roads were given rights of way, is to bear the burden by compen- sating the Indians, or only by assisting in the negotiations. Ib.
18. Oklahoma Enabling Act; effect on power of Congress over Indians. The proviso to § 1 of the Oklahoma Enabling Act expressly reserving to the Government of the United States the power to make laws and regulations in the future respecting Indians, negatives any purpose to repeal by implication the existing laws and regulations on the subject. Ex parte Webb, 663.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 4, 5;
PUBLIC LANDS, 9; STATUTES, A 9.
INDIAN TERRITORY.
See TERRITORIES.
INDICTMENT AND INFORMATION.
See CRIMINAL LAW, 4;.
1. Against enforcement of order of Interstate Commerce Commission; ap- plication of requirements in § 210, Judicial Code.
The requirements in § 210, Judicial Code, that a restraining order must contain a statement of facts as to irreparable damage resulting from the order of the Commission relate only to the first class of cases. United States v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co., 306.
2. To restrain enforcement of ordinance fixing rates for telephone company denied.
In this case the evidence is not sufficient to justify enjoining enforce- ment of an ordinance fixing rates of a telephone company and the decree granting an injunction is reversed, but without prejudice. Louisville v. Cumberland T. & T. Co., 430.
See APPEAL AND ERROR, 3;
INTERSTATE COMMERCE, 15, 16; JUDGMENTS AND DECREES, 2-5;
JURISDICTION, F 1,.8, 9, 10, 11;
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, 1.
INSPECTION LAWS.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 13, 29, 30.
Special charges based on part of evidence not obligatory on court. The trial court is not under obligation to give special charges based on only a part of the evidence. Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Duvall, 477. See CRIMINAL LAW, 17.
INTERLOCUTORY ORDERS.
See APPEAL ANd Error, 3; JURISDICTION, B 2.
A rate fixed on that part of interstate carriage which includes the tual placing of the shipment into vessels ready to be carried beyond the state destination is, as to merchandise intended for points be- yond the State, a burden on interstate commerce and beyond the power of the State to impose, even if the merchandise is billed from a point within the State to the point where the vessel is. Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. Texas, 204 U. S. 403, distinguished. Ohio Railroad Commission v. Worthington, 101.
2. What constitutes; how determined.
Through billing to the point beyond the State is not always necessary to determine that a shipment is interstate. (Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. Young, 219 U. S. 498.) Ib.
3. What constitutes; sales in original packages.
Sales made in one State to be delivered free on board at a point therein, to be delivered to consumers in another State in the original un- broken packages, freight to be paid by purchaser, constitutes in- terstate commerce. Savage v. Jones, 501.
4. Discrimination by carrier violative of Elkins Act; agreement to ex- pedite as.
To agree with a particular shipper to expedite a shipment at regular rates, where no rate has been published for special expediting, is a discrimination and as such a violation of the Elkins Act of Feb- ruary 19, 1903, 32 Stat. 847, c. 708, and relief on the contract will be denied. Chicago & Alton R. R. Co. v. Kirby, 155.
5. Discrimination illegal under Elkins Act; what amounts to.
To guarantee a particular connection and transportation by a par-
ticular train amounts to giving a preference when not open to all and provided for in the published tariffs, and under the Elkins act is an illegal discrimination. Ib.
6. Discrimination; shipper charged with notice of.
A shipper is presumed to know what the published rates arc, and if they do not contain provisions for the special service guaranteed to him he must be taken as having contracted for a rate discrimina- tory in his favor. Ib.
7. Discrimination in rates between railroad-fuel and commercial coals. An interstate carrier may not charge a different rate for the transporta-
tion of railroad-fuel coal to a given point than for the transporta- tion of commercial coal to the same point. It would be an illegal preference or discrimination under § 3 of Act to Regulate Com-. merce. Interstate Com. Comm. v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co., 326.
8. Discrimination; railroads may not be favored.
A railroad company cannot be made a favored shipper and given a lower rate on the same commodity to the same point than other persons. Ib.
9. Discrimination in rates; railroads, not to be favored.
A railroad company is not to be put on the same basis as a locality and entitled to preferential rates to accommodate competitive condi- tions. The Import Rate Case, 162 U. S. 197, distinguished. Ib.
10. Right of carrier to assume extra liability.
An interstate carrier can assume an extra liability for expediting, pro- vided it makes and publishes a rate therefor and opens it to all. Chicago & Alton R. R. Co. v. Kirby, 155.
11. Sales by receiver of goods in original packages within protection of Constitution.
Commerce among the States is not a technical legal conception, but a practical one drawn from the course of business. Protection ac- corded to interstate commerce by the Federal Constitution extends to the sale by the receiver of the goods in the original packages. Savage v. Jones, 501:
12. State interference; what constitutes.
A rate fixed by the Ohio Railroad Commission for coal from state points to "on board" vessels at the port of Huron, Ohio, and intended for shipment to some point beyond the State undetermined at
time of shipment, and, for convenience, billed to the shippers' own order at Huron, held to be a rate affecting interstate shipment and void under the commerce clause of the Constitution as an attempt to regulate interstate commerce. Ohio Railroad Commission v. Worthington, 101.
13. State interference; effect of statute requiring prompt transportation. A statute of North Carolina requiring common carriers to transport freight as soon as received to interstate points under penalties for failure, conflicts with the requirements of § 2 of the Hepburn Act and is unenforceable. Southern Railway Co. v. Burlington Lumber Co., 99.
14. State interference; incidental; effect on validity of repugnance to Federal statute.
No state statute which even affects incidentally interstate commerce is valid if it is repugnant to the Federal Food and Drugs Act of June 30, 1906, the object of which is to prevent adulteration and misbranding and keep adulterated and misbranded articles out of interstate commerce. Savage v. Jones, 501.
15. State interference; injunction against.
An order made by a state commission under assumed authority of the State, which directly burdens interstate commerce, will be en- joined. (McNeill v. Southern Railway Co., 202 U. S. 543.) Ohio Railroad Commission v. Worthington, 101.
16. Equitable relief from state interference with. An attack by state authorities upon purchasers of goods manufactured in and shipped from another State, inflicts injury upon the manu- facturer by reducing the interstate sales, and if this result can only be prevented by complying with illegal demands, under an uncon- stitutional state statute, equity will grant relief. Savage v. Jones, 501.
17. Tariffs of carriers; power of Commerce Commission in respect to. Tariffs are but forms of words, and the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission, in the exercise of its powers to administer the Act to Regu- late Commerce, can look beyond the forms to what caused them and what they are intended to, and do, cause. Interstate Com. Comm. v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co., 326.
18. Purpose of Commerce Act; special contracts prohibited.
The broad purpose of the Commerce Act to compel the establishment
of reasonable rates and uniform application will not be defeated by sanctioning special contracts giving special advantages to particu- lar shippers. Chicago & Alton R. R. Co. v. Kirby, 155. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1, 2, 3.
INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION.
Jurisdiction; quære as to.
Quare; whether transportation under the circumstances of this case is such a transportation within the State or to points without the State, partly by railroad and partly by water, as to be within the jurisdiction and control of the Interstate Commerce Commission. Ohio Railroad Commission v. Worthington, 101.
JUDGMENTS AND DECREES.
1. Collateral attack; when not subject to.
Prior decisions of this court holding that a judgment of a competent
court admitting a person to citizenship is, like every other judg- ment, competent evidence of its own validity, go no further than protecting the judgment from collateral attack. Johannessen v. United States, 227.
2. Enjoining enforcement; power of court of equity over judgment at law. In order to warrant a court of equity in restraining the enforcement of a judgment at law, the defeated party must show that it is mani- festly unconscionable for the judgment creditor to enforce it; it is not sufficient for him merely to show that because of newly discov- ered facts or evidence he would have a better prospect of success on a retrial. Pickford v. Talbott, 651.
3. Enjoining enforcement on ground of newly discovered evidence. It is incumbent on one seeking to have the enforcement of a judgment against him enjoined by a court of equity on the ground of newly discovered evidence to show that his failure to discover the evi-
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