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Having described the principal items on the agenda, I would now like to set down for you our judgment as to the accomplishments which were achieved. First and foremost, we succeeded in producing a resolution on the basis of the overall analysis which was undertaken, which in our view protected the essentials of the basic framework of the Commission. Its Terms of Reference were satisfactorily preserved so that the Commission maintains its capacity, as it has always done, to deal with the whole range of human rights, civil and political and economic, social and cultural. The efforts of some delegations' to shift the focus to rights which they call collective rights were unsuccessful. The resolution which was adopted by consensus under this item contained important provisions in the area of coordination of the total human rights effort in the United Nations system, provided for a reasonable enlargement of the Commission, provided for longer sessions of the Commission as well as for the possible establishment of intersessional machinery to function in emergency situations, and for extended annual sessions of the Subcommission. The important proposal for a High Commissioner for Human Rights, which has for many years been strongly favored by the United States Government, was discussed but no agreement was reached. This means that further efforts to promote this proposal in the United Nations General Assembly may be carried forward, since the proposal is before the General Assembly for final decision, it having already been once endorsed by the Commission on Human Rights a number of years ago.

A serious and substantial beginning was achieved in the drafting of a Convention Against Torture. We were encouraged by the workman-like attitude on the part of all delegations as well as by the constructive discussion which took place on the key measures of implementation of such a Convention.

Further progress was achieved in strengthening the procedures for dealing with country situations concerning consistent patterns of gross violations of human rights. These procedures, which were authorized a number of years ago with the strong support of the United States, are laid down in ECOSOC Resolution 1503. They use as their basis the mass of evidentiary material which is submitted to the United Nations from private sources including, very importantly, the nongovernmental organizations. These procedures are confidential and therefore I cannot describe the developments which took place under them in detail. Suffice it to say that the Commission acted upon serious human rights situations in the following countries: Bolivia, Burma, Ethiopia, Malawi, Paraguay, Republic of Korea, Uruguay, Indonesia, Uganda and Equatorial Guinea. In the case of the latter, an important precedent was set in that for the first time the discussion was moved out of the confidential setting. This shift from confidential to public discussion represents one of the sanctions available to the Commission in these types of cases.

Progress in drafting a Declaration on Religious Intolerance moved forward through the adoption of three substantive articles. Compared to previous sessions, this was an unusual development in that, finally, the delaying tactics of those delegations opposed in principle to the drafting of such a Declaration were successfully countered.

A decision to maintain a watching brief on the human rights situation in Chile was achieved. The Commission's Ad Hoc Working Group was abolished and in its place agreement was reached upon the establishment of a Special Rapporteur. The serious problem of disappeared persons in Chile was also addressed through the choice of two experts who have been given the task of looking into that situation and reporting upon it to the next General Assembly.

In the discussion of the Report of the Subcommission on Discrimination and Minorities, unusual attention was directed to one aspect of the Subcommission's work, namely, a report which had been in preparation for a number of years on the subject of genocide. The discussion centered upon the historical analysis section of this report and the extent to which specific instances of genocide in the past should be described. Our delegation spoke out against the deletion from the report of a paragraph, which had appeared in an earlier progress report, relating to the instance of the Armenian massacres.

Finally, satisfactory progress was achieved in furthering Commission encouragement of the establishment within Member States of national institutions for the promotion of human rights.

This record of accomplishment, while in my view an impressive one, does not deal with the whole story. There were serious omissions and shortcomings. The principal one was the failure of the Commission to deal with the problem of

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human rights in Democratic Kampuchea. The United States Delegation played a strong role in urging such consideration on the basis of the mass of evidentiary material which had been gathered at the request of the Commission when this subject was first raised last year. Unfortunately, because of the political events which have occurred in that country, the majority of the members of the Commission, principally the Third World countries, shied away from taking positions on the question and instead the Commission adopted the Third World proposal that the issue be put off until next year. There was also an unfortunate failure to address squarely the serious human rights problem of disappeared persons. This problem was addressed in the context of the human rights situation in Chile, but the United States Delegation had hoped for an overall approach which would have reflected a proper concern with the startling fact that disappeared persons is a major human rights problem area in a number of other countries in South America and in other regions of the world.

Finally, in the general debate which annually takes place under the agenda item dealing with human rights violations, the United States Delegation delivered a major statement constituting an overview of the human rights situation as it exists in the world today. In this overview, we noted particularly the importance of the Helsinki Accords and their implementation. In the United States statement were included the names of 22 Soviet monitors of these Accords.

In summary, it is difficult to state specific conclusions about the effect which the last session of the Commission had upon the state of human rights throughout the world. It is fair to say that the Commission does carry out a necessary role in that, through its discussions, attention is focused on human rights problems. This attention means discussion and publicity which ultimately are the chief weapons the United Nations possesses in bringing its influence to bear in the direction of improvement of human rights problem areas. Progress must necessarily be slow and uncertain, but there is no alternative but to keep trying. The ideals and historical principles upon which the United States Government is based require that we give our best efforts in the United Nations to supporting programs and actions by that Organization to achieve the Charter goal of encouraging greater respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.

Mr. BONKER. Congressman Buchanan raised some concerns that I think would be of interest to the subcommittee. As we proceed with an overall review of U.S. human rights policies, we will be looking into the lack of definition of our policy, and lack of implementation of those policies in such forums as the U.N. Commission.

The concern that Congressman Buchanan raised with a specific case involving the resolutions on Iran's policy of oil shipments to South Africa, I think, represents a classic problem with respect to a nondefinitional case of human rights issues and being faced with a series of votes as to how we line up in condemning or congratulating a country for its policies with respect to South Africa.

It also hints of the difficulty in trying to communicate between the State Department and our official human rights policy and for someone who is in the field, such as yourself, and must vote not only on the substantive issue but a variety of procedural issues as well.

He also touched upon the need to stay with the consensus from time to time as it relates to U.S. allies and their votes on human rights issues.

Could you share with the subcommittee, Mr. Mezvinsky, how your position evolved on this issue and the relationship you had with the State Department and what ultimately guided your final vote on the resolution?

Mr. MEZVINSKY. On that particular resolution, specifically with Iran-and maybe I should just quickly point out that generally the policy in terms of the Commission and how it is guided, it comes out of the Bureau for which you have the oversight function, that is the IO Bureau and the Assistant Secretary involved there and the Deputy

Assistant Secretary, whose focus is primarily human rights, so you have the Assistant Secretary, in this case Mr. Maynes, and the Deputy Assistant Secretary in this case would be Mr. George Dalley, who would have the function.

Of course, Warren Hewitt is involved from the Office of Human Rights in terms of looking at these measures and trying to guide them and then, of course, I am the delegate there in Geneva, so the process goes that way.

Then, if there is any conflict between the Bureaus, between the Humanitarian Affairs Bureau and some of the regional bureaus, it will then go up to Mr. Christopher. If it is a White House question, if it reaches that level, it can go to the National Security Council and the President.

Mr. BONKER. How do you ever get a decision in time to vote?

Mr. MEZVINSKY. Well, most of these issues we know about ahead of time and there is a process of cable traffic where you send back the resolutions. You send back the particular language. Everyone has a chance to look at that. You make recommendations yourself as to what we think the position is as a reasonable position. You discuss that. It is discussed in the Department and a decision is made, which is the U.S. position in terms of our vote.

Specifically on the matter at hand, as to the Iranian question, that resolution or that particular item went through several phases, as Congressman Buchanan pointed out. The first phase was the congratulatory words or language congratulating Iran for the cutoff of oil. The problem was that it just was not tied to Iran. As you know, the question was also tied to cutting off oil to the State of Israel. It was not just isolated. Explicitly, it was South Africa. Implicitly, as pointed out by the main sponsor of that was the most critical and the one who let it move to counter the positive steps that were taken at Camp David.

So it was not explicitly stated regarding Israel; it was clearly implicitly stated.

They then changed the language somewhat to try to improve upon it so that it was not

Mr. BONKER. Who was its principal sponsor?

Mr. MEZVINSKY. The principal sponsor was Syria, and Syria coupled with Iraq were the two main countries. But Syria in particular and the Ambassador that serves there in Geneva was the one who was the main originator of this and who was the main sponsor. They then tried to, and did to some extent, clean up some of the language. At the same time that this was going on, we had discussions as to whether or not we would get an agreement between Israel and Egypt, a very sensitive nerve. At the same time, we had our Namibia discussion going on in terms of South Africa and whether or not they were at all responsive.

That is some of the background.

The language was somewhat changed. The problem of the Mideast talks was still going on. The implicit nature of the criticism over the State of Israel and the cutoff of oil was there. The condemnation of Israel for Zionist activities, the recalling of Resolution 3379, equating Zionism and racism, was all implicit. It all came through this.

Based on that factor, our final decision was yes, we would take a position that was alone. And it was alone; we voted no. We were also alone, I might point out, in terms of our initially saying we would not participate in a world conference on racism that equated Zionism and racism.

There are times when we are alone. The question Congressman Buchanan raised is a significant one and one that we should not dismiss. Does our being alone on certain issues destroy our effectiveness, or hurt our effectiveness, or undermine our position on other issues? I do not think there is an easy answer to that. It may have some effect. Did it affect us on other issues in terms of the Human Rights Commission? Well, on the question that I know he was interested in, specifically the Helsinki monitors, I do not view that that undermined our position. It just was clear that other countries do not want to be up front on that. The European, Western view toward human rights discussions goes back more to our policy on human rights in the past. We should be more quiet. It should be a quiet sort of diplomatic effort. We should not be as vocal. We should not be as open on human rights.

The policy has changed. I think the Congress, to a great extent, as you know, has been in the forefront of that change.

The European view of how we should handle human rights is not unique to the Human Rights Commission. It shows itself at what happened at Belgrade in terms of the Helsinki accords, and it is of a somewhat different interpretation.

I do not think it totally undermined our position. I do not think it affected our ability to deal with other issues, but we should not dismiss the fact that when we are isolated, it does affect us and South Africa specifically. That is a sensitive nerve.

To be effective in a Human Rights Commission, it is not enough for the United States to carry a big stick and to always be the one up front and be the bully on human rights. What we should be doing is acting as a catalyst, encouraging other countries, specifically Third World countries, to face up to it.

That is where the sensitive nerve comes. They would hope that we would respond on South Africa in a manner that would be stronger than what they are perceiving now.

Our policy has been stated. I do not have to go into that. There are those differences. The degree as to how it affects our policy in terms of other countries, I think, is still an open ended question. I do not think we are totally undermined, but it does affect us in terms. of some substantive issues.

I do not think it hurt us on the issues I mentioned in the preceding part of my statement, but we should not totally dismiss it. We should also acknowledge that there will be some issues where we have to stand up and be alone, and if it meant on this question of Iran, which implicitly involves the State of Israel, bringing in the Zionism-racism issue, yes we were alone in that case. It may not be totally understood, but there were other reasons for it.

Mr. BONKER. When you say the reference to Israel was implicit, do you mean the discussion that precipitated the vote was brought out by delegates, or was there something in the language that made it implicit?

Mr. MEZVINSKY. Yes; first of all, we knew at the same time, or around the same time that this issue was raised, the new government of Iran said they would cut off oil shipments. They mentioned South Africa and they mentioned Israel, so the statement was made there. The reason that the first language was used was because it was congratulatory, being expressed by the U.N. Human Rights Commission as evidenced by the Syrian delegate that we should congratulate them. What was very interesting; they knew the sensitivity from the West. They did not tie Israel to the actual action taken by the Human Rights Commission. They set its guidelines simply to South Africa.

Yes, there was continued mention of the State of Israel by the main sponsors throughout, and that was one of the reasons-that may not mean that we could not have abstained, which is what Congressman Buchanan mentioned, but I think on this issue in terms of the sensitivities raised regarding Israel, regarding the Middle East, regarding the Zionism issue that, yes, we were alone, and also there was another factor.

To congratulate Iran at a time when we are now seeing violations of human rights, even under this new regime-we are seeing the executions go on-I do not think our position by voting no is inconsistent with our policy, that we would hope that human rights policies would be followed by the present regime, by the present government, as by the past.

So there were several factors involved, and I think that certainly from Congressman Buchanan's standpoint, to see us alone on that issue was troublesome, but those are some of the rationale and the reasons behind it.

I do not think they were adequately explained, in all fairness to Congressman Buchanan, at the time because of the chain of command, shall we say, as to how communications are made. And I think it is clear now that we have had some perspective and some time to take a look at the issue.

Mr. BONKER. Does the State Department's annual report on human rights conditions of recipient countries become a source document? Is that ever referred to? Do you use it in your work on looking at different countries?

Mr. MEZVINSKY. Sure. As a matter of fact, it is submitted to the Congress just before the Human Rights Commission meets and it is used, it is cited-in this case it was cited-by the same delegate that sponsored the Iranian matter as to activities taking place on the West Bank.

At the same time, there were press accounts of that that came out of the Human Rights report. It is cited, of course, with Latin American countries.

There is a resentment by some countries who say, who are we, the United States, to be holier than thou, to issue a public report and subsequent to the meeting in Geneva, I had to go to other countries, European countries, to talk on human rights and there was a sensitivity, there is a cynicism. It is one thing to talk about it privately, but the issue of public reports on other countries bothers, shall we say, bothers certain European countries as well as those countries who are clear violators of human rights.

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