two points; third, the physical one, In all the changes of the physical world the quantity of matter remains unchanged; and fourth, the metaphysical one, Every event must have a cause; * and shows, by a careful analysis, that every one of them is analytic (New Essay, vol. i. §§ 346– 352). He then proceeds to demonstrate that our only really synthetic judgments à priori are those by which concepts are formed, and that these presuppose nothing innate in the mind save the idea of being. In this way he shows that Kant's whole scheme of subjective categoriesQuantity, Quality, Relation, and Modality, with their subdivisions-was invented to explain something which does not exist. According to Rosmini, the order of thought is—(1) Intuition of being, (2) Sensation, (3) Synthetic judgment, resulting in (4) Concept, (5) Analytic judgment, (6) Reasoning.‡

"The problem: How is the object of thought formed? -the object which becomes the subject of subsequent judgments—or, more briefly, How are concepts formed?— is the entire object of our investigation. Let us then analyze it under this form. . . .

"In order that we may form a concept of a thing, we require an intrinsic judgment, by means of which we consider that thing objectively, or in itself, not as a modification of ourselves; in a word, we consider it in its possible existence. Now, as in every judgment (supposing it already formed) there must be a subject and a predicate, we must inquire, first, what is the subject and what the predicate in the judgment in question; and then, whence we obtain that subject and that predicate.

'Now, in the present instance, the predicate is merely existence, since to perceive a thing intellectually is merely to perceive it in itself, or in the existence which it may have. The subject, on the other hand, is the thing as

See Kritik der r. Vernunft, Einleitung, vi.; Prolegomena, Vorerinnerung,

§ 2 (c). Rosmini's treatment of this last judgment is masterly.

† Cf. under §§ 18, 35.

Cf. under § 43, where 2-5 are united as judgment, involving perception of the real and conception.

The notion of being in general is

a neces

sary con

dition of

the cognition of particular real

beings.

having affected our senses, that which has acted upon them.

"In the analysis, therefore, of the primitive judgment, whereby we form the concepts of things, i.e. ideas, there are found a subject (if, thus isolated, it may be so termed) given merely by the senses and of which we have not yet any intellectual concept, and a predicate (the idea of existence) which cannot in any manner be given by the senses, and of which, in consequence, no explanation can be afforded. by those philosophers who undertake to derive all human knowledge from the senses. The problem, therefore, of Ideology is: To know how that primitive judgment whereby we intellectually perceive things felt [sensa], and so form concepts of them, is possible" (New Essay, vol. i. § 355).

15.

When I say to myself that there exists any particular real being or entity, I should not understand my own meaning if I did not know what entity was. Therefore the notion of being or entity in general must be in my mind before I can pronounce any of those judgments whereby I affirm the existence of any particular real entity.

In this section and in the preceding one, Rosmini draws that distinction which is fundamental in his philosophythe distinction between real and ideal being, or between reality and ideality. These terms are explained further on. At present it will suffice to say that by the real is meant that which affects the senses or the sense; in other words, the felt subjective and extra-subjective. By the ideal is meant that which is purely objective, pure objectivity. The former is the term of feeling; the latter, the object of intelligence (cf. under §§ 18, 74). The following definitions, taken from the Theosophy (vol. i. § 211), * Cf. under §§ 35, 78.

may be useful here. They are explained at length,

Theosophy, §§ 213–239.

"Being [essere, esse, siva, Sein] is the act of every being (beënt?) and every entity.

Being [ente, ens, ov, Seiendes] has two definitions :

(a) A subject having being (esse);

(b) Being (esse) with one or another of its terms.

"Entity [entità, entitas, ovoía, Wesen] is any object of thought, regarded by the thought as one.

Essence, [essenza, essentia, rò rí v ɛîvai, Wesenheit] is being (esse) possessed by a subject, but abstracted from the subject which possesses it (cf. under § 18).

Subject in general [subjetto in universale, subjectum, ÚTOKεíμEVOV, Gegenstand] is that which in a being (ens) or in a group of entities is conceived as the first container (primum continens) and cause of unity."

The second sentence of this section expresses a cardinal doctrine of Rosmini's system, which is, that, since all concepts are the result of a judgment requiring a subject and a predicate, and since only subjects are supplied directly by the senses, therefore the first, most simple predicate—that is, being, the pure essence of objectivity— must be present in the mind prior to the first particular concept. It may be said that the whole of the New Essay is devoted to the establishment and development of this doctrine. In the first volume, the author, after stating the purpose of the treatise and the difficulties surrounding its. subject, enters into a criticism of the more important previous systems which have attempted to explain the origin of knowledge. These systems he arranges in two classes. In the first he places those that err from assigning to the mind too small a share in the production of concepts; in the second, those that err in the opposite direction. In the first he includes the systems of Locke, Condillac, Reid, and Stewart; in the second, those of Plato, Aristotle, Leibniz, and Kant. His criticisms of Stewart and Kant are especially remarkable. In the second volume, after showing that we have the idea of being and explaining its nature, he proceeds to show that it cannot be derived either

from bodily sensations, from the feeling of individual existence, from reflection in Locke's sense, or from the act of perception, and concludes that it must therefore be innate. The remainder of the volume is devoted to showing how, through this one innate formal idea and the material derived from sensation, all other ideas may be formed and explained (§ 471). The third volume treats of the criterion of certainty and its application to human cognitions and reasonings.

Sir William Hamilton (Lectures on Metaphysics and Logic, vol. ii. p. 366 sq.) says, "I pronounce Existence to be a NATIVE COGNITION, because I find that I cannot think except under the condition of thinking all that I am conscious of to exist. Existence is thus a form, a category of thought." This, so far as it goes, is precisely the doctrine of Rosmini, who, however, goes farther and asserts that existence or being is the only form native to the mind, the only idea that can be thought by itself, and the only one necessary in order to explain the origin of all others (New Essay, §§ 410-412). That we cannot think without the idea of being, that being is contained in every other idea and category, is a self-evident fact. The idea of being, which forms the universal condition of thought, Rosmini finds to be objective, merely possible or ideal, simple, one, identical, universal, necessary, immutable, eternal, and indeterminate-attributes not one of which belongs to sensation. It cannot, therefore, be derived from sensation. Similar reasoning shows that it cannot be derived from any other external source open to man. Indeed, if man were placed in front of all the possible sources of knowledge, he could not draw from any of them without first having the idea of being, since without it he could not make anything an object, and therefore could not know anything. It follows from all this that the idea of being is innate.

Rosmini quotes a very striking passage from St. Bonaventura, to show that that philosopher held the same doctrine: "Mira igitur est cæcitas intellectus, qui non considerat illud quod prius videt, et sine quo nihil potest

cognoscere. Sed sicut oculus intentus in varias colorum differentias, lumen per quod videt cætera, non videt, et si videt, non tamen advertit; sic oculus mentis nostræ intentus in ista entia particularia et universalia, IPSUM ESSE EXTRA OMNE GENUS, licet primo occurrat menti, et per ipsum alia, tamen non advertit (Itiner. Mentis in Deum. cap. v.)" (New Essay, § 472, n. 2). The difference between Rosmini's view, however, and that of St. Bonaventura is very great, inasmuch as the latter does not conceive being to be an innate idea, or, indeed, an idea at all. Many philosophers, besides and before St. Bonaventura, held that the first thing known or revealed to the mind was universal being, or the universal, which is the same thing. Aristotle, for example, repeatedly says that the first in reason is the universal, whereas the first in sensation is the individual (κατὰ μὲν γὰρ τὸν λόγον τὰ καθόλου πρότερα, κατὰ δὲ τὴν aïolŋσiv тà кal' kaoтa (Metaph., iv. 11: 1018 b, 32.; cf. Phys., i. 5: 189 a, 5). And the same thing is asserted, though indirectly, still more strongly, in Metaph., iii. 3: 1005 b, 19 sq., in the principle of contradiction, which Aristotle regards as the most certain of all principles. Rosmini himself also quotes from St. Thomas the assertion that "the object of the intellect is common being or truth," * and he might easily have found even a stronger statement of the same doctrine in that philosopher's commentary on the passage from Aristotle's Metaphysics last referred to. "Cum duplex sit operatio intellectus: una, qua cognoscit quid est, quæ vocatur indivisibilium intelligentia : alia, qua componit et dividit: in utroque est aliquod primum: in prima quidem operatione est aliquod primum quod cadit in conceptione intellectus, scilicet hoc quod dico ens; nec aliquid hac operatione potest mente concipi, nisi intelligatur ens. .. Hoc principium, impossibile est esse et non esse simul, dependet ex intellectu entis" (Comment. in Metaphys., lib. iv. [iii.], sect. vi.). It is plain that, according to St. Thomas, the intuition of being is innate. A large number of passages of like import will be found collected in

* 66 'Objectum intellectûs est ens vel verum commune" (Sum. Theol., i. q. 55, art. 1, concl.).