or universal being, Rosmini says, “Being in universal is idea "'* (New Essay, vol. ii. § 534). "Besides that form of being which is possessed by subsisting things, and which we have called real, there is another, entirely distinct, which we have called ideal, and which forms the basis of the possibility of these things. Yes, ideal being is an entity of a nature entirely peculiar, such that it cannot be confounded either with our minds, or with bodies, or with anything else belonging to real being. It would be a grave error to conclude from this that ideal being, or the idea, is nothing, on the ground that it does not belong to that kind of things that enter into our feelings. On the contrary, ideal being, the idea, is a most true and noble entity, and we have seen with what sublime characteristics it is endowed. It cannot, indeed, be defined; but it may be analyzed and its effect upon us stated, viz., that it is the light of the mind. What can be clearer than light? When this light is extinguished, there remains only darkness. Finally, from what has been said we may form a conception of the mode in which the idea of being adheres to the mind: it may be known without any assent or dissent on our part. It is present to us as a pure fact. The reason is this. Such an idea does not affirm and does not deny; it merely constitutes in us the possibility both of affirming and denying (New Essay, vol. ii. §§ 555-557). "Even if the reality and ideality of things were identical, which is not the case. still things would never confound themselves with the act of the mind, nor with the subject which possesses them, because idea, as such, is object, distinct from the thinking subject and opposed to it" (Ibid., vol. iii. § 1192). "Every one who attends to what takes place within himself may observe the difference existing between a thing which he thinks as possible and a real thing. It is easy to observe, and there is no one in the world who does not observe, that a thing or a being simply possible does not act on our For example, a possible food does not satisfy our

senses.

...

According to Rosmini, "The word idea expresses a mode of being, that is, indicates being in so far as it is intelligible" (Psychology, vol. i. § 18, note; cf. Restoration of Philosophy, Book iii. cpp. 39-51).

hunger, however long we think of it, even if we contemplate it for entire days, and the poor philosopher would die of hunger, if he had no other nutriment than this object of his mind. In order, therefore, that a real action may be exerted upon us, there must be a real being, because nothing acts really but that which is really. Nevertheless no one calls that which is not real, but merely possible, nothing; nor can it be so called; for, if it were nothing, it could not call into exercise, as it does, the activity of our minds. This obvious observation, which everybody makes continually, and according to which everybody speaks and acts, leads us to the evident conclusion that being, taken in the widest sense, has two modes, the ideal and the real; that is, that being manifests and communicates itself to us in two ways, by that of the mind and that of the sense. Nor must we suppose it possible to reduce these two modes, in which being acts upon us and reveals itself to us, to one. The qualities of ideal being are different from, and opposed to, those of real being, and the sense, which perceives the latter, does not reach or attain to a knowledge of anything that the mind, which perceives the latter, In fact, the sense does not perceive anything that is merely possible, but only that which is real, and the mind, as the faculty of knowing, perceives nothing of the real, but only the possible. In the faculty of knowing there are only ideas; things do not enter it" (La Sapienza, ii. 7, pp. 399 sqq.).

sees.

Rosmini criticizes Aristotle and the German school, from Kant to Hegel, for neglecting this obvious distinction between ideal and real being, or, which in his language is the same thing, between object and subject. Aristotle certainly is guilty of this neglect, or rather of a deliberate confusion and identification of these necessarily distinct elements of cognition. He tells us that "intellect and the intelligible are the same thing," and that "the intellect is potentially, in a certain sense (Túc), the intelligibles." † Rosmini is very severe upon the word múc (“in a certain

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“Tavтdy voûs кal vonтóv" (Metaph., xi. 7, 1072 b, 20; cf. Bonitz' note). + " Δυνάμει πώς ἐστι τὰ νοητὰ ὁ νοῦς (De An., iii. 4, 11: 429 b, 30).

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sense"). "In respect to Aristotle," he says, "it is to be observed that . . . he continually interlards his discourse with exceptive and diminutive particles, which he nowhere explains, and which, nevertheless, furnish him with a convenient excuse for accepting a proposition when it suits him, and rejecting it for its contrary when the case is otherwise. Thus, when he says that the mind is potentially, in a certain mode (úc), the intelligibles,' the whole knot of the question lies in the particle més, a particle of such very small bulk that it escapes the reader's attention, as if it were nothing, whereas it is the very point of the whole system, if system there be, and if there be not, is that which makes us believe there is. Now, this particle is just the one most neglected by our philosopher. He leaves the interpretation of it to the reader, and, supposing it perspicuous in itself, gives no explanation of it. Nevertheless, from this proposition, conditioned and limited by Tç 'in a certain mode,' he draws an absolute conclusion, namely, that the mind can think of the intelligibles when it chooses, which presupposes that the intelligibles are in the mind, not merely in a certain mode, but absolutely; otherwise the consequence, keeping within the limits of the premises, ought to be, that the mind can think of the intelligibles when it chooses, in a certain mode. When, however, the proposition does not suit him, he takes its contrary, and affirms that the intelligibles are in a certain mode outside the mind. And there he is at once among real things, in defiance of his previous supposition" (Aristotle Explained, § 94). The work from which this passage is taken is, for the most part, devoted to showing the errors into which Aristotle fell, from not distinguishing between ideal and real being. Rosmini, had he not been specially lenient to St. Thomas, might easily have shown that that philosopher sometimes falls into the same fundamental mistake as Aristotle, accepting unreservedly the doctrine that "In his quæ sunt sine materia, idem est intellectus et quod intelligitur' (Sum. Theol., i. q. 55, art. 1, 2, con.); in other

* “Ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἄνευ ὕλης, τὸ αὐτό ἐστι νοοῦν καὶ νοούμενον ” (De An. iii. 4, 12: 430 a, sq).

words, confounding the subject with the object of thought. St. Thomas, indeed, is careful to say that "Non oportet quod efficiantur unum secundum esse simpliciter, sed solum quod fiant unum quantum pertinet ad actum intelligendi” (Supp. Qu., xcii. 1, 8.) This, however, only makes matters worse; for it is precisely in the act of intelligence that subject and object are not one. Indeed, while there is no reason for believing that subject and object are not one really, кarà μéyε0os, as Aristotle would say, it is perfectly plain that, unless they are distinct ideally, karà tòv dóyov,* there can be neither thought nor cognition. However, it must be admitted that neither Aristotle nor St. Thomas had a consistent theory of cognition.

Speaking of Kant, Rosmini says, "The fundamental error of criticism lies in this, that it makes the objects of thought subjective. These objects result from sensations (matter) and intellectual forms. The sensations are modifications of our own feeling, and, according to Kant, are not sufficient to justify us in believing in the existence of an external cause that produces them, because, in order to draw this conclusion, we should have to admit the validity of the principle of cause. But the principle of cause, and all the other forms that do not come from the sensations, emanate from our minds (spirito), and they emanate from these, says Kant, precisely because they do not come from sensations. Kant therefore finds no alternative for the source of a cognition, or of an element of cognition, other than sensation or our own minds. But such an argument per exclusionem is manifestly arbitrary and false, because the enumeration of possible cases is incomplete. Such is the fundamental error of this school, and the original sin of all the German philosophies which have appeared since Kant, all having gone astray in the same way. position upon which Kant rears his system, but of which he does not furnish the slightest proof-the supposition, I mean, that whatever there is in our intelligence that does

The sup

* See De Animâ, iii. 4, 1; 429 a, 13. Cf. Ibid., 9, 1; 432 a, 20 and 10, 8; 433 b, 24 sqq. Also Trendelenburg's note, Aristotelis De Animâ, Lib. III., p. 527 sq.

not belong to sensation must of necessity come from the intelligent subject--had its origin in his failing to observe that being has two modes, the one subjective, the other objective, and that being is identical in the two. Being, in its objective mode, is being which makes itself known, and makes itself known as it is, even as subjective. Inasmuch as the being is identical, the cognition is valid and true" (New Essay, vol. i. § 331).

Rosmini calls those philosophers who identify ideal with real being Unitarians, in contradistinction to those who do not see the need of ideal being at all, and whose system he calls the absolute anoetic. Among the chief of the former he includes Hegel. "Among the absolute unitarian and dianoetic systems, that which in our times has made most noise is the system of Hegel. According to this greatgrandson of Kant, the concept is the form of things, and this free and infinite form itself constitutes universal matter (all diversity of matter is declared by Hegel an illusion).* How a speculative mind can fall so easily into this error, which to common sense seems incredible, has been explained above. . . ." After clearly setting forth the nature and fecundity of ideal being, as distinguished from real being, Rosmini proceeds: "This immense virtuality of indeterminate or initial being, if not considered with the greatest care, may easily impose upon the mind. The philosopher who discovers its fecundity may rashly conclude that everything, even reality, issues from the idea, like water from a spring, and that the concept, as Hegel put it, is the form from which matter issues. But the illusion of these philosophers arises from their not having sufficiently considered that, although the cognition of real things consists in apprehending these as terms of that being which was previously intuited without it, nevertheless, such cognition cannot take place, if such terms are not given to us, and that, whatever effort a man may make with his

"Die tiefere Anschauung ist dagegen diese . . . einerseits, dass der Materie als solcher keine Selbstständigkeit zukommt, und andererseits dass die Form nicht von aussen an die Materie gelangt, sondern als Totalität, das Prinzip der Materie in sich selbst trägt, welche freie und unendliche Form sich uns demnächst als der Begriff ergeben wird" (Encyclopædie, § 128, Zusatz).

E