(b) Special Ethics. Treats of the special forms of moral good and evil. 224. The second part of Ethics, or Special Ethics, treats of the special forms of moral good and evil, and begins by distinguishing between act and habit [], showing the various forms of morality of which each is susceptible. It then goes on to set forth our special duties to divinity and humanity. As regards the latter, a man must respect and honour human nature in himself and in his fellows; he must respect it in individuals and in the societies, natural or artificial, in which men unite themselves. All social relations give occasion to the existence of moral duties. Next, it treats of habits, and so of all the special virtues and vices. Furthermore, it considers the means by which evil may be avoided and moral good attained. To this part of Ethics, as we have seen, the name of Ascetics may be given. Eudæmonology shows the beauty of moral good and the turpi tude of moral evil in themselves and in their effects. 225. Eudæmonology, the third part of Ethics, considers the excellence of moral good and the turpitude of moral evil. It shows that both are infinite. It describes the dignity and joy of the virtuous soul, and the ignobleness and misery of the vicious soul. It shows that no truly virtuous man is unhappy, and no wicked one happy. It thus wakes the confidence and trust which slumber in the human heart, that virtue will meet with an eternal reward, and vice with an eternal punishment. It proves this from the divine attributes. The wise philosopher, after having, as a pedagogue, led man thus far, consigns him to the hands of a more sublime teacherRevelation. 226. Right. From Ethics proceeds the very extensive Rational science of Rational Right. It arises from the protection which Ethics, or the moral law, affords to the useful good, or, more generally, to all the eudæmonologic goods which man can enjoy. In fact, it is one of man's ethical duties that he shall not injure his neighbour. This the Roman lawyers expressed by their formula Neminem lædere. No one, therefore, may interfere with the good possessed by his neighbour. Now, a man who has a good which, in virtue of the moral law, must not be interfered with by any one, is said to have a right. If the man, possessing this right, had not the power to make it useful to himself, it would no longer be either a good, the object of right, or a right itself. Right, therefore, considered subjectively—that is, in relation to the subject possessing it is an eudæmonological faculty, protected by the moral law. From being thus protected by the moral law, this eudæmonological good acquires a certain moral dignity, and he who possesses it acquires the power to protect it against any one who would take it from him or depreciate it. Rosmini has left a very voluminous treatise on the Philosophy of Right, which, though it contains many antiquated notions, is still well worth a careful reading. Sphere of the science of right. 227. The Science of Right undertakes (1) to classify all those goods which may be the object or material of right; (2) to determine what protection the moral law accords to them, and how far and under what conditions it may be extended; (3) to decide the doubtful ones, that is, those which arise from the apparent collision of rights; (4) to determine in how far the defence extended to rights is sanctioned by the moral law itself, and under what circumstances and conditions it is legitimate; and (5) to settle the satisfaction and damages due for violated rights, and, hence, for losses and injuries. Fundamental division of a man's rights in relation to other men. 228. All the goods and rights which a man possesses in his relations with his fellow-men come under two forms, which constitute the basis of the fundamental classification of these rights themselves-freedom and property. What is freedom? 229. Freedom is the power which each man has to use all his faculties and resources, so long as he does not thereby encroach upon the rights of others, that is, so long as he does not interfere with the goods of his fellow-men. Aristotle defines the free man as the man who exists for his own sake and not for the sake of others ("¿λεú0εpoç ἄνθρωπος ὁ αὑτοῦ ἕνεκα καὶ μὴ ἄλλου ὤν.” Metaphys. i. 2 ; 982 a, 26). Hegel says, "The existence of free will is Right" (Philosophie des Rechts, Einleitung, § 29). By existence (Daseyn), Hegel means "being with a determination, which, as an immediate and being (i.e. existing) de termination, is—quality” (Encyclop., pt. i. § 90). 230. property? Property is the union of goods with man. What is This union is based upon a psychological law, in virtue of which a man may unite to himself things different from himself, in somewhat the same way as his body is united to his soul. This permanent union takes place through feeling and intelligence. Through feeling even the lower animals unite external things to them-their young, the food they collect, their nests, habitations, and other things, which they sometimes defend even with their lives. Thus they have a certain property, but not a moral or legal one. Man unites things to himself both by the natural bond of feeling, and also by the bond which intelligence adds to the other, a bond in virtue of which he lays claim to many external things, and reserves them for future use. This also is a kind of property, but not that property which constitutes a right. When, however, the bonds of feeling and intelli gence are supplemented by the moral bond, then Two parts of the science of right. 231. The subject of rights may be either the individual man, considered in relation to his fellowmen, or the social man. Hence the science of right has two parts, individual right and social right. Subject of 232. Individual Right treats of three things: (1) of natural and acquired rights, describing their nature and conditions, their titles and modes of acquisition; (2) of the transmission of rights and the modifications which they undergo in this ! |