen carried the fight to the floor of Communist Party congresses in East Europe in November and December, where Chinese delegates were outnumbered, outvoted. and jeered.

By mid-December 1962, Peking especially had shaken off any reluctance to discuss the extent of the Sino-Soviet rift, of its ideological differences and of its charges of Soviet pressures to impose its will on other bloc members.

Khrushchev himself, speaking on Cuban developments before the Supreme Soviet in December 1962, opened a new stage in the bloc conflict by addressing himself directly to his Chinese adversaries, rather than continuing the indirec tion by which the major protagonists had hit at each other through Yugoslavia (in place of the Soviet Union) and Albania (in place of China). Moscow opened 1963 with a second address by Khrushchev, at the SED Party Congress, which focused on Soviet reasonableness and made Chinese intransigence the chief offender. Khrushchev signified his reasonableness by proposing an end to open polemices and a beginning of private comradely negotiations.

Peking, retorting with a rash of comment delineating the major points of difference in unheard-of detail, finally agreed. The matter rests for the moment.

PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE

As the arguments ebbed and flowed between Moscow and Peking, the dialectie centered about a series of interrelated points which quickly became the key issues in the controversy. Their prominence was even more apparent during the latter half of 1962. Central to these key issues was the policy of "peaceful coexistence," Khrushchev's favorite gambit in foreign relations, and the purported driving force in Moscow's handling of international affairs. "Peaceful coexistence"-not exactly friendship with the West, but not war either-was declared essential to the safe extension of Communist influence, according to Moscow. But for Peking, "peaceful coexistence" was a negative policy which passed up attractive opportunities to expand Communist influence and power

1 See "The Sino-Soviet Controversy: Key Issues and Chronology," R-40-61 (p. 367) for an earlier review.

rapidly throughout the world. Their arguments on the issue of "peaceful coexistence" have been expressed in the following manner :

A logical extension of the issue of "peaceful coexistence" is the more detailed subject of "negotiations". Obviously, if coexistence with the West was to have meaning and definition, negotiation with the West was essential. Moscow has, therefore, found itself defending the feasibility of negotiation and even temporary compromise in order to create the conditions necessary for coexistence to flourish. Peking, admitting the theoretical possibility of negotiations to achieve particular ends, has restricted the practical application to fewer conditions and has warned particularly against the danger that a policy favoring negotiations would surely weaken the fiber of revolutionary struggle movements. Moscow and Peking have expressed themselves in the following manner on the subject:

Soviet Position

We recognize the possibility and necessity of compromise in politics, and therefore seek a "mutually acceptable basis" for agreements with the West. Controversial issues between states must be solved by peaceful means, not by war, which can bring nothing but calamity to the people and is contrary to Marxism-Leninism.

Chinese Position

Overtures to the West dampen the revolutionary spirit everywhere. Negotiations are permissible, but little should be expected from them, and they can never take the place of struggle.

DISARMAMENT

Disarmament follows directly on the two preceding issues. Moscow has suggested that peaceful coexistence is made more durable by a willingness to negotiate on the subject of disarmament. In fact, according to Moscow, disarmament is perhaps the single most important issue of our time. Again, it is Peking which has taken a doctrinaire view of "imperialism" and declared the futility of expecting to coexist peacefully or negotiate sincerely on disarmament with the West. Moscow sees the possible economic savings as useful both at home and in the competition to influence the uncommitted world; Peking sees rather that the "illusion" of disarmament would weaken communism's bid for power elsewhere in the world.

Soviet Position

Chinese Position

Disarmament, the most pressing The destruction of imperialism is the problem of our time, is both necessary main problem. As long as imperialism and feasible. Regardless of concrete exists, disarmament is inconceivable; achievement, it works to the bloc's it is an illusion to think that the West propaganda advantage. Actual dis- would ever accept it. The issue is armament would release needed re- useful only to expose imperialist war sources for the bloc's competition with preparations, and it impedes the the West. It would aid the liberation liberation struggle. Colonialists would struggle, and would make funds avail- never free funds for the underdeveloped able for use in important areas, and areas, and militarists will dominate in this would strengthen the working the West until overthrown by violence. class. Disarmament would also weaken the influence of militarists in the West.