the Covenant." Standing alone this might mean merely that the organs of the League could offer advice, or seek to bring about an accord without a claim on their part, or on that of the state aggrieved, to exert any pressure upon the nation whose domestic affairs were concerned. But a change was also made to Article 10. After declaring that any state shall be presumed to be an aggressor if it disregards a finding that a matter is solely one of domestic jurisdiction, these words were added: "nevertheless, in the last case the state shall only be presumed to be an aggressor if it has not previously submitted the question to the Council or the Assembly, in accordance with Article 11 of the Covenant." What these words mean it is difficult to be sure. Obviously they contemplate the possibility of one state, without being treated as an aggressor, going to war with another over matters solely within the domestic jurisdiction of the latter. But under what circumstances? Will it be only in case the nation attacked fails to do what the Council or Assembly thinks it ought to do; or whenever the attacking nation pleases, provided it has previously submitted the question to the League? Does it supersede for domestic matters the agreement in Article 2 against resorting to war, or does it mean that "acting in agreement with the Council or the Assembly" in that article covers a recommendation on their part about domestic affairs? To us these questions are not of the first importance for we should not join in the Protocol with either interpretation; and it may be noted that there is a strong sentiment in Australia and New Zealand against submitting domestic questions to any international body, while Canadians and South Africans are highly sensitive on the same subject.

A RESULT OF OUR ABSENCE

On these events some interesting observations may be made. If the United States had been a member of the League of Nations such a provision about domestic questions could hardly have been adopted. In her resistance thereto she would have been joined by these four countries, and Great Britain could not have put herself in opposition to us and all her principal self-governing Dominions. Curiously enough one of the chief objections raised to our entering the League of Nations was the fact that these

states were given independent votes in addition to that of England; and yet of all the countries in the world they are the ones whose foreign problems are on the whole most nearly akin to our own. From their geographical position, their inherited traditions, their democratic ideas, their recent settlement and their capacity for a larger population, their interests and attitude are more like ours than those of any other peoples; and hence their foreign relations involve much the same questions. Were we to enter the League their presence and votes would be a distinct advantage to us, as ours would be to them.

Another observation to be made on the framing of the Protocol, with the Japanese amendments, is our mistake in not taking part in world-conferences where important principles may be evolved. Of course if we do not take part they do not bind us, but they may nevertheless have an effect upon us. The adoption of principles of international law or conduct by almost all other civilized countries, contrary to our ideas and interests, does not force us to adopt them; but it does tend to establish them in the eyes of mankind as common international law and the proper manner of dealing with international relations. Such an agreement makes it more arduous for us to hold the sympathy of others in resisting the principles established. It tends to form the public opinion of the world. If matters that after all interest us, even indirectly, are being discussed it is better to be inside the debating body than outside, especially if, as in the Council of the League, decisions are made by unanimous vote. To have the Members of the League agree, for example, that what they themselves acknowledge as domestic questions are nevertheless subject to interference by other states is not to our advantage. It would be much better for us to participate in the discussion and make our ideas prevail throughout the world, which in this instance at least we could hardly have failed to to.

THE CASE OF PRIVATEERS

We have already had one memorable example of this. In 1856 we did not take part in the Congress at Paris, which agreed to forbid the use of privateers in war. We refused to consent to that agreement unless the nations should go farther and respect private property at sea as on land, and we made it clear that we

should not feel bound by the provision against privateers. Yet in face of the public opinion created against privateers by the Declaration of Paris, we have never ventured to use them in war, and never shall. In fact, at the opening of the Spanish War we felt so much the need of bowing to an opinion created in our absence that we declared we should not use privateers. Let us not make the same mistake again by staying away from any Conference for Reduction of Armaments that may take place. The glory of isolation is somewhat dimmed when matters of importance may be settled in one's absence.

THE STEPS OF PROGRESS

By ELIHU ROOT

REMARKS AS PRESIDING OFFICER AT DINNER OF THE COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, DECEMBER 9, 1924

Three propositions underlie all discussions of the character we are taking part in to-night, and they are sometimes overlooked, especially by the more ardent spirits who would reform the world overnight.

The first of them is that public opinion is impotent unless institutions are created through which it can act. There is no doubt that the public opinion of most civilized countries is in favor of peace and against having more war. This opinion may be expressed in a variety of ways but it will not amount to anything until there is some institution through which it can operate, for the moment there is some insult or some controversy it disappears and the lower instinct of belligerency and hatred takes its place.

We have been within a brief period endeavoring to form institutions that will give expression to this public opinion and not let it be disappointed. It is only twenty-five years since the Hague Conference by accident hit upon world arbitration as a matter for indorsement. It was sketchily done, but gave a great impulse to the habit of adjusting differences by arbitration.

The Second Hague Conference strengthened this. The League of Nations went into the business of taking up purely political questions between nations. The Court of International Justice goes into the other end by constituting a real court presided over by real justices who are too numerous to yield to pressure of the usual social order and will decide questions on the basis of law and their self-respect.

Still another agency is the Protocol of the League of Nations. The only thing I care to say about that now is that it is not common sense or sound reasoning to insist upon having a perfect institution at the beginning. The great thing is to get a beginning. Get an institution. If it can be developed to fill a need of the world it will be developed.

My second point is that in endeavoring to bring about real

agreement between many nations actuated by different beliefs and prejudices you have got to begin with the few things they will all agree upon. You will fail just as soon as you try to get them to go beyond the things they really agree upon deep down in their hearts.

And my third point is that you must not seek to measure the progress of nations by the foot-rule of our short lives. You must think in terms of generations and centuries. You must not be resentful or discouraged because progress at the moment may seem slow.

It is my deliberate belief that the greatest contributions to the history of world peace are the negotiations and the exchanges that have failed in their immediate object. The man who has spent himself in the march or in the charge before he reached the breastworks is the greater benefactor to the world than the man who sets the flag.

If we can not be patient, keep our courage, be considerate of the differing opinion and the prejudices of others, then we had better not undertake a share in the great enterprise in which the world is engaged, the standardizing of the opinion of mankind in the conduct of life and the ideals that should be followed.

Later in the evening when the speeches of James T. Shotwell and Philip Marshall Brown were finished Mr. Root expressed his wish to make some further remarks. He said:

What has happened at Geneva is the progressive expression of the world's demand for peace. In 1920 it was proposed that when a world court be formed it should have compulsory jurisdiction over justiciable questions. This proposal was denied. But the court was formed and under auspices that gave the world confidence in its personnel and its functioning.

So what happened? The Court was there and people began to think differently than they did when there was no court. At Geneva they reversed themselves and said the Court should have the compulsory jurisdiction proposed.

As things change, the way men think changes with them. You can see to-day that the way the world is thinking is toward what constitutes justice and right dealing and away from the old doctrine of force,