SCIENCES OF REASONING.

Ontological and Deontological Sciences.

163.

the prin

material of

Intuition supplies the means of reasoning: Sources of intuition and perception together supply its ciples and material. There is no reasoning which does not reasoning. at last draw its material from these two sciences. The sciences of intuition and perception are sciences of observation. They observe what presents itself to the intuition of the mind, what takes place in the mind itself, and what occurs in the body, in so far as it is an agent in feeling. These observations reflection turns over and over again, and, following the guidance of the principles supplied by the light of being, to which it refers everything, discovers new truths and even reasons to the existence of beings lying beyond the reach of both intuition and perception.

Reasoning, according to Rosmini, is "a continuous application of the light of reason," and implies "a duality: (1) the light which is applied; (2) that to which it is applied. That to which the light of intelligence is applied may either be (1) that light itself, or (2) other things different from that light. These other things are feelings, in themselves blind, or appurtenances of these feelings, e.g. matter, which is a term of animal feeling. When the intellectual light is applied to itself by means of a reflection, it performs at once two offices, that of light and that of object illuminated. . . . When it is applied . . . to feelings and all that they contain, it produces the materiated sciences” (Logic, § 8). Rosmini objects to the term material sciences, on the ground that material without form can never be the object of science.

164.

The philosophical sciences of reasoning are divided into two classes. The one treats of beings as they are, and is called Ontological; the other of beings as they ought to be, and is called Deontological.

The Germans would say Wissenschaften des Seienden and Wissenschaften des Seinsollenden. It is hardly necessary to remark that Deontology must not be confounded with Morality or Ethics, which is merely a branch of it, as we shall see.

1. Ontological Sciences.

165.

The Ontological Sciences are two: Ontology, properly so called, and Natural Theology.

A. Ontology.
166.

Ontology treats of being in all its extent, as known to man. It treats of being in its essence, and in the three forms in which its essence is

the ideal form, the real form, and the moral form.

167.

In all these three forms, the essence is identical, while the forms themselves are most distinct and altogether incapable of interchange.

The first three volumes of the Theosophy are devoted to the subject of Ontology. In the first, the author considers the ontological problem in its various aspects, shows that the highest categories of being are ideality, reality, and morality, and treats of being in its unity. The second and third volumes deal with being in its triplicity. It would be impossible here to follow Rosmini into all the heights and depths of his ontological doctrines. Suffice it to say that, according to his arguments, being exists of necessity in three forms, perfectly distinct and inconfusible, but yet in such a way that each implies the other two. One of these forms, viz. the ideal, is presented as pure cognizability to human intelligence, which, by means of it, is able to reason to the existence of the other two, and to see that all three are truly forms of one identical being. These three forms have all the characteristics of true categories. They are predicates, first, fundamental, complete, and divided. Therefore the true categories of being are ideality, reality, and morality, and being itself is triune. Rosmini severely criticizes those who maintain the unity of being alone. He says, "The thought of all Unitarians, from Plotinus to Hegel, performs two operations. It goes from the many to the one, by the way of abstraction, and thus arrives at pure unity, which, as Plotinus says, has nothing in it but indefinite unity, and is therefore exactly Hegel's naught (nichts); and it goes from the One to the Many by way of addition. Two ways powerless to annihilate or create, and merely capable of diminishing or destroying the objects before the mind of the philosopher" (Theosophy, vol. i. § 164). Rosmini's criticism of Plotinus and Hegel contains many profound and admirable thoughts.

168.

form.

The ideal form cannot be conceived without Ideal the essence of being, for the plain reason that it is the essence of being in so far as knowable; but

*“Ovdèv éxov év éautý àλλ' év tɩ” (Enneads, i. 9, 1, ad init.).

Real form.

Moral form.

the real form may be conceived as not having in itself the essence of being. In this case, the real form does not obtain the name either of being or of object, and it is not conceivable unless there be added to it the essence of being, which imparts to it that act of being which it would otherwise lack. In this way is partly explained the origin, that is, the creation, of contingent being.

169.

The moral form is the relation that real being holds to itself through the medium of ideal being.

"The law of perception is, that the limited being perceived in feeling shall be referred to ideal being and seen in it, so that there are in perception three things: (1) feeling or reality; (2) ideal being; (3) the (imperfect) relation of identity between the two. Ideal being is infinite and essentially complete. Hence, if real being is rationally perceived in relation with ideal being, there is perceived along with it its measure, because, when real beings are referred to the total of being, it is seen which of them has more, and which less, of being realized in it. Now, since the term of practical reason is being, as given by the theoretic reason* and by all its functions, this term includes perceived being. And since the act of the practical reason consists in adhering to its term, it must adhere to being in the shape in which it is perceived. But it is perceived as measured by ideal being, so that one perceived being is perceived as a larger being, another as a smaller being. Hence it is the law of practical reason that it adheres to beings according to their measure. And even when the subject perceives only one real being, it sees, by comparing it with ideal being, whether it is limited or unlimited, and must

See below, under § 217.

adhere to it as it is, that is, with affection measured and proportioned to it. Now, this is the moral principle, the law of the moral order,' that affectionate recognition shall be distributed to known real beings in proportion to their measure, considered with respect to complete real being, and, if they are several, as compared with each other.

"Hence we draw another most important consequencethat moral good is infinite in its nature, having always infinite being for its object. Limited being is never seen by perception as alone and as having no relation but to itself, but always as united to the ideal, which is complete and infinite and which measures it. Thus the object of the practical reason never stops with the finite-real being, but always unites it to the infinite-ideal, and so converts it into its good [ayalóv], adhering to it only in so far as idealuniversal being prescribes. Hence the act of adhesion obeys this ideal-universal being, as its supreme rule and norm, and, therefore, holds it in greater reverence than any finite real. And this is what constitutes the essential characteristic of what is moral-that it always embraces the WHOLE OF BEING, ends in this whole, regulates itself according to this whole. It is, therefore, a good of an infinite nature, not comparable with any finite good, such as eudæmonological good, which is severed from the moral and terminates in the finite" (Psychology, vol. ii. §§ 14191422).

170.

Being, in so far as ideal, has the property of Properties being a light and of being an object.

In so far as it is real, it has the property of being force, of being an active, individual feeling, and hence a subject. But the sentient principle or subject may have as its term something which is not itself, as extension and body, and this term is neither object nor subject, but is outside the subject.

of the three forms.