Secondly, so long as the war is a shooting war and not just a peacekeeping operation, I think there is no chance at all that the United Nations would undertake the responsibility for a shooting war. If there were a settlement; if there is a truce, cease-fire, and it was necessary to get-important to get some people in there to watch the cease-fire, then the United Nations might be able and willing to do that. You see, the Korean war was really a unique situation. That was a U.N. effort because the Soviet Union had walked out of the Security Council and it was possible for the United Nations to act without the Soviet veto. Otherwise there never would have been a U.N. effort as such in Korea. [Security deletion.] Secretary RUSK. U Thant has been in touch with this situation from time to time. He has been among the contacts to try to find out whether peaceful settlement is possible. That hasn't produced anything yet. Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Berry. Mr. BERRY. No questions. Secretary RUSK. In reference to the Sino-Soviet conflict, Mr. Chairman, let me just say on this point that you remember at the time we took the Gulf of Tonkin affair into the Security Council the Soviet representatives suggested that we invite Hanoi to the table. We said, "Fine. Sure. Let's invite them." We supported the Soviet request. Hanoi turned it down. "We are not coming to the Security Council. The U.N. has nothing to do with it." That is even though the Soviet Union made the suggestion in the first place. Mr. ZABLOCKI. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Mr. Monagan. Mr. MONAGAN. With reference to the Sino-Soviet dispute is there any opportunity for us to take some advantage from the dispute with reference to the Communist countries of Eastern Europe on the basis that this dispute makes them want to have a foothold in the West? The Czechs, for instance, are looking for trade opportunities. Can we put some conditions on granting those opportunities whereby they might be persuaded to do certain things; such as, discontinue the help that they are giving to subversion in Latin America? Secretary RUSK. I think one of the more pleasant effects of the Sino-Soviet dispute has been that the Eastern European countries have been able during this period to elbow a little more independence for themselves in the Communist world. [Security deletion.] This has made it possible for particularly the Western European countries to extend their relationships with the Eastern European countries. We have done that to a degree. Germany, for example, is able to get some trade agreements in Eastern Europe with a Berlin clause in them recognizing the Federal Republic's interest in the economic relations of Berlin with the rest. of the world. That was quite a development politically. But I don't believe that the traffic would bear too many conditions. [Security deletion.] There is great variety among the Eastern European countries on that point. I think it is something worth following up on. Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Derwinski. Mr. DERWINSKI. Mr. Secretary, you have used the analysis that the hard-core Communist would be supporting Peking and the more moderate type would be supporting Moscow. Then on this point Mr. Monagan raised of your possible strategy or program to expand our presence in the Eastern European satellites, could you not condition that to obtain concrete and specific adjustments from them in terms of their support of Cuba, support of the North Vietnamese, or even some of their more irritating domestic policies to which we might legitimately object? Secretary RUSK. I think the prospect now is, Mr. Derwinski, that the pace of improvement of relations with the smaller countries of Eastern Europe is going to be slowing down-at least during the southeast Asia crisis. [Security deletion.] Mr. DERWINSKI. Thank you. Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Culver. Mr. CULVER. No questions, Mr. Chairman. Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Fulton. Mr. FULTON. Mr. Secretary, the question comes up with the split. of Russia and China, what do you think is going to happen next in southeast Asia? Now what do we look to? When we turn the next page what is it, in your opinion? Secretary RUSK. I think the next page isn't yet turning. It is a little hard to see what is written on the other side. We do believe that the attacks in the north, plus the landing of the Marines at Da Nang, have posed for the other side at least a clearer signal than they have had that if they are going to continue on this business it is going to be a very tough business. [Security deletion.] Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. McVicker. Mr. McVICKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, along the same line, during the hearings, witnesses that we have heard on this question have made one theme perfectly clear: that U.S. firmness has helped to widen the breach between the two capitals, and, consequently, U.S. policy should be directed in terms of following up whatever advantages there are to us in dealing firmly to counter Soviet-Sino dissensions as they are spreading throughout the world. Yet you have stated basically our policy is, not knowing where these rifts maybe next-our policy must be on one hand, not refusing to recognize the fact of the rift, but at the same time not trying to take positive advantage of the rifts between the two capitals. Secretary RUSK. [Security deletion.] Let me point out one thing. sir, that I think is important. To the extent that the Soviet Union has moved somewhat closer to peaceful coexistence, this did not turn upon an agreement with the Soviet Union. This flowed from a total effort in the West, particularly in the defense field, which in the United States alone called for $650 billion over and above the level of defense expenditures that we were making in 1947. In other words, it took us $650 billion of defense effort to make it clear to the Soviet Union that pressures against Western Europe were not going to succeed, and that threatening war was not going to sueceed. Peiping has not really had to face up to that yet in a big way. This is one of the key issues here in southeast Asia. I don't think it will be a $650 billion requirement, but Peiping has not yet learned what the Soviet Union has learned, that military pressures aren't on unless you are prepared to stake the life of your country. Mr. McVICKER. The $650 billion figure? Secretary RUSK. We came very close to a $10 billion defense budget in 1947 as a sort of normal postwar, peacetime budget. The additions to that since 1947 because of Stalin's attitude on Berlin, and a whole series of other things, has amounted to a total of $650 billion. On the two points, Mr. Gross, we don't have any confirmation that Soviet ships have brought any arms to North Vietnam or any information that SAMS have yet been furnished. All our indications are to the opposite, that they are not there on that particular point. On the other point, Mrs. Kelly, on Vietnam alone our economic aid. since about 1955 has been $2,392 million. [Security deletion.] Even in Vietnam our economic assistance has been far more important than our military assistance. Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Rosenthal. Mr. ROSENTHAL. Mr. Secretary, yesterday at lunch the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee suggested to some of us that it might be wiser, might have been wiser if we had participated in letting elections go in South Vietnam and getting a socialistic, YugoslavRumanian type state rather than trying to prop up a government that appeared to be unprofitable and that in the long run we would be better off with that kind of state there than an arena where China might eventually come in. Mr. ROSENTHAL. Would you care to comment? Secretary RUSK. [Security deletion.] The distinguished Senator and I have talked about this on a number of occasions. That could have been repeated time after time, Greece, Iran, Malaya, not just southeast Asia. In other words, the whole map could, country by country, be rolled up with those who would not be friendly to the United States. Then I think we would be in a very, very serious position and guaranteed that there would be a big and catastrophic war. This is the thing that bothers me about a course of aggression that is allowed to proceed unchecked. It doesn't make a peace. It means that the necessity for an even larger fight is even more firmly fixed somewhere on the horizon because of the appetites developed by the other side. Mr. ZABLOCKI. Did I omit anybody present in not calling upon them? Mr. Chairman? Chairman MORGAN. I thought you missed Mr. Whalley. Mr. ZABLOCKI. I asked Mr. Whalley. Mr. Secretary, there is about 30 seconds left and I have one brief question. Mr. Secretary, as China builds a nuclear arsenal the boundary disputes between Moscow and Peiping will likely lose their secondary importance and become a primary issue. This happened to be the view of the witnesses before our subcommittee. Do you agree? In that event what would our role then be? Secretary RUSK. I think that is some time off in terms of precipitating that boundary issue [security deletion.] I don't believe that is an operational question for a long, long time to come. 45-003-65--26 Mr. ZABLOCKI. If I might add along the same vein to the boundary. The consensus of the public interest that U.S. recognition of Outer Mongolia would be in our advantage. Is it the intention of the Executive branch to advise the Congress, or ask for any legislation with respect to this matter? Secretary RUSK. No. Recognition does not require legislation although we consult with the committees before any action of that sort is taken. [Security deletion.] We will be in consultation with the committee before taking such a step. Mr. ZABLOCKI. I am sure all of the members join with me in thanking you for taking of your valuable time, particularly at this time when you have so many other critical problems. The subcommittee stands adjourned. (Whereupon, at 4:01 p.m. the subcommittee adjourned.) APPENDIX [U.S. Information Agency, Office of Research and Reference Service. R-40-61. July 25, 1961. This report is not a statement of USIA policy] THE SINO-SOVIET CONTROVERSY: KEY ISSUES AND CHRONOLOGY I. INTRODUCTION The past 3 years have seen increasing signs of disunity within the Communist bloc, brought about principally by differing tactics advanced by the Soviet Union and Communist China. Both major partners in the Communist world look forward to the overthrow of governments of the free world and to the worldwide extension of Communist rule, but they are disagreeing more openly on the tactics necessary to achieve these common ends. Their differences, expressed through the special ideological jargon unique to the mistique of communism, have spread to mutual criticism of foreign policies and of important domestic programs and to competition for support from other Communist parties. The following sections provide a brief rundown of the major opposing positions adopted by Moscow and Peking in their running dispute and list the chronological development of the dispute since 1958. The importance of the dispute for careful observers of international developments is attested to by the list of subjects over which it has ranged i.e., the prospects of war, negotiations, coexistence, and revolution, as well as control of the international Communist movement. Typically, the argument has been staged through leading articles in Communist journals and newspapers, in speeches by the most prominent spokesmen in both Communist China and the Soviet Union, as well as in special meetings of leading party officials from all over the world. The controversy has ebbed or risen as it has been joined on critical issues or allowed to subside with only occasional, guarded references. Attention is currently focused on the domestic problems, particularly agricultural, which have dominated news from Communist China and elsewhere in the bloc, and on the effect these problems will have on the relations between Peking and Moscow. Available reports this spring noted long-drawn-out economic talks, but the final communique contained no reference to major Soviet assistance to alleviate Peking's food shortage. There are no good indicators that the differences have been resolved, and the future course of the dispute toward resolution, further exacerbation or as a source of confined tension between the two Communist partners has still to be determined. II. KEY ISSUES IN THE CONTROVERSY Chinese Position 1. Noninevitability of War The strength of the bloc, abetted by While the West is currently deterred the world's peace forces, makes a West- from war, it is actively preparing for ern-initiated war a diminishing possi- it. Imperialism is an inevitable source bility. Thus even while imperialism of wars. The question of whether war continues to exist, there is an increas- can be averted refers primarily to world ing possibility of excluding wars of all war. kinds. 367 |