[Inclosure 3 in No. 874.-Telegram.] Mr. Phelps to Mr. Bayard. LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES, Mr. Phelps informs Mr. Bayard of the reception of a reply from Lord Salisbury in the Sackville case. No. 893.] No. 16. Mr. Phelps to Mr. Bayard. [Extract.] LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES, London, January 12, 1889. (Received January 22.) SIR Referring to previous correspondence with respect to the ds missal of Lord Sackville, the late British minister at Washington, i have the honor to inclose herewith the official correspondence on the subject issued by Her Majesty's Government to Parliament, and a co of an article in this day's Morning Post. I have, etc., [Inclosure 1 in No. 893.] E. J. PHELPS LORD SACKVILLE AND THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT. [From the London Morning Post, Saturday, January 12, 1889.J Further correspondence respecting the demand of the United States Government for the recall of Lord Sackville was issued yesterday. The facts of the case are a ready well known, but the principle claimed by the Government of the United States is controverted by the Marquis of Salisbury in his dispatch of the 24th ultimo. He observes that the judgment of Her Majesty's Government on the conduct of Lord Sackville has ceased to be of any importance, as the President has already sent to him his passports, and adds: "In your letter under reply you explain the course thus pursued by observing: 'In asking from Her Majesty's Government the recall or withdrawal of its minister upe a representation of the general purport of the letter and statements above mentione the Government of the United States assumed that such request would be sufficiea: for that purpose, whatever consideration the reasons for it might afterwards demand or receive. It was believed that the acceptance or retention of a minister was a question solely to be determined either with or without the assignment of reasons by the government to which he was accredited.' The general principles admitted by the practice of nations upon this matter are of more importance than the particular case in reference to which the above doctrine is laid down. Her Majesty's Govern ment are unable to assent to the view of international usage which you have hereexpressed. It is, of course, open to any government, on its own responsibility, suddenly to terminate its diplomatic relations with any other state, or with any particular minister of any other state. But it has no claim to demand that the other state stai make itself the instrument of that proceeding, or concur in it, unless that state is satisfied by reasons duly produced of the justice of the grounds on which the demand is made. The principles which govern international relations on this subjec appear to Her Majesty's Government to have been accurately laid down by Lord Palmerston on the occasion of Sir Henry Bulwer's sudden dismissal from the court of Madrid in 1848: "The Duke of Sotomayor, in treating of that matter, seems to argue as if every government was entitled to obtain the recall of any foreign minister whenever, for reasons of its own, it might wish that he should be removed; but this is a doctrine to which I can by no means assent. It is quite true, as said by the Duke of Soto * See Appendix. mayor, that the law of nations and international usage may permit a government to make such a demand; but the law of nations and international usage also entitle the government to whom such a request may be preferred to decline to comply with it. I do not mean to say that if a foreign government is able to state to the Government of Her Majesty grave and weighty reasons why the British minister accredited to such government should be removed, Her Majesty's Government would not feel it to be their duty to take such representations into their serious consideration and to weigh them with all the attention which they might deserve. But it must rest with the British Government in such a case to determine whether there is or is not any just cause of complaint against the British diplomatic agent, and whether the dignity and interests of Great Britain would be best consulted by withdrawing him or maintaining him at his post."" (Viscount Palmerston to Señor Isturiz, June 12, 1848.) [Inclosure 2 in No. 893.-Editorial in the London Morning Post, Saturday, January 12, 1889.] The correspondence between Lord Salisbury and Mr. Phelps relative to the peremptory dismissal of Lord Sackville from Washington throws considerable light upon this curious episode in the history of diplomacy. We have never expressed the view that the British minister could be held guiltless of an indiscretion by writing the letter which was the source of the disturbance or of emphasizing his first mistake by consenting to be interviewed by a member of the American press. But having candidly admitted this, we find little cause for surprise in the disinclination of Lord Salisbury to accept without demur the subsequent proceedings of the United States Government. The whole of the correspondence now before us is inspired by a courteous and conciliatory spirit, and it would be misplaced to comment upon it in any spirit of acrimony. Nevertheless, it must be observed that the Presidential exigencies shine clearly through all the proceedings of Mr. Bayard subsequent to Lord Sackville's letter, and are not rendered less distinct by the somewhat naïve admission of Mr. Phelps with respect to the dismissal of the accredited ministers of friendly states. "It was believed," says Mr. Phelps, "that the acceptance or retention of a minister was a question solely to be determined, either with or without the assignment-of reasons, by the government to which he was accredited, and the Government of the United States was not, therefore, prepared for your lordship's intimation that particulars of the language complained of should be furnished, and that the action of Her Majesty's Government would await the reception of it and the hearing accorded to the minister in regard to it." With respect to this remarkable admission it can only be observed that, assuming the genuine surprise of the American Government, the diplomats of the United States must possess a somewhat elementary acquaintance with the recognized text-books of international law on the questions of the rights of ambassadors. The precedents concerning the treatment of legations are among the most carefully worked out points in the subject; a fact which is only to be expected when the historic proneness of nations to take offense is considered. The absolutely unusual character of summary proceedings may be recognized by any one who notices the care with which Grotius admits an exception to the rules which dictate extraordinary courtesy to an ambassador or minister. The first of modern international lawyers draws the line at self-defense. A state, he says, must resist violence offered by the representative of another state, but must distinguish this from any question of punishment. No question of this kind arose, so far as we remember, between 1718 and 1848, and even before the former date the cases of the Bishop of Ross, in the days of Elizabeth, and of the Russian ambassador to the court of St. James, in the reign of Anne, stand out as solitary exceptions to the general courtesy everywhere enforced. In 1718 Gyllenburg, the ambassador of Sweden, was rightly arrested for joining in a plot against George I, and, short of some absolute treason of this kind against the state to which he was accredited, no minister, with the exception of Lord Dalling and Bulwer in 1848, at Madrid, has received the summary notice to quit which was sent to Lord Sackville. It is the Madrid incident, in fact, which alone can furnish a direct precedent for this case, and to the words of Lord Palmerston the present prime minister very rightly refers the American Government. Lord Dalling and Bulwer, as every one will remember, was suspected of encouraging the national disaffection then rife in Spain against the Government of Isabella II, and he was peremptorily handed his passports. Lord Palmerston then complained that the Duke of Sotomayor, "in treating of that matter, seemed to argue as if every government was entitled to recall any foreign minister whenever, for reasons of its own, it might wish that he should be removed." And he goes on to deny utterly the justice of any such doctrine. It is quite true, he says, that any government is entitled to demand the withdrawal of a minister whose presence is no longer desired, but it is equally permitted by the same international usage for the nation thus addressed to refuse a compliance with the request. It is evident H. Ex. 1, pt. 1--108 that to force such an alternative upon a friendly state would be to ignore all the loopholes of diplomacy and to produce very strained relations, and therefore the wisdom of the law of nations has decided that a complaint of this kind should be made the subject of mutual inquiry and negotiation between the parties concerned. As Lord Palmerston said in the Madrid case, it must then ultimately rest with the government of the minister whose conduct is impugned to decide whether to comply with the request or to abide by the consequences of a refusal. Now, it must be particnlarly observed that this doctrine, so far from being the invention of Lord Palmerston, had been from the first laid down by the international law writers with a clearness which accounts for the rarity of its infraction. The celebrated jurist, Wheaton, who it may be remarked was the minister of the United States to the court of Prussia, and is understood to be largely studied by the diplomatists of his native country, is particularly explicit upon this subject. Except in cases affecting "the existence and safety" of the state to which foreign representatives are accredited, Wheaton states as the general rule that "it appears to be the established usage of nations to request their recall by their own sovereign which, if unreasonably refused by him, would unquestionably authorize the offended state to send away the offender." Subsequently, as if to strengthen this strong statement of the agreement between civilized nations, Wheaton adds, "the anomalous exceptions to the general rule resolve themselves into the permanent right of self-preservation and necessity." Yet, with all this mass of precedent and uncontroverted statement of usage open to their inspection, President Cleveland and Mr. Bayard believed that it rested solely with them to put the greatest of international slights on the friendly "representative of Her Britannic Majesty." It will be observed that the case of Lord Sackville is not even on all-fours with that of Lord Dalling in respect to the gravity of the offense lodged against b There seems to have been a general belief at Madrid in the complicity of the Engist minister in a movement which satisfied the rule of Grotius and Wheaton and of every other international jurist that "the safety and existence of the state" must be in question in order to justify peremptory measures. But all that is alleged against Lord Sackville is an inconvenient expression of his opinion on the puzzling attitude of the Democratic party with regard to the fisheries treaty; moreover, Mr. Bayard evidently accepted his original disclaimer, and no attempt is made in the letter of Mr. Phelps to get away from the awkward charge of Lord Sackville that "in the end the exigencies of the campaign and the necessity of gaining the Irish vote were paramount." These are poor grounds on which to have offered to the British Empire a slight historically identified with times which we now regard as semi-barbaric. Lotu Salisbury is too conscious of his vast responsibilities to identify the American nation with the idiosyncracies of its wire-pullers, and he makes no irritating demand for the redress which, unless international comity be a farce, might be considered as fair due. But in drawing the attention of the United States Government to the norms! usages of diplomacy, in declining to discuss their electoral peculiarities and in refi ing to give, after the event, the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, which, by every rule of states in amity, should have been requested beforehand, Lord Sals bury has acted with a due regard to the national diguity. Lord Sackville's indiscre tion offers no condonation of Mr. Bayard's neglect of decent international observ ance, and Great Britain can easily afford to accept the verdict of the civilized world as against a few American politicians without abating in any way her cordial feeling to the great American people. No. 901.] No. 17. Mr. Phelps to Mr. Bayard. LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES, London, January 16, 1889. (Received January 23. SIR: With reference to previous correspondence on the subject of Lord Sackville's dismissal, and particularly to my dispatch numbered 893, of 12th instant, I have the honor to inclose leading articles from the Times and Daily News newspapers, respecting the correspondence published by Her Majesty's Government, copies of which have been forwarded to you. I have, etc., E. J. PHELPS. [Inclosure 1 in No. 901.-Editorial from the London Times, Tuesday, January 15, 1889.] The publication of the correspondence between the Governments of the United States and Great Britain on the dismissal of Lord Sackville marks, it may be hoped, the close of a troublesome diplomatic incident. Mr. Cleveland's administration has, it is to be presumed, said its last word, and, in any case, Lord Salisbury can have nothing to add to his conclusive letter of December 24. For the present the secretary of the British legation in charge is abundantly competent to transact any business which is likely to arise out of the relations between the two countries. In England the best disposition exists to avoid any complication which might shorten the sojourn here of a representative American so popular and respected as is Mr. Phelps. When the new President is installed at Washington the United States legation in London will have a fresh chief. The opportunity will no doubt be taken to fill the corresponding British post. On both sides of the Atlantic there is a sincere desire to forget a dispute trivial in its origin and absurd in its details. All sound American opinion from the first was keenly ashamed of the trap laid by jobbing partisans for Lord Sackville's ingennous trustfulness. It was ashained of the exaggerated importance attached to the disclosure of his personal views upon American politics. It was ashamed, most of all, of the eagerness of the President and his Cabinet to submit to the dictation of party wire-pullers and treat a foreigner's error as if it were a treason. Englishmen, in their turn, have no cause to reflect with pleasure on the conduct of their representative. A diplomatist ought not merely to have scented the snare in virtue of his professional training, but to have been guarded by an intuitive feeling of the obligations of his position from the least temptation to let himself be caught by it. No extraordinary sagacity is needed to warn an envoy that it is not his province to tell expatriated fellow-countrymen how they should use their rights of citizenship in a new land. He increased the offense by the indiscreet endeavor to excuse himself before a self-constituted native tribunal, to which it was not for him to render an account. Had he cut the knot by soliciting Lord Salisbury's leave to resign forthwith he might perhaps have acted most judiciously. But nothing was done at the time by any body concerned which was precisely appropriate. Nothing can now be done to correct what was then done wrong. The only remaining expedient is to pass a general act of oblivion and start afresh. There is little fear that any future British representative's guilelessness will give occasion to disinter the matter as a precedent. The affair itself is already by-gone and dead. A principle enunciated by Mr. Phelps as a guide for the two Governments in dealing with it is, as Lord Salisbury has said, of more permanent importance. Lord Salisbury, it will be remembered, replied to the original request for the withdrawal of Lord Sackville by asking for particulars. He intimated that when they had been furnished and the minister had been afforded an opportunity of explanation, the Queen's Government would return a definite answer. This, neither in practice nor in theory, satisfied the American Government. Mr. Phelps, acting doubtless on instructions, in his letter of December 4 lays it down as self-evident that the demand of the recall upon a general statement was sufficient, whatever consideration the reasons for it might afterwards require or receive. The notification of the general statement itself, it is implied, was a piece of courtesy rather than of international necessity. Mr. Phelps propounds broadly that "the acceptance or retention of a minister is a question solely to be determined, with or without the assignment of reasons, by the government to which he is accredited." By this he manifestly means that it is the right of the government to which he is accredited to decide, and the duty of the government which accredits to act upon the decision. Lord Salisbury challenges the proposition in its obvious signification. He takes his stand upon the distinction sharply drawn by Lord Palmerston in 1848 on Sir Henry Bulwer's dismissal from the court of Madrid. Every sovereign state is entitled to determine whether it shall demand the recall of a foreign minister accredited to it. If the request be supported by “grave and weighty reasons,” it is the plain duty of the sovereign state which accredits him to consider the reasons, and if they seem adequate, to defer to them. By the law of nations the government to which the minister is sent may specify any grounds for his removal. By the same law it rests with the government which sent him to consider and decide upon their sufficiency. Lord Salisbury is willing to go a step further, as Lord Palmerston would have been, had the point been urged. He grants the authority of any government, under the law of nations, to terminate suddenly, on its own responsibility, with or without reasons, as Mr. Phelps would say, its diplomatic relations with any other state, or with a particnlar minister of any other state. But he claims an equivalent liberty for such other state to refuse to "make itself the instrument of the proceeding or concur in it, unless it be satisfied by reasons duly produced of the justice of the grounds on which the demand is made." The theory, as thus expounded and illustrated, must command general assent. It is perfectly intelligible and it is universally applicable. Each state is left free to act for itself within its own sphere. If it be discontented with the demeanor of a foreign minister its natural course is to bring forward its complaint in a friendly way. A friendly government will entertain the representation in the same spirit. No government which does not want to pick a quarrel will insist upon keeping a diplomatist where, by his own fault or not, he can not discharge his functions successfully. Should it think the alleged grievances petty and imaginary, or manufactured for purposes extraneous to the question of the envoy's good faith and honor, it can not fairly be expected to cast an unjust slur on the professional reputation of its servant. On the other hand, judgments and standards in subjects of the sort will often differ. Motives, "not of an international character," as Lord Salisbury expresses it, may palliate aa ebullition of ill-temper against an envoy which to his own government appears preposterous. If the government to which he is accredited act upon the local emotion, it must itself undertake the moral liability. All which the other government can do, benevolently as it may be disposed, is to adopt a neutral and reserved attitude. That is exactly the conduct which the British Government has been and is pursuing. It recognizes that the United States Government might, if it pleased, have sent Lord Sackville his passports without any prior communication with his Government, though that Government could not but have retaliated in kind. It recognizes that the American Government had the right to choose its own mode of explaining its act, if it gave any explanation. It is willing to believe that the explanation as tendered seemed satisfactory to President Cleveland and his advisers. Accordingly, it has exhibited no official resentment, though it must have felt considerable surprise at "a striking departure from the circumspect and deliberate procedure by which in sch cases it is the usage of friendly states to mark their consideration for each other' It is able and ready to appreciate the very unfortunate bearing of the accident of its representative's awkward innocence upon an electoral crisis, and to forgive the petulance of the sufferers. At the same time it could not have visited upon the head of an honest public servant all the indirect consequences to the American Democratic party of his small blunder without a glaring violation of the equity which, like charty, should begin at home. Americans are not so unreasonable as to insist, when the delusion has served its turn, not only upon seeing mole-hills as mountains, but that Englishmen should borrow their spectacles to discern the enormity of the scene. [Inclosure 2 in No. 901.-Editorial from the London Daily News, Monday, January 14, 189.) LORD SACKVILLE AND THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT. The further correspondence respecting the demand for Lord Sackville's recall, which has just been published, practically concludes with a weighty and important dispatch addressed by Lord Salisbury to Mr. Phelps. Lord Salisbury argues with consideratie force, in opposition to the American minister, that a foreign government can not require as a matter of right the withdrawal of a British representative who may have made himself obnoxious in the country where he is officially residing. To this comm tention Mr. Bayard has not yet made any reply, and since his own term of ofhe s rapidly drawing to a close as the inauguration of General Harrison approaches i seems highly probable that no reply will ever be made. The views of the An erran Secretary of State and of President Cleveland are sufficiently expressed by Mr. Pleas in a single sentence. "It was believed," he says, referring to the request made or Mr. Bayard for Lord Sackville's removal--"it was believed that the acceptance a retention of a minister was a question solely to be determined, either with or wit oat the assignment of reasons, by the government to which he was accredited.” Prt in the absolute and unqualified form, the proposition is no doubt too broad, and Lord S. bury more correctly lays down the international understanding on the subject:** is, of course, open," he says, "to any government, on its own responsibility, sudden' to terminate its diplomatic relations with any other state, or with any particular minister of any other state. But it has no claim to demand that the other state sasi make itself the instrument of that proceeding or concur in it, unless that state is salistied by reasons duly produced of the grounds on which the demand is made.' We take this to be the proper usage in the matter, and we should be much surprised f Mr. Bayard or his successor were seriously to dispute it. An ambassador or már se is the servant of the sovereign or President who appoints him and by whom a ore can be cashiered. He is responsible for his conduct to his official superiors at bezand not to the authorities with whom he negotiates. If they have any coreĮ against him, they should make it not to him, but to those under whom he acts, suspension of diplomatic intercourse to which Lord Salisbury alludes does not it ver or necessarily lead to a declaration of war. President Cleveland might undoubd'y if he had thought fit, have refused to hold any further communication with Lard Sackville, and have recalled Mr. Phelps from London. This would have been at serious step, and more likely to cause inischief, than the step which he actually took |